Aakif Ateeque Nachan v. N. I. A. , New Delhi Through Special P. P.
2023-01-05
BIRENDRA KUMAR, PANKAJ BHANDARI
body2023
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER 1. Heard the parties. 2. The appellant is one of the accused in FIR No. 150/2022 registered with Sadar Nimbaheda Police Station in the District of Chittorgarh for different offences under Explosive Substance Act as well as UAPA Act. The appellant was remanded in judicial custody on 17/05/2022. 3. On 18/08/2022, the appellant filed an application for default bail under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. Prayer was refused by the impugned order dated 30.08.2022 on the ground that before expiry of 90 days, the period for completion of investigation was extended upto 180 days on 22/06/2022 itself in exercise of power under Section 43-D (2)(b) of UAPA Act. 4. The investigation was completed on 22/09/2022 and chargesheet was filed in the case thereafter, cognizance has also been taken. 5. In one of the aforesaid appeals, the appellant has challenged the order dated 08/08/2022 whereby custody of the appellant was increased by 45 days i.e beyond 90 days without notice to the appellant. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the investigation was not completed within statutory period of 90 days from the date of custody of the appellant on 17/05/2022. Moreover, the period for completion of investigation was extended without giving notice/opportunity of hearing as well as without ensuring the presence of the appellant who was in custody, as such valuable fundamental right of the appellant under Article 21 of the Constitution was violated. Therefore, on the date of exercise of indefeasible right of bail the application for default bail ought to have been allowed. Even copy of the application for extension of time for completion of investigation was not supplied to the appellant. 7. Learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Jigar @ Jimmy Pravinchandra Adatiya vs. State of Gujarat (SLP Criminal No. 7696/21) decided on 23/09/2022 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court considering Sanjay Dutt’s case and held that before consideration of application for extension of time for completion of investigation, the accused must be informed and should have the right to be heard. Para 29, 30 & 31 of the judgment are being reproduced below:- "29.As noted earlier, the only modification made by the larger Bench in the case of Sanjay Dutt to the decision in the case of Hitendra Vishnu Thakur1 is about the mode of service of notice of the application for extension.
Para 29, 30 & 31 of the judgment are being reproduced below:- "29.As noted earlier, the only modification made by the larger Bench in the case of Sanjay Dutt to the decision in the case of Hitendra Vishnu Thakur1 is about the mode of service of notice of the application for extension. In so many words, in paragraph 53(2) (a) of the Judgment, this Court in the case of Sanjay Dutt held that it is mandatory to produce the accused at the time when the Court considers the application for extension and that the accused must be informed that the question of extension of the period of investigation is being considered. The accused may not be entitled to get a copy of the report as a matter of right as it may contain details of the investigation carried out. But, if we accept the submission of the respondents that the accused has no say in the matter, the requirement of giving notice by producing the accused will become an empty and meaningless formality. Moreover, it will be against the mandate of clause (b) of the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 167 of CrPC. It cannot be accepted that the accused is not entitled to raise any objection to the application for extension. The scope of the objections may be limited. The accused can always point out to the Court that the prayer has to be made by the Public Prosecutor and not by the investigating agency. Secondly, the accused can always point out the twin requirements of the report in terms of proviso added by sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the 2015 Act to sub-section (2) of Section 167 of Cr.PC. The accused can always point out to the Court that unless it is satisfied that full compliance is made with the twin requirements, the extension cannot be granted. 30. The logical and legal consequence of the grant of extension of time is the deprivation of the indefeasible right available to the accused to claim a default bail.
The accused can always point out to the Court that unless it is satisfied that full compliance is made with the twin requirements, the extension cannot be granted. 30. The logical and legal consequence of the grant of extension of time is the deprivation of the indefeasible right available to the accused to claim a default bail. If we accept the argument that the failure of the prosecution to produce the accused before the Court and to inform him that the application of extension is being considered by the Court is a mere procedural irregularity, it will negate the proviso added by sub section (2) of Section 20 of the 2015 Act and that may amount to violation of rights conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution. The reason is the grant of the extension of time takes away the right of the accused to get default bail which is intrinsically connected with the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. The procedure contemplated by Article 21 of the Constitution which is required to be followed before the liberty of a person is taken away has to be a fair and reasonable procedure. In fact, procedural safeguards play an important role in protecting the liberty guaranteed by Article 21. The failure to procure the presence of the accused either physically or virtually before the Court and the failure to inform him that the application made by the Public Prosecutor for the extension of time is being considered, is not a mere procedural irregularity. It is gross illegality that violates the rights of the accused under Article 21 31. An attempt was made to argue that the failure to produce the accused will not cause any prejudice to him. As noted earlier, the grant of extension of time to complete the investigation takes away the indefeasible right of the accused to apply for default bail. It takes away the right of the accused to raise a limited objection to the prayer for the extension. The failure to produce the accused before the Court at the time of consideration of the application for extension of time will amount to a violation of the right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. Thus, prejudice is inherent and need not be established by the accused. 8.
