JUDGMENT : SANDEEP SHARMA, J. 1. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with judgment dated 12.5.2016, passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court, whereby CWP No. 111 of 2009, titled Dr. Y.S. Parmar University and Another vs. Shri Pratap Singh and Another, having been filed by the appellants/petitioners, laying therein challenge to award dated 23.10.2008, passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Dharamshala, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh (herein after referred to as the “Industrial Tribunal”) came to be dismissed, appellants/petitioners have approached this Court in the instant LPA, praying therein to set aside the aforesaid impugned judgment. 2. Key facts, necessary for adjudication of the case at hand, are that being aggrieved on account of termination of his services without there being compliance of various provisions contained under the Industrial Disputes Act (herein after referred to as “the Act”), respondent No. 1 raised industrial dispute before the appropriate authority. Since conciliation failed, appropriate government under Section 10 (2) of the Act, made following reference: “Whether the termination of services of Sh. Pratap Singh, S/o Shri Chambal Ram workman by the (1) Registrar, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry, Nauni, Distt. Solan, H.P. (2) Executive Engineer (Const.), Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry, Nauni, Distt. Solan, H.P. w.e.f. 21.08.98 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is proper and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits and amount of compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to?” 3. Respondent No. 1 claimed before the Industrial Tribunal that he was initially engaged as daily paid labourer on 3.6.1995 against the work namely “construction of Training Hostel at Manali” which was a project work under NARP funded by the Government of India. Respondent No. 1 claimed that he worked with the appellants/petitioners/department on different intervals, but suddenly, after 20.8.1998, his services were dispensed with for want of work and funds. He submitted before the Industrial Tribunal that he worked continuously for five years with the department with 240 days in each calendar year. 4. While refuting the aforesaid claim put forth by the respondent, appellants/petitioners stated in their reply that respondent No. 1 was engaged for casual, specific and seasonal work under DARP, which was an adhoc project of the Government of India undertaken at the time of construction of training hostel at Manali. 4. While refuting the aforesaid claim put forth by the respondent, appellants/petitioners stated in their reply that respondent No. 1 was engaged for casual, specific and seasonal work under DARP, which was an adhoc project of the Government of India undertaken at the time of construction of training hostel at Manali. Appellants/petitioners also submitted in their reply that respondent No. 1 never completed 240 days continuously in any calendar year and at the time of his initial engagement, he had given undertaking in writing to the effect that he would not claim any seniority and regularization on account of seasonal engagement with appellants/petitioners. In nutshell, appellants/petitioners claimed that appointment/engagement of respondent No. 1 was co-terminus with the work of the hostel. 5. Respondent No. 1 controverted the aforesaid pleas set up by the appellants/petitioners by way of rejoinder. 6. After having perused aforesaid pleadings adduced on record by the respective parties as well as evidence, be it oculour or documentary, led on record, learned Industrial Tribunal vide award dated 23.10.2008, held respondent No. 1 entitled to reinstatement with 25% of back-wages alongwith the benefit of continuity of service. 7. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid award passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal, appellants/petitioners filed writ petition as detailed herein above in this Court, however, same also came to be dismissed vide judgment dated 12.5.2016 passed by the learned Single Judge. In the aforesaid background, appellants/petitioners have approached this Court in the instant appeal, praying therein to set-aside the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge. 8. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records of the case. 9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused material available on record vis-à-vis reasoning assigned in the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge, we are not persuaded to agree with Mr. B.N. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants/petitioners that learned Single Judge failed to appreciate the pleadings as well as evidence led on record in its right perspective, rather this court finds that learned Single Judge after having carefully examined each and every aspect of the matter rightly concurred with the finding returned by the learned Industrial Tribunal that termination of respondent No. 1 was bad in law. Though Mr. Though Mr. Mishra, while making this court peruse the pleadings as well as material adduced on record made a serious attempt to carve out a case that services of respondent No. 1 were engaged for a casual, specific and seasonal work under DARP, which was an adhoc project of the Government of India undertaken at the time of construction of training hostel at Manali, but he was unable to dispute that during service tenure of respondent No. 1 w.e.f. 17.9.1995 and 20.2.1998, he was not only made to work qua the aforesaid project, rather during the aforesaid period, his services were availed at various places that too under different projects. Daily Attendance Roll of Labourer (Ext.RW1/B) itself suggests that respondent No. 1 was engaged as daily wage paid labourer against the work of ‘Construction of Scientist Residence at R & S Seobagh BP’ on 3.6.1995. Apart from above, respondent is also shown to have been engaged against the work of construction of Farmer’s Hostel at Manali. Most importantly, as per the Daily Attendance Roll of the Labourers for the period after 21.5.1996, he was shown to have been engaged as DPL Beldar against the work ‘Trainee’s Hostel at Manali.” 