JUDGMENT : ASHUTOSH SHASTRI, J. 1. This group of appeals is arising out of very same vehicular accident and arising out of common judgment and award passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Aux.) Panchmahal at Godhra, whereby claim petitions came to be dismissed, vide judgment and order dated 30.5.2006. Since facts are almost similar and controversy involved is same, learned advocates appearing on behalf respective sides have requested the Court to deal with and dispose of these appeals by present common order and pursuant to such request, hearing was taken up. 2. The brief facts which gave rise to filing of these appeals are that a vehicular accident had taken place on 15.6.1997 between Maruti car bearing registration No. GJ-17 C-3033 and Truck bearing registration No. DL-1 GA-8839 on Baroda Halol Highway, Near Machchilpura village and in the said accident, all passengers who were in Maruti car sustained serious injuries, which resulted into consequential death. Deceased were Mohmad Hanif Abdul Majid, Hajrabibi Mohmad Hanif, Minor Tahir and Minor Soyeb. This accident had given rise to filing of four separate claim petitions before Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Panchmahal, which were registered as Motor Accident Claim Petition Petition Nos.1538, 1539, 1550 and 1551 of 1997. In the year 2000, appellant of present appeal namely Mohammad Harun Abdul Rahim Haji (deleted vide order below Exh.26), Jetunbibi Harun Haji had moved an application for being joined as party in afore-mentioned claim petitions. By common judgment, said application came to be rejected on 3.1.2000 and said order appears to have not been disturbed though same was challenged by way of filing Civil Revision Application in the High Court. Subsequently, these two appellants thereafter in the year 2005 filed a substantive claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 despite order was passed against them way back in 2000, precisely on 3.1.2000 as indicated above. However, their claim petitions were registered as MACP Nos.1419 of 2005, 1420 of 2005, 1421 of 2005 and 1422 of 2005. It appears from record that present appellants had moved an application below Exh.5 for seeking a relief to consolidate their claim petitions of 2005 with earlier set of claim petitions of 1997. However, their claim petitions were registered as MACP Nos.1419 of 2005, 1420 of 2005, 1421 of 2005 and 1422 of 2005. It appears from record that present appellants had moved an application below Exh.5 for seeking a relief to consolidate their claim petitions of 2005 with earlier set of claim petitions of 1997. However, learned Tribunal was pleased to reject the said request on 10.4.2006 by common order and as such taking note of these circumstances, claim petitions filed by present appellants came to be dismissed by common order dated 30.5.2006 by virtue of which, MACP Nos.1419, 1420, 1421 and 1422 of 2005 came to be dismissed and it is against this order, appellants have filed present appeals under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 3. Appeals were admitted and in between, upon similar Civil Applications for stay, respective orders have been passed and with background of the afore-mentioned facts, present appeals have come up for consideration before this Court. Since these appeals are arising out of common order and very same accident and on the basis of very same circumstances, learned advocate has concentrated to make submissions from First Appeal No. 3245 of 2006 being a lead matter and as such, by treating this appeal as a lead matter, the Court has taken up the hearing. 4. Learned advocate Mr. M.A. Kharadi appearing on behalf of appellants has submitted that order passed by learned Tribunal dated 30.5.2006 is not only unjust, arbitrary but contrary to the provisions of law and without jurisdiction and as such same deserves to be corrected by issuing appropriate consequential orders. It has been contended that learned Tribunal ought to have appreciated that daughter of the appellant who met with an accident, property of her cannot be inherited by respondent Nos.7 to 9 under Muslim Personal Law and since they cannot inherit property, question of claiming compensation does not arise and same is a case with mother-in-law as well as brother-in-law who cannot inherit property of the daughter of present appellant and as such, simply because on earlier occasion, applications came to be rejected, that would not be a relevant circumstance to dismiss substantive claim petitions without assigning proper reasons. It has further been contended that learned Tribunal has committed a grave error in interpreting the provisions contained under Section 166 of the M.V. Act which clearly indicates that any legal representative of deceased can submit a claim petition and here, parties being Muslim are undoubtedly governed by Muslim Personal Law, which does not give any right to succession at any point of time to mother-in-law and it has been submitted that other children or maternal relatives only can succeed the property. 