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2023 DIGILAW 591 (HP)

State of H. P. - v. Mehar Singh

2023-12-26

SATYEN VAIDYA, TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN

body2023
JUDGMENT : Satyen Vaidya, J. By way of instant petition, the State has sought leave to appeal against judgment of acquittal passed by learned Sessions Judge, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, H.P. in sessions Trial No. 18/7 of 2019, on 31st March, 2023. 2. On 25th May, 2019, a case was registered at Women Police Station, Hamirpur against the respondent under Sections 376 and 354-A of the IPC vide FIR Ex.PW14/A. 3. The case in brief as set up by the prosecution was that the prosecutrix was daughter-in-law of the respondent. She had alleged that respondent had committed rape on her for multiple times besides outraging her modesty. As per the prosecutrix, she was married to the son of respondent in July, 2018 and till the date of submission of compliant to the police, she had been raped thrice by the respondents, firstly, in the month of October, 2018, thereafter in the month of December, 2018 and lastly in April-May 2019. The prosecutrix had further alleged that she had complained about the sexual assaults made on her by the respondent to her husband and her mother-in-law, but none of them had helped her. 4. Lastly, the prosecutrix had made a complaint to her mother and the mother of the prosecutrix along with few of her relatives had visited the matrimonial house of prosecutrix. The prosecutrix had allegedly disclosed the details of misconduct on the part of the respondent to one of her female relatives. The matter was placed before the ‘Panchayat’ and on the advice of the ‘Panchayat’, the matter was reported to the police. 5. During investigation, the Medico Legal Examinations of the prosecutrix as also of respondent were conducted. 6. On completion of investigation, report under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. was present against the respondent. He was charged for commission of offences under Section 376 (f)(n) and 354-A of the IPC. 7. The prosecution examined total 18 witnesses. The respondent was examined under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. He did not lead any evidence in defence. 8. Learned trial court did not sufficient evidence against the respondent and vide impugned judgment acquitted the respondent of all charges. 9. We have heard learned Additional Advocate General for the State and have also gone through the records carefully. 10. The prosecutrix appeared in the witness box as PW-2 and narrated her woes. 8. Learned trial court did not sufficient evidence against the respondent and vide impugned judgment acquitted the respondent of all charges. 9. We have heard learned Additional Advocate General for the State and have also gone through the records carefully. 10. The prosecutrix appeared in the witness box as PW-2 and narrated her woes. She specifically mentioned that ugly things had started with the indecent advances shown by the respondent towards the prosecutrix. The respondent would outrage the modesty of the prosecutrix as and when he got the opportunity. In October 2018, as per the prosecutrix, she along with her husband and respondent had gone towards fields and jungle for collecting fuel wood. The husband of the prosecutrix was made to cut a tree at a particular place by the respondent and the prosecutrix was made to accompany him. The prosecutrix was thereafter raped by the respondent in the jungle despite resistance shown by her. Prosecutrix made a complaint to her husband and her mother-in-law, but without any result. In December, 2018, again the prosecutrix was raped by the respondent in a room in their house, whereas the husband and mother-in-law of the prosecutrix were stated to be engaged in some agricultural pursuits at some distance. To similar effect has the narration been made with respect to another episode of rape committed on prosecutrix by the respondent about 15-20 days prior to the lodging of complaint with the police. 11. No incriminating medical or scientific evidence was available with the prosecution against the respondent. Last incident of commission of rape on the prosecutrix by respondent was stated to have taken place about 15-20 days before the lodging of complaint. For obvious reason, there would be no medical evidence available at such a belated stage. Moreover, the prosecutrix herself has deposed in her testimony that she used to wash bed sheet on which the alleged crime was committed and also the cloth pieces with which respondent used to clean himself after commission of sexual assault. 12. Prosecution had cited the husband of prosecutrix as one of the witnesses to prove the allegations, but he did not support the prosecution case. Apart from this, there was no direct evidence to corroborate the allegations against the respondent. 13. In the aforementioned circumstances, the prosecution case rested only on the statement of the prosecutrix. 12. Prosecution had cited the husband of prosecutrix as one of the witnesses to prove the allegations, but he did not support the prosecution case. Apart from this, there was no direct evidence to corroborate the allegations against the respondent. 13. In the aforementioned circumstances, the prosecution case rested only on the statement of the prosecutrix. Learned trial Court after analysing the entire evidence and the facts emanating therefrom did not find the same to be worth credence and hence acquitted the respondent by affording him benefit of doubt. 