Research › Search › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

2023 DIGILAW 593 (ALL)

Ram Kishor Yadav v. State of U. P.

2023-02-28

MAHESH CHANDRA TRIPATHI, VIVEK KUMAR SINGH

body2023
JUDGMENT : We have heard Sri Amulya Ratan Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioners; Ms. Uttara Bahuguna, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel alongwith Sri Piyush Shukla, learned Standing Counsel for State respondents and Sri Abhinava Krishna Srivastava, learned counsel for Kanpur Development Authority. 2. By means of these writ petitions, the petitioners have sought following reliefs : ''(a) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 13 June, 2018 passed by respondent No. 4 by means of which he has rejected the petitioners' representation regarding Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (since repealed) in respect of the disputed plot. (b) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondent authorities not to interfere with the petitioner's physical possession over plot Nos. 1570, 1514, 1478, 1523, 1543, 1568, 1653, 1579, 1537, 1515, 1529, 1575, 1583, 1655, 1685, 1519, 1377, 1534 and 1587 situated in Naobasta, Kanpur.'' 3. It appears from the record that the petitioners' grand father namely Ram Sevak was original tenure holder of Arazi Nos. 1570, 1514, 1478, 1523, 1543, 1568, 1653, 1579, 1537, 1515, 1529, 1575, 1583, 1655, 1685, 1519, 1377, 1534 and 1587, situated at Village Baktauripurva, Naobasta, District Kanpur Nagar. The said land was recorded as agricultural land in revenue record before enforcement of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (in short, Ceiling Act). For declaring the said land of original owner to be surplus, the Collector/Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceiling, Kanpur Nagar instituted a case under provisions of Ceiling Act and accordingly, a draft statement under Section 8 (3) of the Ceiling Act was sent to the land holder on 24.11.1980 through registered post but he had not filed any objection within the stipulated period. Finally, the Competent Authority had declared the land owned by the original owner to the extent of 18103.10 square meters to be surplus on 26.2.1981 and the final statement under Section 9 of the Ceiling Act was sent to the original owner through registered post. Thereafter, a notification under Section 10 (1) was issued and the same was also published in the official Gazette. After publication of the notification, no interested person had filed any objection within 15 days and consequently, the notification under Section 10 (3) was issued on 31.3.1984 and the same was also published in the official Gazette. Thereafter, a notification under Section 10 (1) was issued and the same was also published in the official Gazette. After publication of the notification, no interested person had filed any objection within 15 days and consequently, the notification under Section 10 (3) was issued on 31.3.1984 and the same was also published in the official Gazette. The surplus land was vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances. On 19.6.1985 a notice under Section 10 (5) of the Ceiling Act was issued to the land holder for handing over the possession of the surplus land. Consequently, the State Government has taken possession of the surplus land on 9.10.1986 and the surplus land has been entered in the revenue records in the name of ''Urban Ceiling'' vide order dated 13.3.1987. The property in dispute has been transferred to the Kanpur Development Authority (KDA) on 27.1.1993. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners in this backdrop submits that petitioners' grand father was the original owner of the land in dispute. He had two sons namely Jay Narayan and Ram Pal. The petitioners are sons of Ram Pal and they have 1/3rd share each in the disputed plots. While declaring the land as surplus on 26.2.1981 the respondents have wrongly declared the shares of Ram Pal, son of Ram Sevak as surplus under the Ceiling Act, whereas the entire land of the co-sharer Jay Narayan, son of Ram Sevak remains intact. The order dated 26.2.1981 was absolutely illegal as the land in dispute was recorded as agricultural land in the revenue record and hence, the Ceiling Act was not at all applicable in the present case. It is submitted that though there is mandatory provision in Section 11 of the Ceiling Act for paying the compensation, if the land of any original holder is declared as surplus but in the present case, the respondents have declared the land in question as surplus land vide order dated 26.3.1981 but till date they have not paid any compensation to the petitioners. On the basis of the order passed by the competent authority dated 16.3.1984, the name of the State Government has been entered in the revenue record on 13.3.1987 but till date no physical possession of the land in question has been taken by the competent authority and the petitioners are in actual physical possession of the disputed land. On the basis of the order passed by the competent authority dated 16.3.1984, the name of the State Government has been entered in the revenue record on 13.3.1987 but till date no physical possession of the land in question has been taken by the competent authority and the petitioners are in actual physical possession of the disputed land. The petitioners have also constructed their houses on part of the disputed plot and the petitioners alongwith family are residing there. 