JUDGMENT : 1. The present appeals have been directed against order dated 15.02.2022 in I.A.Nos.534 of 2021 and 218 of 2021 in O.S.No.182 of 2006 on the file of X Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Ranga Reddy District (hereinafter referred to as ‘Court below’), wherein and whereby, the applications filed by defendant Nos.52 to 59 and defendant Nos.1, 27 to 32, 41, 43 to 47 for rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code (for short ‘CPC’) were allowed and consequently, the plaint was rejected. 2. Challenging the order dated 15.02.2022 in I.A.No.534 of 2021 in O.S.No.182 of 2006, the plaintiffs filed A.S.No.109 of 2022, defendant Nos.10 and 11 filed A.S.No.270 of 2022, defendant No.4 filed A.S.No.319 of 2022 and defendant Nos.39 and 40 filed A.S.No.325 of 2022 before this Court. Similarly, challenging the order dated 15.02.2022 in I.A.No.218 of 2021 in O.S.No.182 of 2006, the plaintiffs filed A.S.No.107 of 2022, defendant Nos.10 and 11 filed A.S.No.274 of 2022, defendant No.4 filed A.S.No.320 of 2022 and defendant Nos.39 and 40 filed A.S.No.331 of 2022 before this Court. For the sake of convenience, the parties are hereinafter referred to as they were arrayed in the suit. 3. The case of defendant Nos.52 to 59 and 1, 27 to 32, 41, 43 to 47, who are petitioners before the Court below, is that they are descendants of Mohd. Moinuddin Khan and the suit properties were purchased by their ancestor Late Mohd. Moinuddin Khan and they are their matruka property and such properties were purchased by said Mohd. Moinuddin Khan, out of his self acquisition. They denied existence of any joint family and that the suit properties are joint family properties. According to them, there is no concept of joint family and joint family property in Mohammedan Law and the plaintiffs filed suit for partition claiming property as matruka property and joint acquisition from joint family funds. Hence, the same is not maintainable. According to them, the suit for partition lies only among the descendants of Mohd. Moinuddin Khan and not in between Mohd. Moinuddin Khan and his brothers. Further, it is there contention that there is no cause of action for the suit and the same is not maintainable under the Mohammedan Law and prayed to reject the plaint. 4. According to them, the suit for partition lies only among the descendants of Mohd. Moinuddin Khan and not in between Mohd. Moinuddin Khan and his brothers. Further, it is there contention that there is no cause of action for the suit and the same is not maintainable under the Mohammedan Law and prayed to reject the plaint. 4. It is the case of the plaintiffs that plaint is not filed under Mohammedan Law, but it is filed as general partition suit and suit properties are jointly purchased by the Mohd. Moinuddin Khan and his three brothers, namely, Mohd. Fakruddin Khan, Mohd. Sharfuddin Khan and Ahmed Mohiuddin Khan. The plaintiffs herein belong to branch of Mohd. Fakruddin Khan. Late Mohd. Moinuddin Khan was eldest among all four brothers and out of respect and custom, the suit properties were purchased in his name. The said fact is supported by the entries in revenue records, past sale transactions, gift to gram panchayath, admissions made by defendant No.1 in land ceiling proceedings and allotment of share to legal heirs of one Sabeerunnisa Begum, who is descendant of Mohd. Sharfuddin Khan. Hence, according to them, the plaint is not liable for rejection. 5. The Court below after appreciating the pleadings of the plaint and the contentions raised by both parties allowed the applications and consequently, plaint was rejected. Hence, the present appeals by the plaintiffs as well as some of the defendants. 6. The points for consideration in the present appeals are as follows: “1. Whether the averments made in the plaint make out any cause of action so as to maintain the suit for partition? 2. Whether the pleadings of the plaint makes out suit is maintainable under the Mohammedan Law?” Point Nos.1 and 2:- 7. In order to answer the above contentions, it is apt to refer to the relevant pleadings of the plaint, which show that Late Mohd. Moinuddin Khan, Late Mohd. Fakruddin Khan, Late Mohd. Sharfuddin Khan and Late Ahmed Mohiuddin Khan were all brothers. They were living in joint family since the death of grandfather of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs and defendant Nos.2 to 14 are descendants from the branch of late Mohd. Fakruddin Khan and defendant No.1 is descendant of Late Mohd. Moinuddin Khan. Subsequently, defendant Nos. 52 to 59 came on record as legal heirs of defendant No.1. Defendant Nos.15 to 19 are descendants of late Mohd. The plaintiffs and defendant Nos.2 to 14 are descendants from the branch of late Mohd. Fakruddin Khan and defendant No.1 is descendant of Late Mohd. Moinuddin Khan. Subsequently, defendant Nos. 52 to 59 came on record as legal heirs of defendant No.1. Defendant Nos.15 to 19 are descendants of late Mohd. Sharfuddin Khan and defendant Nos.20 to 26 are descendants of late Ahmed Mohiuddin Khan. All the other defendants are legal heirs of descendants of original four brothers. 