14. We have also gone through the statements of prosecution witnesses and also the contents of various documents proved on record. There is no doubt that even the sole testimony of the prosecutrix can be sufficient to prove the charge of rape against the accused, provided that such statement inspires confidence. In the case in hand, the version put forth by the prosecutrix does not appear to be free from doubts. The prosecutrix for unexplainable reasons had delayed the disclosure of material facts beyond reasonable limits. As per her own version, the prosecutrix was raped for the first time in October, 2018. Though, she is alleged to have made a complaint to her husband and his mother, but the version of the prosecutrix does not appear to be convincing. In case of a serious charge of rape against the father-in-law, the prosecutrix having failed to convince her husband and mother-in-law, would have disclosed the facts either to her mother or any one in whom she could confide. It happened in the similar way in December, 2018 and in March-April, 2019 also. The prosecutrix has failed to submit any reasonable explanation for such a material lapse. 15. In one of her allegations, the prosecutrix had alleged that in October, 2018, she was raped by the respondent in a Jungle despite her resistance. The prosecutrix at that juncture could have easily come out with her allegations to the police or at least to her near relations and the evidence, if any, to corroborate her version could be preserved. What to talk of preservations of evidence, the prosecutrix has mentioned that she used to wash the clothes, which could provide evidence for the crime allegedly committed by the prosecution. 16. What to talk of preservations of evidence, the prosecutrix has mentioned that she used to wash the clothes, which could provide evidence for the crime allegedly committed by the prosecution. 16. Prosecution had alleged that the prosecutrix had disclosed entire details about her sexual exploitation to her one of the family relations, but no such relative was examined as a witness. 17. The respondent defended himself by alleging that he and his wife used to object to the conduct of the prosecutrix, whereby she had regularly been indulging in telephonic conversation with the strangers. The prosecutrix in her cross-examination has admitted that the respondent and his family members suspected the prosecutrix to be talking to her boyfriends. 18. Thus, huge gaps have remained in prosecution case and the most prominent being the unnatural conduct of the prosecutrix herself. On the basis of the material on record, we have no hesitation to hold that the findings and conclusions recorded by the learned trial Court are borne out from the material on record and cannot be said to be either illegal or perverse. 19. It is the settled proposition of law that in appeal against acquittal, no interference is called for in case the view taken by learned trial Court is a possible one and its findings do not suffer from perversity. The accused always has a benefit of presumption of being innocent till proof of charges against him beyond reasonable doubt. The acquittal by the learned trial Court doubles the strength of such presumption. 20. In Chandrappa and others vs. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 , it has been observed as under: “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge; (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law; (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 21. In State of Rajasthan vs. Kistoora Ram, 2022 SCC Online SC 984, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “ 8 . The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is very limited. Unless it is found that the view taken by the Court is impossible or perverse, it is not permissible to interfere with the finding of acquittal. Equally if two views are possible, it is not permissible to set aside an order of acquittal, merely because the Appellate Court finds the way of conviction to be more probable. The interference would be warranted only if the view taken is not possible at all.” 22. Similar reiteration of law can be found as under in Ravi Sharma vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) and another (2022) 8 SCC 536 : “8. Before venturing into the merits of the case, we would like to reiterate the scope of Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short ‘Cr.P.C.’) while deciding an appeal by the High Court, as the position of law is rather settled. We would like to quote the relevant portion of a recent judgment of this Court in Jafarudheen and Others v. State of Kerala (2022) 8 SCC 440 as follows: (SCC p. 454, para 25) 25. We would like to quote the relevant portion of a recent judgment of this Court in Jafarudheen and Others v. State of Kerala (2022) 8 SCC 440 as follows: (SCC p. 454, para 25) 25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 of the Cr.PC, the Appellate Court has to consider whether the Trial Court's view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the Appellate Court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the Trial Court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.” 