JUDGMENT : RAKESH KAINTHLA, J. 1. The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 4.6.2016 passed by learned Special Judge-IV, Kangra at Dharamshala vide which the appellant (accused before the learned Trial Court) was convicted for the commission of offence punishable under Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (in short ‘NDPS Act’) and order dated 6.6.2016 vide which, he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years, pay a fine of Rs. 20,000/- and in default of payment of fine to further undergo simple imprisonment for two months. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 20 of the NDPS Act. It was asserted that ASI-Tibeti Ram (PW9), ASI Bhim Chand, ASI Sunil Kumar (PW4), HHC Ravinder Awasthi (PW1), HHC Tharchan Negi (PW5), HHC Manjeet Singh (PW2), HHC Sanjay and LC-Anita Kumari were on patrolling duty on 6.5.2015 at about 12:30 pm on Macleodganj Dal Lake Road under the supervision of Inspector-Naresh Kumar. A secret information was received that accused Nanu Oli alias Ram Chand was sitting on a bench near Hari Bawri. He had a polythene containing charas. In case of his apprehension, a huge quantity of charas could be recovered. The information was reduced into writing (Ext. PW9/B) and was sent to DSP through HHC Ravinder Singh (PW3). The place was lonely and deserted. The time taken to associate independent witnesses would have delayed the proceedings and the accused would have destroyed the case property in the meantime; hence, ASI Sunil Kumar (PW4) and ASI Bhim Chand were associated as witnesses. The policy party went towards Hari Bawri. The accused was found sitting on the bench. The police apprehended him. He revealed his name as Nanu Oli alias Ram Chand. He was told about the information and was also asked to exercise his option under Section 50. The accused opted to be searched by the police. Memo (Ext. PW4/B) was prepared. The police party gave their search to accused and nothing incriminating was found in their possession. Memo (Ext. PW4/A) was prepared. The police searched the polythene bag and found a transparent polythene (Ext. The accused opted to be searched by the police. Memo (Ext. PW4/B) was prepared. The police party gave their search to accused and nothing incriminating was found in their possession. Memo (Ext. PW4/A) was prepared. The police searched the polythene bag and found a transparent polythene (Ext. PX2) containing a black-coloured stick-like substance (Ext. Px1). The substance was tested with a drug detection kit and the result was found to be positive for charas. The charas was weighed with polythene and its weight was found to be 700 grams. The charas was put in the transparent polythene and transparent polythene was put in the polythene from which they were recovered. They were put in a cloth parcel (Ext. P1) and the parcel was sealed with 6 impressions of seal ‘M’. The seal impression (Ext. PW4/C) was taken on a separate piece of cloth. NCB-1 form (Ext. PW9/B) was filled in triplicate. The parcel was seized vide seizure memo (Ext. PW4/B). Rukka (Ext. PW9/C) was prepared and was handed over to HHC-Tharchan Negi (PW5) with a direction to carry it to the police station. ASI Tibeti Ram conducted the investigation on the spot. He prepared the site plan (Ext. PW9/D) and recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version. The accused was arrested and a memo (Ext. PW4/E) was prepared. FIR (Ext. PW6/B) was registered in the Police Station. Case property was handed over to Inspector Mangat Ram (PW8) who re-sealed the parcel (Ext. P1) with 6 seals of seal ‘N’. He filled columns no. 9 to 11 of the NCB-I form and put the seal impression on the form. He obtained the sample seal (Ext. PW8/C) and issued the re-sealing certificate (Ext.PW6/B). He handed over the case property, documents, and sample seal to MHC Prakash Chand (PW6) who deposited the same in Malkhana and made the entry in the Malkhana Register at Serial No. 337. He handed over the parcel, sample, seal, NCB-I form, copies of seizure memo, re-sealing certificate and docket to Yashwant Singh (PW7) with a direction to carry them to FSL, Junga for chemical examination vide RC No. 84/2015. Yashwant Singh deposited all these articles in a safe condition at FSL Junga and handed over the receipt to MHC on his return. A special report (Ext.PW1/B) was prepared and was handed over to Dy. SP, Badri Singh. Yashwant Singh deposited all these articles in a safe condition at FSL Junga and handed over the receipt to MHC on his return. A special report (Ext.PW1/B) was prepared and was handed over to Dy. SP, Badri Singh. The result of analysis (Ext.PW9/A) was issued in which it was mentioned that the Exhibit was an extract of cannabis and a sample of charas, which contained 26.43% w/w resin in it. Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the Court. 3. Learned Special Judge charged the accused with the commission of an offence punishable under Section 20 of the NDPS Act. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 9 witnesses to prove its case. HHC Ravinder Awasthi (PW1) was posted as a reader to Dy. S.P. who proved the receipt of the information under Section 42 of the NDPS Act and special report. HHC Manjeet Singh (PW2) carried the special report to Dy. S.P. HHC Ravinder Singh (PW3) carried the information under Section 42 of the NDPS Act to Dy.S.P. ASI-Sunil Kumar (PW4) and Tharchan Negi (PW5) are the witnesses to recovery. HC-Prakash Chand (PW6) was posted as MHC with whom the case property was deposited. ASI-Yashwant Singh (PW7) carried the case property to FSL, Junga. Mangat Ram (PW8) was posted as SHO, who re-sealed the parcel. ASI Tibeti Ram (PW9) conducted the investigation. 5. The accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. denied the prosecution case in its entirety. He stated that he was taken from the Bazaar to Police Station. All the witnesses are police officials, who have deposed falsely. He was innocent and a false case was made against him. No defence was sought to be adduced by the accused. 6. The learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of the police officials corroborated each other. The information was received at a lonely and secluded place; therefore, it was not possible to associate independent witnesses. The failure to join independent witnesses is not fatal. Minor contradictions are bound to come in the testimonies of the witnesses and they are not sufficient to discard the prosecution case. The information was received at a lonely and secluded place; therefore, it was not possible to associate independent witnesses. The failure to join independent witnesses is not fatal. Minor contradictions are bound to come in the testimonies of the witnesses and they are not sufficient to discard the prosecution case. The recovery was effected from the polythene being carried by the accused and the requirement of Section 50 of the NDPS Act did not apply to the present case. The link evidence was complete; hence, the prosecution version that the accused was found in possession of 700 grams of charas was held to be duly proved. Consequently, the accused was convicted and sentenced as aforesaid. 7. Being aggrieved from the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the present appeal has been filed asserting that the prosecution has not succeeded in proving its case beyond reasonable doubt. No independent witness was associated even though the police had prior information. The accused was never informed of his right to be searched in the presence of a Magistrate/Gazetted Officer and there was a violation of Section 50 of the NDPS Act; hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment/order passed by learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr. Vikrant Thakur, learned counsel for the accused/appellant and Mr. R.P. Singh & Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocates General, for the respondent/State. 9. Mr. Vikrant Thakur, learned counsel for the accused/appellant submitted that the prosecution had not associated independent witnesses despite availability and opportunity. The police had prior information and sufficient time was available with them to associate independent witnesses. The failure to join independent witnesses is fatal; therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment/order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr. R.P. Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State submitted that sufficient explanation was given for the non-association of independent witnesses. The testimonies of the police officials are not to be doubted without any sufficient reasons. They have corroborated the testimonies of each other. Since the recovery was effected from the bag, therefore; there was no requirement to comply with the requirement of Section 50 of the NDPS Act. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. The testimonies of the police officials are not to be doubted without any sufficient reasons. They have corroborated the testimonies of each other. Since the recovery was effected from the bag, therefore; there was no requirement to comply with the requirement of Section 50 of the NDPS Act. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. ASI-Tibeti Ram (PW9) stated that he was posted as an I.O. in State CID, Crime Unit, Dharamshala in 2013. He, ASI Bhim Chand, HHC Ravinder Singh, and LC Anita Katoch had gone for patrolling duty under the supervision of Inspector Naresh Kumar. They associated Sunil Kumar, HHC Tharchan Negi, and HHC Manjeet Singh at Macleodganj. They were present at Dal Lake Road when secret information was received that a Nepali Nanu Oli alias Ram Chand was sitting on the bench with the polythene in his hand near Hari Bawri. The report (Ext.PW9/B) was prepared and sent to Dy.SP, CID through HHC-Ravinder Singh. The patrolling party proceeded towards the spot. The accused was found near Hari Bawri sitting on a bench holding a polythene bag in his hand. He disclosed his name as Nonu Oli on enquiry. He was told about his right to be searched before the Magistrate or the Gazetted Officer. Nanu Oli opted to be searched by the police party. Memo (Ext. PW4/B) was prepared. The police party gave their search to the accused and prepared a memo (Ext.PW4/B). No incriminating substance was found during the search of the police officials. The police searched the accused and the polythene bag. A transparent plastic bag containing black sticks was found in the polythene. The sticks were checked with a drug detection kit and were found to be charas. The charas was weighed and its weight was found to be 700 grams. The charas was put in the transparent bag. The bag was put in polythene and polythene was sealed in a parcel with six impressions of seal ‘M’. The sample seal (Ext.PW4/C) was taken on a separate piece of cloth. NCB-1 form (Ext. PW9/B) was filled in triplicate and the seal was handed over to ASI Sunil Kumar after the use. A seizure memo was prepared. He duly identified the case property. 