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2023 DIGILAW 592 (RAJ)

Narayan Shankar Upadhyaya, S/o. Shri Madan Mohan Upadhyaya v. Rajasthan Rajya Vidhyut Prasaran Nigam Limited

2023-02-23

ANOOP KUMAR DHAND

body2023
ORDER : 1. The issue involved in this petition is that “whether the petitioner can withdraw his resignation after its acceptance?” 2. Facts of the case as per the petitioner, are that the petitioner was appointed as Overseer (Electrical) and he joined the said post on 22.09.1975 as a pre-service trainee. Thereafter he was appointed as Junior Engineer/Overseer and on 29.9.2003 he was promoted to the post of Assistant Engineer (E&M). 3. The petitioner submitted a notice dated 1.8.2008 under Regulation 18(3) of the RSEB Employees Service Regulations, 1964 (for short “Regulations 1964”) seeking voluntary retirement (for short “VRS”) with effect from (for short ”w.e.f.”) 15.11.2008, but the said application was rejected by the respondent vide order dated 5.11.2008, on account of shortage of manpower. After that, again a similar application was submitted for seeking VRS on 10.12.2008 stating therein that his 80 years old father is suffering from Prostate and wife is suffering from Arthritis (pain in joints) and due to his busy schedule of duties, he is not in a position to take care of his family, due to which he remains under depression. But no order was passed on this second application, hence he sent reminder on 29.1.2009 but no orders were passed on these applications. 4. The petitioner tendered his resignation on 13.4.2009 before the respondent with request to accept his resignation w.e.f. 16.5.2009. 5. In terms of Regulation 16 of the Regulations 1964, the respondent accepted the resignation of the petitioner vide order dated 14.5.2009 w.e.f. 16.5.2009 and the order dated 14.5.2009 was communicated to the petitioner. After receipt of the order dated 14.5.2009, the petitioner submitted an application on 25.5.2009 to the respondent that a mistake has been committed by him, so the petitioner be reinstated back in service. After receipt of the order dated 14.5.2009, the petitioner submitted an application on 25.5.2009 to the respondent that a mistake has been committed by him, so the petitioner be reinstated back in service. When the petitioner was not reinstated back in service, the petitioner submitted this petition before this court with the following prayer :- “It is, therefore, prayed that the Hon’ble Court may call for the entire record concerning the case and by issuing writ, order or direction or in the nature thereof; (i) quash the orders dated 5.11.2008 and 14.5.2009 and treat the petitioner to be deemed to have retired voluntarily from service and be given all consequential benefits from the said date alongwith interest thereto; (ii) further quash the order dated 5.11.2008 and hold that the respondent could not have rejected the application of voluntary retirement on the ground mentioned therein; (iii) any other order or direction as may be deemed fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may also be passed in favour of humble petitioner;” 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner rendered thirty-three and a half years in service and contributed amount in his pension fund. Counsel submits that on account of family circumstances, it was not possible for the petitioner to continue with the service that is why he submitted the application seeking voluntary retirement, but the same was rejected by the respondent on the ground of shortage of staff. Counsel submits that when the petitioner tendered resignation for the same family reasons, his resignation was accepted by the respondent vide impugned order dated 14.5.2009. Counsel submits that such action of the respondent smells mala fide on their part because once application of the petitioner for voluntary retirement was denied on the ground of shortage of staff, then there was no occasion available with the respondent to accept his resignation because staff was short at that point of time also. Counsel submits that the petitioner cannot be deprived to get pensionary and other service benefits because the petitioner has rendered thirty-three and a half years service with the department and his equal amount of contribution was deducted from his salary. In support of his contentions he has placed reliance on the following judgments :- (i) Sheel Kumar Jain v. The New India Assurance Company Ltd. & Ors. In support of his contentions he has placed reliance on the following judgments :- (i) Sheel Kumar Jain v. The New India Assurance Company Ltd. & Ors. (2011) 12 SCC 197 (ii) Shashikala Devi v. Central Bank of India, (2014) 16 SCC 260 (iii) Senior Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India Ltd. & Ors. v. Shree Lal Meena, (2019) 4 SCC 479 (iv) Binod Kumar Singh v. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Ltd., [S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1676/2009 decided on 1.4.2022] 7. Counsel submits that in view of the submissions made herein above, the impugned orders dated 5.11.2008 and 14.5.2009 may be quashed and set aside and the respondent may be directed to treat the petitioner as voluntarily retired and grant him all service and consequential benefits. 8. