JUDGMENT : AJAY MOHAN GOEL, J. 1. By way of this petition, which was initially filed as an Original Application, the petitioner has prayed for the following relief: “(i) That inquiry report (Annexure A­6), order dated 17th August, 2009 (Annexure A­7) and order dated 3rd November, 2010 (Annexure A­11) may very kindly be quashed and set aside by further reinstating the applicant in the service with all consequential benefits of pay, arrears, seniority etc. in the interest of law and justice.” 2. The Original Application itself was filed in the month of November, 2017, i.e. after a lapse of seven years as from the date when the impugned orders were passed. After the abolition of the erstwhile Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, the Original Application was transferred to this Court and registered as Civil Writ Petition. 3. Brief facts necessary for the adjudication of the petition are that vide Annexure A­7, i.e. order dated 17.08.2009, the Disciplinary Authority imposed a penalty of reduction to a lower stage in the minimum of time scale of Rs.3330­6200 i.e. at Rs.3330/­ which was initial of the scale for a period of three years upon the petitioner with further condition that he will not earn increment during this period of reduction. The order was passed after Disciplinary Proceedings were held against the petitioner as per the provisions of the CCS (CCA) Rules. 4. Feeling aggrieved by the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority the petitioner preferred an Appeal. Vide Annexure A­9, dated 03.07.2010, the Appellate Authority issued a show cause to the petitioner stating therein that as in the opinion of the Appellate Authority, the punishment imposed upon the petitioner by the Disciplinary Authority was on the lessor side, what major penalty of removal from service may not imposed upon him as the allegation against the petitioner was that he was under the influence of liquor while performing his duty as a driver. 5. After the response of the petitioner thereto, the Appellate Authority vide order Annexure A­11, dated 03.11.2010, modified the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and while dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner, imposed penalty of ‘compulsory retirement’ upon the petitioner w.e.f. 08.11.2010. 6. This order was not challenged by the petitioner within the statutory limitation period of one year as provided under the Administrative Tribunals Act, but was assailed after seven years by way of O.A. No. 6079 of 2017. 6. This order was not challenged by the petitioner within the statutory limitation period of one year as provided under the Administrative Tribunals Act, but was assailed after seven years by way of O.A. No. 6079 of 2017. Not only this, a perusal of the averments made in the Original Application demonstrates that in Para­5 thereof there was no prayer for condonation of delay, but the reason given therein for approaching learned Tribunal beyond the period of limitation was that the petitioner was harassed by the officers time and again and further as he was pressurized by the Authorities that if he again approaches the Court he will be imposed a very harsh penalty. It was on this count that he did not file the Original Application within the period of Limitation. 7. Be that as it may, the averments so made in the Original Application have not been substantiated by any material on record and nothing was placed on record to substantiate such bald assertion. 8. During the course of hearing of this petition on 18.12.2023, this Court passed the following order: “With the consent of the parties, the case was taken up for consideration today itself. A perusal of the relief clause demonstrate that the petitioner has prayed for the quashing of order dated 3rd November, 2010, by way of this petition, which was filed after almost seven years. Incidentally, the petition was originally filed as an Original Application before the Erstwhile Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, wherein, the law of limitation was applicable and the limitation period for assailing the order was one year. Faced with the situation, learned counsel for the petitioner prays that he may be granted some time to assist the Court on this ground. List on 21.12.2023.” 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to satisfactorily explain the delay. 10. Seven Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.S. Rathore vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1989) 4 SCC 582 , while dealing with the scope of Sections 20 and 21 of the Limitation Act vis­a­vis Section 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has been pleased to hold as under: “20. 10. Seven Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.S. Rathore vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1989) 4 SCC 582 , while dealing with the scope of Sections 20 and 21 of the Limitation Act vis­a­vis Section 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has been pleased to hold as under: “20. We are of the view that the cause of action shall be taken to arise not from the date of the original adverse order but on the date when the order of the higher authority where a statutory remedy is provided entertaining the appeal or representation is made and where no such order is made, though the remedy has been availed of, a six months' period from the date of preferring of the appeal or making of the representation shall be taken to be the date when cause of action shall be taken to have first arisen. We, however, make it clear that this principle may not be applicable when the remedy availed of has not been provided by law. Repeated unsuccessful representations not provided by law are not governed by this principle. 21. It is appropriate to notice the provision regarding limitation under s. 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. Sub-Section (1) has prescribed a period of one year for making of the application and power of condonation of delay of a total period of six months has been vested under sub­section (3). The Civil Court's jurisdiction has been taken away by the Act and, therefore, as far as Government servants are concerned, Article’ 58 may not be invocable in view of the special limitation. Yet, suits outside the purview of the Administrative Tribunals Act shall continue to be governed by Article 58. 22. It is proper that the position in such cases should be uniform. Therefore, in every such case only when the appeal or representation provided by law is disposed of, cause of action shall first accrue and where such order is not made, on the expiry of six months from the date when the appeal was filed or representation was made, the right to sue shall first accrue. Submission of just a memorial or representation to the Head of the establishment shall not be taken into consideration in the matter of fixing limitation.” 11. Submission of just a memorial or representation to the Head of the establishment shall not be taken into consideration in the matter of fixing limitation.” 11. In the facts of this case, wherein the cause of action accrued on the day when Appellate Authority while dismissing the appeal of the petitioner, enhanced the penalty imposed upon him by the Disciplinary Authority, the order passed by the Appellate Authority ought to have been challenged within the statutory period as envisaged under the Administrative Tribunals Act. The petitioner not only failed to do so, but he did not file the Original Application within some reasonable time thereafter. He approached the Court after seven years and that too without any cogent explanation as already observed hereinabove. 12. Therefore, as this Court is satisfied that the Original Application has filed by the petitioner was hit by the bar of limitation, this petition is liable to be dismissed on the said count. Though the petition now stands registered as a Writ Petition, yet delay of seven years in challenging the order before the erstwhile Tribunal cannot be ignored by this Court. Accordingly, this petition is dismissed on the ground of gross unexplained delay. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, stand disposed of.