JUDGMENT : SANJAY K. AGRAWAL, J. 1. This criminal appeal preferred by the appellant-accused under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 02.01.2015, passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Raighar in Sessions Case No. 167 of 2013, whereby he has been convicted for offence under Section 302 of IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life with fine of Rs.1,000/- and, in default of fine amount, additional rigorous imprisonment for 01 year and also convicted under Section 450 of IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life with fine of Rs.1,000/- and in default of fine amount, additional rigorous imprisonment for 01 year. [Both the sentences are directed to run consecutively and also to commence after the punishment imposed on the appellant in connected Criminal Appeal No. 1418 of 2023 arising out of Sessions Trial No. 166 of 2013, wherein he has been convicted for offences under Section 320 and 324 (on two counts) of IPC and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and rigorous imprisonment for 03-03 years’ respectively alongwith fine and default stipulations. The appellant herein has also not been given the benefit to set off the period already undergone under Section 428 of Cr.P.C. 2. The case of the prosecution, in short, is that on 08.07.2015, at about 2:30 AM in the night, at Village Kondasiya, Kosiyapara within the ambit of Police Station Lailunga, the accused-appellant herein with the intent to commit murder, firstly unauthorizedly and illegally trespassed into the house of Thabir Sai Nag (PW-1) and, thereafter, assaulted his brother-Jagdish (for short herein after called as “deceased”) by means of iron ‘basula’ (adze) on his neck, due to which he suffered grievous injuries and died, and, thereby, the appellant is said to have committed offences under Sections 302 & 450 of IPC. 3. The further case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 05.07.2013, in the house of Thabir Sai Nag (PW-1), 10th day ceremony of Smt. Samari Bai was to be performed and, on that account, Thabir Sai (PW-1) has invited all his relatives including the appellant herein and his wife- Janki (PW-4). 3. The further case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 05.07.2013, in the house of Thabir Sai Nag (PW-1), 10th day ceremony of Smt. Samari Bai was to be performed and, on that account, Thabir Sai (PW-1) has invited all his relatives including the appellant herein and his wife- Janki (PW-4). It is further case of the prosecution that on said day, in the afternoon, the appellant herein asked his wife- Janki (PW-4) to accompany him and return back to their home at Village Sukwas, but when Janki (PW-4) refused to go, the appellant herein in anger started quarreling with her in filthy language and a dispute arose between them, in which, Dholi Bai, Maniyaro Bai and Jagmoti tried to intervene between them, upon which, the appellant herein assaulted Dholi Bai by means of knife on her chest, due to which she suffered grievous injuries and died, and the subject matter of such crime/incident was tried in separate trial being Sessions Case No. 166/2013, wherein he has been convicted and sentenced for offences under Sections 320 & 324 (on two counts) of IPC, which has also been challenged by the appellant before this Court in separate appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 1418 of 2023. Thereafter, in that night Thabir Sai (PW-1) alongwith one Mahesh (not examined) were sleeping in one cot and deceased- Jagdish was also sleeping in the same room on anther cot, and at about 02:30 AM in the night, when deceased- Jagdish started wiggling, Thabir Sai and Mahesh woke up and saw the appellant armed with blood stained iron adze (basula) standing towards the head of deceased- Jagdish and blood was oozing out from his neck and, after some time, the appellant went to another room and absconded from the spot and, thereafter, on the shout so made by Thabir Sai (PW-1) and Mahesh (not examined), other family members including Janki (PW-4) and Gangaram Nag (PW-5) woke up and reached to the spot and saw the appellant herein absconding from the spot armed with blood stained iron adze. 4. 4. Thereafter, on the report so lodged by Thabir Sai Nag (PW-1), on 08.07.2013 at about 10:30 AM, the police registered marg intimation (Ex.P/01) and FIR (Ex.P/02) against the appellant herein for offence under Section 302 of IPC and wheels of investigation started running, in which, inquest proceedings were conducted vide Ex.P/09 and summons under Section 175 of Cr.P.C. were issued vide Ex.P/08. Nazari Naksha was also prepared vide Ex.P/04. On 08.07.2013 at about 04:30 PM, the dead-body of deceased was sent for postmortem examination and in the postmortem report (Ex.P/09), conducted by Dr. Yogeshwar Singh Rathiya (PW-6), it was opined that the cause of death of deceased- Jagdish was on account of neurogenic shock and hemorrhage and nature of death is homicidal in nature. Memorandum statement of the appellant was recorded vide Ex.P/05A on 09.07.2013 at 12:30 PM and, pursuant to the memorandum statement of the appellant herein, iron adze (basula) was seized vide Ex.P/06 on 10.07.2013 at 02:30 PM. Thereafter, on 10.07.2013 at about 11:05 AM, the appellant-accused was arrested vide Ex.P/14. The aforesaid seized axe along with other seized articles were sent for chemical examination on 05.09.2013 vide Ex.P/16, but no FSL report has been brought on record for the reasons best known to the prosecution. Thereafter, statements of witnesses were recorded and, after due investigation, the police filed charge-sheet against the appellant in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Gharghoda and, thereafter, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions for hearing and trial in accordance with law, in which the appellant/accused abjured his guilt and entered into defence by stating that he is innocent and has been falsely implicated. 