8. The case of the plaintiffs is that lands in Sy.Nos.122, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 135, 136, 137 and 141 admeasuirng Ac.174-22 guntas situated at Mankhal village, Maheshwaram Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, are matrukajoint family property of plaintiffs and defendants herein. The plaintiffs’ father and his three brothers lived as a joint family and jointly owned and possessed the above said properties and they are still undivided. After death of Mohd. Moinuddin Khan, in the year 1954, the plaintiffs’ father and his brothers had jointly acquired agricultural lands in Sy.Nos.443, 446, 489, 490 and 491, to an extent of Ac.60-36 guntas at Thimmajiguda H/o Mankhal village, Maheshwaram Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, in the name of defendant No.1. The said property was acquired out of joint family funds. The plaintiffs and defendants are joint owners, pattedars and possessors of agricultural lands to a total extent of Ac.235-18 guntas. The lands in Thimmajiguda were kept in the name of Mohd. Muzafferuddin Khan-defendant No.1, who was son of Late Mohd. Moinuddin Khan, out of custom and respect towards his deceased father. The plaintiffs and other defendants are legal heirs and are in joint possession and enjoyment of undivided share and each branch is entitled for 1/4th share of the suit properties. Hence, the present suit is filed seeking partition. 9. Heard parties to the appeal. 10. The principles governing the rejection of plaint has been laid down by the Apex Court in the decision of Shakti Bhog Food Industries Limited vs. Central Bank of India, (2020) 17 SCC 260 at para Nos. 8 and 9, which read as under: “8. On the same lines, this Court in Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust [Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust, (2012) 8 SCC 706 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 612], observed as follows: (SCC pp. 713-15, paras 10-12) “10. 8 and 9, which read as under: “8. On the same lines, this Court in Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust [Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust, (2012) 8 SCC 706 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 612], observed as follows: (SCC pp. 713-15, paras 10-12) “10. … It is clear from the above that where the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, the relief claimed is undervalued and not corrected within the time allowed by the court, insufficiently stamped and not rectified within the time fixed by the court, barred by any law, failed to enclose the required copies and the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9, the court has no other option except to reject the same. A reading of the above provision also makes it clear that power under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code can be exercised at any stage of the suit either before registering the plaint or after the issuance of summons to the defendants or at any time before the conclusion of the trial. 11. This position was explained by this Court in [Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 1 SCC 557 ], in which, while considering Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code, it was held as under: (SCC p. 560, para 9) ‘9. A perusal of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC makes it clear that the relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application thereunder are the averments in the plaint. The trial court can exercise the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC at any stage of the suit — before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. The trial court can exercise the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC at any stage of the suit — before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 Order 7 CPC, the averments in the plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage, therefore, a direction to file the written statement without deciding the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC cannot but be procedural irregularity touching the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court.’ It is clear that in order to consider Order 7 Rule 11, the court has to look into the averments in the plaint and the same can be exercised by the trial court at any stage of the suit. It is also clear that the averments in the written statement are immaterial and it is the duty of the court to scrutinise the averments/pleas in the plaint. In other words, what needs to be looked into in deciding such an application are the averments in the plaint. At that stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement are wholly irrelevant and the matter is to be decided only on the plaint averments. These principles have been reiterated in Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property [Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property, (1998) 7 SCC 184 ] and Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. v. Vessel M.V. Fortune Express [Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. v. Vessel M.V. Fortune Express, (2006) 3 SCC 100 ]. 