13. The sample seal (Ext.PW4/C) was taken on a separate piece of cloth. NCB-1 form (Ext. PW9/B) was filled in triplicate and the seal was handed over to ASI Sunil Kumar after the use. A seizure memo was prepared. He duly identified the case property. 13. He stated in his cross-examination that they had gone from Dharamshala to Macleodganj in a public carrier jeep. They were patrolling on foot. He admitted that Macleodganj is a tourist place and the tourist season is at its peak in May. The information was received at Dal Lake Road. It took about 20 to 25 minutes to reach Hari Bawri from Dal Lake Road. Some vehicles met the police party on the way but no person met them. He admitted that no person from the locality was associated. He volunteered to say that they had tried to associate people from the spot but no one was available. He admitted that he had not sent any constable to call the witness. He volunteered to say that it was a lonely place and no one was available. He denied that Dal Lake was two and a half kilometres from Hari Bawri. He volunteered to say that the distance was two kilometres. He could not say that it took about one hour to reach from Dharamshala to Macleodganj. He volunteered to say that it depends upon the circumstances. It took about 10 minutes to prepare the information under Section 42 (2) of the NDPS Act. No one had searched the lady constable. He could not tell the measurement of the sticks as they were of different sizes. No samples were taken from the sticks. He denied that no recovery was effected and the accused was falsely implicated. 14. Tharchan Negi (PW5) made the same statement in his examination-in-chief as was made by ASI Yashwant Singh (PW7), therefore, the same is not being reproduced to avoid prolixity and repetition. He stated in his cross-examination that Inspector Naresh, ASI Bhim Chand, ASI Tibeti Ram, HHC Ravinder and LC Anita had come from the Dharamshala office. The team from Dharamshala reached Macleodganj at about 11:00 am. He could not say in which vehicle they had travelled to Macleodganj. He denied that it takes about one and a half hours from Dharamshala to reach Macleodganj. The team from Dharamshala reached Macleodganj at about 11:00 am. He could not say in which vehicle they had travelled to Macleodganj. He denied that it takes about one and a half hours from Dharamshala to reach Macleodganj. He volunteered to say that a person takes half an hour to reach Macleodganj from Dharamshala in his vehicle. He admitted that Macleodganj, Naddi, Dal Lake, and Bhagsunag are tourist places and the tourist season is at its peak in May. The place where the information was received was about 750 meters away from the spot. He denied that there were shops and people on the road. He volunteered to say that it was a lonely road. They had met only one vehicle. HHC-Sanjay Kumar was also with the raiding party who went to the spot. He denied that no information was reduced into writing and none was sent to the Police Station. They reached the spot at about 12:30 pm. The personal search of the lady constable was not conducted. He volunteered to say that she had herself given her search and nothing was recovered from her. He had gone on a night bus to Shimla. He denied that no effort was made to associate any independent witness. He volunteered to say that I.O. had tried to associate independent witnesses but he could not find anyone. 15. ASI-Sunil Kumar (PW4) also made a similar statement in his examination-in-chief as was made by ASI-Yashwant SIngh; therefore, the same is not being reproduced to avoid repetition. He stated in his cross-examination that he was posted at Macleodganj on the relevant date. Inspector Naresh, ASI-Bhim Chand, ASI Tibeti Ram, HHC-Ravinder, LC-Anita came to Macleodganj from CID Unit Dharamshala at about 11:00-11:30 am. He did not know in which vehicle they had visited Macleodganj. He admitted that Macleodganj, Dal Lake, and Naddi are tourist places and many tourists visit these places. He admitted that tourist season is at its peak in May. No independent witnesses could be associated as it was a lonely place. It took about 5 to 7 minutes for the I.O. to prepare the information under Section 42(2) of the NDPS Act. He denied that there were many shops around the spot. He admitted that some taxis had crossed the spot. He admitted that the memo (Ext. PW4/A) does not bear the signatures of the accused. It took about 5 to 7 minutes for the I.O. to prepare the information under Section 42(2) of the NDPS Act. He denied that there were many shops around the spot. He admitted that some taxis had crossed the spot. He admitted that the memo (Ext. PW4/A) does not bear the signatures of the accused. Lady Constable was not searched by anyone and she had given her search herself. The locality was 1- 1.5 kilometres away from the spot. He admitted that there are many offices in Macleodganj and no constable was sent to associate any independent witness. He volunteered to say that the spot was at a considerable distance from Macleodganj and there was an apprehension that the accused might destroy the contraband. The charas was in the form of sticks and each stick was measuring around three and a half inch. He did not know the number of sticks. He admitted that charas was of different shapes and sizes. They reached the spot at around 12:45 pm. No independent witness was available at the spot, where information was received by ASI-Tibeti Ram. No independent witness met them on the way. The police had tried to stop the taxis but no taxi had stopped. 16. This is the entire evidence related to the recovery. 17. It was submitted that the police officials admitted that Macleodganj is a tourist place but no independent witness was associated by the police even though it was a peak season. The non-association of the independent witnesses is fatal to the prosecution case. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court Surinder Kumar vs. State of Punjab, (2020) 2 SCC 563 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 767 : 2020 SCC Online SC 3, that the prosecution case cannot be doubted due to the non-association of independent witnesses. It was observed: “14. Further, it is contended by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant that no independent witness was examined, despite the fact they were available. In this regard, it is to be noticed from the depositions of Devi Lal, Head Constable (PW 1), during the course of cross-examination, has stated that efforts were made to join independent witnesses, but none were available. The mere fact that the case of the prosecution is based on the evidence of official witnesses, does not mean that same should not be believed. 15. The mere fact that the case of the prosecution is based on the evidence of official witnesses, does not mean that same should not be believed. 15. The judgment in Jarnail Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2011) 3 SCC 521 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 1191, relied on by the counsel for the respondent State also supports the case of the prosecution. In the aforesaid judgment, this Court has held that merely because the prosecution did not examine any independent witness, would not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the accused was falsely implicated. The evidence of official witnesses cannot be distrusted and disbelieved, merely on account of their official status. 16. In State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Sunil, (2001) 1 SCC 652 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 248 it was held as under: (SCC p. 655) “It is an archaic notion that actions of the police officer should be approached with initial distrust. It is time now to start placing at least initial trust on the actions and the documents made by the police. At any rate, the court cannot start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a proposition of law, the presumption should be the other way round. That official acts of the police have been regularly performed is a wise principle of presumption and recognised even by the legislature.” 18. Similarly, this Court also held in Noop Ram vs. State of H.P. 2022 Cri. L.J. 1946 that the prosecution case cannot be rejected due to non-association of independent witnesses despite opportunity and availability but the same is required to be seen with due care and caution. It was observed: “10. In light of the above material on record, it cannot be said that the place from where the recovery was alleged to have been effected was totally secluded. The said place at least was not far away from the town. No serious attempt appears to have been made to procure the presence of independent witnesses. (PW-7) HC Mahesh Kumar has made a vague statement that he went towards Akhara Bazar in search of witnesses. He has not been categoric as to which place he visited and under what circumstances he failed to procure the presence of independent witnesses. 11. No serious attempt appears to have been made to procure the presence of independent witnesses. (PW-7) HC Mahesh Kumar has made a vague statement that he went towards Akhara Bazar in search of witnesses. He has not been categoric as to which place he visited and under what circumstances he failed to procure the presence of independent witnesses. 11. It is settled that where the stringent procedure in cases attracting severe punishments is involved, the prosecution evidence has to be scanned minutely in order to check and test its genuineness and veracity. In Hanif Khan alias Annu Khan vs. Central Bureau of Narcotics, (2020) 16 SCC 709 : AIR Online 2019 SC 2084, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “8. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the parties. The prosecution under the N.D.P.S. Act carries a reverse burden of proof with a culpable mental state of the accused. He is presumed to be guilty consequent to the recovery of contraband from him, and it is for the accused to establish his innocence unlike the normal rule of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty. But that does not absolve the prosecution from establishing a prima facie case only whereafter the burden shifts to the accused. In Noor Aga vs. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 417 : AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 852, it was observed as follows: “58. Sections 35 and 54 of the Act, no doubt, raise presumptions with regard to the culpable mental state on the part of the accused as also place the burden of proof in this behalf on the accused, but a bare perusal of the said provision would clearly show that presumption would operate in the trial of the accused only in the event the circumstances contained therein are fully satisfied. An initial burden exists upon the prosecution and only when it stands satisfied, would the legal burden shift. Even then, the standard of proof required for the accused to prove his innocence is not as high as that of the prosecution. Whereas the standard of proof required to prove the guilt of the accused on the prosecution is “beyond all reasonable doubt” but it is “preponderance of probability” on the accused. Even then, the standard of proof required for the accused to prove his innocence is not as high as that of the prosecution. Whereas the standard of proof required to prove the guilt of the accused on the prosecution is “beyond all reasonable doubt” but it is “preponderance of probability” on the accused. If the prosecution fails to prove the foundational facts so as to attract the rigours of Section 35 of the Act, the actus reus which is possession of contraband by the accused cannot be said to have been established.” 9. Because there is a reverse burden of proof, the prosecution shall be put to a stricter test for compliance with statutory provisions. If at any stage, the accused is able to create a reasonable doubt, as a part of his defence, to rebut the presumption of his guilt, the benefit will naturally have to go to him.” Simultaneously it is also settled that the mere absence of non-association of independent witnesses will not be fatal to the prosecution case. However, in such circumstances, it is called upon the Courts to assess the version of available prosecution witnesses on record more minutely in order to negate the possibility of any foul play or mischief.” 19. Hence, the submission that the prosecution case is to be rejected because of failure to associate independent witnesses is not acceptable. However, the testimonies of the police officials are to be seen with utmost care and caution. 20. It was submitted that ASI-Sunil Kumar (PW4) and Tharchan Negi (PW5) were unable to tell the vehicle used by the police party to cover the distance from Dharamshala to Macleodganj. This casts doubt on the prosecution’s version. This submission is not acceptable. ASI-Tibeti Ram (PW9) stated that they had covered the distance from Dharamshala to Macleodganj in a public carrier and thereafter, they went for patrolling on foot. It was specifically stated by him that other police officials met them while patrolling, therefore, they were on foot at the time they met the police officials. Hence, ASI-Sunil Kumar and Tharchan Negi could not have mentioned the vehicle, which was used by the other police party to cover the distance between Dharamshala and Macleodganj. 21. It was specifically stated by him that other police officials met them while patrolling, therefore, they were on foot at the time they met the police officials. Hence, ASI-Sunil Kumar and Tharchan Negi could not have mentioned the vehicle, which was used by the other police party to cover the distance between Dharamshala and Macleodganj. 21. It was submitted that HHC -Manjeet Kumar (PW2) was a member of the police party and was present during the search and recovery as per the prosecution; however, he did not say anything regarding the search, when he appeared as PW2. He only deposed about the handing over of the special report under Section 57 to Dy. S.P, CID Unit. His failure to mention the recovery will make the prosecution case suspect. This submission is not acceptable. In Chet Ram Versus of H.P. Criminal Appeal No. 151 of 2016 decided on 25.07.2008, Constable-Dhan Dev was stated to be with the police party at the time of the recovery, however, he did not depose anything about the recovery. It was contended that his failure to depose this fact made the prosecution case suspect. This Court did not agree with this submission and held that Dhan Dev was examined to prove the fact that he had carried the sample from Malkhana to the Chemical Examiner. When the defence did not cross-examine him regarding the incident at the spot, his testimony will not make the prosecution case suspect. It was observed: “PW-7 Dhan Dev was examined by the prosecution to prove another fact, viz. he carried one of the two sample parcels from Malkhana to the laboratory of the Chemical Examiner. So, he confined his statement only to this fact. It was known to the defence side that PW-7 Dhan Dev was cited as a witness of search and recovery because copies of the challan and other papers filed therewith had been supplied to the appellant before the state of the trial. Memo. Ext. PW6/C not only records that Dhan Dev was one of the two witnesses of the search and seizure, but it also bears his signature as one of the witnesses. Memo. Ext. PW6/C not only records that Dhan Dev was one of the two witnesses of the search and seizure, but it also bears his signature as one of the witnesses. Now when it was known to the defence that Dhan Dev was a witness of search and seizure and the prosecution examined him to prove some other fact and not the fact of search and seizure, because one witness, namely PW-6 LHC Narpat Ram had already been examined and Investigating Officer PW-8 HC Ram Lal was also going to be examined to prove the fact, defence could have cross-examined PW-7 Dhan Dev with regard to the search and recovery. No suggestion was put either to PW-6 LHC Narpat Ram or PW-8 HC Ram Lal that Dhan Dev (PW7) was not on the spot nor was any such suggestion put even to PW-7 Dhan Dev, in the cross-examination. 23. In view of the above-stated position, no inference or presumption is required to be drawn against the prosecution for PW-7 Constable Dhan Dev not testifying about the search and seizure, even though he was a witness thereto and had even signed the search and seizure memo, as a witness.” 22. Thus, in view of the precedent of this Court, the testimony of Manjeet Singh (PW2) will not make the prosecution case suspect, when he was not cross-examined regarding the incident. 23. Sunil Kumar (PW4) stated that the police party met him at about 11:00-11:30 am, whereas, ASI Tibeti Ram (PW9) stated that police officials were associated at about 10:00 am. It was submitted that there is a contradiction regarding the time, which is fatal to the prosecution case. This submission is not acceptable. The incident took place on 06.05.2015. ASI Sunil Kumar made a statement on 23.03.2016 and ASI Yashwant Singh made a statement on 13.05.2016 after the lapse of nearly one year from the date of the incident. Human memories fail with time and do not behave like a video recorder. The principles of appreciation of ocular evidence were explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Balu Sudam Khalde and Another vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2023 SC 1736 , as under: “25. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task. There is no fixed or straightjacket formula for appreciation of the ocular evidence. The principles of appreciation of ocular evidence were explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Balu Sudam Khalde and Another vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2023 SC 1736 , as under: “25. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task. There is no fixed or straightjacket formula for appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved principles for appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal case can be enumerated as under: “(I) While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the Court to scrutinize the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. (II) If the Court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which did not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. (III) When an eyewitness is examined at length it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. (IV) Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hyper-technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. (IV) Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hyper-technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. (V) Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny. (VI) By and large a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a video tape is replayed on the mental screen. (VII) Ordinarily it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence, which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties therefore cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details. (VIII) The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person’s mind whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another. (IX) By and large people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder. (X) In regard to the exact time of an incident, or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals which varies from person to person. (XI) Ordinarily a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events, which take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused, or mixed up when interrogated later on. Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals which varies from person to person. (XI) Ordinarily a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events, which take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused, or mixed up when interrogated later on. (XII) A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross-examination by counsel and out of nervousness mix up facts, get confused regarding the sequence of events, or fill up details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness sometimes so operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him. (XIII) A former statement though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to contradiction. Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the latter statement, even if the latter statement is at variance with the former to some extent it would not be helpful to contradict that witness.” [See Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai vs. State of Gujarat, 1983 Cri. L.J. 1096 : AIR 1983 SC 753 , Leela Ram vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1995 SC 3717 and Tahsildar Singh vs. State of U.P. AIR 1959 SC 1012 ] 24. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Karan Singh vs. State of U.P. 2022 (2) RCR (Criminal) 239, that the Court has to examine the evidence of the witnesses to find out whether it has a ring of truth or not. The Court should not give undue importance to omission, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter. It was observed: “This Court, in Rohtash Kumar vs. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434 held: “24. ... The court has to examine whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. The Court should not give undue importance to omission, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter. It was observed: “This Court, in Rohtash Kumar vs. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434 held: “24. ... The court has to examine whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief. Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter, and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness...” [42] Referring to Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary and Another vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 3352 , Mr. Tyagi argued that minor discrepancies caused by lapses in memory were acceptable, but contradictions were not. In this case, there was no contradiction, only minor discrepancies. [43] In Kuriya and Another vs. State of Rajasthan, 2012 10 SCC 433 this Court held: “30. This Court has repeatedly taken the view that the discrepancies or improvements which do not materially affect the case of the prosecution and are insignificant cannot be made the basis for doubting the case of the prosecution. The courts may not concentrate too much on such discrepancies or improvements. The purpose is to primarily sift the chaff from the grain and find out the truth from the testimony of the witnesses. Where it does not affect the core of the prosecution case, such discrepancy should not be attached undue significance. The normal course of human conduct would be that while narrating a particular incident, there may occur minor discrepancies. Such discrepancies may even in law render credentials to the depositions. The improvements or variations must essentially relate to the material particulars of the prosecution case. The alleged improvements and variations must be shown with respect to the material particulars of the case and the occurrence. Such discrepancies may even in law render credentials to the depositions. The improvements or variations must essentially relate to the material particulars of the prosecution case. The alleged improvements and variations must be shown with respect to the material particulars of the case and the occurrence. Every such improvement, not directly related to the occurrence, is not a ground to doubt the testimony of a witness. The credibility of a definite circumstance of the prosecution case cannot be weakened with reference to such minor or insignificant improvements. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgments of this Court in Kathi Bharat Vajsur vs. State of Gujarat, (2012) 5 SCC 724 , Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary vs. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457 , Gura Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 2 SCC 205 and Sukhchain Singh vs. State of Haryana, (2002) 5 SCC 100 . 31. What is to be seen next is whether the version presented in the Court was substantially similar to what was said during the investigation. It is only when exaggeration fundamentally changes the nature of the case, the Court has to consider whether the witness was stating the truth or not. [Ref. Sunil Kumar vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), 2003 (11) SCC 367]. 32. These are variations which would not amount to any serious consequences. The Court has to accept the normal conduct of a person. The witness who is watching the murder of a person being brutally beaten by 15 persons can hardly be expected to state a minute-by-minute description of the event. Everybody, and more particularly a person who is known to or is related to the deceased, would give all his attention to take steps to prevent the assault on the victim and then to make every effort to provide him with medical aid and inform the police. The statements which are recorded immediately upon the incident would have to be given a little leeway with regard to the statements being made and recorded with the utmost exactitude. It is a settled principle of law that every improvement or variation cannot be treated as an attempt to falsely implicate the accused by the witness. The approach of the court has to be reasonable and practicable. It is a settled principle of law that every improvement or variation cannot be treated as an attempt to falsely implicate the accused by the witness. The approach of the court has to be reasonable and practicable. Reference in this regard can be made to Ashok Kumar vs. State of Haryana, (2010) 12 SCC 350 and Shivlal vs. State of Chhattisgarh, (2011) 9 SCC 561 .” [44] In Shyamlal Ghosh vs. State of West Bengal, (2012) 7 SCC 646 , this Court held: “46. Then, it was argued that there are certain discrepancies and contradictions in the statement of the prosecution witnesses inasmuch as these witnesses have given different timing as to when they had seen the scuffling and strangulation of the deceased by the accused.............Undoubtedly, some minor discrepancies or variations are traceable in the statements of these witnesses. But what the Court has to see is whether these variations are material and affect the case of the prosecution substantially. Every variation may not be enough to adversely affect the case of the prosecution. 49. It is a settled principle of law that the court should examine the statement of a witness in its entirety and read the said statement along with the statement of other witnesses in order to arrive at a rational conclusion. No statement of a witness can be read in part and/or in isolation. We are unable to see any material or serious contradiction in the statement of these witnesses which may give any advantage to the accused.” [45] In Rohtash Kumar vs. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434 , this Court held: “24.......The court has to examine whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief. Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter, and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness...” 25. Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter, and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness...” 25. Similar is the judgment in Anuj Singh vs. State of Bihar, AIR 2022 SC 2817 , wherein it was observed: “[17] It is not disputed that there are minor contradictions with respect to the time of the occurrence or injuries attributed on hand or foot but the constant narrative of the witnesses is that the appellants were present at the place of occurrence armed with guns and they caused the injury on informant PW-6. However, the testimony of a witness in a criminal trial cannot be discarded merely because of minor contradictions or omissions as observed by this court in Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary and Another vs. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457 . This Court while considering the issue of contradictions in the testimony, while appreciating the evidence in a criminal trial, held that only contradictions in material particulars and not minor contradictions can be a ground to discredit the testimony of the witnesses. The relevant portion of Para 42 of the judgment reads as under: “42. Only such omissions which amount to a contradiction in material particulars can be used to discredit the testimony of the witness. The omission in the police statement by itself would not necessarily render the testimony of the witness unreliable. When the version given by the witness in the court is different in material particulars from that disclosed in his earlier statements, the case of the prosecution becomes doubtful and not otherwise. Minor contradictions are bound to appear in the statements of truthful witnesses as memory sometimes plays false and the sense of observation differs from person to person. The omissions in the earlier statement if found to be of trivial details, as in the present case, the same would not cause any dent in the testimony of PW 2. Even if there is a contradiction of statement of a witness on any material point, that is no ground to reject the whole of the testimony of such witness.” 26. Therefore, in view of the binding precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court the statements of the witnesses cannot be discarded due to omissions, contradictions or discrepancies. Even if there is a contradiction of statement of a witness on any material point, that is no ground to reject the whole of the testimony of such witness.” 26. Therefore, in view of the binding precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court the statements of the witnesses cannot be discarded due to omissions, contradictions or discrepancies. The Court has to see whether the discrepancies affect the prosecution case adversely or not and whether they are related to the core of the prosecution case or the details. Since no person remembers the time by looking at the watch and every person gives a different estimate of the time which may or may not be correct, therefore, the fact that two witnesses have given different times will not make the prosecution case suspect. 27. It was submitted that the lady constable had not given her search to the accused and the memo of the search of the police (Ext. PW4/A) does not contain the signatures of the accused, which would cast doubt on the prosecution case. This submission cannot be accepted. It was not the case of the accused that the police had come with the charas and had planted the same upon the accused. The accused has not given any reason as to why the police would be deposing against him falsely, therefore, there was no reason for the police to bring the charas with it and falsely implicate the accused; hence, the failure to obtain the signature on the memo of the personal search of the police officials will not make the prosecution case suspect. Similarly, it was never suggested to any person nor did the accused state that the lady constable was in possession of the charas and she had put it in the bag; hence, the failure to give the search by the lady constable to the accused will not be fatal to the prosecution case. 28. It was submitted that the police were under an obligation to take the accused to the Magistrate or the Gazetted Officer but the police had failed to do so. This is a violation of Section 50 of the NDPS Act and the same is fatal to the prosecution case. This submission is not acceptable. 28. It was submitted that the police were under an obligation to take the accused to the Magistrate or the Gazetted Officer but the police had failed to do so. This is a violation of Section 50 of the NDPS Act and the same is fatal to the prosecution case. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ranjan Kumar Chadha vs. State of H.P. 2023 SCC Online SC 1262 that the police is bound to take the accused to the nearest Magistrate or the Gazetted Officer if he so requires and not otherwise. It was observed: “62. Section 50 of the NDPS Act only goes so far as to prescribe an obligation to the police officer to inform the suspect of his right to have his search conducted either in the presence of a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate. Whether or not the search should be conducted in the presence of a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate ultimately depends on the exercise of such right as provided under Section 50. In the event the suspect declines this right, there is no further obligation to have his search conducted in the presence of a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate, and in such a situation the empowered police officer can proceed to conduct the search of the person himself. To read Section 50 otherwise would render the very purpose of informing the suspect of his right a redundant exercise. We are of the view that the decision of this Court in Arif Khan (supra) cannot be said to be an authority for the proposition that notwithstanding the person proposed to be searched has, after being duly apprised of his right to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate, but has expressly waived this right in clear and unequivocal terms; it is still mandatory that his search be conducted only before a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate. 63. 63. A plain reading of the extracted paragraphs of Arif Khan (supra) referred to above would indicate that this Court while following the ratio of the decision of the Constitution Bench in Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja (supra) held that the same has settled the position of law in this behalf to the effect that, whilst it is imperative on the part of the empowered officer to apprise the person of his right to be searched only before a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate; and this requires strict compliance; this Court simultaneously proceeded to reiterate that in Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja (supra) “it is ruled that the suspect person may or may not choose to exercise the right provided to him under Section 50 of the NDPS Act.” 64. There is no requirement to conduct the search of the person, suspected to be in possession of a narcotic drug or a psychotropic substance, only in the presence of a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate, if the person proposed to be searched, after being apprised by the empowered officer of his right under Section 50 of the NDPS Act to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate categorically waives such right by electing to be searched by the empowered officer. The words “if such person so requires” as used in Section 50(1) of the NDPS Act would be rendered otiose, if the person proposed to be searched would still be required to be searched only before a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate, despite having expressly waived “such requisition” as mentioned in the opening sentence of Sub-Section (2) of Section 50 of the NDPS Act. In other words, the person to be searched is mandatorily required to be taken by the empowered officer, for the conduct of the proposed search before a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate, only “if he so requires” upon being informed of the existence of his right to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate and not if he waives his right to be so searched voluntarily, and chooses not to exercise the right provided to him under Section 50 of the NDPS Act. 65. However, we propose to put an end to all speculations and debate on this issue of the suspect being apprised by the empowered officer of his right under Section 50 of the NDPS Act to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate. 65. However, we propose to put an end to all speculations and debate on this issue of the suspect being apprised by the empowered officer of his right under Section 50 of the NDPS Act to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate. We are of the view that even in cases wherein the suspect waives such right by electing to be searched by the empowered officer, such waiver on the part of the suspect should be reduced into writing by the empowered officer. To put it in other words, even if the suspect says that he would not like to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate and he would be fine if his search is undertaken by the empowered officer, the matter should not rest with just an oral statement of the suspect. The suspect should be asked to give it in writing duly signed by him in presence of the empowered officer as well as the other officials of the squad that “I was apprised of my right to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate in accordance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act, however, I declare on my own free will and volition that I would not like to exercise my right of being searched before a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate and I may be searched by the empowered officer.” This would lend more credence to the compliance of Section 50 of the NDPS Act. In other words, it would impart authenticity, transparency and credit worthiness to the entire proceedings. We clarify that this compliance shall henceforth apply prospectively.” 29. In the present case, the accused never required that he should be taken to the Gazetted Officer of the Magistrate; therefore, there was no obligation to take him to the Magistrate or the Gazetted Officer. 30. It is not the case of the prosecution that the recovery was effected from the personal search of the accused. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab vs. Baljinder Singh and Another, (2019) 10 SCC 473 , that where the recovery was effected from the bag, briefcase etc. non-compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act is not necessary. It was observed: “14. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab vs. Baljinder Singh and Another, (2019) 10 SCC 473 , that where the recovery was effected from the bag, briefcase etc. non-compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act is not necessary. It was observed: “14. The law is thus well settled that an illicit article seized from the person during a personal search conducted in violation of the safeguards provided in Section 50 of the Act cannot by itself be used as admissible evidence of proof of unlawful possession of contraband. But the question is if there be any other material or article recovered during the investigation, would the infraction with respect to personal search also affect the qualitative value of the other material circumstance. 15. At this stage we may also consider the following observations from the decision of this Court in Ajmer Singh vs. State of Haryana, (2010) 3 SCC 746 : 2010 AIR SCW 1494, Para 16: “15. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the provision of Section 50 of the Act would also apply while searching the bag, briefcase, etc. carried by the person and its non-compliance would be fatal to the proceedings initiated under the Act. We find no merit in the contention of the learned counsel. It requires to be noticed that the question of compliance or non-compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act is relevant only where a search of a person is involved and the said section is not applicable nor attracted where no search of a person is involved. Search and recovery from a bag, briefcase, container, etc. do not come within the ambit of Section 50 of the NDPS Act, because firstly, Section 50 expressly speaks of search of person only. Secondly, the section speaks of taking of the person to be searched by the gazetted officer or a Magistrate for the purpose of the search. Thirdly, this issue in our considered opinion is no more res Integra in view of the observations made by this Court in Madan Lai vs. State of H.P. (2003) 7 SCC 465 : AIR 2003 SC 3642 . The Court has observed: (SCC p. 471, Para 16) (at p. 3645, Para 17 of AIR) “16. A bare reading of Section 50 shows that it only applies in the case of a personal search of a person. The Court has observed: (SCC p. 471, Para 16) (at p. 3645, Para 17 of AIR) “16. A bare reading of Section 50 shows that it only applies in the case of a personal search of a person. It does not extend to a search of a vehicle or a container or a bag or premises [See Kalema Tumba vs. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 8 SCC 257 : AIR 2000 SC 402 , State of Punjab vs. Baldev Singh, (1999) 6 SCC 172 : AIR 1999 SC 2378 and Gurbax Singh vs. State of Haryana, (2001) 3 SCC 28 : AIR 2001 SC 1002 ]. The language of Section 50 is implicitly clear that the search has to be in relation to a person as contrasted to a search of premises, vehicles or articles. This position was settled beyond doubt by the Constitution Bench in Baldev Singh case. Above being the position, the contention regarding non-compliance with Section 50 of the Act is also without any substance.” 16. As regards the applicability of the requirements under Section 50 of the Act is concerned, it is well settled that the mandate of Section 50 of the Act is confined to “personal search” and not to search of a vehicle or a container or premises. 17. The conclusion (3) as recorded by the Constitution Bench in Para 57 of its judgment in Baldev Singh ( AIR 1999 SC 2378 ) clearly states that the conviction may not be based “only” on the basis of possession of an illicit article recovered from personal search in violation of the requirements under Section 50 of the Act but if there be other evidence on record, such material can certainly be looked into. In the instant case, the personal search of the accused did not result in the recovery of any contraband. Even if there was any such recovery, the same could not be relied upon for want of compliance of the requirements of Section 50 of the Act. But the search of the vehicle and recovery of contraband pursuant thereto having stood proved, merely because there was non-compliance of Section 50 of the Act as far as “personal search” was concerned, no benefit can be extended so as to invalidate the effect of recovery from the search of the vehicle. Any such idea would be directly in the teeth of conclusion (3) as aforesaid. 18. Any such idea would be directly in the teeth of conclusion (3) as aforesaid. 18. The decision of this Court in Dilip’s ( AIR 2007 SC 369 ) case, however, has not adverted to the distinction as discussed herein above and proceeded to confer an advantage upon the accused even in respect of recovery from the vehicle, on the ground that the requirements of Section 50 relating to personal search were not complied with. In our view, the decision of this Court in said judgment in Dilip’s case is not correct and is opposed to the law laid down by this Court in Baldev Singh ( AIR 1999 SC 2378 ) and other judgments. 