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent opposed the arguments raised by the counsel for the petitioner and submitted that the petitioner tendered resignation by way of filing application on 13.4.2009 and the resignation was accepted on 14.5.2009. Counsel submits that there is no provision to withdraw the resignation under the Regulations 1964. Counsel submitted that the petitioner is estopped to challenge his own action and now he cannot be allowed to question the legality of the act done by himself. In support of his contentions, he has placed reliance on the judgment of B.L. Sreedhar & Ors. v. K.M. Munireddy (Dead) & Ors., (2003) 2 SCC 355 . Counsel submits that under these circumstances, interference of this court is not warranted. 9. This court has gone through the arguments raised by the respective counsel for the parties and perused the material available on the record and considered the judgments cited at Bar. 10. This fact is not in dispute that the petitioner submitted an application seeking voluntary retirement on account of his family circumstances but the application was rejected by the respondent for the reason of shortage of manpower. It appears that when VRS of the petitioner was not accepted, then he moved an application seeking resignation on 13.4.2009 for accepting the same w.e.f. 16.5.2009 and the application was accepted by the Chairman & Managing Director on 14.5.2009 and the resignation of the petitioner was accepted w.e.f. 16.5.2009 in terms of Regulation 16 of the Regulations 1964. It is to be noted that the term 'Resignation' means the act of giving up or relinquishing the office. It is to be noted that the term 'Resignation' means the act of giving up or relinquishing the office. To constitute a 'Resignation', it must be an unconditional one and with an intent to operate as such. In reality, a 'Resignation' of a public office to be effective must be made with an intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by an act of relinquishment. Suffice it for this Court to point out that 'Resignation' means a spontaneous relinquishment of one's own right and in relation to an office. In general, juristic sense, in order to constitute a complete and operative resignation, there must be an intention to give up or relinquish the office and the concomitant act of its relinquishment as per decision Moti Ram Vs. Param Dev reported in AIR 1993 SC at page 1662. 11. The relinquishment of one's own right meaning 'Resignation' is conveyed by the Latin maxim 'Resignation est juris propii spontanea refutatio'. In relation to the office, resignation connotes 'to lose hold of the office' or 'to leave the job'. Indisputably, the resignation of an employee from a particular office when it was accepted by the authorities, then terminates the status of 'Master and Servant'. In Law, an employee had no Locus Poenitentiae to withdraw his offer of resignation after it was accepted. 12. In this connection, it is not out of place for this court to make a relevant mention that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision of Dr. Prabha Atri V. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in AIR 2003 SC at page 534, had observed that ‘to constitute resignation the letter of resignation must be unconditional and with an intention to operate as such’. Where a person submits a resignation, then in such contingency, the question of holding an enquiry never arises and the authorities are left with no alternative but to terminate his services as per decision R.N. Mohindra v. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in AIR 1953 HP 125 . After all, 'Resignation' is a 'Bilateral Concept'. The service of a Government servant normally stands terminated from the date on which the letter of resignation is accepted by the authorities as per decision Raj Narain v. Srimati Indira Gandhi reported in AIR 1973 SC at page 1302. Moreover, acceptance of resignation does not amount to 'dismissal'. 13. After all, 'Resignation' is a 'Bilateral Concept'. The service of a Government servant normally stands terminated from the date on which the letter of resignation is accepted by the authorities as per decision Raj Narain v. Srimati Indira Gandhi reported in AIR 1973 SC at page 1302. Moreover, acceptance of resignation does not amount to 'dismissal'. 13. It is worthy to note here that the petitioner sought voluntary retirement but his application was rejected on the ground of lack of staff. Thereafter he tendered his resignation on 13.4.2009 due to family reasons and the same was accepted by the respondent w.e.f. 16.5.2009 vide order dated 14.5.2009 and this order was communicated to the petitioner. After receipt of the impugned order dated 14.5.2009, the petitioner did not remain in service. The petitioner was in service so long as his resignation was not accepted. Once his resignation is accepted on 14.5.2009, now the question arises that whether the petitioner can be allowed to withdraw his resignation and whether he can be allowed to say that his resignation be treated as voluntary retirement and whether he can be allowed to get service and pensionary benefits as if he remained in service for thirty-three and a half years. 