12. It is also useful to refer the judgment in T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal [T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467 ], wherein while considering the very same provision i.e. Order 7 Rule 11 and the duty of the trial court in considering such application, this Court has reminded the trial Judges with the following observation: (SCC p. 470, para 5) ‘5. … The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful — not formal — reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10 CPC. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial courts would insist imperatively on examining the party at the first hearing so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage. The Penal Code is also resourceful enough to meet such men, (Chapter XI) and must be triggered against them.’ It is clear that if the allegations are vexatious and meritless and not disclosing a clear right or material(s) to sue, it is the duty of the trial Judge to exercise his power under Order 7 Rule 11. If clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action as observed by Krishna Iyer, J. in the abovereferred decision [T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467 ], it should be nipped in the bud at the first hearing by examining the parties under Order 10 of the Code.” 9. We may also advert to the exposition of this Court in Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal [Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal, (2017) 13 SCC 174 : (2017) 5 SCC (Civ) 602]. In para 7 of the said decision, this Court has succinctly restated the legal position as follows: (SCC pp. 178-79) “7. The plaint can be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 if conditions enumerated in the said provision are fulfilled. It is needless to observe that the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC can be exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit. The relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding the application are the averments of the plaint only. It is needless to observe that the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC can be exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit. The relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding the application are the averments of the plaint only. If on an entire and meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing any right to sue, the court should exercise power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. Since the power conferred on the Court to terminate civil action at the threshold is drastic, the conditions enumerated under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC to the exercise of power of rejection of plaint have to be strictly adhered to. The averments of the plaint have to be read as a whole to find out whether the averments disclose a cause of action or whether the suit is barred by any law. It is needless to observe that the question as to whether the suit is barred by any law, would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The averments in the written statement as well as the contentions of the defendant are wholly immaterial while considering the prayer of the defendant for rejection of the plaint. Even when the allegations made in the plaint are taken to be correct as a whole on their face value, if they show that the suit is barred by any law, or do not disclose cause of action, the application for rejection of plaint can be entertained and the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC can be exercised. If clever drafting of the plaint has created the illusion of a cause of action, the court will nip it in the bud at the earliest so that bogus litigation will end at the earlier stage.” 11. The Apex Court in the case of P.V.Guru Raj Reddy vs. P. Neeradha Reddy, (2015) 8 SCC 331 , had an occasion to deal with the concept of rejection of plaint. It was held that pleadings of the plaint have to be read as whole to exercise power under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC. The relevant paras are para Nos.5 and 6, which read as under: “5. It was held that pleadings of the plaint have to be read as whole to exercise power under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC. The relevant paras are para Nos.5 and 6, which read as under: “5. Rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC is a drastic power conferred in the court to terminate a civil action at the threshold. The conditions precedent to the exercise of power under Order 7 Rule 11, therefore, are stringent and have been consistently held to be so by the Court. It is the averments in the plaint that have to be read as a whole to find out whether it discloses a cause of action or whether the suit is barred under any law. At the stage of exercise of power under Order 7 Rule 11, the stand of the defendants in the written statement or in the application for rejection of the plaint is wholly immaterial. It is only if the averments in the plaint ex facie do not disclose a cause of action or on a reading thereof the suit appears to be barred under any law the plaint can be rejected. In all other situations, the claims will have to be adjudicated in the course of the trial. 