9 . This Court in the aforesaid judgment has noted the following decision while laying down the law: (Jafarudheen case, SCC pp. 454-62, paras 26-27) “Precedents: 26. Mohan vs. State of Karnataka, (2022) 12 SCC 619 as hereunder: (SCC paras 20-23) ‘20. Section 378 CrPC enables the State to prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal. Section 384 CrPC speaks of the powers that can be exercised by the Appellate Court. When the trial court renders its decision by acquitting the accused, presumption of innocence gathers strength before the Appellate Court. As a consequence, the onus on the prosecution becomes more burdensome as there is a double presumption of innocence. Certainly, the Court of first instance has its own advantages in delivering its verdict, which is to see the witnesses in person while they depose. The Appellate Court is expected to involve itself in a deeper, studied scrutiny of not only the evidence before it, but is duty bound to satisfy itself whether the decision of the trial court is both possible and plausible view. When two views are possible, the one taken by the trial court in a case of acquittal is to be followed on the touchstone of liberty along with the advantage of having seen the witnesses. Article 21 of the Constitution of India also aids the accused after acquittal in a certain way, though not absolute. When two views are possible, the one taken by the trial court in a case of acquittal is to be followed on the touchstone of liberty along with the advantage of having seen the witnesses. Article 21 of the Constitution of India also aids the accused after acquittal in a certain way, though not absolute. Suffice it is to state that the Appellate Court shall remind itself of the role required to play, while dealing with a case of an acquittal. 21. Every case has its own journey towards the truth and it is the Court's role undertake. Truth has to be found on the basis of evidence available before it. There is no room for subjectivity, nor the nature of offence affects its performance. We have a hierarchy of courts in dealing with cases. An Appellate Court shall not expect the trial court to act in a particular way depending upon the sensitivity of the case. Rather it should be appreciated if a trial court decides a case on its own merit despite its sensitivity. 22. At times, courts do have their constraints. We find, different decisions being made by different courts, namely, trial court on the one hand and the Appellate Courts on the other. If such decisions are made due to institutional constraints, they do not augur well. The district judiciary is expected to be the foundational court, and therefore, should have the freedom of mind to decide a case on its own merit or else it might become a stereotyped one rendering conviction on a moral platform. Indictment and condemnation over a decision rendered, on considering all the materials placed before it, should be avoided. The Appellate Court is expected to maintain a degree of caution before making any remark. 23. This court, time and again has laid down the law on the scope of inquiry by an Appellate court while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC. We do not wish to multiply the aforesaid principle except placing reliance on a recent decision of this court in Anwar Ali v. State of Himanchal Pradesh, (2020) 10 SCC 166 : (SCC pp. 182-85, para 14). 14.2. We do not wish to multiply the aforesaid principle except placing reliance on a recent decision of this court in Anwar Ali v. State of Himanchal Pradesh, (2020) 10 SCC 166 : (SCC pp. 182-85, para 14). 14.2. When can the findings of fact recorded by a court be held to be perverse has been dealt with and considered in paragraph 20 of the aforesaid decision, which reads as under: [Babu v. State of Kerala, [ (2010) 9 SCC 189 , SCC p.199) “20. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is “against the weight of evidence”, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn. [ (1984) 4 SCC 635 ], Excise & Taxation Officer-cum- Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons [1992 Supp (2) SCC 312], Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665], Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [ (2001) 1 SCC 501 ], Arulvelu v. State, [ (2009) 10 SCC 206 ] and Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P. [ (2009) 10 SCC 636 ]).” It is further observed, after following the decision of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police [ (1999) 2 SCC 10 ], that if a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse, and the findings would not be interfered with. 14.3. In the recent decision of Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka, [ (2019) 5 SCC 436 ], this Court again had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 378 CrPC and the interference by the High Court [State of Karnataka v. Vijay Mohan Singh, 2013 SCC OnLine Kar 10732] in an appeal against acquittal. This Court considered a catena of decisions of this Court right from 1952 onwards. In para 31, it is observed and held as under: (Vijay Mohan Singh case, SCC pp. This Court considered a catena of decisions of this Court right from 1952 onwards. In para 31, it is observed and held as under: (Vijay Mohan Singh case, SCC pp. 447-49) “31. An identical question came to be considered before this Court in Umedbhai Jadavbhai v. State of Gujarat, [ (1978) 1 SCC 228 ]. In the case before this Court, the High Court interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court on reappreciation of the entire evidence on record. However, the High Court, while reversing the acquittal, did not consider the reasons given by the learned trial court while acquitting the accused. Confirming the judgment of the High Court, this Court observed and held in para 10 as under: Umedbhai Jadavbhai case, SCC p. 233) “10. Once the appeal was rightly entertained against the order of acquittal, the High Court was entitled to reappreciate the entievidence independently and come to its own conclusion. Ordinarily, the High Court would give due importance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge if the same were arrived at after proper appreciation of the evidence. This rule will not be applicable in the present case where the Sessions Judge has made an absolutely wrong assumption of a very material and clinching aspect in the peculiar circumstances of the case.” 31.1. In Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, [ (1998) 5 SCC 412 ], the High Court reversed the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court and held the accused guilty on reappreciation of the entire evidence on record, however, the High Court did not record its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. Confirming the order passed by the High Court convicting the accused on reversal of the acquittal passed by the learned trial court, after being satisfied that the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court was perverse and suffered from infirmities, this Court declined to interfere with the order of conviction passed by the High Court. While confirming the order of conviction passed by the High Court, this Court observed in para 8 as under: (SCC p.416) ‘8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned principles. While confirming the order of conviction passed by the High Court, this Court observed in para 8 as under: (SCC p.416) ‘8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned principles. We find that the High Court has not strictly proceeded in the manner laid down by this Court in Doshi case [Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225 ] viz. first recording its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable, which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal though the High Court has rendered a well- considered judgment duly meeting all the contentions raised before it. But then will this non-compliance per se justify setting aside the judgment under appeal? We think, not. In our view, in such a case, the approach of the court which is considering the validity of the judgment of an appellate court which has reversed the order of acquittal passed by the trial court, should be to satisfy itself if the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusions arrived at by it are demonstrably unsustainable and whether the judgment of the appellate court is free from those infirmities; if so to hold that the trial court judgment warranted interference. In such a case, there is obviously no reason why the appellate court's judgment should be disturbed. But if on the other hand the court comes to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court does not suffer from any infirmity, it cannot but be held that the interference by the appellate court in the order of acquittal was not justified; then in such a case the judgment of the appellate court has to be set aside as of the two reasonable views, the one in support of the acquittal alone has to stand. Having regard to the above discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of the trial court in this case.” 31.2. Having regard to the above discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of the trial court in this case.” 31.2. In K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kerala, [ (1999) 3 SCC 309 ], after observing that though there is some substance in the grievance of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused that the High Court has not adverted to all the reasons given by the trial Judge for according an order of acquittal, this Court refused to set aside the order of conviction passed by the High Court after having found that the approach of the Sessions Judge in recording the order of acquittal was not proper and the conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge on several aspects was unsustainable. This Court further observed that as the Sessions Judge was not justified in discarding the relevant/material evidence while acquitting the accused, the High Court, therefore, was fully entitled to reappreciate the evidence and record its own conclusion. This Court scrutinised the evidence of the eyewitnesses and opined that reasons adduced by the trial court for discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses were not at all sound. This Court also observed that as the evaluation of the evidence made by the trial court was manifestly erroneous and therefore it was the duty of the High Court to interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge. 31.3. In Atley v. State of U.P., [ AIR 1955 SC 807 ], in para 5, this Court observed and held as under: (AIR pp.809-10) “5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the judgment of the trial court being one of acquittal, the High Court should not have set it aside on mere appreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution unless it came to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial Judge was perverse. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 CrPC came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 CrPC came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order. It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well- established rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened by the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence have been recorded in its presence. It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal. If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in this connection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh v. State [1951 SCC 1207]; Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P. [1951 SCC 898]. In our opinion, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence and coming to its own conclusions.’ 