14. Before dealing with the answer of the above issue, it is gainful to quote here the relevant provisions of ‘Voluntary Retirement’ and ‘Notice for quitting service’ (i.e. resignation). Regulation 18(3)(a) of Regulations 1964 deals with the provision of ‘Voluntary Retirement’ and the same is reproduced here under :- “18(3)(a)Retirement on completion of 20 years qualifying service: A Board employee may, after giving at-least 3 months notice in writing to the Appointing Authority, retire from Board’s service on the date on which he completes 15 years of qualifying service or attains the age of 45 years whichever is earlier or any date thereafter to be specified in the notice. Provided that it shall be open to the Appointing Authority to withhold permission to retire a Board employee; (i) who is under suspension; (ii) in whose case disciplinary proceedings are pending or contemplated for the imposition of a major penalty and the disciplinary authority having regard to the circumstances of the case, might is of the view that such disciplinary proceeding might result in imposition of the penalty of removal or dismissal from service; (iii) in whose case prosecution is contemplated or may have been launched in a Court of law. Note: The Chairman is authorized to decide the cases of officers seeking voluntary retirement in whose cases the Board is the appointing authority. (b) A Board employee who has given notice for seeking retirement under clause(a) of this sub-regulation, may presume acceptance of the notice of retirement and the retirement shall be effective in terms of the notice automatically unless an order in writing to the contrary has been issued by the Competent Authority and served upon the Board’s employee before the expiry of the period of the notice.” Likewise, Regulation 16 of the Regulations 1964 deals with the provision of notice for quitting service i.e. ‘resignation’ and the same is reproduced as under:- “An employee, shall not leave or discontinue the service in the Board without first giving one month’s notice in writing to the authority competent to make appointment to the post he is holding at the time of his intention to leave or discontinue the service. Provided that such notice may be waived in part or in full by the competent authority at its discretion.” 15. Here, in this case the petitioner applied for taking voluntary retirement but the request was turned down on 5.11.2008. Thereafter the petitioner tendered resignation notice on 13.4.2009, which was accepted on 14.5.2009 with effect from 16.5.2009. After acceptance of resignation, the petitioner submitted application to treat his resignation as voluntary retirement. The denial of voluntary retirement does not mitigate the legal consequences that flow from resignation. Service of the petitioner stands forfeited upon his resignation. 16. The similar issue was dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of BSES Yamuna Power Ltd. v. Ghanshyam Chand Sharma & Ors., (2020) 3 SCC 346 , and it has been held in paras 14 to 15 as under :- “14. This argument cannot be accepted. Service of the petitioner stands forfeited upon his resignation. 16. The similar issue was dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of BSES Yamuna Power Ltd. v. Ghanshyam Chand Sharma & Ors., (2020) 3 SCC 346 , and it has been held in paras 14 to 15 as under :- “14. This argument cannot be accepted. Even if he was denied voluntary retirement on 25 May 1990, the first Respondent did not challenge this decision but resigned, on 7 July 1990. The denial of voluntary retirement does not mitigate the legal consequences that flow from resignation. No evidence has been placed on the record to show that the first Respondent took issue with the denial of voluntary retirement between 25 May 1990 and 7 July 1990. To the contrary, in the legal notice dated 1 December 1992 sent by the first Respondent to the Appellant, the first Respondent admitted to having resigned. The first Respondent’s writ petition was instituted thirteen years after the denial of voluntary retirement and eventual resignation. In the light of these circumstances, the denial of voluntary retirement cannot be invoked before this Court to claim pensionary benefits when the first Respondent has admittedly resigned. 15. On the issue of whether the first Respondent has served twenty years, we are of the opinion that the question is of no legal consequence to the present dispute. Even if the first Respondent had served twenty years, Under Rule 26 of the CCS Pension Rules his past service stands forfeited upon resignation. The first Respondent is therefore not entitled to pensionary benefits. 17. Perusal of the above judgment clearly indicates the situation that denial of voluntary retirement does not mitigate the legal consequences that flow from resignation. In the light of the circumstances as indicated above, the denial of voluntary retirement cannot be allowed to be invoked before this court to claim pensionary benefits when the petitioner has admittedly resigned. Even if the petitioner has served for more than thirty-three years, his services stand forfeited under Regulation 16 of the Regulations 1964 upon his resignation. The petitioner is, therefore, not entitled for pensionary benefits. 18. Now this court proceeds to decide the issue involved in this petition. 18.1 Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of AIR India Express Limited & Ors. v. Capt. The petitioner is, therefore, not entitled for pensionary benefits. 18. Now this court proceeds to decide the issue involved in this petition. 