5. Learned advocate Mr. Kharadi has further contended that learned Tribunal has grossly erred in passing the order below Exh.25 instead of evaluating the legal position for inter-se fighting of claimants, i.e. present appellants and opponents. Learned Tribunal ought to have further held that only present appellants are the only persons who can submit application on death of their daughter in a vehicular accident and as such except claim petition of present appellants, rest of the claim petitions submitted by opponents ought to have been dismissed. Even otherwise order passed by learned Tribunal is erroneous, not in consonance with law and as such same deserves to be quashed and set aside in the interest of justice and by submitting in brief, a request is made to set aside impugned order dated 30.5.2006 which has been passed by learned Tribunal. 6. By giving written submissions, learned advocate Mr. Kharadi has tried to make certain submissions though which are not forming part of pleadings of present appeal, but then has canvassed a proposition that dismissing the claim petition of present appellants being grandfather and grandmother (Nana & Nani) of a married daughter, is erroneous. On the contrary, learned Tribunal ought to have appreciated that cause of action arose for these appellants to submit claim petition from the time when their joining applications came to be disposed of and with a view to avoid complication, separate substantive claim petitions have been presented and in accident, appellants’ daughter passed away along with other family members. She inherited all assets of her husband and two sons (as per Muslim Shariat) and after her death, they are entitled to get entire share of daughter (i.e. from her own estate as well as inherited share from her husband and two grandsons since all died in an accident). She inherited all assets of her husband and two sons (as per Muslim Shariat) and after her death, they are entitled to get entire share of daughter (i.e. from her own estate as well as inherited share from her husband and two grandsons since all died in an accident). It has been further contended that principle of res judicata is not applicable and substantive claim petition was maintainable. In fact, issue as to whether grandfather and grandmother (Nana & Nani) (present appellants) are entitled to receive share from compensation as per Muslim Shariat is untouched and never decided and therefore, question of res judicata would not arise. Simply because joining party application came to be rejected, that would not be a relevant circumstance for not considering substantive claim petition of present appellants and therefore, serious error is committed by leaned Tribunal in passing the order. In substance, according to learned advocate Mr. Kharadi, daughter of present appellants is entitled to inherit the estate from her husband and two sons and after her death, appellants are entitled since daughter died lastly. So, before her death, she had inherited estate of her husband and two sons and after her demise, her estate will automatically go to the present appellants, being parents, and as such, has submitted that these appellants are only persons who are entitled to seek compensation and as such by setting aside impugned order, Hon’ble Court may kindly grant the reliefs as prayed for in the respective claim petitions. 7. Learned advocate Mr. Kharadi has further contended that order passed by learned Tribunal is not only unjust and arbitrary but is violative of principles of natural justice as well and as such by passing necessary orders by setting aside impugned order dated 30.5.2006, consequential effect be given, hence requested to allow the appeal. 8. As against this, learned advocate Mr. Arpit Kapadia appearing for contesting opponents has vehemently opposed the stand taken by learned advocate appearing for appellants. It has been contended that appellants have grossly suppressed the material facts and as such they are not entitled to seek any equity as they have not come to the Court with clean hands. 8. As against this, learned advocate Mr. Arpit Kapadia appearing for contesting opponents has vehemently opposed the stand taken by learned advocate appearing for appellants. It has been contended that appellants have grossly suppressed the material facts and as such they are not entitled to seek any equity as they have not come to the Court with clean hands. On account of death of four persons, as indicated above, substantive claim petitions first in point of time were submitted by present respondents being MACP Nos.1538 and 1539 of 1997 as well as MACP Nos.1550 and 1551 1997 and these claim petitions when came up for consideration, present appellants had moved applications for being joined as a party in the respective claim petitions. These applications were submitted initially on 30.7.1999 and same came to be rejected by a detailed order dated 3.1.2000 and though contended that some Civil Revision Applications-came to be filed in the High Court of Gujarat, no substantive order of said Civil Revision Application was submitted before learned Tribunal and that was also taken into consideration at the time when impugned order was passed. 