5. The prosecution in order to prove its case examined as many as 08 witnesses and exhibited 19 documents, whereas the appellant-accused in support of his defence has neither examined any defence witness nor exhibited any defence document. 6. The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record, proceeded to convict the appellant for offence under Sections 302 & 450 of IPC and sentenced him as mentioned herein-above, against which this appeal has been preferred by the appellant-accused questioning the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. 7. Mr. 6. The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record, proceeded to convict the appellant for offence under Sections 302 & 450 of IPC and sentenced him as mentioned herein-above, against which this appeal has been preferred by the appellant-accused questioning the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. 7. Mr. Varun Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellant for offences under Section 302 & 450 of IPC, as the prosecution has failed to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt. He further submits that Thabir Sai Nag (PW-1), who has been cited as an eye-witness has not seen the appellant herein hitting the deceased. Thabir Sai Nag (PW-1) himself gave three different version in Paras-1, 03 & 06 of his statement recorded before the Court. Since, Thabir Sai (PW-1) has not seen the appellant herein hitting the deceased, his testimony needs to be examined on the anvil of Section 06 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short the “IE Act, 1872”). Learned counsel also submits that the place of the incident is said to be parental house of the wife of the appellant, namely, Janki (PW-4), wherein the appellant was invited by Thabir Sai (PW-1) with his wife-Janki on the occasion of 10th day ceremony of Samari Bai (grand-mother of appellant’s wife) and the act of the appellant entering into his own in-laws house would not amount to criminal trespass as provided under Section 441 of IPC, as criminal trespass is punishable under Section 450 of IPC, which is an aggravated form of house trespass. He also submits that the learned trial Court has erred in law by directing two sentences of imprisonment for life to run consecutively (as awarded in the present case i.e. arising out of S.T. No. 167/2013) and to commence after completion of the punishment awarded in connected matter which is arising out of S.T. No. 166/2013, wherein the appellant has been awarded two term sentences of 03-03 years’ RI under Section 324 of IPC and one life imprisonment under Section 302 of IPC), which is in sheer violation of the provisions contained in Section 427(2) of Cr.P.C. as multiple life sentences can only be directed to run concurrently and refusal to grant the benefit of set off provided under Section 428 of Cr.P.C. is clearly contrary to law. He relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the matters of Muthuramalingam vs. State, (2016) 8 SCC 313 and Iqram vs. State of U.P. (2023) 3 SCC 184 to bolster his submission. Hence, the present appeal deserves to be allowed and the appellant herein is liable be acquitted/discharged from the said charge. 8. Per-contra, Mr. Sudeep Verma, learned State counsel supported the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence and submits that the prosecution has proved the offence beyond reasonable doubt by leading evidence of clinching nature. He further submits that though the testimony of Thabir Sai Nag (PW-1) is in the nature of res gestae witness, but his statement can be relied upon to hold the appellant herein guilty for having committed the offence of murder. Furthermore, the appellant unauthorizedly trespassed into the house of his in-laws in late night hours i.e. around 02:30 AM with the intent to commit the offence and, early noon on the same day, the appellant has also assaulted one Dholi Bai by means of knife, due to which she suffered grievous injuries and died. He also submits that view of the statements of prosecution witnesses coupled with other material available on record, the learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for offence under Sections 302 & 450 of IPC. Thus, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 10. Thus, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 10. The first and foremost question is as to whether the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature, which the learned trial Court has recorded in affirmative by taking into consideration the postmortem report (Ex.P/09), wherein it has been opined that cause of death of deceased is hemorrhage and neurogenic shock and nature of death is homicidal, which is duly proved by the statement of Dr. Yogeshar Singh Rathiya (PW-6). Accordingly, taking into consideration the postmortem report (Ex.P/09) and the statement of Dr. Yogeshar Singh Rathiya (PW-6), who has conducted the postmortem of the dead-body of the deceased, we are of the considered opinion that the death of the deceased is homicidal in nature, as the same is correct finding of fact based on evidence and same is neither perverse nor contrary to the record. We hereby affirm the said finding. 