Research › Search › Judgment

Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2023 DIGILAW 588 (HP)

Ajit Kumar v. State of H. P.

2023-12-22

RAKESH KAINTHLA

body2023
JUDGMENT : RAKESH KAINTHLA, J. 1. The respondent no. 2 informant made a complaint against respondent no. 3 before Dy. S.P. Vigilance Office, Solan stating that he is a Civil contractor with BSNL. Paramjeet Singh- respondent no. 3 demanded money for releasing the security of Rs. 1,40,000/-pertaining to Ayurvedic Dispensary, Barog. He was asking that the security would be released on the clearance of the previous transaction. The informant was undertaking the work of the CDPO building at Dharampur. Paramjeet was not permitting the informant to lay the slab. He was saying that permission could be granted only on the clearance of the previous transaction. Paramjeet demanded Rs. 1,00,000/- as a bribe. The informant had a recording of the demand made by Paramjeet; hence, he prayed that appropriate action be taken. 2. The police registered the FIR and set up a trap. Currency notes worth Rs. 1,00,000/- were treated with phenolphthalein powder and the informant was asked to signal the police on demand. Shadow witness was associated. Paramjeet was caught red-handed with the money. His hands were washed with the solution of sodium carbonate and the solution turned pink. The solution was sent to FSL for analysis. He was arrested. The police conducted the investigation and seized the recording of the conversation. The call detail record was also taken in possession. The report of FSL was received. The informant subsequently made a supplementary statement stating that Ajeet Kumar, the present petitioner was also present at the time when the demand for the bribe was made and Paramjeet Singh had told the informant that the money could be paid to the present petitioner in his absence because both accused Paramajit and the petitioner were the same. The voice in the recording was identified to be that of the present petitioner as per the analysis made in the laboratory; hence, the police prepared a challan and presented it before the Court. 3. The petitioner filed the present petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. for quashing the summoning order dated 03.03.2022 passed by learned Special Judge, Solan against the petitioner in case No. 1-S/7 of 2022 titled State of H.P. versus Paramjeet Singh and Ors. It was asserted that no complaint was ever made against the petitioner in the FIR. The petitioner was arrayed as an accused belatedly. There is no evidence to show that the petitioner had misused his position. It was asserted that no complaint was ever made against the petitioner in the FIR. The petitioner was arrayed as an accused belatedly. There is no evidence to show that the petitioner had misused his position. He only tried to settle the dispute between the respondents no. 2 and 3. This was considered to be against the present petitioner. No prima facie case is made out against the petitioner. The informant also did not question the credibility of the petitioner. The conversation placed on record does not implicate the petitioner. The informant Chander Mohan never interacted with the petitioner regarding the bribe. The petitioner could have been cited as a witness but the prosecution erred in arraying him as an accused. No witness stated that the petitioner facilitated Paramjeet Singh in getting the bribe. Prosecution sanction was also not proper as per the law and it is a mere reproduction of the version of the I.O. There is no certificate that the memory card was not tampered with; hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the proceedings pending before the learned Special Judge, Solan be set aside. 4. Respondent No. 1 filed a reply making preliminary submissions regarding lack of maintainability and the petitioner having not approached the Court without exhausting the remedies available to him. The contents of the petition were denied on merits. The contents of the FIR were reproduced. It was asserted that the petitioner had participated in the conversation of demand for a bribe. He being the controlling officer of Paramjeet Singh, abused his official position by helping him in obtaining the bribe. The prosecution sanction is proper. Challan has been prepared and presented before learned Trial Court against the petitioner and other accused. The petitioner has the remedy of seeking the discharge before the learned Trial Court and he has not exhausted that remedy. The transcript of the conversation disclosed that the petitioner had the knowledge of demand for a bribe and he had actively helped Paramjeet Singh in obtaining the bribe. His voice was duly matched with the sample voice in the laboratory; therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 5. Respondent No. 2 also filed a reply asserting that respondent no. 3- Paramjeet Singh is the main accused who was working as an SDE. The informant had filed a complaint against respondent no. 3. His voice was duly matched with the sample voice in the laboratory; therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 5. Respondent No. 2 also filed a reply asserting that respondent no. 3- Paramjeet Singh is the main accused who was working as an SDE. The informant had filed a complaint against respondent no. 3. He never filed any complaint against the petitioner, as the petitioner had never demanded any amount from the informant. Paramjeet Singh was caught red-handed. No complaint was ever made by the informant against the present petitioner. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 6. I have heard Mr. Sudhir Thakur, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Karun Negi, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. R.P. Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondent no. 1/State, Mr. Aditya Thakur, learned counsel for respondent no. 2 & Mr. Vivek Sharma, learned counsel for respondent no. 3. 7. Mr. Sudhir Thakur, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the statement of the informant was recorded belatedly on 02.07.2020 more than two years after the incident. The delay in recording the statement shows mala fide on the part of the Investigating Officer. The conversation relied upon by the prosecution does not show that he has abetted the demand of a bribe by Paramjeet Singh. He being a superior of Paramjeet Singh had called the meeting between the informant and Paramjeet Singh to resolve their differences. There is nothing to connect the petitioner with the commission of the crime. The conversation, even if accepted as correct, does not show the presence of the petitioner at the time of the demand for a bribe because his voice was not found at that time. A reasonable inference can be drawn that he was not present at that time. The continuation of the proceedings against the petitioner amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the proceedings pending against the petitioner be quashed. 8. Mr. R.P. Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondent no. 1 submitted that the informant had specifically stated in the complaint made by him that he had recorded the conversation on his mobile. The conversation clearly shows that the petitioner was present in the meeting when the demand for the bribe was made. 8. Mr. R.P. Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondent no. 1 submitted that the informant had specifically stated in the complaint made by him that he had recorded the conversation on his mobile. The conversation clearly shows that the petitioner was present in the meeting when the demand for the bribe was made. He remained silent and failed to discharge his duty as his Superior Officer which amounts to the encouragement of the demand of a bribe by Paramjeet Singh. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 9. Mr. Aditya Thakur, learned counsel for respondent no. 2 submitted that he never made any complaint against the present petitioner and the petitioner was arrayed as a party by the prosecution itself. Hence, appropriate orders be passed. 10. Mr. Vivek Sharma, learned counsel for respondent no. 3 submitted that he has to face the trial even if the petition is quashed qua the petitioner and he has nothing to say at this stage, therefore, he prayed that an appropriate order be passed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions at the bar and gone through the records carefully. 12. The principles of exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. were laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Supriya Jain vs. State of Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711 : 2023 SCC Online SC 765 wherein it was observed at page 716: “17. The principles to be borne in mind with regard to the quashing of a charge/ proceedings either in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397CrPC or Section 482CrPC or together, as the case may be, has engaged the attention of this Court many a time. Reference to each and every precedent is unnecessary. However, we may profitably refer to only one decision of this Court where upon a survey of almost all the precedents on the point, the principles have been summarised by this Court succinctly. In Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986, this Court laid down the following guiding principles: (SCC pp. 482-484, Para 27) “27........27.1. Though there are no limits to the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. 482-484, Para 27) “27........27.1. Though there are no limits to the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in the exercise of its inherent powers. 27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused. 27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender. 27.7. The process of the court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose. 27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith predominantly give rise to and constitute a “civil wrong” with no “element of criminality” and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. 27.9. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. 27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. 27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 27.12. In the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was the possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution. 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit a continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to deciding the admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. 27.14. Where the chargesheet, reported under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge. 27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to an abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debitojustitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone, the courts exist. *** *** *** 27.16. The power is to be exercised ex debitojustitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone, the courts exist. *** *** *** 27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence.” 13. Similar is the judgment in Gulam Mustafa vs. State of Karnataka, 2023 SCC Online SC 603 wherein it was observed: “26. Although we are not for verbosity in our judgments, a slightly detailed survey of the judicial precedents is in order. In State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335, this Court held: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala-fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala-fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. It was laid down in CBI vs. Aryan Singh, 2023 SCC Online SC 379, that the High Court cannot conduct a mini-trial