10. Having carefully perused aforesaid Daily Attendance Roll (Ext.RW1/B), this court is compelled to concur with the findings returned by the learned Single Judge as well as learned Industrial Tribunal that Attendance Roll of the Labourer placed on record by the appellants/petitioners clearly suggests that respondent was not engaged for casual or seasonal work under NARP that too for one work namely “construction of training hostel at Manali.” Perusal of Attendance Roll (Ext.RW1/B) clearly reveals that w.e.f. 21.7.1995 till 20.2.1998, respondent had been regularly working, may be at different places for ‘Construction of Scientist Residence at R & S Seobagh BP’ on 3.6.1995, Construction of Farmer’s Hostel at Manali and Construction of training hostel at Kangra. Though appellants/petitioners attempted to carve out a case that all the works as detailed herein above were being done under adhoc government project, but such fact may not be of any relevance, especially when, it is not in dispute that work qua the aforesaid projects was being executed by the appellants/petitioners by engaging various persons, including respondent No. 1. 11. Though appellants/petitioners attempted to carve out a case that all the works as detailed herein above were being done under adhoc government project, but such fact may not be of any relevance, especially when, it is not in dispute that work qua the aforesaid projects was being executed by the appellants/petitioners by engaging various persons, including respondent No. 1. 11. It is quite apparent from the pleadings as well as material available on record that respondent No. 1 was not engaged for one work at Manali, rather his services were being utilized at different places for different works by the appellants/petitioners. Perusal of award passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal clearly reveals that despite sufficient opportunity, appellants/petitioners failed to place any material on record justifying or substantiating its stand that respondent No. 1 was appointed against the project work for a limited period and against a specific work. Similarly, it has been categorically recorded in Para-14 of the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge that even during the course of the arguments, learned counsel for the appellants/petitioners could not place on record any document, compelling the court to draw an inference that at the time of initial engagement, respondent No. 1 was expressly intimated/informed that his appointment will be co-terminus with the project, against which, he was allegedly engaged. 12. Month-Wise Attendance i.e. Ext.RW1/A clearly reveals that respondent worked for 240 days from the date he was illegally removed from the service without resorting to the provisions contained under the Act. Since respondent continuously worked for more than 240 days in last preceding 12 months from the date he was removed, it was incumbent upon the appellants/petitioners to serve one month notice upon the respondent or he was to be paid compensation as envisaged under the Act. Since respondent continuously worked for more than 240 days in last preceding 12 months from the date he was removed, it was incumbent upon the appellants/petitioners to serve one month notice upon the respondent or he was to be paid compensation as envisaged under the Act. Though having taken note of the fact that respondent No. 1 had completed more than 240 days during the preceding 12 months from the date he was removed, this Court need not ascertain the correctness of claim of the appellants/petitioners that respondent had furnished an undertaking at the time of his initial engagement that he shall not claim any seniority or regularization and his services shall be liable to be dispensed with, with the completion of the project, but even otherwise, undertaking, if any, given by the respondent may not be of much consequence because appellants/petitioners being mighty employer could always compel the respondent to furnish any kind of undertaking, who being a petty employee, had no option but to succumb to the illegal/unauthorized demand of the mighty employer to secure the job. 13. Leaving everything aside, since appellants/petitioners failed to refute the contention of the respondent that he had worked for more than 240 days during the preceding 12 months from the date of his illegal termination, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the court below while holding that termination of the respondent from service was in violation of Section 25 of the Act, which certainly casts a duty upon an employer to serve one month notice upon the workman before proposed termination, if any. Apart from above, it never came to be proved by the appellants/petitioners that at the time of the dis-engagement of the respondent, no work was available, rather during arguments before the learned Single Judge, parties to the lis specifically stated that respondent is still serving with the appellants/petitioners. Since work was available and services of the respondent have been disengaged in violation of provisions of 25 of the Act, coupled with the fact that persons junior to respondent No. 1 were retained, learned Single Judge ordered for reinstatement of the respondent with benefit of continuity in service. It is none of the case of the appellants/petitioners that respondent himself abandoned the job, rather he was prevented by the department to work despite there being availability of work. 14. It is none of the case of the appellants/petitioners that respondent himself abandoned the job, rather he was prevented by the department to work despite there being availability of work. 14. Needless to say that while exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the writ court has a limited scope to re-appreciate the findings of fact recorded by the Court below. In this regard, reliance is placed upon judgment passed in case Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi vs. M/s Hindalco Industries Ltd. 2014 AIR SCW 3157. Relevant paras of the of the aforesaid judgment read as under: “16.........The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior Courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior Courts or Tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is no entitled to act as an Appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened for questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the interference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.” 15. Having scanned the entire pleadings vis-à-vis evidence led on record, this Court finds no perversity in the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge as well as award passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal, as such, both are upheld. 16. In view of the detailed discussion made herein above, present appeal is dismissed being devoid of any merits alongwith pending applications, if any.