11. Now, the next question would be whether the accused-appellant herein is the author of the crime or not? 12. In order to hold the appellant guilty, the learned trial Court has relied upon the statements of Thabir Sai Nag (PW-1), Ganesh Kumar (PW-2), Vasudev Malakar (PW-3), Janki (PW-4), Gangaram Nag (PW-5), Dr. Yogeshwar Singh Rathiya (PW-6), Jagmoti (PW-7) and I. Tirkey (PW-8). 13. Dr. Yogeshwar Singh Rahtiya (PW-6) has proved the postmortem report of the deceased (Ex.P/09), wherein the death of the deceased was held to be homicidal in nature, which we have already considered to be rightly held by the learned trial Court in preceding paragraph of this judgment. I. Tirkey (PW-8) is the investigating officer in this case, who has recorded statements of witnesses and had also investigated the matter. I. Tirkey (PW-8) is the investigating officer in this case, who has recorded statements of witnesses and had also investigated the matter. Thabir Sai Nag (PW-1) is the complainant in this case, in whose house the incident took place and, on that day, all the relative including the appellant and his wife- Janki (PW-4) had gathered on 10th day ceremony of Late Samari Bai (mother-in-law of the appellant), wherein a dispute arose between the appellant and his wife- Janki (PW-4), in which, one Dholi Bai tried to intervene and the appellant assaulted her by means of knife, due to which Dholi Bai suffered grievous injuries and died, which is subject matter of separate Criminal Appeal No. 1418 of 2023, arising out of S.T. No. 166 of 2013. It is also not in dispute that in the early hours of the date of present incident i.e. 08.07.2013, the appellant herein firstly quarreled with his wife- Janki (PW-4) and when Dholi Bai tried to intervene, he assaulted her and caused her murder. Thereafter, in late night hours i.e. at about 02:30 AM, the appellant is said to have entered into the house of Thabir Sai (PW-1) and assaulted the deceased on his neck by means of iron adze (basula), which was witnessed by Thabir Sai (PW-1). Though, Thabir Sai (PW-1) has been cited as an eye-witness by the prosecution, but he has not seen the appellant assaulting or hitting the deceased by means of ‘basula’, as he himself has stated in Para-01 of his statement that he saw the appellant hitting the deceased with iron adze in front of his eyes, thereafter, in Para-03 he stated that the appellant was standing armed with blood stained iron adze (basula) and in Para-06 of his cross-examination, he has stated that he saw the appellant running from the spot. However, a careful scrutiny of the statement of Thabir Sai (PW-1) would show that on the date and time of the offence, when he woke up, he has seen the appellant standing therein armed with blood stained iron adze (basula) and absconding from the spot and, as such, his statement would be admissible as relevant fact under Section 06 of the Evidence Act. 14. Before proceeding to evaluate the statements of witnesses, it would be apt to remember the principle enshrined under Section 6 of the Evidence Act. 14. Before proceeding to evaluate the statements of witnesses, it would be apt to remember the principle enshrined under Section 6 of the Evidence Act. The said provision is reproduced hereunder for ready reference: “6. Relevancy of facts forming part of same transaction - Facts which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue as to form part of the same transaction, are relevant, whether they occurred at the same time and place or at different times and places.” 15. The principle on which the provision referred above is based is popularly defined as res gestae. It has been defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as follows: “(Latin: ‘things done’) The events at issue, or other events contemporaneous with them. In evidence law, words and statements about the res gestae are usually admissible under a hearsay exception (such as present sense impression or excited utterance).” 16. Section 6 of the Evidence Act is thus an exception to the general rule whereunder hearsay evidence, which is otherwise inadmissible, becomes admissible. However, for bringing such hearsay evidence within the ambit and scope of Section 6 what is required to be established is that it must be almost contemporaneous with the acts and there could not be any interval which would allow fabrication. In other words, the statement forming part of res gestae must be made contemporaneously with the act or immediately thereafter. 17. In the matter of Badruddin Rukonddim Karpude and Others vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1981 SC 1223 it is held by the Supreme Court that where in a prosecution for murder apart from the witnesses whose testimony could not be relied on there was evidence of other witnesses also, supported by the testimony of a wholly independent witness, that the names of the accused were mentioned to him as the assailants of the deceased while beating of the deceased was in progress the information conveyed to such witness being part of the res gestae was admissible and the accused in question could be convicted on the basis of corroboration furnished by the evidence of such witness. 