while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. The allegations are required to be proved during the trial based on evidence led before the Court. It was observed: “10. From the impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has dealt with the proceedings before it, as if, the High Court was conducting a mini-trial and/or the High Court was considering the applications against the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court on conclusion of the trial. As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. The High Court in the common impugned judgment and order has observed that the charges against the accused are not proved. This is not the stage where the prosecution/investigating agency is/are required to prove the charges. The charges are required to be proved during the trial on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution/investigating agency. Therefore, the High Court has materially erred in going in detail in the allegations and the material collected during the course of the investigation against the accused, at this stage. The charges are required to be proved during the trial on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution/investigating agency. Therefore, the High Court has materially erred in going in detail in the allegations and the material collected during the course of the investigation against the accused, at this stage. At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider “whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not.” 11. One other reason pointed by the High Court is that the initiation of the criminal proceedings/proceedings is malicious. At this stage, it is required to be noted that the investigation was handed over to the CBI pursuant to the directions issued by the High Court. That thereafter, on conclusion of the investigation, the accused persons have been charge-sheeted. Therefore, the High Court has erred in observing at this stage that the initiation of the criminal proceedings/proceedings is malicious. Whether the criminal proceedings was/were malicious or not, is not required to be considered at this stage. The same is required to be considered at the conclusion of the trial. In any case, at this stage, what is required to be considered is a prima facie case and the material collected during the course of the investigation, which warranted the accused to be tried.” 15. It is apparent from these judgments that power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. can be exercised to prevent the abuse of the process or secure the ends of justice. The Court can quash the F.I.R. if the allegations do not constitute an offence or make out a case against the accused. However, it is not permissible for it to conduct a mini-trial to arrive at such findings. 16. A perusal of the complaint made by the informant shows that he had specifically mentioned that he had the conversation of the demand of a bribe which would be produced by him before the police. Thus, the informant had stated at the very beginning about the availability of the conversation. The transcript of the conversation dated 24.05.2018 shows that the petitioner was present during the meeting. Thus, the informant had stated at the very beginning about the availability of the conversation. The transcript of the conversation dated 24.05.2018 shows that the petitioner was present during the meeting. Even, the petitioner has not denied his presence in the meeting and stated that the meeting was organized to settle the differences between respondents no. 2 and 3. As per this conversation, the petitioner asked the parties to settle the matter between themselves. He stated what was the old matter between the two. Thereafter, he said that it should not happen that the relationship would deteriorate due to him. The petitioner is further heard to say no EOT is stuck in it. He further said that he did not know what was the amount. He again said that they would be knowing the amount and he was not aware of the amount. Paramjeet Singh is stated to have said that you should hand it over to Sahab. It is the same thing. I may not be available but Sahab is always available at Solan. Thereafter, Paramjeet is stated to have made a demand of Rs. 1,00,000/-. The informant questioned Paramjeet regarding the amount. Paramjeet confirmed it and said that this thing should not be discussed repeatedly as it did not look nice. Thereafter, the petitioner is stated to have said thank God it is Thursday. Then the matter regarding the construction was discussed and the petitioner said that are you becoming happy. Thereafter, the conversation is not clear. 17. The transcript of the conversation clearly shows that the petitioner was present in the beginning. He was present in the end and he remained silent when the demand of Rs. 1,00,000/-was made and confirmed to the informant. Therefore, the submission that the petitioner was not present during the conversation is not acceptable at this stage. 18. It was submitted that mere silence is not sufficient to implicate the petitioner. This submission is not acceptable. He was present in the end and he remained silent when the demand of Rs. 1,00,000/-was made and confirmed to the informant. Therefore, the submission that the petitioner was not present during the conversation is not acceptable at this stage. 18. It was submitted that mere silence is not sufficient to implicate the petitioner. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Judicial Committee of the Privy Council about a Century Ago in Barendra Kumar Ghosh vs. Emperor, AIR 1925 (PC) 1 that in crimes as in other things, “they also serve who only stand and wait.” It was observed: “[23] As soon, however, as the other sections of this part of the Code are looked at, it becomes plain that the words of Section 31 are not to be eviscerated by reading them in this exceedingly limited sense. By Section 33 a criminal act in Section 34 includes a series of acts and, further, “act” includes omission to act, for example, an omission to interfere to prevent a murder being done before one's very eyes. By Section 37, when any offence is committed by means of several acts, whoever intentionally co-operates in the commission of that offence by doing any one of those acts, either singly or jointly with any other person, commits that offence. Even if the appellant did nothing as he stood outside the door, it is to be remembered that in crimes as in other things, “they also serve who only stand and wait.” By Section 38, when several persons are engaged or concerned in the commission of a criminal act, they may be guilty of different offences by means of that act. Read together, these sections are reasonably plain. Section 34 deals with the doing of separate acts, similar or diverse, by several persons; if all are done in furtherance of a common intention, each person is liable for the result of them all, as if he had done them himself, for “that act” and “the act” in the latter part of the section must include the whole action covered by “a criminal act” in the first part because they refer to it. Section 37 provides that when several acts are done so as to result together in the commission of an offence, the doing of any one of them, with an intention to cooperate in the offence (which may not be the same as an intention common to all), makes the actor liable to be punished for the commission of the offence. Section 38 provides for different punishments for different offences as an alternative to one punishment for one offence, whether the persons engaged or concerned in the commission of a criminal act are set in motion by the one intention or by the other.” 19. Therefore, a person who has not actively participated but provided tacit approval cannot claim that he was not a party to the transaction. 20. It was laid down in Jamnalal Pande vs. State of M.P. 2010 Cri. L.J. 538: 2009 SCC Online M.P. 546 that the abetment not only includes instigation but also intentional aiding by an illegal omission. In the present case, the petitioner by omitting to clarify that no bribe needs to be paid had abetted the demand of bribe by accused Paramajeet. 21. It was submitted that the informant made a statement after more than 2 years, which shows mala fide on the part of the Investigating Officer. It was further submitted that a delay in recording the statement of the witness would make the testimony of the witness highly improbable. These considerations are not relevant at this stage because the Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is to accept the contents of the FIR and the result of the investigation as correct. It does not go into the veracity of the matter placed before it. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra vs. Maroti, (2023) 4 SCC 298 : 2022 SCC Online SC 1503 that the High Court exercising the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot examine the truthfulness, sufficiency and admissibility of the evidence. It was observed: “21. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra vs. Maroti, (2023) 4 SCC 298 : 2022 SCC Online SC 1503 that the High Court exercising the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot examine the truthfulness, sufficiency and admissibility of the evidence. It was observed: “21. If FIR and the materials collected disclose a cognizable offence and the final report filed under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. on completion of investigation based on it would reveal that the ingredients to constitute an offence under the POCSO Act and a prima facie case against the persons named therein as accused, the truthfulness, sufficiency or admissibility of the evidence are not matters falling within the purview of exercise of power under Section 482CrPC and undoubtedly they are matters to be done by the trial court at the time of trial. This position is evident from the decisions referred to supra. 22. In the decision in M.L. Bhatt vs. M.K. Pandita, (2023) 12 SCC 821 : 2002 SCC Online SC 1300 : JT (2002) 3 SC 89, this Court held that while considering the question of quashing of FIR the High Court would not be entitled to appreciate by way of sifting the materials collected in course of investigation including the statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. 23. In the decision in Rajeev Kourav vs. Baisahab, (2020) 3 SCC 317 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 51, a two-judge Bench of this Court dealt with the question as to the matters that could be considered by the High Court in quashment proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It was held therein that statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. being wholly inadmissible in evidence could not be taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. In that case, this Court took note of the fact that the High Court was aware that one of the witnesses mentioned that the deceased victim had informed him about the harassment by the accused, which she was not able to bear and hence wanted to commit suicide. Finding that the conclusion of the High Court to quash the criminal proceedings, in that case, was on the basis of its assessment of the statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. it was held that statements thereunder, being wholly inadmissible in evidence could not have been taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It was also held that the High Court committed an error in quashing the proceedings by assessing the statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C.” 22. In the present case, the charge sheet has been filed and it is for the learned Trial Court to see the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal vs. State of U.P. (2023) 8 SCC 734 : 2023 SCC Online SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and charge-sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence more particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, yet we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any case for discharge is made out or not.” 23. Therefore, this Court cannot say that the statement of the witnesses was recorded after the delay and it should be excluded from consideration. 