6. In the present case, reading the plaint as a whole and proceeding on the basis that the averments made therein are correct, which is what the Court is required to do, it cannot be said that the said pleadings ex facie disclose that the suit is barred by limitation or is barred under any other provision of law. The claim of the plaintiffs with regard to the knowledge of the essential facts giving rise to the cause of action as pleaded will have to be accepted as correct. At the stage of consideration of the application under Order 7 Rule 11 the stand of the defendants in the written statement would be altogether irrelevant.” 12. A reading of the above decisions, it is crystal clear that termination of civil action at the threshold is drastic power and the same has to be exercised by strict adherence to the conditions laid down under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC. The averments of the plaint must be read as whole to find out whether they disclose the cause of action or the suit is barred by any law. The averments of the plaint must be read as whole to find out whether they disclose the cause of action or the suit is barred by any law. The averments in the defence statement as well as the contentions of the defendants are wholly immaterial while considering the rejection of plaint. The Court is bound to examine whether the real cause of action has been set up or something purely illusionary has been stated in order to get over the rigours of Order VII Rule 11. The Court has to keep in mind that if on a meaningful and not formal reading of plaint, the suit is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing the clear right to sue, the powers under Order VII Rule 11 can be exercised. If clever drafting has created the illusion of cause of action, the same has to be nipped in the bud. There cannot be any compartmentalization, dissection, segregation and inversions of the language of various paragraphs in the plaint. It is impermissible to take out a sentence or a passage to read it, out of the context in isolation. It is the substance and not merely the form that has to be looked into. The pleadings have to be construed as it stands out without addition or subtraction or words or change of its apparent grammatical sense. 13. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs/defendants is that the Court below has not properly read the averments in the plaint as a whole and some sentences here and there were taken to hold that the suit for partition is barred on account of no cause of action and no right to sue from the pleadings in the plaint under Mohammedan Law. According to the appellants, the Court ought not to have rejected the plaint in the light of pleadings. Rejection of plaint suffers from illegality. 14. Learned counsel for appellants also contended that the learned Judge failed to take note that the suit properties were purchased jointly by brothers and they have acquired the said property where the family lives in commensality and they have ownership and possession. The suit cannot be understood to be brought under Mohammedan Law and it is general suit for partition. Learned counsel for appellants also contended that the learned Judge failed to take note that the suit properties were purchased jointly by brothers and they have acquired the said property where the family lives in commensality and they have ownership and possession. The suit cannot be understood to be brought under Mohammedan Law and it is general suit for partition. They also contended that the learned Judge has erred in holding that the suit between brothers is not maintainable and only suit for partition among the wife and children of an adult muslim is maintainable. 15. It is also contended that the Court below ought to have rejected the application on the ground that the other defendants, who were parties to the suit are not made party to the application and they were not heard. Therefore, on that ground the impugned orders have to be set aside. It is further contended that the defence statement of defendant No.1 clearly shows that he admitted the joint living of Late Mohd. Moinuddin Khan with his brothers. Hence, the defendants, who filed the impugned applications before the Court below, who are legal heirs of defendant No.1, cannot go beyond such plea set up by defendant No.1. In the said circumstances, the appeals require to be allowed setting aside the impugned orders. 16. In support of their contentions the learned counsel for appellants relied upon by the following decisions: “1. Shahnaaz Fatima vs. Noorul Hussain, 2019 (1) ALD 520 2. Pharez John Abraham vs. Arul Jothi Sivasubramaniam, (2020) 13 SCC 711 3. Azgar Barid vs. Mazambi, (2022) 5 SCC 334 4. Dhiben vs. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra), (2020) 7 SCC 366 5. Nunna Rama Krishna Nageswara Rao vs. Bolisetty Lakshmi Venkata Naga Srinivasa Rao, 2002 (1) ALD 632 6. Ram Niranjan Kajaria vs. Sheo Prakash Kajaria, (2015) 10 SCC 203 7. Venkatappa @ Moode vs. M. Abdul Jabbar, (2006) 9 SCC 235 8. Heeralal vs. Kalyab Mal, (1998) 1 SCC 278 9. D. Raja Ahmed vs. Pacha Bi, (1969) 1 An. WR 255 10.Khetrabasi Biswal vs. Ajaya Kumar Baral, (2004) 1 SCC 317 11. Mayar (H.K.) Ltd vs. Owners and parties, vessel M.V. Fortune Express, (2006) 3 SCC 100 12. Saroj Anand vs. Prahlad Rai Anand, (2009) 15 SCC 505 13. C. Natrajan vs. Ashim Bai, (2007) 14 SCC 183 14. Srihari Hanumandas Totala vs. Hemant Vithal Kamat, (2021) 9 SCC 99 15. Mayar (H.K.) Ltd vs. Owners and parties, vessel M.V. Fortune Express, (2006) 3 SCC 100 12. Saroj Anand vs. Prahlad Rai Anand, (2009) 15 SCC 505 13. C. Natrajan vs. Ashim Bai, (2007) 14 SCC 183 14. Srihari Hanumandas Totala vs. Hemant Vithal Kamat, (2021) 9 SCC 99 15. Biswanath Banik vs. Sulanga Bose, AIR 2022 SCC 1519 16. Jayendra Vishnu Thakur vs. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 7 SCC 104 17. Mst. Bibi Bintul Fatma vs. S.M.Aftab Ahma, AIR 1963 Patna 128 18. Mohammed Ibrahim vs. Syed Muahhmad Abbubakker, AIR 1976 Madras 84 19. C. Krishnamurthy Setty vs. Abdul Khadar, AIR 1956 Mysore 14 17. It is the contention of the learned counsel for petitioners before the Court below i.e., defendant Nos. 52 to 59 and 1, 27 to 32, 41, 43 to 47 that the suit properties are acquired under registered sale deeds in the name of Mohd. Moinuddin Khan and such properties are exclusive properties of Mohd. Moinuddin Khan. After his death, the properties became matruka properties of his descendants. The plaintiffs and other defendants have nothing to do with the suit properties and their claim that the properties are joint family and Mohd. Moinuddin Khan was head of the family and that they purchased properties out of joint family funds is unknown under the Mohammedan Law. The suit properties are exclusive properties of Mohd. Moinuddin Khan and after his demise, they became the matruka properties of petitioners/defendants. 18. It is also contended that the suit for partition is filed on the assumption that the lands of Mankhal village are matruka properties and lands of Timmajiguda were joint family properties purchased out of joint family funds is mis-conceived and on the said ground the suit is not maintainable since there is no right cause of action for instituting the suit for partition of properties which are not commonly acquired by Mohd. Moinuddin Khan and his brothers. The Court below has rightly considered the pleadings on record and rightly rejected the plaint. 19. It is also contended that petitioners filed impugned applications against the plaintiffs alone as party, since they are alone aggrieved if plaint is rejected. The other defendants, who filed some of the appeals before this Court were participants of suit proceedings, but they have not raised any objection while dealing with impugned applications filed for rejection of plaint. 19. It is also contended that petitioners filed impugned applications against the plaintiffs alone as party, since they are alone aggrieved if plaint is rejected. The other defendants, who filed some of the appeals before this Court were participants of suit proceedings, but they have not raised any objection while dealing with impugned applications filed for rejection of plaint. In the impugned applications, the said defendants have not made any efforts to get impleaded at any stage. However, at later stage, they have made attempts to halt such applications by filing Civil Revision Petitions before this Court. This Court has dismissed the said applications holding that being conscious of proceedings for rejection of plaint, they did not chose to get impleaded. In the said circumstances, now they cannot agitate before this Court against the impugned orders on the ground that they were not made as parties. Lastly, it is contended that for consideration of rejection of plaint, the admissions and pleadings in the defence statement is so irrelevant and application for rejection can be made at any stage, such a right cannot be defeated on account that the applications were not filed before filing of defence statements are filed. Hence, they prayed to dismiss the present appeals. 20. In support of their contentions, they have relied on the following decisions: “1. Mohd. Jamal vs. Mohd. Sharfuddin, 1998 (5) ALD 223 2. Jamil Ahmad vs. Vth Additional District Judge, Moradabad, (2001) 8 SCC 599 3. Md. Aliuddin Farooqui vs. Mohd. Karamath Hussain, 2003 (3) ALD 528 (DB) 4. Srihari Hanumandas Totala vs. Hemant Vithal Kamat, (2021) 9 SCC 99 5. Sopan Sukhdeo Sable vs. Assistant Charity Commissioner, (2004) 3 SCC 137 6. T. Ravi vs. B. Chinna Narasimha, MANU/SC/0279/2017 7. Usman Sab vs. Dastagir Sab, LAWS (KAR) 1995 7 31 8. Syed Shah Gulam Ghouse Mohiuddin vs. Syed Shah Ahmad Mohiuddin Kamisul Quadri, AIR 1971 SCC 2184 9. Mukhtar Ahmad vs. Mahmudi Khatoon, 2010 SCC OnLine Jhar 808 10. Hakim Rahman Bux vs. Muhammad Mahmood Hassan, 1956 SCC OnLine Pat 119 21. A reading of concept of Mohammedan Law relating to joint family and joint family business shows that the members of Mohammedan family can live in commensality and by such living they do not form a joint family in the sense of usage of said expression in the Hindu Law. A reading of concept of Mohammedan Law relating to joint family and joint family business shows that the members of Mohammedan family can live in commensality and by such living they do not form a joint family in the sense of usage of said expression in the Hindu Law. There is no presumption as in Hindu Law that the acquisitions of the several members of a family living and messing together are for the benefit of the family. However, during the