18.1 Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of AIR India Express Limited & Ors. v. Capt. Gurdarshan Kaur Sandhu (2019) 17 SCC 129 , has dealt with the circumstances under which an employee can withdraw the resignation tendered by him and what are the limitations to the exercise of such right, have been dealt by the Hon’ble Supreme Court after considering number of decisions of Hon’ble Apex Court in paras 11 to 12 as under :- “11. The circumstances under which an employee can withdraw the resignation tendered by him and what are the limitations to the exercise of such right, have been dealt by this Court in a number of decisions. 11.1 In Jai Ram v. Union of India AIR 1954 SC 584 , the Government servant concerned was to attain age of 55 years on 26.11.1946. He applied on 07.05.1945 for leave preparatory to retirement in terms of Fundamental Rule 86. The request was finally allowed and he was given 6 months' leave which was to expire on 25.05.1947. Ten days before such expiry i.e. on 16.05.1947, he sent an intimation that he would resume his duties which request was rejected. The submission that the age of retirement was 60 years was rejected by this Court. The submission that in terms of Rule 56(b)(i) of Chapter IX of the Fundamental Rules, if found efficient, he could have continued till he attained the age of 60 years, was rejected. It was observed that when a public servant himself expresses his inability to continue in service any longer and seeks permission for retirement, the required exercise in terms of said Rule 56(b)(i) to decide whether to continue him beyond the age of 55 years was rightly not undertaken and the age of retirement for him would be 55 years. It was observed that when a public servant himself expresses his inability to continue in service any longer and seeks permission for retirement, the required exercise in terms of said Rule 56(b)(i) to decide whether to continue him beyond the age of 55 years was rightly not undertaken and the age of retirement for him would be 55 years. In the context whether he could apply for resuming duties on 16.05.1947, it was observed by the Constitution Bench of this Court: “7… It may be conceded that it is open to a servant, who has expressed a desire to retire from service and applied to his superior officer to give him the requisite permission, to change his mind subsequently and ask for cancellation of the permission thus obtained; but he can be allowed to do so long as he continues in service and not after it has terminated. As we have said above, the Plaintiff's service ceased on the 27th of November 1946; the leave, which was allowed to him subsequent to that date, was post-retirement leave which was granted under the special circumstances mentioned in F.R. 86. He could not be held to continue in service after 26.11.1946, and consequently it was no longer competent to him to apply for joining his duties on the 16.5.1947, even though the postretirement leave had not yet run out. In our opinion, the decision of the Letters Patent Bench of the High Court is right and this appeal should stand dismissed.” 11.2 In Raj Kumar v. Union of India (1968) 3 SCR 857 , an officer belonging to the Indian Administrative Service tendered resignation and addressed a letter to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Rajasthan on 30.08.1964 that it may be forwarded to the Government of India with remarks of the State Government. The State Government recommended that the resignation be accepted and on 31.10.1964 the Government of India requested the Chief Secretary to the State Government "to intimate the date on which the Appellant was relieved of his duties so that a formal notification could be issued in that behalf". Before the date could be intimated and formal notification could be issued, the officer withdrew his resignation by letter dated 27.11.1964. On 29.03.1965 an order accepting his resignation was issued. Before the date could be intimated and formal notification could be issued, the officer withdrew his resignation by letter dated 27.11.1964. On 29.03.1965 an order accepting his resignation was issued. The challenge raised by the officer was rejected and the High Court held that the resignation became effective on the date the Government of India had accepted it. While dismissing the appeal, a Bench of three Judges of this Court observed: “4. The letters written by the appellant on 21.8.1964, and 30.8.1964, did not indicate that the resignation was not to become effective until acceptances thereof was intimated to the appellant. The appellant informed the authorities of the State of Rajasthan that his resignation may be forwarded for early acceptance. On the plain terms of the letters, the resignation was to become effective as soon as it was accepted by the appointing authority. No Rule has been framed Under Article 309 of the Constitution which enacts that for an order accepting the resignation to be effective, it must be communicated to the person submitting his resignation. 