19. Since in the present matter, seven bags of poppy husk each weighing 34 kgs. were found from the vehicle which was being driven by accused Baljinder Singh with the other accused accompanying him, their presence and possession of the contraband material stood completely established.” 31. This position was reiterated in Kallu Khan vs. State, AIR 2022 SC 50 and it was observed: “15. Simultaneously, the arguments advanced by the appellant regarding non-compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act are bereft of any merit because no recovery of contraband from the person of the accused has been made to which compliance with the provision of Section 50 NDPS Act has to follow mandatorily. In the present case, in the search of a motorcycle at a public place, the seizure of contraband was made, as revealed. Therefore, compliance with Section 50 does not attract in the present case. It is settled in the case of Vijaysinh (supra) that in the case of the personal search only, the provisions of Section 50 of the Act are required to be complied with but not in the case of the vehicle as in the present case, following the judgments of Surinder Kumar (supra) and Baljinder Singh (supra). Considering the facts of this Court, the argument of non-compliance of Section 50 of NDPS Act advanced by the counsel is hereby repelled.” 32. Similar is the judgment in Dayalu Kashyap vs. State of Chhattisgarh, 2022 (1) RCR (Cri) 815 (SC) wherein it was observed: “5. Considering the facts of this Court, the argument of non-compliance of Section 50 of NDPS Act advanced by the counsel is hereby repelled.” 32. Similar is the judgment in Dayalu Kashyap vs. State of Chhattisgarh, 2022 (1) RCR (Cri) 815 (SC) wherein it was observed: “5. Learned counsel submits that the option given to the appellant to take a third choice other than what is prescribed as the two choices under Sub-Section (1) of Section 50 of the Act is something which goes contrary to the mandate of the law and in a way affects the protection provided by the said Section to the accused. To support his contention, he has relied upon the judgment of State of Rajasthan vs. Parmanand and Another, (2014) 5 SCC 345 , more specifically, Para 19. The judgment, in turn, relied upon a Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in State of Punjab vs. Baldev Singh, (1999) 6 SCC 172 to conclude that if a search is made by an empowered Officer on prior information without informing the person of his right that he has to be taken before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate for search and in case he so opts, failure to take his search accordingly would render the recovery of the illicit article suspicious and vitiate the conviction and sentence of the accused where the conviction has been recorded only the on basis of possession of illicit articles recovered from his person. The third option stated to be given to the accused to get himself searched by the Officer concerned not being part of the statute, the same could not have been offered to the appellant and thus, the recovery from him is vitiated. 6. In the conspectus of the facts of the case, we find the recovery was in a polythene bag which was being carried on a Kanwad. The recovery was not in person. Learned counsel seeks to expand the scope of the observations made by seeking to contend that if the personal search is vitiated by violation of Section 50 of the NDPS Act, the recovery made otherwise also would stand vitiated and thus, cannot be relied upon. We cannot give such an extended view as is sought to be contended by learned counsel for the appellant.” 33. We cannot give such an extended view as is sought to be contended by learned counsel for the appellant.” 33. Therefore, the defence cannot take any advantage of the failure of the police to take the accused to the Magistrate or the Gazetted Officer. 34. In the present case, nothing was asserted against the police officials in their cross-examinations to show that they have any enmity to depose falsely against the accused. The accused stated in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. that he was brought from Bazaar to the police station. He has not given any reason as to why the police would implicate him falsely. He simply stated that the witnesses were police officials and they had deposed falsely. It was laid down by this Court in Budhi Ram vs. State, 2021 (4) Shim. L.C. 1945, that where the defence asserts that the accused was falsely implicated, it must be proved that enmity or quarrel between the accused and the police was such as to push the police in wrongly framing the accused. It was observed: “[16] We have considered the contentions as well as the evidence of DW-1. The evidence of DW-1 is not to such an extent that would support the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant. The evidence of DW-1 only indicates that a quarrel took place between the accused and the police. What was the quarrel and what was the intensity of the enmity between the accused and the police has not been stated? The enmity or hatred between the appellant and the police should be to such an extent, which would push the police into wrongly framing the accused. The incident should have hurt the police to such an extent that they had no other option but to falsely implicate the accused. We do not find that the intensity of the evidence is to such an extent as to lead to such a conclusion. The evidence only indicates that there was an altercation between the accused and the police. It may not be possible for us to conclude that this particular quarrel between the accused and the police has led to the wrong implication for the accused. We do not find that there is any nexus between the contention of a false implication of the accused with the evidence of DW-1. It may not be possible for us to conclude that this particular quarrel between the accused and the police has led to the wrong implication for the accused. We do not find that there is any nexus between the contention of a false implication of the accused with the evidence of DW-1. Therefore we are unable to accept the evidence of DW-1 to the extent which is sought to be argued.” 35. In the present case, no enmity was alleged or proved; hence, the statement that the accused was falsely implicated is not acceptable. 36. The police officials have deposed consistently about their visit to the spot, search of the polythene and recovery of the charas. Their testimonies are corroborating each other. It was laid down by this Court in Budh Ram vs. State of H.P. 2020 Cri. L.J. 4254 that the testimonies of the police officials cannot be discarded on the ground that they belong to the police force. It was observed: “11. It is a settled proposition of law that the sole testimony of the police official, which if otherwise is reliable, trustworthy, cogent and duly corroborated by other admissible evidence, cannot be discarded only on the ground that he is a police official and may be interested in the success of the case. There is also no rule of law, which lays down that no conviction can be recorded on the testimony of a police officer even if such evidence is otherwise trustworthy. Rule of prudence may require more careful scrutiny of their evidence. Wherever, the evidence of a police officer, after careful scrutiny, inspires confidence and is found to be trustworthy and reliable, can form the basis of conviction and the absence of some independent witness of the locality does not in any way affect the creditworthiness of the prosecution case. No infirmity attaches to the testimony of the police officers merely because they belong to the police force.” 37. Similar is the judgment in Karamjit Singh vs. State, AIR 2003 SC 3011 wherein it was held: “The testimony of police personnel should be treated in the same manner as a testimony of any other witness and there is no principle of law that without corroboration by independent witnesses, their testimony cannot be relied upon. Similar is the judgment in Karamjit Singh vs. State, AIR 2003 SC 3011 wherein it was held: “The testimony of police personnel should be treated in the same manner as a testimony of any other witness and there is no principle of law that without corroboration by independent witnesses, their testimony cannot be relied upon. The presumption that a person acts honestly applies, as much in favour of police personnel as of other persons and it is not a proper judicial approach to distrust and suspect them without good grounds. It will all depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and no principle of general application can be laid down.” (Emphasis supplied) 38. Therefore, the testimonies of police officials are accepted and it is held that the accused was found in possession of a bag containing 700 grams of substance in it. 39. Tharchan Chand (PW5) stated that I.O. handed over the rukka, sample seal and case property to him with a direction to carry them to the police station, CID, Bharari, Shimla. He sent the fax of the rukka to police station Bharari from the CID Office at Dharamshala. He deposited the case property, NCB-I form in triplicate, sample, seal and rukka with MHC P.S. CID, Bharari, Shimla. The case property remained intact till it remained in his custody. 40. HC Prakash (PW6) stated that he received a fax on 06.05.2015. He made an entry in the daily diary and recorded the FIR. The case file was prepared and sent to I.O ASI Tibeti Ram for investigation. HHC Tharchan Negi deposited the case property, sample seal, and NCB-I form with him on 07.05.2015. The case property was re-sealed by Inspector Mangat Ram. 41. Inspector Mangat Ram (PW8) stated that a rukka was received through fax at Police Station Bharari. FIR was registered, which was signed by him. The case file was handed over to MHC-Prakash Chand with a direction to send it to ASI-Tibeti Ram at Dharamshala for investigation. He re-sealed the parcel with 6 impressions of seal ‘N’. He filled Columns No. 9 to 11 of the NCB-I form. He issued the re-sealing certificate and prepared a sample seal (Ext.PW8/C). He denied that no fax was received. He admitted that no other witness was associated with the re-sealing certificate. The original rukka was received on 07.05.2015. He denied that he was deposing falsely. 42. He filled Columns No. 9 to 11 of the NCB-I form. He issued the re-sealing certificate and prepared a sample seal (Ext.PW8/C). He denied that no fax was received. He admitted that no other witness was associated with the re-sealing certificate. The original rukka was received on 07.05.2015. He denied that he was deposing falsely. 