5. It is also submitted that the Act No. 33 of 1976 has been repealed by Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 with effect from 18.3.1999 (in short, Repeal Act). Section 3 of the Repeal Act provides that if the possession of the land, which was declared as surplus by the Competent Authority in pursuance of the provisions of the Ceiling Act, has not been taken till enforcement of the Repeal Act, all the proceedings of this case against the original owner are liable to be abated and the land will be released in favour of the original land holder. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance on the judgment and order of this Court dated 17.3.2005 passed in Writ C No. 6354 of 2003 (Chabi Nath son of Sarju Prasad v. State of U.P. and others) wherein it has been held that if physical possession has not been taken by the competent authority the same should be released to the owner of the land. He has also placed reliance on the judgement and order dated 15.3.2012 passed in Writ C No. 50181 of 2008 (Ram Singh v. State of U.P. and others), which was disposed of by a coordinate Bench of this Court with following observations : ''1. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner for a mandamus directing the respondents not to interfere with the petitioner's physical possession over Arazi No. 1503, 1504, 1628, 1478, 1644, 1569, 1568, 1650, 1545, 1548, 1549, 1538, 1567, 1571, 1577, 1639, 1640, 1656 situated in Mauza Naubasta, Tehsil and District Kanpur Nagar area 59276.11 sq. mt. 2. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner for a mandamus directing the respondents not to interfere with the petitioner's physical possession over Arazi No. 1503, 1504, 1628, 1478, 1644, 1569, 1568, 1650, 1545, 1548, 1549, 1538, 1567, 1571, 1577, 1639, 1640, 1656 situated in Mauza Naubasta, Tehsil and District Kanpur Nagar area 59276.11 sq. mt. 2. The petitioner's father-Mauji Lal was the original tenure holder of Arazi No. 1503 area 1 Bigha 7 Biswa, 1504 area 7 Biswa and Arazi No. 1628, 1478, 1644, 1569, 1568, 1650, 1545, 1548, 1549, 1538, 1568, 1571, 1577, 1639, 1640, 1656 total area 53 Bigha situated in Mauja Naubasta Tehsil and District Kanpur Nagar, which were recorded as agricultural land in the revenue records. 3. Proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) were initiated and after giving benefit of 1000 sq. mt. of land, 59276.11 sq. mt. of land was declared as surplus. The petitioner filed an application under Section 20 of the Act seeking exemption from the provisions of the Act. In the meantime the Repeal Act 1999, namely, Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act 1999 (the Repealing Act) was enacted on 18.3.1999. The petitioner by means of this petition is therefore seeking benefit of the said Repeal Act. 4. We have heard Shri A.R. Srivastava, counsel appearing for the petitioner and Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents. 5. With the consent of the parties the writ petition is being disposed of at this stage. 6. The petitioner in the writ petition has stated that the possession of the surplus land has not been taken. This fact has been admitted in paragraph 4 of the counter-affidavit by the State. The relevant assertion of the State is as under: ''.....but due to pendency of the application under Section 20 of the Act in regard to relaxation, the possession over the declared surplus land was not taken.'' 7. In view of above and the Repealing Act the State is restrained from taking possession over the declared surplus land. In case if the name of the State has been recorded in the revenue records, it shall be recorded back in the name of the petitioner. 8. With these observations this petition is disposed of.'' 6. In view of above and the Repealing Act the State is restrained from taking possession over the declared surplus land. In case if the name of the State has been recorded in the revenue records, it shall be recorded back in the name of the petitioner. 8. With these observations this petition is disposed of.'' 6. It is submitted that right to property is a legal right as provided under Article 300-A of Constitution of India but in the present case, inspite of enforcement of Act No. 15 of 1999 in most arbitrary manner the respondents have entered the name of the State in the revenue record. The petitioners filed applications before the respondent No. 2 for entering their names in the revenue record after deleting the name of the State from the disputed plot. Once their applications were not decided by the respondent No. 4 then they had preferred Writ C Nos. 2277 of 2018; 2314 of 2018 and 2316 of 2018, which were disposed of by the Division Bench on 18.1.2018 directing the petitioners to move an appropriate application before the Collector, who will consider and decide the matter by a reasoned and speaking order after hearing all the parties concerned including the Development Authority within three months. Thereafter, the claim of the petitioners has been rejected by the respondent No. 4 vide impugned order dated 13.6.2018. Till date the possession of the land in dispute has not been taken and the petitioners are in actual physical possession of the land in dispute. The land in dispute has wrongly been declared as surplus land, though the property of the co-sharer Jay Narayan has not been declared as surplus. 