5. Our attention was invited to a judgment of this Court in State of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika AIR 1966 SC 1313 , in which it was held that an order of dismissal passed by an authority and kept on its file without communicating it to the officer concerned or otherwise publishing it did not take effect as from the date on which the order was actually written out by the said authority; such an order could only be effective after it was communicated to the officer concerned or was otherwise published. The principle of that case has no application here. Termination of employment by order passed by the Government does not become effective until the order is intimated to the employee. But where a public servant has invited by his letter of resignation determination of his employment, his services normally stand terminated from the date on which the letter of resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority and in the absence of any law or Rule governing the conditions of his service to the contrary, it will not be open to the public servant to withdraw his resignation after it is accepted by the appropriate authority. Till the resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority in consonance with the Rules governing the acceptance, the public servant concerned has locus poenitentiae but not thereafter. Undue delay in intimating to the public servant concerned the action taken on the letter of resignation may justify an inference that resignation has not been accepted. In the present case the resignation was accepted within a short time after it was received by the Government of India. Apparently the State of Rajasthan did not immediately implement the order, and relieve the appellant of his duties, but the appellant cannot profit by the delay in intimating acceptance or in relieving him of his duties.” 11.3 In Union of India and Ors. v. Gopal Chandra Misra (1978) 2 SCC 301 , the issue for consideration was whether a High Court Judge, who had by letter in his own hand writing sent to the President intimated his intention to resign the office with effect from a future date would be competent to withdraw the resignation before the date had reached? The decisions in Jai Ram AIR 1954 SC 584 and Raj Kumar (1968) 3 SCR 857 were considered and while dealing with the scope of clause (a) of the proviso to Article 217 of the Constitution, the Constitution Bench of this Court stated: “20. Here, in this case, we have to focus attention on clause (a) of the proviso. In order to terminate his tenure under this clause, the Judge must do three volitional things: Firstly, he should execute a "writing under his hand". Secondly, the writing should be "addressed to the President". Thirdly, by that writing he should "resign his office". If any of these things is not done, or the performance of any of them is not complete, clause (a) will not operate to cut short or terminate the tenure of his office. 22. It may be observed that the entire edifice of this reasoning is founded on the supposition that the "Judge" had completely performed everything which he was required to do under proviso (a) to Article 217(1). We have seen that to enable a Judge to terminate his term of office by his own unilateral act, he has to perform three things. It may be observed that the entire edifice of this reasoning is founded on the supposition that the "Judge" had completely performed everything which he was required to do under proviso (a) to Article 217(1). We have seen that to enable a Judge to terminate his term of office by his own unilateral act, he has to perform three things. In the instant case, there can be no dispute about the performance of the first two, namely: (i) he wrote a letter under his hand, (ii) addressed to the President. Thus, the first two pillars of the ratiocinative edifice raised by the High Court rest on sound foundations. But, is the same true about the third, which indisputably is the chief prop of that edifice? Is it a completed act of resignation within the contemplation of proviso (a)? This is the primary question that calls for an answer. If the answer to this question is found in the affirmative, the appeals must fail. If it be in the negative, the foundation for the reasoning of the High Court will fail and the appeals succeed.” 11.4 The tenor and the effect of resignation were then considered in paragraph 28 and it was held that the letter in question was merely an intimation or notice to resign the office on a future date and it was open to withdraw the resignation before the arrival of the indicated future date. The observations were: (Gopal Chandra Misra case, SCC p.311, para 28) “28. The substantive body of this letter (which has been extracted in full in a foregoing part of this judgment) is comprised of three sentences only. In the first sentence, it is stated: ‘I beg to resign my office as Judge, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.’ Had this sentence stood alone, or been the only content of this letter, it would operate as a complete resignation in praesenti, involving immediate relinquishment of the office and termination of his tenure as Judge. But this is not so. The first sentence is immediately followed by two more, which read: ’I will be on leave till 31.7.1977. My resignation shall be effective on 1.8.1977.’ The first sentence cannot be divorced from the context of the other two sentences and construed in isolation. It has to be read along with the succeeding two which qualify it. The first sentence is immediately followed by two more, which read: ’I will be on leave till 31.7.1977. My resignation shall be effective on 1.8.1977.’ The first sentence cannot be divorced from the context of the other two sentences and construed in isolation. It has to be read along with the succeeding two which qualify it. Construed as a whole according to its tenor, the letter dated 7.5.1977, is merely an intimation or notice of the writer's intention to resign his office as Judge, on a future date viz. 1.8.1977. For the sake of convenience, we might call this communication as a prospective or potential resignation, but before the arrival of the indicated future date it was certainly not a complete and operative resignation because, by itself, it did not and could not, sever the writer from the office of the Judge, or terminate his tenure as such.” 11.5 The Court went on to state the principles as: “41. The general principle that emerges from the foregoing conspectus, is that in the absence of anything to the contrary in the provisions governing the terms and conditions of the office/post, an intimation in writing sent to the competent authority by the incumbent, of his intention or proposal to resign his office/post from a future specified date can be withdrawn by him at any time before it becomes effective, i.e. before it effects termination of the tenure of the office/post or the employment. 50. It will bear repetition that the general principle is that in the absence of a legal, contractual or constitutional bar, a "prospective" resignation can be withdrawn at any time before it becomes effective, and it becomes effective when it operates to terminate the employment or the office-tenure of the resignor. This general Rule is equally applicable to government servants and constitutional functionaries. In the case of a government servant/or functionary/who cannot, under the conditions of his service/or office, by his own unilateral act of tendering resignation, give up his service/or office, normally, the tender of resignation becomes effective and his service/or office-tenure terminated, when it is accepted by the competent authority. In the case of a government servant/or functionary/who cannot, under the conditions of his service/or office, by his own unilateral act of tendering resignation, give up his service/or office, normally, the tender of resignation becomes effective and his service/or office-tenure terminated, when it is accepted by the competent authority. In the case of a Judge of a High Court, who is a constitutional functionary and under proviso (a) to Article 217(1) has a unilateral right or privilege to resign his office, his resignation becomes effective and tenure terminated on the date from which he, of his own volition, chooses to quit office. If in terms of the writing under his hand addressed to the President, he resigns in praesenti, the resignation terminates his office-tenure forthwith, and cannot therefore, be withdrawn or revoked thereafter. But, if he by such writing, chooses to resign from a future date the act of resigning office is not complete because it does not terminate his tenure before such date and the Judge can at any time before the arrival of that prospective date on which it was intended to be effective, withdraw it, because the Constitution does not bar such withdrawal.” 11.6 As regards the applicability of the Rule in Jai Ram AIR 1954 SC 584 , it was stated: “49. In our opinion, none of the aforesaid reasons given by the High Court for getting out of the ratio of Jai Ram case is valid. Firstly, it was not a "casual" enunciation. It was necessary to dispose of effectually and completely the second point that had been canvassed on behalf of Jai Ram. Moreover, the same principle was reiterated pointedly in 1968 in Raj Kumar case. Secondly, a proposal to retire from service/office and a tender to resign office from a future date for the purpose of the point under discussion, stand on the same footing. Thirdly, the distinction between a case where the resignation is required to be accepted and the one where no acceptance is required, makes no difference to the applicability of the Rule in Jai Ram case.” 11.7 In Balram Gupta v. Union of India 1987 (Supp) SCC 228 the concerned officer was an accountant in the Photo Division of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. While holding that the matter was covered by the decisions of this Court in Raj Kumar (1968) 3 SCR 857 and Gopal Chandra Misra (1978) 2 SCC 301 , this Court considered the relevant guidelines and observed: “12. In this case the guidelines are that ordinarily permission should not be granted unless the officer concerned is in a position to show that there has been a material change in the circumstances in consideration of which the notice was originally given. In the facts of the instant case such indication has been given. The appellant has stated that on the persistent and personal requests of the staff members he had dropped the idea of seeking voluntary retirement. We do not see how this could not be a good and valid reason. It is true that he was resigning and in the notice for resignation he had not given any reason except to state that he sought voluntary retirement. We see nothing wrong in this. In the modern age we should not put embargo upon people's choice or freedom. If, however, the administration had made arrangements acting on his resignation or letter of retirement to make other employee available for his job, that would be another matter but the appellant's offer to retire and withdrawal of the same happened in such quick succession that it cannot be said that any administrative set-up or arrangement was affected. The administration has now taken a long time by its own attitude to communicate the matter. For this the respondent is to blame and not the appellant.” 