42. There is nothing in their cross-examinations to show that they are making false statements. Their testimonies are duly corroborated by the entry in the daily diary regarding the receipt of the fax and the printout of the fax (Ext.PW5/A). Their testimonies are also corroborated by the entry in the Malkhana Register (Ext. PW6/C), in which the entry of the deposit of the parcel, sample seal, NCB-I form, copy of the re-sealing certificate and seizure memo have been made. 43. HC-Prakash Chand (PW6) stated that he handed over the sealed parcel, sample seal, NCB-I form, copy of the seizure memo, and re-sealing certificate to HC Jaswant with a direction to carry them to FSL Junga for analysis. 44. Yashwant Singh (PW7) stated that MHC, PS Bharari handed over one sealed parcel, documents, docket, copy of FIR, copy of seizure memo and sample seal to him with a direction to deposit them in FSL, Junga vide RC No. 84/15. He deposited all the articles in FSL, Junga in safe condition. He denied that no case property was handed over to him or there was any tampering with the case property. 45. His statement is duly corroborated by the Road Certificate (Ext. PW6/D) in which the parcel, sample seal, NCB-I form in triplicate, copy of seizure memo, re-sealing certificate, copy of FIR and Docket are mentioned to have been handed over to him. His statement that the case property remained intact is duly corroborated by the result of analysis (Ext.PW9/E) in which it was mentioned that one sealed parcel bearing 6 seals of seal impression ‘M’ and 6 seals of seal impression ‘N’ was received with docket, photocopy of FIR, Seizure memo, re-sealing certificate, NCB-I form in triplicate and sample seals ‘M’ and ‘N’ through Yashwant Singh. The seals were found intact and tallied with the specimen seals sent by the forwarding authority and the seal impression impressed on the form NCB-I. The report clearly shows that the seals were found intact when the parcel was received in the laboratory. 46. The seals were found intact and tallied with the specimen seals sent by the forwarding authority and the seal impression impressed on the form NCB-I. The report clearly shows that the seals were found intact when the parcel was received in the laboratory. 46. It was held in Baljit Sharma vs. State of H.P. 2007 HLJ 707, where the report of analysis shows that the seals were intact, the case of the prosecution that the case property remained intact is to be accepted as correct. It was observed: “A perusal of the report of the expert Ex.PW8/A shows that the samples were received by the expert in a safe manner and the sample seal separately sent tallied with the specimen impression of a seal taken separately. Thus, there was no tampering with the seal and the seal impressions were separately taken and sent to the expert also.” 47. Similar is the judgment in Hardeep Singh vs. State of Punjab, 2008 (8) SCC 557 wherein it was held: “It has also come on evidence that till the date the parcels of the sample were received by the Chemical Examiner, the seal put on the said parcels was intact. That itself proves and establishes that there was no tampering with the previously mentioned seal in the sample at any stage and the sample received by the analyst for chemical examination contained the same opium, which was recovered from the possession of the appellant. In that view of the matter, a delay of about 40 days in sending the samples did not and could not have caused any prejudice to the appellant.” 48. In State of Punjab vs. Lakhwinder Singh, 2010 (4) SCC 402 the High Court had concluded that there could have been tampering with the case property since there was a delay of seven days in sending the report to FSL. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that case property was produced in the Court and there was no evidence of tampering. Seals were found to be intact, which would rule out the possibility of tampering. It was observed: “The prosecution has been able to establish and prove that the aforesaid bags, which were 35 in number, contained poppy husk and accordingly the same were seized after taking samples therefrom which were properly sealed. Seals were found to be intact, which would rule out the possibility of tampering. It was observed: “The prosecution has been able to establish and prove that the aforesaid bags, which were 35 in number, contained poppy husk and accordingly the same were seized after taking samples therefrom which were properly sealed. The defence has not been able to prove that the aforesaid seizure and seal put in the samples were in any manner tampered with before it was examined by the Chemical Examiner. There was merely a delay of about seven days in sending the samples to the Forensic Examiner and it is not proved as to how the aforesaid delay of seven days has affected the said examination when it could not be proved that the seal of the sample was in any manner tampered with. The seal having been found intact at the time of the examination by the Chemical Examiner and the said fact having been recorded in his report, a mere observation by the High Court that the case property might have been tampered with, in our opinion is based on surmises and conjectures and cannot take the place of proof. 17. We may at this stage refer to a decision of this Court in Hardip Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2008) 8 SCC 557 in which there was a delay of about 40 days in sending the sample to the laboratory after the same was seized. In the said decision, it was held that in view of cogent and reliable evidence that the opium was seized and sealed and that the samples were intact till they were handed over to the Chemical Examiner, the delay itself was held to be not fatal to the prosecution case. In our considered opinion, the ratio of the aforesaid decision squarely applies to the facts of the present case in this regard. 18. The case property was produced in the Court and there is no evidence to show that the same was ever tampered with.” 49. Similar is the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surinder Kumar vs. State of Punjab, (2020) 2 SCC 563 , wherein it was held: “10. 18. The case property was produced in the Court and there is no evidence to show that the same was ever tampered with.” 49. Similar is the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surinder Kumar vs. State of Punjab, (2020) 2 SCC 563 , wherein it was held: “10. According to learned senior counsel for the appellant, Joginder Singh, ASI to whom Yogi Raj, SHO (PW-3) handed over the case property for producing the same before the Illaqa Magistrate and who returned the same to him after such production was not examined, as such, link evidence was incomplete. In this regard, it is to be noticed that Yogi Raj SHO handed over the case property to Joginder Singh, ASI, for production before the Court. After producing the case property before the Court, he returned the case property to Yogi Raj, SHO (PW-3) with the seals intact. It is also to be noticed that Joginder Singh, ASI was not in possession of the seals of either the investigating officer or Yogi Raj, SHO. He produced the case property before the Court on 13.09.1996 vide application Ex.P-13, the concerned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, after verifying the seals on the case property, passed the order Ex.P-14 to the effect that since there was no judicial malkhana at Abohar, the case property was ordered to be kept in safe custody, in Police Station Khuian Sarwar till further orders. Since Joginder Singh, ASI was not in possession of the seals of either the SHO or the Investigating Officer, the question of tampering with the case property by him did not arise at all. 11. Further, he has returned the case property, after production of the same, before the Illaqa Magistrate, with the seals intact, to Yogi Raj, SHO. In that view of the matter, the Trial Court and the High Court have rightly held that the non-examination of Joginder Singh, did not, in any way, affect the case of the prosecution. Further, it is evident from the report of the Chemical Examiner, Ex.P-10, that the sample was received with seals intact and that the seals on the sample tallied with the sample seals. In that view of the matter, the chain of evidence was complete.” (Emphasis supplied) 50. Therefore, the prosecution version is to be accepted as correct that the case property remained intact till its analysis at FSL, Junga. 51. In that view of the matter, the chain of evidence was complete.” (Emphasis supplied) 50. Therefore, the prosecution version is to be accepted as correct that the case property remained intact till its analysis at FSL, Junga. 51. The seizure memo (Ext.PW4/D) mentions that the seal ‘M’ was handed over to ASI-Sunil Kumar after the use. ASI-Sunil Kumar did not produce the seal before the Court; however, that will not affect the prosecution case adversely. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Varinder Kumar vs. State of H.P. 2019 (3) SCALE 50 that failure to produce the seal in the Court is not fatal. It was observed: “6. We have considered the respective submissions. PW10 is stated to have received secret information at 2.45 P.M. on 31.03.1995. He immediately reduced it into writing and sent the same to PW8, Shri Jaipal Singh, Dy.S.P., C.I.D., Shimla. At 3.05 P.M. PW7, Head Constable Surender Kumar stopped PW5, Naresh Kumar and another independent witness, Jeevan Kumar travelling together, whereafter the appellant was apprehended at 3.30 P.M. with two Gunny Bags on his Scooter which contained varying quantities of ‘charas’. PW8, Shri Jaipal Singh, Dy.S.P., C.I.D., Shimla who had arrived by then gave notice to the appellant and obtained his consent for carrying out the search. Two samples of 25 gms. each were taken from the two Gunny Bags and sealed with the seal ‘S’, and given to PW5. PW2, Jaswinder Singh the Malkhana Head Constable resealed it with the seal ‘P’. The conclusion of the Trial Court that the seal had not been produced in the Court is therefore perverse in view of the two specimen seal impressions having been marked as Exhibits PH and PK. It is not the case of the appellant that the seals were found tampered with in any manner.” 52. It was specifically held in Virender Kumar (supra) that when the sample seals were produced before the Court, the conclusion of the Trial Court that seals were produced before the Court was perverse. 53. In the present case, the prosecution had produced sample seal ‘M’ (Ext.PW4/C) and sample seal ‘N’ (Ext.PW8/C) before the Court. Thus, the Court had the sample seal with it to compare the seal impression on the parcel. 53. In the present case, the prosecution had produced sample seal ‘M’ (Ext.PW4/C) and sample seal ‘N’ (Ext.PW8/C) before the Court. Thus, the Court had the sample seal with it to compare the seal impression on the parcel. The Court noticed that the parcel contained ‘M’ seal six in number, ‘N’ seal six in number and FSL-II four in number, which were intact; therefore, the parcel had the seals intact at the time of its production in the Court and the non-production of the seal will not affect the prosecution case adversely. 