9. Learned advocate Mr. Kapadia has further submitted that thereafter for the very same accident of 1997, after almost a period of 8 years, by suppressing the aforesaid material fact about adverse order on joining applications, a substantive claim petition same to be filed under Section 166 of the MV Act in the year 2005. So much so, an attempt was also made by submitting an application below Exh.25 to consolidate their claim petitions of 2005 with batch of claim petitions of 1997 filed by present opponents. But, after considering relevant circumstances, learned Tribunal was pleased to dismiss said applications vide order dated 10.4.2006 which order also has not been challenged in higher forum and has become final. These facts were not properly presented and by common judgment and order dated 30.5.2006, learned Tribunal has rightly rejected the claim petitions submitted by appellants. In fact, according to Mr. Kapadia, present claim petitions are itself not maintainable and therefore, same are rightly rejected. Even attempts were made during pendency of these appeals to thwart the process of disbursement in favour of present respondents, which clearly indicates that by suppressing the material facts, an attempt is made to somehow deprive the legitimate persons from amount of compensation. Kapadia, present claim petitions are itself not maintainable and therefore, same are rightly rejected. Even attempts were made during pendency of these appeals to thwart the process of disbursement in favour of present respondents, which clearly indicates that by suppressing the material facts, an attempt is made to somehow deprive the legitimate persons from amount of compensation. It has further been contended that it is a settled position of law that once a woman gets married, she becomes a member of her husband’s family and so far as Mohammedan Law is concerned, there is no converse proposition to this effect and therefore learned Tribunal has rightly not entertained their claim petitions since they are not legitimate legal representatives for claiming compensation of deceased family. In fact, Hon’ble the Apex Court in a case of Shiv Kumar and others v. Raj Kumar and others reported in 1999 ACJ 1417 has already interpreted the word ‘legal representative’ as defined under Section 166 of the M.V. Act and has indicated that married daughter along with her brothers cannot claim compensation for death of her father and mother as she is dependent of her husband’s income. Hence, in this case, a married daughter along with her husband and daughters died in accident and as such legitimate claimants would be parents of husband and not present appellants. This logic of claiming compensation which is derived is misconceived, on the contrary, appellants have not spent a single amount for medical treatment or hospitalization. On the contrary, an agreement was executed on 16.10.1997 indicating that present appellants have given some gold of 4 tola to daughter deceased Hajrabibi and in substitution of gold, some amount of Rs.20,000/- is given. It is in fact incorrect that son of respondent died prior in point of time and as such, whole estate would come to Hajrabibi under succession automatically. This is clearly ill-founded in the mouth of present appellants just to canvass for securing compensation. On the contrary, their daughter was residing with her husband’s family in which whole family died and present appellants have also not asserted in any form that appellants were dependents on the income of deceased in any form and therefore, even in respect of loss of dependency also, there is hardly any claim sustainable of the present appellants. 10. On the contrary, their daughter was residing with her husband’s family in which whole family died and present appellants have also not asserted in any form that appellants were dependents on the income of deceased in any form and therefore, even in respect of loss of dependency also, there is hardly any claim sustainable of the present appellants. 10. It has been further submitted that sole surviving applicant by now is appellant No. 2 since Mohammad Harun- original appellant No. 1 died and whose name was deleted vide Exh.26 and this Jetunbibi-applicant No. 2 is residing with her son Idrish Harun Haji and having several immovable properties in Godhra town and had also fixed rent income on account of lease of immovable properties and therefore even otherwise appellant No. 2 is not at all hand to mouth in any circumstance by virtue of which she can claim an amount of compensation. It only reflects a greediness to seek compensation. By pointing out decisions delivered by Calcutta High Court as well as Punjab & Haryana High Court, learned advocate Mr. Kapadia has pointed out that there is no substance in the appeals and order dated 30.5.2006 does not deserve to be quashed or interfered with and present appeals therefore be dismissed in the interest of justice. 