7. Per contra, Ms. Uttara Bahuguna, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel appearing for the State respondents and Sri Abhinava Krishna Srivastava, learned counsel for KDA have raised preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petitions on the ground of delay and submitted that these writ petitions have been filed after almost 36 years of the taking over of possession and consequently, the same do not deserve to be entertained. They have submitted that against the grand-father of the petitioners, the proceeding under the the Ceiling Act was drawn. Finally, the Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceiling, Kanpur Nagar had declared the land in dispute the extent of 18103.10 square meters to be surplus on 26.2.1981. They have submitted that against the grand-father of the petitioners, the proceeding under the the Ceiling Act was drawn. Finally, the Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceiling, Kanpur Nagar had declared the land in dispute the extent of 18103.10 square meters to be surplus on 26.2.1981. Thereafter, a notification under Section 10 (1) was issued and published in the official Gazette but no interested person had filed any objection within the stipulated time. The notification under Section 10 (3) was issued on 31.3.1984 and the surplus land was vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances. On 19.6.1985 a notice under Section 10 (5) was issued to the land holder for handing over the possession of the surplus land. Consequently, the State Government had taken possession of the surplus land on 9.10.1986 and the surplus land has been entered in the revenue records on 13.3.1987. The property in dispute has been transferred to the KDA on 27.1.1993. Admittedly, the proceeding under the Ceiling Act has been completed before the Repeal Act came into force on 18.3.1999 and the name of State is continuing in revenue record. The writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. In support of their submission, they have placed reliance upon the judgments in State of U.P. v. Nathan Singh; Ramesh Kumar v. State and others and Raju Sharma v. State of U.P. and others in which Hon'ble Court has dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay and observed that once the proceedings has been completed and the name of Urban Ceiling has been mutated before passing the Repeal Act, 1999 then no relief can be accorded to the petitioner. 8. Heard rival submission and perused the record. 9. We have proceeded to examine the record in question and find that the land in dispute was proposed to be declared as surplus and accordingly, draft statement under Section 8 (3) of the Ceiling Act was sent to the land holder on 24.11.1980 to which he did not submit any objection within the stipulated period. After confirming the said notice under Section 8 (3) of the Ceiling Act, an order under Section 8 (4) was passed by the Competent Authority on 26.2.1981 declaring 18103.10 sq.m. of land as surplus with the land holder being beyond the saving limit. After confirming the said notice under Section 8 (3) of the Ceiling Act, an order under Section 8 (4) was passed by the Competent Authority on 26.2.1981 declaring 18103.10 sq.m. of land as surplus with the land holder being beyond the saving limit. In compliance of the said order, final statement under Section 9 of the Ceiling Act was issued to the original owner through registered post. Thereafter, the notification under Section 10 (1) was issued and published in the official Gazette. After publication of the notification, no interested person had filed any objection within the stipulated time and consequently, the notification under Section 10 (3) was issued on 31.3.1984. The surplus land was vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances. Thereafter, on 19.6.1985 the notice under Section 10 (5) was issued to the land holder for handing over the possession of the surplus land. Consequently, the State Government had taken possession of the surplus land on 9.10.1986 and the surplus land has been entered in the revenue records in the name of the State on 13.3.1987 and the name of the tenure holder was deleted. The property in dispute has been transferred to the KDA on 27.1.1993 and huge development work i.e. construction of road/sewage has been done by the KDA. After 22 years of the taking of the possession, as an afterthought after the Repeal Act came into force on 18.3.1999, the writ petitions were filed by the petitioners in the year 2008 claiming that the possession, in fact, had not been taken from the original owner (grand father of the petitioners) and for the restoration of their names in the revenue records and the writ petitions were disposed of by this Court on 18.1.2018 directing the Collector to decide the application of the petitioners after giving opportunity of hearing to all the parties concerned including the development authority. In compliance of the aforesaid order, the claim of the petitioners has been rejected by the competent authority vide impugned order dated 13th June, 2018. 10. In compliance of the aforesaid order, the claim of the petitioners has been rejected by the competent authority vide impugned order dated 13th June, 2018. 