54. It was submitted that the daily diary regarding the arrival of the police party at the police station was not produced and this is fatal to the prosecution. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kalpnath vs. State, AIR 1998 SC 201 that the prosecution is not expected to produce the diaries as a matter of course and the defence can move the Court to bring the daily diary. It was observed: “No doubt Daily Diary is a document which is in constant use in the police station. But no prosecution is expected to produce such diaries as a matter of course in every prosecution case for supporting the police version. If such diaries are to be produced by the prosecution as a matter of course in every case, the function of the police station would be greatly impaired. It is neither desirable nor feasible for the prosecution to produce such diaries in all cases. Of course, it is open to the defence to move the Court for getting down such diaries if the defence wants to make use of it.” 55. This position was reiterated in Chet Ram vs. State of H.P. Cr. It is neither desirable nor feasible for the prosecution to produce such diaries in all cases. Of course, it is open to the defence to move the Court for getting down such diaries if the defence wants to make use of it.” 55. This position was reiterated in Chet Ram vs. State of H.P. Cr. Appeal No. 191/06, decided on 25.7.2008 (HP) and it was held as under: “It is true that Rojnamcha was not produced in the Court to prove the departure of PW-8 HC Ram Lal and other police officials for organizing a “Nakka” at the site, in question, or to prove their return to the Police Station from the said site, but merely for this omission, it cannot be held that PW-8 HC Ram Lal, accompanied by PW-6 LHC Narpat Ram, PW-7 Constable Dhan Dev and other police officials, did not go to the spot to organize a “Nakka” especially when the appellant has not taken the plea that he was picked up from some different place and brought to the police station.” 56. Therefore, the prosecution’s version cannot be doubted due to the failure to produce the entry in the daily diary. 57. HHC-Manjeet Singh (PW2) stated that Tibeti Ram handed over the special report to him on 08.05.2015 and he handed it over to the Dy.SP Badri Singh on the same date at 10:10 am. HHC Ravinder Awasthi (PW1) stated that HHC Manjeet Singh handed over the special report to Dy.S.P.-Badri Singh on 08.05.2015 at 10:10 am, who made an endorsement regarding the receipt and handed over the special report to him. He made the entry in the register at Sr. No. 6 of the special report register. He denied that no special report was handed over to him. He denied the suggestion that it does not amount to any proof and is not sufficient to doubt the prosecution case. Thus, the prosecution has duly complied with the requirement of Section 57 of the NDPS Act. 58. It was submitted that the prosecution has not complied with the requirement of Section 52(A), which is fatal. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by this Court in Sandeep Kumar vs. State of H.P. 2022 Law Suit HP 149 that the provisions of Section 52A is not mandatory and its non-compliance is not fatal to the prosecution case. It was observed: “24. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by this Court in Sandeep Kumar vs. State of H.P. 2022 Law Suit HP 149 that the provisions of Section 52A is not mandatory and its non-compliance is not fatal to the prosecution case. It was observed: “24. It has also been strenuously argued on behalf of the appellants that the investigating agency had failed to comply with the provisions of Section 52-A of the NDPS Act and thus cast a shadow of doubt on its story. The contention raised on behalf of appellants is that the rules framed for investigations under the NDPS Act are mandatory and have to be strictly followed. Neither the required sample was taken on the spot nor the samples were preserved by complying with Section 52-A of the Act. It has been argued that compliance of Section 52-A of the Act is mandatory...... xxx xxx xxx 27. The precedent relied upon on behalf of the appellants, however, did not lay down the law that non-compliance with Section 52-A of the Act is fatal to the prosecution case under the NDPS Act. On the other hand, in State of Punjab vs. Makhan Chand, 2004 (3) SCC 453 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the question of the effect of non-compliance of Section 52-A has held as under: 10. This contention too has no substance for two reasons. Firstly, Section 52A, as the marginal note indicates, deals with the “disposal of seized narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.” Under Sub-Section (1), the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, is empowered to specify certain narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances having regard to the hazardous nature, vulnerability to theft, substitution, constraints of proper storage space and such other relevant considerations, so that even if they are material objects seized in a criminal case, they could be disposed of after following the procedure prescribed in Sub-Sections (2) & (3). If the procedure prescribed in Sub-Sections (2) & (3) of Section 52A is complied with and upon an application, the Magistrate issues the certificate contemplated by Sub-Section (2), then Sub-Section (4) provides that, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 or the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, such inventory, photographs of narcotic drugs or substances and any list of samples drawn under Sub-Section (2) of Section 52A as certified by the Magistrate, would be treated as primary evidence in respect of the offence. Therefore, Section 52A(1) does not empower the Central Government to lay down the procedure for the search of an accused but only deals with the disposal of seized narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. 11. Secondly, when the very same standing orders came up for consideration in Khet Singh vs. Union of India, 2002 (4) SCC 380 , this Court took the view that they are merely intended to guide the officers to see that a fair procedure is adopted by the Officer-in-Charge of the investigation. It was also held that they were not inexorable rules as there could be circumstances in which it may not be possible for the seizing officer to prepare the mahazar at the spot if it is a chance recovery, where the officer may not have the facility to prepare the seizure mahazar at the spot itself. Hence, we do not find any substance in this contention.” 59. It was submitted that ASI-Tibeti Ram had effected the recovery. He also conducted the investigation. The investigation should have been entrusted to some independent person. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mukesh vs. State (NCT of Delhi), AIR 2020 SC 4794 that the accused cannot be acquitted on the ground that the police officer who effected the recovery had conducted the investigation unless some prejudice is shown. It was observed: “12. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mukesh vs. State (NCT of Delhi), AIR 2020 SC 4794 that the accused cannot be acquitted on the ground that the police officer who effected the recovery had conducted the investigation unless some prejudice is shown. It was observed: “12. From the above discussion and for the reasons stated above, we conclude and answer the reference as under: (I) That the observations of this Court in the cases of Bhagwan Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, (1976) 1 SCC 15 , Megha Singh vs. State of Haryana, (1996) 11 SCC 709 and State by Inspector of Police, NIB, Tamil Nadu vs. Rajangam, (2010) 15 SCC 369 and the acquittal of the accused by this Court on the ground that as the informant and the investigator was the same, it has vitiated the trial and the accused is entitled to acquittal are to be treated to be confined to their own facts. It cannot be said that in the aforesaid decisions, this Court laid down any general proposition of law that in each and every case where the informant is the investigator there is a bias caused to the accused and the entire prosecution case is to be disbelieved and the accused is entitled to acquittal. (II) In a case where the informant himself is the investigator, by that itself cannot be said that the investigation is vitiated on the ground of bias or the like factor. The question of bias or prejudice would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Therefore, merely because the informant is the investigator, by that itself the investigation would not suffer the vice of unfairness or bias and therefore on the sole ground that the informant is the investigator, the accused is not entitled to acquittal. The matter has to be decided on a case to case basis. A contrary decision of this Court in the case of Mohan Lal vs. State of Punjab, (2018) 17 SCC 627 and any other decision taking a contrary view that the informant cannot be the investigator and in such a case the accused is entitled to acquittal are not good law and they are specifically overruled.” 60. A contrary decision of this Court in the case of Mohan Lal vs. State of Punjab, (2018) 17 SCC 627 and any other decision taking a contrary view that the informant cannot be the investigator and in such a case the accused is entitled to acquittal are not good law and they are specifically overruled.” 60. In the present case, no prejudice was shown and the prosecution case will not become suspect due to the fact that the person, who effected the recovery had conducted the investigation. 61. The result of the analysis shows that the parcel contained charas, which had 26.43% W/W resin in it. Since the parcel remained intact till its analysis in the laboratory, therefore, it was duly proved that the accused was found in possession of the charas and the learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the accused for the commission of offence punishable under Section 20 of the NDPS Act. 62. The Learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine of Rs. 20,000/- and in default of payment of the fine to further undergo simple imprisonment for two months. The charas affect the young generation adversely and keeping in view this consideration, the sentence of five years is not excessive; therefore, no interference is required with the same. 63. No other point was urged. 64. Therefore, the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court are fully sustainable and no interference is required with the same. Final Order: 65. In view of this, the present appeal fails and the same is dismissed.