11. Since no other submissions have been made by either side, having heard learned advocates appearing for the parties and having gone through the material on record, following circumstances deserve consideration before coming to an ultimate conclusion: (1) First of all, record of the present proceedings indicates that substantive claim petitions were filed by respondents being legal representatives of the family inherited by husband, happens to be son and said substantive claim petitions were adjudicated at great length and by common judgment and award dated 15.5.2006, came to be allowed which has attained finality as it is borne out from the record. Now, in between, during pendency, it appears that applications for being joined as party was submitted by the appellants on the premise that they are entitled to amount which may be determined since their daughter has passed away in the accident and by virtue of her husband’s death, she inherited the property, but then said respective applications came to be dismissed by common order dated 3.1.2000 and while dismissing the same, detailed reason is also assigned after considering the rival submissions. Said conclusion the Court deems it proper to reproduce hereunder: “6. Now, perusing the petitions Exh.1 in of all the four claim-petitions, it becomes clear that in the accident, son, son's wife and grand children of original claimant Halimabib died. Therefore, the four claim petitions have been filed by her. The proposed third party named Mohmad Harun and Jetunbibi, are the parents of the deceased Hajrabibi. Admittedly, Hajrabibi married Mohmad Hanif and she went to reside in the house of her husband. She left the house of her parents. Unfortunately, in the vehicular accident, the members of the entire family consisting of Hajrabibi, her husband and her two children died. Admittedly, her parents were not residing with her even after her marriage. Even in the applications, nothing is stated that the proposed third party were maintained out of the income of Hajrabibi or her husband. Even in the applications, the proposed third party do not say that they were dependent upon the income of the deceased. In the case of G.S.R.T.C. vs. Ramanbhai - Prabhatbhai, 1987 ACJ 561 decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the brothers of the deceased person who died in a vehicular accident filed the claim petition under the M.V. Act. The GSRTC contended that the brother of the deceased, has no right to recover the amount of compensation. Hon'ble Supreme Court, after discussing Section-1A of the Old M.V. Act, 1939 and discussing the definition of “legal representative” held that in an Indian family, brothers, sisters, brothers' children and sometimes, foster children live together and they are the dependent upon the bread- winner of the family and if the breadwinner is killed in an accident, they can claim compensation in a proceeding instituted before the M.A.C. Tribunal. There cannot be any dispute regarding the principle established in the said ruling. In light of the principle established in this ruling, as stated above, the parents of the deceased Hajrabibi, after her marriage, no longer remained the dependent upon her income. The real dependents were the family members who resided with the deceased persons i.e. the mother of her deceased husband Mohmad Hanif and her family members resided with them. As stated above, the proposed third party were not dependent upon the income of the deceased. The real dependents were the family members who resided with the deceased persons i.e. the mother of her deceased husband Mohmad Hanif and her family members resided with them. As stated above, the proposed third party were not dependent upon the income of the deceased. In the recent decision giver in the case of Shivkumar and Others vs. Rajkumar and Others, 1999 ACJ 1417 relying upon the definition of legal representative defined under section 166 of the M.V. Act, 1988, it was held that the married daughter, along with her brothers cannot claim compensation for the death of her father and mother, as she is dependent on her husband's income. In that case, two daughters of the decease parents were married and they were residing with their husbands and in-laws. It was observed that they may have a claim for a share under the Hindu Succession Act being the Class-I heirs of a Hindu dying intestate but being married, they cannot be said to be legal representatives/dependents of the deceased as they are dependent on their respective husbands after marriage. Now, similarly, in our case married daughter along with her husband and children died and her parents claimed that they have a right to recover an amount of compensation. Thus, the ratio laid down in the above referred Shiv Kumar's case fully applies to our case. Even considering the Ramanbhai's case, what the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed was this that brother in the said case was the dependent upon the income of the deceased and therefore, he was entitled to claim compensation. Thus, keeping in view the principles established in both the rulings and considering the facts and circumstances of this case, it becomes clear that the applications filed by the proposed third party, the parents of the married daughter Hajrabibi, deserve to be dismissed. Thus, keeping in view the principles established in both the rulings and considering the facts and circumstances of this case, it becomes clear that the applications filed by the proposed third party, the parents of the married daughter Hajrabibi, deserve to be dismissed. (2) Further, it appears that even subsequent to that, during the course of adjudication of the main claim petitions, claim petitions of 1997 were also requested to be consolidated with claim petitions of 2005, but said request was also turned down