11.8 The principles laid down in Union of India and Ors. v. Gopal Chandra Misra (1978) 2 SCC 301 have since then been followed by this Court in P. Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology (1981) 1 SCC 405 , Punjab National Bank v. P.K. Mittal (1989) Supp 2 SCC 175, Moti Ram v. Param Dev (1993) 2 SCC 725, Power Finance Corporation Ltd. v. Pramod Kumar Bhatia (1997) 4 SCC 280 , Nand Keshwar Prasad v. Indian Farmers Fertilizers Coop. Ltd. (1998) 5 SCC 461 , J.N. Srivastava v. Union of India and Anr. Ltd. (1998) 5 SCC 461 , J.N. Srivastava v. Union of India and Anr. (1998) 9 SCC 559 , Union of India v. Wing Commander T. Parthasarathy (2001) 1 SCC 158 , Shambhu Murari Sinha v. Project & Development India Ltd. (2002) 3 SCC 437 , Bank of India v. O.P. Swarnakar (2003) 2 SCC 721 , Reserve Bank of India v. Cecil Denis Solomon (2004) 9 SCC 461 , Srikantha S.M. v. Bharath Earth Movers Ltd. (2005) 8 SCC 314 , Secy., Technical Education, U.P. and ors. v. Lalit Mohan Upadhyay (2007) 4 SCC 492 , New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Raghuvir Singh Narang and Anr. (2010) 5 SCC 335 and Union of India and ors. v. Hitendra Kumar Soni (2014) 13 SCC 204 . 11.9 In Punjab National Bank v. P.K. Mittal (1989) Supp 2 SCC 175 a permanent officer in the bank sent a letter of resignation on 21.01.1986 in terms of Regulation 20 of PNB (Officers) Service Regulation, 1979, which was to become effective on 30.06.1986. By communication dated 07.02.1986, he was informed that his resignation was accepted with immediate effect. The resignation was withdrawn by the officer on 15.04.1986. The issue therefore arose in the context of said Regulation 20, whether the officer could withdraw the resignation. Regulation 20 was as under: “20. (1) Subject to sub-regulation (3) of Regulation 16, the bank may terminate the services of any officer by giving him three months' notice in writing or by paying him three months' emoluments in lieu thereof. (2) No officer shall resign from the service of the bank otherwise than on the expiry of three months from the service on the bank of a notice in writing of such resignation: Provided further that the competent authority may reduce the period of three months, or remit the requirement of notice.” 11.10 The submission that clause (2) of Regulation 20 and its proviso were intended only to safeguard the bank's interest and as such the bank could accept the resignation before the date when it was to come into effect was rejected by this Court in following terms: “7. Dr. Anand Prakash emphasises that as clause (2) and its proviso are intended only to safeguard the bank's interests they should be interpreted on the lines suggested by him. Dr. Anand Prakash emphasises that as clause (2) and its proviso are intended only to safeguard the bank's interests they should be interpreted on the lines suggested by him. We are of the opinion that Clause (2) of the Regulation and its proviso are intended not only for the protection of the bank but also for the benefit of the employee. It is common knowledge that a person proposing to resign often wavers in this decision and even in a case where he has taken a firm decision to resign, he may not be ready to go out immediately. In most cases he would need a period of adjustment and hence like to defer the actual date of relief from duties for a few months for various personal reasons. Equally an employer may like to have time to make some alternative arrangement before relieving the resigning employee. Clause (2) is carefully worded keeping both these requirements in mind. It gives the employee a period of adjustment and rethinking. It also enables the bank to have some time to arrange its affairs, with the liberty, in an appropriate case, to accept the resignation of an employee even without the requisite notice if he so desires it. The proviso in our opinion should not be interpreted as enabling a bank to thrust a resignation on an employee with effect from a date different from the one on which he can make his resignation effective under the terms of the regulation. We, therefore, agree with the High Court that in the present case the resignation of the employee could have become effective only on or about 21-4-1986 or on 30-6-1986 and that the bank could not have "accepted" that resignation on any earlier date. The letter dated 7-2-1986 was, therefore, without jurisdiction. 