The failure to produce the accused before the Court at the time of consideration of the application for extension of time will amount to a violation of the right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. Thus, prejudice is inherent and need not be established by the accused. 8. Learned counsel appearing for National Investigation Agency contends that this appeal is not maintainable in view of the specific bar under Section 21 of NIA Act as impugned orders being interlocutory orders. 9. Learned counsel contends that the order of remand is an interlocutory order therefore, appeal is not maintainable. 10. Since valuable right of the appellant to be released on mandatory bail has been decided finally by the impugned order dated 30.08.2022, it is in the nature of intermediary order and not simple interlocutory order. 11. In the case of State rep. By Inspector of Police & Ors. vs. N.M.T. Joy Immaculate reported in AIR 2004 SC 2282 relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent, the accused was remanded to the police custody. 12. In the case on hand, the right of the appellant to be released on bail on default of non-conclusion of the investigation has been decided therefore, the impugned order is intermediary in nature as such challengable under Section 21 of the Act in this appeal. 13. Learned counsel for the respondent next contends that neither order of extension of time for completion of investigation was challenged anywhere nor as of today the appellant is in illegal detention as investigation of the case is already complete and cognizance has already been taken and remand of the appellant is under Section 309 Cr.P.C. within scope and ambit of power of the court. 14. The law is well settled that once the appellant exercised his right of indefeasible bail, it should have been decided forthwith whether investigation was complete or not and whether the appellant was entitled to bail or not. Due to not allowing an opportunity of notice and hearing to the accused-appellant at the time of extension of period for completion of investigation or extension of remand of the appellant on 08.08.2022 the constitutional right of the appellant to have fair opportunity to defend was taken away.
Due to not allowing an opportunity of notice and hearing to the accused-appellant at the time of extension of period for completion of investigation or extension of remand of the appellant on 08.08.2022 the constitutional right of the appellant to have fair opportunity to defend was taken away. In the circumstance, legality or otherwise of order of extension of period would also be taken note of while considering the correctness of the order of refusal of grant of bail under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. Therefore, only for the reason that an order which was passed in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution against the appellant is not under challenge, its correctness cannot be ignored while examining the correctness and legality of the subsequent action of refusal of peremptory bail. 15. Therefore, we are of the view that the investigation of the case was not completed within 90 days on the date of exercise of right by the appellant for indefeasible bail and the time for completion of investigation was extended against the well settled judicial pronouncements referred above violating the right of the appellant under Article 21 of the Constitution of India therefore, impugned orders are not sustainable in law. 16. Learned counsel for the respondent has relied on Devinder Pal Singh vs. Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi reported in (1996) 1 SCC 44 . 17. The aforesaid judgment was taken note of in Jimmy’s case (supra) while laying down that allowing an opportunity of hearing to the accused must be provided at the time of considering the prayer for extension of time for completion of investigation. Learned counsel for the respondent has relied on the following judgments:- 1. R.M. Ravindra vs. Intelligence Officer; (2021) 2 SCC 485 2. Uday Mohanlal Acharya vs. State of Maharashtra; (2001) 5 SCC 453 3. Hitendra Kumar vs. State of Maharashtra 1994 (4) SCC 602 4. Asst. Excise Commissioner vs. Esthappan Cherin (2021) 10 SCC 210 . Legal propositions decided in the above cases are not disputed here. 18. Learned counsel for the respondent contends that one more criminal case is pending against the appellant and allegation in the present case is also of very serious nature. 19.
Asst. Excise Commissioner vs. Esthappan Cherin (2021) 10 SCC 210 . Legal propositions decided in the above cases are not disputed here. 18. Learned counsel for the respondent contends that one more criminal case is pending against the appellant and allegation in the present case is also of very serious nature. 19. The pendency of another criminal case and seriousness of the allegation cannot be a ground to not complete the investigation within the statutory time and violating the fundamental right of the accused nor it would be a ground to not give notice of the prayer for extension of time to the accused. Therefore, we do not find any reason to accept the aforesaid submission. Accordingly, both the orders stands hereby set aside and the appeals are allowed. 20. Let the appellant be released forthwith on execution of surety bond of Rs. 2,00,000/-(two lakhs) alongwith two sureties of the like amount. One of the sureties must be resident of territorial jurisdiction of the court below. Since the charge sheet has already been submitted, the appellant shall remain present on each and every date till framing of the charges unless the trial court permits, on being satisfied with reasonable excuse of the appellant for his absence on any particular date. The appellant shall surrender passport to the court at the time of furnishing security and the appellant shall fully cooperate with the trial for its early conclusion. If the appellant breaches any of the conditions, the respondent would be at liberty to pray for cancellation of bail.