31.4. In K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P., [ (1979) 1 SCC 355 ], this Court has observed that where the trial court allows itself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it is the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule.” 27. N. Vijayakumar v. State of T.N., [ (2021) 3 SCC 687 ] as hereunder: (SCC pp. 695-99, paras 20-21 & 23-24) ‘20. N. Vijayakumar v. State of T.N., [ (2021) 3 SCC 687 ] as hereunder: (SCC pp. 695-99, paras 20-21 & 23-24) ‘20. Mainly it is contended by Shri Nagamuthu, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant that the view taken by the trial court is a “possible view”, having regard to the evidence on record. It is submitted that the trial court has recorded cogent and valid reasons in support of its findings for acquittal. Under Section 378 CrPC, no differentiation is made between an appeal against acquittal and the appeal against conviction. By considering the long line of earlier cases this Court in the judgment in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, [ (2007) 4 SCC 415 ] has laid down the general principles regarding the powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal. Para 42 of the judgment which is relevant reads as under: (SCC p. 432) “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 21. Further in the judgment in Murugesan v. State, [ (2012) 10 SCC 383 ] relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, this Court has considered the powers of the High Court in an appeal against acquittal recorded by the trial court. In the said judgment, it is categorically held by this Court that only in cases where conclusion recorded by the trial court is not a possible view, then only the High Court can interfere and reverse the acquittal to that of conviction. In the said judgment, distinction from that of “possible view” to “erroneous view” or “wrong view” is explained. In clear terms, this Court has held that if the view taken by the trial court is a “possible view”, the High Court not to reverse the acquittal to that of the conviction. xxx xxx xxx 23. Further, in Hakeem Khan v. State of M.P., [ (2017) 5 SCC 719 ] this Court has considered the powers of the appellate court for interference in cases where acquittal is recorded by the trial court. In the said judgment it is held that if the “possible view” of the trial court is not agreeable for the High Court, even then such “possible view” recorded by the trial court cannot be interdicted. It is further held that so long as the view of the trial court can be reasonably formed, regardless of whether the High Court agrees with the same or not, verdict of the trial court cannot be interdicted and the High Court cannot supplant over the view of the trial court. Para 9 of the judgment reads as under: (SCC pp. 722-23) “9. Para 9 of the judgment reads as under: (SCC pp. 722-23) “9. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that the trial court's judgment is more than just a possible view for arriving at the conclusion of acquittal, and that it would not be safe to convict seventeen persons accused of the crime of murder i.e. under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Penal Code. The most important reason of the trial court, as has been stated above, was that, given the time of 6.30 p.m. to 7.00 p.m. of a winter evening, it would be dark, and, therefore, identification of seventeen persons would be extremely difficult. This reason, coupled with the fact that the only independent witness turned hostile, and two other eyewitnesses who were independent were not examined, would certainly create a large hole in the prosecution story. Apart from this, the very fact that there were injuries on three of the accused party, two of them being deep injuries in the skull, would lead to the conclusion that nothing was premeditated and there was, in all probability, a scuffle that led to injuries on both sides. While the learned counsel for the respondent may be right in stating that the trial court went overboard in stating that the complainant party was the aggressor, but the trial court's ultimate conclusion leading to an acquittal is certainly a possible view on the facts of this case. This is coupled with the fact that the presence of the kingpin Sarpanch is itself doubtful in view of the fact that he attended the Court at some distance and arrived by bus after the incident took place.” 24. By applying the abovesaid principles and the evidence on record in the case on hand, we are of the considered view that having regard to material contradictions which we have already noticed above and also as referred to in the trial court judgment, it can be said that acquittal is a “possible view”. By applying the ratio as laid down by this Court in the judgments which are stated supra, even assuming another view is possible, same is no ground to interfere with the judgment of acquittal and to convict the appellant for the offence alleged. By applying the ratio as laid down by this Court in the judgments which are stated supra, even assuming another view is possible, same is no ground to interfere with the judgment of acquittal and to convict the appellant for the offence alleged. From the evidence, it is clear that when the Inspecting Officer and other witnesses who are examined on behalf of the prosecution, went to the office of the appellant-accused, the appellant was not there in the office and office was open and people were moving out and in from the office of the appellant. It is also clear from the evidence of PWs 3, 5 and 11 that the currency and cellphone were taken out from the drawer of the table by the appellant at their instance. There is also no reason, when the tainted notes and the cellphone were given to the appellant at 5.45 p.m. no recordings were made and the appellant was not tested by PW 11 till 7.00 p.m.” 23. Keeping in view the above exposition of law and the facts of the case, no interference with the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 31.03.2023, passed by learned Sessions Judge, Bilaspur, in Sessions Trial No.18/7 of 2019, is required. 24. Consequently, leave to appeal is denied. Records be also sent back forthwith.