10. The aspect of the belated and stale claim has been considered in detail in Dehri Rohtas Light Railway v. District Board Bhojpur and others, (1992) 2 SCC 598 , wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court observed in paragraph No. 13 as under : ''The rule which says that the Court may not inquire into belated and stale claim is not a rule of law but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion. Each case must depend upon its own facts. It will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and how the delay arose. The principle on which the relief to the party on the grounds of laches or delay is denied is that the rights which have accrued to others by reason of the delay in filing the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay. The real test to determine delay in such cases is that the petitioner should come to the writ Court before a parallel right is created and that the lapse of time is not attributable to any laches or negligence. The test is not to physical running of time. Where the circumstances justifying the conduct exists, the illegality which is manifest cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. The decision in Trilok Chand (supra) relied on is distinguishable on the facts of the present case. The levy is based on the net profits of the railway undertaking was beyond the authority and the illegal nature of the same has been questioned though belatedly in the pending proceedings after the pronouncement of the High Court in the matter relating to the subsequent years. That being the case, the claim of the appellant cannot be turned down on the sole ground of delay. We are of the opinion that the High Court was wrong in dismissing the writ petition in limine and refusing to grant the relief sought for. We however agree that suit has been rightly dismissed.'' 11. That being the case, the claim of the appellant cannot be turned down on the sole ground of delay. We are of the opinion that the High Court was wrong in dismissing the writ petition in limine and refusing to grant the relief sought for. We however agree that suit has been rightly dismissed.'' 11. Similarly, Hon'ble Apex Court has also considered the delay and laches pertaining to ceiling matters in Shivgonda Anna Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 3 SCC 5 , wherein, the petitioner had approached after considerable delay of ten years after the land was declared surplus and vested in the State Government and the writ petition was summarily dismissed by the High Court and the same was also approved by the Apex Court. Hon'ble Apex Court has also considered the delay and laches in preferring the petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India in Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, (2000) 2 SCC 48 and held that the equitable doctrine, namely, ''delay defects equity'' has its fullest application in the matter of grant of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. 12. The Supreme Court in U.P. Jal Nigam and another v. Jaswant Singh and another, (2006) 11 SCC 468 referred, with approval the law relating to laches, as summarized in Halsbury's Law of England. The relevant extract from the aforesaid judgement is reproduced below : ''12. The statement of law has also been summarized in Halsbury's Laws of England, Para 911, pg. 395 as follows : ''In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are : (i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and (ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant's part. Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation has been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches.'' (Emphasis added) 13. In Tukaram Kana Joshi and others v. MIDC and others, (2013) 1 SCC 353 , the Supreme Court observed as follows : ''12. The State, especially a welfare State which is governed by the Rule of Law, cannot arrogate itself to a status beyond one that is provided by the Constitution. Our Constitution is an organic and flexible one. Delay and laches is adopted as a mode of discretion to decline exercise of jurisdiction to grant relief. There is another facet. The Court is required to exercise judicial discretion. The said discretion is dependent on facts and circumstances of the cases. Delay and laches is one of the facets to deny exercise of discretion. It is not an absolute impediment. There can be mitigating factors, continuity of cause action, etc. That apart, if whole thing shocks the judicial conscience, then the Court should exercise the discretion more so, when no third party interest is involved. Thus analysed, the petition is not hit by the doctrine of delay and laches as the same is not a constitutional limitation, the cause of action is continuous and further the situation certainly shocks judicial conscience. The question of condonation of delay is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of the facts of the case at hand, as the same vary from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226, nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter, after the passage of a certain length of time. There may be a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, that the High Court would be inclined to interfere in spite of delay. Ultimately, it would be a matter within the discretion of the Court and such discretion, must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it. The validity of the party's defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Ultimately, it would be a matter within the discretion of the Court and such discretion, must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it. The validity of the party's defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. (Vide: P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., AIR 1974 SC 2271 ; State of M.P. and others v. Nandlal Jaiswal and others, AIR 1987 SC 251 ; and Tridip Kumar Dingal and others v. State of West Bengal and others, (2009) 1 SCC 768 ;) 14. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. Discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably. In the event that the claim made by the applicant is legally sustainable, delay should be condoned. In other words, where circumstances justifying the conduct exist, the illegality which is manifest, cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in the injustice being done, because of a non- deliberate delay. The Court should not harm innocent parties if their rights have infact emerged, by delay on the part of the Petitioners. (Vide: Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports and others, AIR 1970 SC 769 ; Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others, AIR 1987 SC 1353 ; Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Company Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur and others, AIR 1993 SC 802 ; Dayal Singh and others v. Union of India and others, AIR 2003 SC 1140 ; and Shankara Co-op Housing Society Ltd. v. M. Prabhakar and others, AIR 2011 SC 2161 ).'' 14. In State of Assam v. Bhaskar Jyoti Sharma and others, (2015) 5 SCC 321 , it was held by the Apex Court as under : ''16. The issue can be viewed from another angle also. Assuming that a person in possession could make a grievance, no matter without much gain in the ultimate analysis, the question is whether such grievance could be made long after the alleged violation of Section 10(5). The issue can be viewed from another angle also. Assuming that a person in possession could make a grievance, no matter without much gain in the ultimate analysis, the question is whether such grievance could be made long after the alleged violation of Section 10(5). If actual physical possession was taken over from the erstwhile land owner on 7th December, 1991 as is alleged in the present case any grievance based on Section 10(5) ought to have been made within a reasonable time of such dispossession. If the owner did not do so, forcible taking over of possession would acquire legitimacy by sheer lapse of time. In any such situation the owner or the person in possession must be deemed to have waived his right under Section 10(5) of the Act. Any other view would, in our opinion, give a licence to a litigant to make a grievance not because he has suffered any real prejudice that needs to be redressed but only because the fortuitous circumstance of a Repeal Act tempted him to raise the issue regarding his dispossession being in violation of the prescribed procedure. 17. Reliance was placed by the respondents upon the decision of this Court in Hari Ram's case (supra). That decision does not, in our view, lend much assistance to the respondents. We say so, because this Court was in Hari Ram's case (supra) considering whether the word 'may' appearing in Section 10(5)gave to the competent authority the discretion to issue or not to issue a notice before taking physical possession of the land in question under Section 10(6). The question whether breach of Section 10(5)and possible dispossession without notice would vitiate the act of dispossession itself or render it non est in the eye of law did not fall for consideration in that case. In our opinion, what Section 10(5)prescribes is an ordinary and logical course of action that ought to be followed before the authorities decided to use force to dispossess the occupant under Section 10(6). In the case at hand if the appellant's version regarding dispossession of the erstwhile owner in December 1991 is correct, the fact that such dispossession was without a notice under Section 10(5) will be of no consequence and would not vitiate or obliterate the act of taking possession for the purposes of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. In the case at hand if the appellant's version regarding dispossession of the erstwhile owner in December 1991 is correct, the fact that such dispossession was without a notice under Section 10(5) will be of no consequence and would not vitiate or obliterate the act of taking possession for the purposes of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. That is because Bhabadeb Sarma-erstwhile owner had not made any grievance based on breach of Section 10(5) at any stage during his lifetime implying thereby that he had waived his right to do so. 19. In support of the contention that the respondents are even today in actual physical possession of the land in question reliance is placed upon certain electricity bills and bills paid for the telephone connection that stood in the name of one Mr. Sanatan Baishya. It was contended that said Mr. Sanatan Baishya was none other than the caretaker of the property of the respondents. There is, however, nothing on record to substantiate that assertion. The telephone bills and electricity bills also relate to the period from 2001 onwards only. There is nothing on record before us nor was anything placed before the High Court to suggest that between 7th December, 1991 till the date the land in question was allotted to GMDA in December, 2003 the owner or his legal heirs after his demise had continued to be in possession. All that we have is rival claims of the parties based