continuance of the family, if the properties are acquired in the name of the managing members of the family and if it is proved that such properties are possessed by all the members jointly, the presumption is that they are properties of family and not separate properties of the member in whose name the properties stand. Similarly, the members of the Mohammedan family carrying on business jointly do not constitute a joint family firm in the sense in which that expression is used in Hindu Law so as to attract the legal incidents of such a firm. 22. The Apex Court in the decision of Jamil Ahmad (cited 23rd supra), at para No.11 defined the word Matruka property as all the properties (both movable as well as immovable) left by a deceased Muslim is called matruka and such properties are distributed among the legal heirs in the proportion ordained under the Mohammedan Law. 23. The Apex Court in the case of Mohammadbhai Kasambhai Sheikh vs. Abdulla Kasambhai Sheikh, (2004) 13 SCC 385 , held that succession in the Mohammedan Law is to a specific share as tenants in common. Mohammedans heirs are not coparceners and he has merely a right to defend a minimum share in each part of the estate. In other words, the concept of joint family is reign to Muslim Law. Further, Mohammedan Law does not recognise theory of representation. Interest of each heir is separate and distinct. There is nothing contrary to law for Mohammedan adult male members of a family carrying on trade for the benefit of all the interested members, including minors and females. When the adult male member holds assets for carrying on business on behalf of all the persons interested, then he stands in fiduciary relationship to such other persons. There is nothing contrary to law for Mohammedan adult male members of a family carrying on trade for the benefit of all the interested members, including minors and females. When the adult male member holds assets for carrying on business on behalf of all the persons interested, then he stands in fiduciary relationship to such other persons. If the plaint makes out a case of partnership or agency or fiduciary relationship, which is permissible to contend that the property purchased in the name of one is for the benefit of all. 24. The above principles are governing the members of joint family and joint family business properties and foundation of same can be culled out from the decisions relied upon by both parties. Therefore, this Court feels that reference of each decision and contentions thereon is irrelevant. Hence, the same is avoided to have succinctness of the decision. 25. In the background of the above principles, the plaint must be understood and should be considered in the context of conditions laid down in Order VII Rule 11 of CPC. The substance of entire pleadings makes out two stands relating to suit properties. First stand is relating to Ac.174-22 guntas covering Sy.Nos. 122, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 135, 136, 137 and 141 of Mankhal village. In this regard, the pleadings only refers that such properties are matruka properties of plaintiffs and defendants. The pleadings do not refer whether the said properties were acquired jointly from their earnings by their ascendants i.e., Mohd. Moinuddin Khan and his three brothers. The second stand is relating to properties covered under Sy.Nos.443, 446, 489, 490 and 491, to an extent of Ac.60-36 guntas at Thimmajiguda. The pleadings show that such properties were purchased jointly by four brothers out of joint family funds. 26. In the backdrop of such pleadings, the substance of the pleadings is existence of matruka properties among four brothers to an extent of Ac.174-22 guntas in Mankhal village and generation of joint family funds out of said matruka property. Out of such joint family funds, they purchased Ac.60-36 guntas of Thimmajiguda h/o.Mankhal village. All through the pleadings, they say that all the parties to the plaint are joint possessors, joint pattedars and joint owners. The pleadings also show that the properties of Thimmajiguda were purchased in the name of Mohd. Out of such joint family funds, they purchased Ac.60-36 guntas of Thimmajiguda h/o.Mankhal village. All through the pleadings, they say that all the parties to the plaint are joint possessors, joint pattedars and joint owners. The pleadings also show that the properties of Thimmajiguda were purchased in the name of Mohd. Muzafferuddin Mahmood Khan, who is son of the head of the family of all the parties to the suit and such properties were purchased in the name of defendant No.1 to pay respects to his father i.e., Mohd. Moinuddin Khan. 27. The undisputed fact is that two sets of properties were purchased in the name of Mohd. Moinuddin Khan, who is father of defendant No.1. It is also undisputed fact that he has three brothers. It is also not disputed that that by virtue of compromise in OS No.542 of 1987 on the file of Principal Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District, one Sabeerunnisa Begum, who is legal heir of Mohd. Sharfuddin Khan received her share. This indicates that the properties were effected partition in the year 1987. Initially, suit was filed against Mohd. Sharfuddin Khan. This makes out previous partition. There are also pleadings that the properties were sold out by some of the parties. It appears that present civil suits are filed by third generation of original brothers i.e., Mohd. Moinuddin Khan and his three brothers. 