24. Even otherwise, the statement of the informant is not relevant to determine the liability of the petitioner because the transcript of the audio conversation and the actual audio conversation show the approval of the demand for a bribe by the petitioner. 24. Even otherwise, the statement of the informant is not relevant to determine the liability of the petitioner because the transcript of the audio conversation and the actual audio conversation show the approval of the demand for a bribe by the petitioner. Therefore, even if the statement was recorded belatedly and is taken out of consideration, the same will not make any difference to the case of the prosecution and will not assist the petitioner in any manner. 25. Heavy reliance was placed upon the affidavit filed by the informant that no demand of a bribe was ever made by the present petitioner and the petitioner never said anything to the informant. The contents of this affidavit will also not assist the petitioner. It is not the case of the prosecution that the petitioner had demanded any bribe. The case is that the petitioner being a witness to the demand for a bribe by Paramjeet Singh had facilitated the demand by not doing anything. Therefore, the impression gained by the informant will be wholly immaterial for determining the liability of the petitioner. 26. It was further submitted that the informant has entered into a money transaction with the department and the conversation can be referred to some other transaction as well. Prima facie, the conversation can only refer to the demand for a bribe, as is confirmed by subsequent payment of the bribe. Even if a grave suspicion exists at this stage, the same is sufficient to try a person. The Court is not to see the guilt of innocence at this stage and that is the matter to be seen at the time of the conclusion of the trial. Therefore, this submission will also not assist the petitioner. 27. It was further submitted that there was no proper sanction. This is not correct. It is admitted even in the petition that sanction has been accorded by the Competent Authority. The authority has also reproduced the case against the petitioner in the sanction. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in R. Sundararajan vs. State, (2006) 12 SCC 749 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 563 : 2006 SCC Online SC 1094 that the Courts cannot sit in appeal over the sanctioning orders. It was observed: 14. The authority has also reproduced the case against the petitioner in the sanction. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in R. Sundararajan vs. State, (2006) 12 SCC 749 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 563 : 2006 SCC Online SC 1094 that the Courts cannot sit in appeal over the sanctioning orders. It was observed: 14. In this connection, it may be mentioned that we cannot look into the adequacy or inadequacy of the material before the sanctioning authority and we cannot sit as a court of appeal over the sanction order. The order granting sanction shows that all the available materials were placed before the sanctioning authority who considered the same in great detail. Only because some of the said materials could not be proved, the same by itself, in our opinion, would not vitiate the order of sanction. In fact in this case there was abundant material before the sanctioning authority, and hence we do not agree that the sanction order was in any way vitiated. 28. In the present case, the Sanctioning Authority has mentioned that it had examined the material namely copies of FIR, statement of witnesses and other documents. Whether there was proper application of mind or not is to be seen during the Trial and not at this stage. 29. It was submitted that the statement of the informant was not recorded under Section 164 of Cr. P.C. and that is fatal. This submission is also not acceptable. It is the prerogative of the investigating officer to decide whose statement is to be recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. No provision of law was brought to the notice of the Court, which obliges the investigating officer to get the statement of the witness recorded in every case. Hence, no advantage can be derived from the fact that the statement of the informant was not recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. 30. Reliance was also placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kapil Aggarwal vs. Sanjay Sharma, 2021 (5) SCC 524 to submit that the criminal proceedings should not be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment. There can be no dispute with this proposition of law. Reliance was also placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kapil Aggarwal vs. Sanjay Sharma, 2021 (5) SCC 524 to submit that the criminal proceedings should not be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment. There can be no dispute with this proposition of law. However, in the present case, a prima facie case exists against the petitioner for the abetment of the demand of a bribe; therefore, it cannot be said that the proceedings are without any basis. 31. No other point was urged. 32. In view of this, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed. 33. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.