by detailed order dated 10.4.2006 and in paragraph 21 thereof, it was clearly opined that present appellants have no rights to claim compensation and as such these two attempts of present appellant failed to interject the claim petitions filed in the year 1997 and overall assertion which is coming out in these two orders which are against the appellants, that they have got no right to claim compensation. The Court is told by the counsels for respective sides that these orders have attained finality as these orders have not been disturbed by higher forum nor any material is placed to indicate that these orders have been disturbed in any form. (3) Perusal of the aforesaid order if to be considered in light of the claim petitions which have been filed by present appellants in which earlier order of 2000 whereby request for being joined came to be dismissed, is not reflecting in any part of the assertion in the claim petitions filed under Section 166 of the M.V. Act by the present appellants. Exh.1 if to be looked into of MACP No. 1422 of 2005, it indicates earlier attempt has not been reflected. However, be that as it may, conclusion about appellants’ ineligibility to claim amount of compensation having attained finality, there is hardly any reason to take a different view since the view is clearly considered by learned Tribunal while passing impugned order. 12. In light of the aforesaid circumstance, a perusal of impugned order dated 30.5.2006 would also indicate that same has been passed after hearing both the sides and after considering all relevant circumstances which are prevailing on record and as such in considered opinion of this Court, order which does not suffer from any illegality or perversity in any form, does not deserve to be disturbed. 13. At this stage, learned advocate Mr. 13. At this stage, learned advocate Mr. Kharadi has tried to canvass a submission with respect to Muslim Personal Law for claiming compensation. But, in absence of any pleading to that effect and in absence of any relevant material, it would not be possible for this Court to set aside the order which has been passed after due consideration of the material on record. In addition to this, conduct on the part of appellants is also not worthy for consideration in view of the fact that an application for being joined as party was rejected way back in 2000, also consolidation applications was rejected in 2006 in which it was held that appellants are not entitled to claim compensation, still continued to precipitate though there is no other mode adopted to establish their right of compensation. In fact, the decisions of Calcutta High Court as well as Punjab & Haryana High Court are to some extent come to the assistance of respondents rather appellants. Hence, conjoint effect of aforesaid circumstances would lead to a situation where order under challenge does not call for any interference. 14. At this stage, the Court would also like to spell out the proposition of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in respect of exercise of appellate jurisdiction, which suggests that in absence of any material irregularity or perversity, a possible view which has been adopted by learned Tribunal may not be disturbed or substituted. We deem it proper to quote hereunder the observations contained in the decisions of Hon’ble Apex Court on the said proposition: (1) Paragraph 20 of the decision in the case of Venkatesh Construction Company vs. Karnataka Vidyut Karkhane Limited, (2016) 4 SCC 119 , reads as under: 20. The Appellate Court may not interfere with the finding of the trial court unless the finding recorded by the trial court is erroneous or the trial court ignored the evidence on record. The High Court reversed the decree passed by the trial court without discussing oral and documentary evidence and several grounds raised before the trial court. The High Court veered away from the main issue and went on to elaborate on the law of arbitration and the mode of setting aside the arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, which in our view, was not warranted. The High Court veered away from the main issue and went on to elaborate on the law of arbitration and the mode of setting aside the arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, which in our view, was not warranted. Without considering the oral and documentary evidence, the High Court erred in interfering with the factual findings recorded by the trial court and the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside. (2) Same proposition is followed by Hon’ble Apex Court in the decision taken in the case of V. Prabhakara vs. Basavaraj K. (Dead) by Legal Representatives and Another, (2022) 1 SCC 115 . 15. Here, exactly same being the situation prevailing on record, this Court is of the opinion that order under challenge does not deserve to be set aside. Accordingly, First Appeals being merit-less, stand DISMISSED with no order as to costs. FURTHER ORDER At this stage, learned advocate Mr. M.M. Kharadi has requested to extend the stay which was prevailing pursuant to the order dated 16.1.2007. But, in view of the fact that First Appeals stand dismissed, Court is not inclined to consider the same, accordingly said request stands REJECTED.