on affidavits in support thereof. We repeatedly asked learned counsel for the parties whether they can, upon remand on the analogy of the decision in the case of Gyanaba Dilavarsinh Jadega (supra), adduce any documentary evidence that would enable the High Court to record a finding in regard to actual possession. They were unable to point out or refer to any such evidence. That being so the question whether actual physical possession was taken over remains a seriously disputed question of fact which is not amenable to a satisfactory determination by the High Court in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution no matter the High Court may in its discretion in certain situations upon such determination. Remand to the High Court to have a finding on the question of dispossession, therefore, does not appear to us to be a viable solution.'' (Emphasis supplied by us) 15. Remand to the High Court to have a finding on the question of dispossession, therefore, does not appear to us to be a viable solution.'' (Emphasis supplied by us) 15. The aforesaid judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhaskar Jyoti Sharma and others (supra) has been followed by a coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Shiv Ram Singh v. State of U.P. and others, 2015(7) ADJ 630 , wherein, the writ petition was dismissed on the ground of laches with following observations : ''We must also advert to another aspect of the matter particularly having regard to the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma (supra). The petitioner moved the first writ petition in 2002 nearly three years after the Repeal Act had come into force. After the earlier writ petition was disposed of by directing the District Magistrate to pass an order on the representation of the petitioner, an order was passed by the District Magistrate on 10 May 2007. The petitioner thereafter waited for a period of over two years until the present writ petition was filed in July 2009. If the petitioner had been dispossessed of the land without due notice under Section 10(5), such a grievance could have been raised at the relevant time. As a matter of fact, it has been the case of the State all along that a notice under Section 10(5) was, in fact, issued in the present case which would be borne out from the original file which has been produced before the Court. The issue is whether such a grievance could be made long after, before the Court. The petitioner had waited for nearly three years after the Repeal Act came into force to file the first writ petition and thereafter for a period of over two years after the disposal of the representation despite the finding of the District Magistrate that possession was taken over on 25 June 1993. In our view, such a belated challenge should not, in any event, be entertained.'' (Emphasis supplied by us) 16. In Kapilaben Ambalal Patel and others v. State of Gujarat, 2021 (12) SCC 95 , the Apex Court has considered the delay and laches in detail and declined to accept the pleas setup by the legal heirs/representatives of the original land holder on the ground of inordinate delay. In Kapilaben Ambalal Patel and others v. State of Gujarat, 2021 (12) SCC 95 , the Apex Court has considered the delay and laches in detail and declined to accept the pleas setup by the legal heirs/representatives of the original land holder on the ground of inordinate delay. Relevant paragraph of the judgement is reproduced herein below : ''Feeling aggrieved, the landowners have approached this Court. It is urged that there is no tittle of evidence to substantiate the fact asserted by the respondent State that physical possession of the land in question has been taken over on 20.3.1986. It was merely a paper-possession in the form of possession panchnama. According to the appellants, de facto possession of the subject land as on the date of the Repeal Act is crucial and entails in abatement of all the actions of the State authorities under the 1976 Act. Mere issuance of notification under Section 10(3) of the 1976 Act regarding deemed vesting of the land in the State is not enough for the purposes of the Repeal Act. Reliance has been placed on Vinayak Kashinath Shilkar v. Collector & Competent Authority, (2012) 4 SCC 718 , State of U.P. v. Hari Ram, (2013) 4 SCC 280 , Gajanan Kamlya Patil v. Additional Collector & Competent Authority (ULC), (2014) 12 SCC 523 and Mangalsen v. State of U.P., (2014) 15 SCC 332 . The consistent view of this Court is that physical possession must be taken by the State authorities, failing which the proceedings shall abate on account of the Repeal Act. The appellants have relied on revenue records to show that the continued possession remained with the appellants/landowners even after the possession panchnama was made on 20.3.1986. The revenue entries have presumptive value and the respondent State had failed to rebut the same. ''Furthermore, in the grounds all that is asserted is that the High Court erred in holding that there was delay of 14 years in filing of writ petition and in not appreciating that the notice under Section 10(5) of the 1976 Act dated 23.1.1986, was not served upon Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel as he had already expired on 31.12.1985 and notice sent to him was returned bacy on 2.2.1986 unserved with remark ''said owner has expired''. Further, the legal heirs of Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel ought to have been served with the said notice.........Be that as it may, we are not inclined to reverse the conclusion recorded by the Division Bench of the High Court that the writ petition filed by the appellants was hopelpessly delayed and suffered from laches. That is a possible view in the facts of the present case.'' 17. Recently, the coordinate Bench of this Court has also considered the Ceiling Act and Repeal Act qua to the subsequent purchaser in Smt. Kalawati Devi v. State of U.P. and others 2023(2) ADJ 201 (DB) and dismissed the writ petition on 18.1.2023 on the ground that the owner never protested or agitated his dispossession before any authority or Court. In the circumstances, the subsequent purchaser cannot raise challenge to the procedure of dispossession at belated stage on the strength of a sale-deed being void ab-initio. Relevant paragraph Nos. 22, 23 and 24 of the judgement are reproduced herein below : ''22. The question of issuing notice under Section 10(5) to the petitioner after 16 years from the date of notice under Section 10(1) of the Act does not arise. The State had taken possession from the land owner way back in 1981. The subsequent transfer of the land in 1994, followed by mutation of the name of the petitioner, would have no bearing on the right of the petitioner. The transfer of the surplus land by the erstwhile owner, in the eye of law being nullity i.e. void ab-initio would not confer any right or title upon the petitioner. The possession of the petitioner after the proceedings concluding under the Act, upon the State taking possession, would merely be a case of encroachment of State land. The Repeal Act would not come to the assistance of the petitioner, rather, the case of the petitioner would not fall within the ambit and scope of the Repeal Act being subsequent purchaser of the surplus land after notification under Section 10(1)/10(3) of the Act. 23. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, petitioner lacks locus, and any case, the proceedings came to be set up belatedly by the petitioner in 2006 by approaching this Court and filing a petition, being Writ Petition No. 14698 of 2006, which came to be disposed of directing the Collector to take a decision. 23. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, petitioner lacks locus, and any case, the proceedings came to be set up belatedly by the petitioner in 2006 by approaching this Court and filing a petition, being Writ Petition No. 14698 of 2006, which came to be disposed of directing the Collector to take a decision. Pursuant thereof, the impugned order came to be passed on 27.4.2011, whereby, the second respondent after recording the facts arrived at a conclusion that the transfer of the land by the erstwhile owner, declared surplus, vesting in the State, is a void document and does not confer any right and title upon the petitioner. The erstwhile tenure holder (Khelai), had no title or ownership to transfer the land, the petitioner on the strength of alleged possession on State land cannot agitate his dispossession in view of Repeal Act. The surplus land vested with the State upon notification under Section 10(3) followed by dispossession of the erstwhile owner of the land (Khelai) under Section 10(5) way back in 1981. The owner never protested or agitated his dispossession before any authority or Court. In the circumstances, the subsequent buyer (Petitioner) cannot raise challenge to the procedure of dispossession at belated stage on the strength of a sale-deed being void ab-initio. 24. The writ petition being devoid of merit, is accordingly, dismissed.'' 18. Admittedly, the ceiling proceeding was drawn against late Ram Sevak and the same was completed in the year 1986. The name of Urban Ceiling has been mutated in the revenue record in the year 1987. Thereafter, the property in dispute was transferred to the KDA in the year 1993 and huge development work has been done on the land in dispute by the KDA. The original owner never protested or agitated his dispossession before any authority or Court. The petitioners claim to be the grand son of late Ram Sevak. After almost 38 years of taking over possession of the land in dispute straightaway as grand children of the original owner the petitioners have filed these writ petitions with the aforesaid reliefs. Nothing has been brought on record that the petitioners were the successors. No succession certificate has been brought on record to indicate that they were only stakeholders in the property in question. Further, nothing has been brought on record qua the status of their father. Nothing has been brought on record that the petitioners were the successors. No succession certificate has been brought on record to indicate that they were only stakeholders in the property in question. Further, nothing has been brought on record qua the status of their father. In our view, at this stage such a belated challenge should not be entertained by this Court. 19. For the reasons aforestated and also in view of the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhaskar Jyoti Sharma (supra), Kapilaben Ambalal Patel (supra) and a coordinate Bench decision of this Court in the case of Shiv Ram Singh (supra), we do not find any merit in the writ petition. This writ petition is also highly time barred and no reason for the inordinate delay has been given in the writ petition. 20. Consequently, all the writ petitions are dismissed.