8. The result of the above interpretation is that the employee continued to be in service till 21-4-1986 or 30-6-1986, on which date his services would have come normally to an end in terms of his letter dated 21-1-1986. But, by that time, he had exercised his right to withdraw the resignation. Since the withdrawal letter was written before the resignation became effective, the resignation stands withdrawn, with the result that the Respondent continues to be in the service of the bank. It is true that there is no specific provision in the regulations permitting the employee to withdraw the resignation. Since the withdrawal letter was written before the resignation became effective, the resignation stands withdrawn, with the result that the Respondent continues to be in the service of the bank. It is true that there is no specific provision in the regulations permitting the employee to withdraw the resignation. It is, however, not necessary that there should be any such specific rule. Until the resignation becomes effective on the terms of the letter read with Regulation 20, it is open to the employee, on general principles, to withdraw his letter of resignation. That is why, in some cases of public services, this right of withdrawal is also made subject to the permission of the employer. There is no such clause here. It is not necessary to labour this point further as it is well settled by the earlier decisions of this Court in Raj Kumar v. Union of India, Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra and Balram Gupta v. Union of India.” 12. It is thus well settled that normally, until the resignation becomes effective, it is open to an employee to withdraw his resignation. When would the resignation become effective may depend upon the governing service regulations and/or the terms and conditions of the office/post. As stated in paragraphs 41 and 50 in Gopal Chandra Misra (1978) 2 SCC 301 , "in the absence of anything to the contrary in the provisions governing the terms and conditions of the office/post" or "in the absence of a legal contractual or constitutional bar, a 'prospective resignation' can be withdrawn at any time before it becomes effective". Further, as laid down in Balram Gupta 1987 (Supp) SCC 228, "If, however, the administration had made arrangements acting on his resignation or letter of retirement to make other employee available for his job, that would be another matter." 19. By perusal of the above judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court, the position of laws is clear that an employee can withdraw his resignation at any stage before the same becomes effective. Following the judgment of AIR India Express Ltd. & Ors (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of M/s New Victoria Mills Ltd. v. Shrikant Arya, Civil Appeal No. 5655/2021 decided on 27.9.2021 has held that the employee has locus poenitentiae to withdraw the resignation later as the jural relationship between the parties continues till the actual date of his resignation. The judgments cited by the petitioner are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. 20. The petitioner has tendered his resignation and the same was accepted on 14.5.2009 w.e.f. 16.5.2009. Now the petitioner is estopped by his own action and he cannot challenge his own action by saying that due to family circumstances and under depression, he tendered resignation. Hon’ble Apex Court has dealt with the rule of estoppel in para 20 of the judgment in the case of B.L. Sreedhar & Ors. v. K.N. Munireddy & Ors. reported in (2003) 2 SCC 355 (supra), which reads as under :- “30. If a man either by words or by conduct has intimated that he consents to an act which has been done and that he will not offer any opposition to it, although it could not have been lawfully done without his consent, and he thereby induces others to do that which they otherwise might have abstained form, he cannot question legality of the act he had sanctioned to the prejudice of those who have so given faith to his words or to the fair inference to be drawn from his conduct.” 21. A perusal of the resignation letter dated 13.4.2009 indicate that the petitioner submitted the same voluntarily in usual course and the same was accepted by the respondent vide order dated 14.5.2009 w.e.f. 16.5.2009 and this order / decision was communicated to the petitioner. After acceptance of his resignation, the petitioner is seeking re-employment in the present writ petition with the directions to the respondent to treat his resignation as an application for voluntary retirement and grant him service and consequential benefits. It is worthy to note here that his request for voluntary retirement was declined by the respondent on 5.11.2008. Now the relief sought for cannot be granted to the petitioner after acceptance of his resignation because the act of the petitioner amounts to relinquishment. To put it differently, the word “resignation” means relinquishment of one’s own right in relation to an office. To put it precisely, the resignation letter of the petitioner dt. 13.4.2009 is unconditional and with an intent to operate as such. A “resignation” of a Public Office, when made with an intention of relinquishing the office, accompanied by an act relinquishment, then nothing further is required. Resignation once accepted, cannot be allowed to be withdrawn. 22. To put it precisely, the resignation letter of the petitioner dt. 13.4.2009 is unconditional and with an intent to operate as such. A “resignation” of a Public Office, when made with an intention of relinquishing the office, accompanied by an act relinquishment, then nothing further is required. Resignation once accepted, cannot be allowed to be withdrawn. 22. Looking from any angle, the writ petition is devoid of merit. In fine, the writ petition stands dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Connected stay application and all applications (pending if any) also stand dismissed.