28. A reading of entire pleadings makes out that the suit is filed as if there was matruka property and generation of funds from such matruka property and creation of joint family funds and purchase of Thimmajiguda properties from such joint family funds and joint ownership and joint possession of suit properties. The claim of shares also shows that suit is filed as if the Mohammedan Law recognises the theory of representation. These are all indications for assumption of suit properties as joint family properties and joint ownership, in the sense of Hindu Law, which is unknown to Mohammedan Law. The suit based on such claim is impermissible under Mohammedan Law. 29. In the light of such plaint pleadings, there is also no real cause of action set out in plaint. These are all indications for assumption of suit properties as joint family properties and joint ownership, in the sense of Hindu Law, which is unknown to Mohammedan Law. The suit based on such claim is impermissible under Mohammedan Law. 29. In the light of such plaint pleadings, there is also no real cause of action set out in plaint. A meaningful reading of such pleadings manifestly establishes vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue and it is by such pleadings, a illusionary cause of action has been created which has to be nipped in the bud and it cannot be allowed to continue. The filing of suit for partition treating the properties as matruka property means the properties must be distributed as per Mohammedan Law principles and such pleadings rules out the case set up by the plaintiffs that it is general suit for partition, which is not governed under Mohammedan Law. The pleadings clearly show that it is not general suit for partition as set up by the plaintiffs in their counter to the application. 30. A reading of the impugned orders shows that the learned Judge was wrong in holding that the suit for partition among brothers is not maintainable and only among wife and children is maintainable. This assumption is wrong. When all the brothers have commonly acquired properties out of their own pooling of earnings, suit for partition is maintainable for division of common property by metes and bounds. 31. In the present case, in the absence of pleadings that four brothers have acquired the property by pooling their earnings, it can be assumed Mankhal village properties become matruka property of their descendants. Such pleadings are lacking in the present case, in respect of Ac.174-22 guntas of Mankhal village. The plea set up against Ac.60-36 guntas by implications show that such properties were purchased from generation of funds from Ac.174-22 guntas and it is based on the assumption of existence of matruka property relating to Ac.174-22 guntas. This makes no cause of action and no right to sue. Therefore, this Court feels that the result arrived at by the Court below cannot be found fault except to the above extent. 32. The contention that the other defendants were not made parties to the application cannot be entertained because all the contesting parties were represented by their counsel. This makes no cause of action and no right to sue. Therefore, this Court feels that the result arrived at by the Court below cannot be found fault except to the above extent. 32. The contention that the other defendants were not made parties to the application cannot be entertained because all the contesting parties were represented by their counsel. While the suit was pending, the applications for rejection were filed by some of defendants. Such applications were long pending and during the interregnum of filing and disposal there were many adjournments. If the concerned defendants were really interested in opposing the said application, they could have resisted the application by appropriate steps. Further, they have also approached this Court with Civil Revision Petition Nos. 1050, 1051, 1675 and 1676 of 2022 and such petitions were dismissed by this Court holding that they have failed to file application as interveners. In spite of such orders, they did not choose to intervene and invited orders. Now, they cannot challenge the impugned orders passed on the same ground that they were not made parties. Therefore, such contention cannot be sustained. 33. The next ground is that defendant No.1 in his pleadings admitted nature of joint family property. Therefore, the legal heirs cannot go beyond the averments of defendant No.1. This contention is also devoid of merits. While, deciding the application of rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11, the Court is not concerned with the pleadings of defendants. Hence, the said contention is unmerited and the same is rejected. 34. In the result, all the appeals are dismissed confirming the orders and decrees of Court below dated 15.02.2022 in I.A.No.534 of 2021 and I.A.No.218 of 2021 in O.S.No.182 of 2006. No order as to costs. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall stand closed.