18. In the matter of Javed Alam vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Another, (2009) 6 SCC 450 the Supreme Court dealt with the principle to hold thus in paragraph-19: “19. Section 6 of the Evidence Act is an exception to the rule of evidence that hearsay evidence is not admissible. 18. In the matter of Javed Alam vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Another, (2009) 6 SCC 450 the Supreme Court dealt with the principle to hold thus in paragraph-19: “19. Section 6 of the Evidence Act is an exception to the rule of evidence that hearsay evidence is not admissible. The test for applying the rule of res gestae is that the statement should be spontaneous and should form part of the same transaction ruling out any possibility of concoction. In Gentela Vijayavardhan Rao vs. State of A.P. (1996) 6 SCC 241 , it was held in Para 15 as follows: (SCC pp. 246-247) Section 6 of the Evidence Act and some of the succeeding sections embody the rule of admission of evidence relating to what is commonly known as res gestae. They are in the nature of exception to “hearsay” rule. Section 6 permits proof of collateral statements which are so connected with the facts in issue as to form part of the same transaction. Whether the statement made by a witness was a part of the same transaction or not is to be considered in the light of the circumstances of each case. The principle is that it should be so intimately connected with the fact in issue as to be a spontaneous utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion or a spontaneous reaction thereof, there being no opportunity for deliberately fabricating the statement. In other words, the statement which is a part of res gestae does not narrate a past event, but it is the event itself speaking through a person thus excluding the possibility of any design behind it.” (Emphasis supplied) 19. Yet again in the matter of Krishan Kumar Malik vs. State of Haryana, (2011) 7 SCC 130 the same principle has been reiterated. Similarly, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sukhar vs. State of U.P. (1999) 9 SCC 507 have held that while considering Section 6 of the Evidence Act qua the conviction of an accused on the basis of admissible evidence under Section 06 of the Evidence Act, it must be corroborated either by oral evidence or from any other circumstances and observed in Para-10 & 11 as under: “10. Applying the ratio of the aforesaid two cases to the evidence of PW-2, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that his statement indicating that the injured told him that his nephew has fired at him, would become admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act. We are, therefore, unable to accept the first submission of Ms Goswami, learned counsel appearing for the appellant. 11. The next question that arises for consideration is whether even if the statement becomes admissible, can the statement be held to be so reliable that a conviction under Section 307 can be based thereupon. PW-2 in the cross-examination candidly admitted that Sukhar, the present appellant and he are inimical to each other since long before. It was also elicited in the cross-examination of the said witness that by the time he reached the scene of occurrence, more than 20 persons had gathered next to Nakkal and yet none of them has been examined by the prosecution to corroborate PW-2 as to what was told to him by the injured. The witness also stated in the cross-examination that Nakkal was naming the accused as his assailant in front of all those people who had gathered but it is not understood as to why the prosecution has chosen not to examine any one of them but to examine only PW-2 who was admittedly inimically disposed towards the accused/appellant. In this view of the matter, the evidence of PW-2 cannot be held to be of such an unimpeachable character on whose testimony alone the conviction can be based without any corroboration. On the other hand, the witness being inimical to the accused and on account of what has been elicited in his cross-examination, his evidence requires corroboration before being accepted. Admittedly there is not an iota of corroboration either from any oral evidence or from any other circumstances. In this view of the matter, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the conviction of the appellant on the unreliable and shaky evidence of PW-2 without any corroboration, cannot be sustained. We accordingly set aside the conviction and sentence of appellant and acquit him of the charges levelled against him. The accused who is in jail should be released forthwith. The appeal is allowed accordingly.” 20. We accordingly set aside the conviction and sentence of appellant and acquit him of the charges levelled against him. The accused who is in jail should be released forthwith. The appeal is allowed accordingly.” 20. The principle of res gestae is thus well settled that a hearsay evidence, which is otherwise inadmissible, becomes admissible when the facts are informed to the witness during the course of the incident or immediately thereafter so that not much time is left in the interregnum to fabricate the evidence. The evidence in the nature of res gestae can also be used as corroboration to the statements of any other evidence whether circumstantial or direct. As such it is quite evident that the evidence in the nature of res gestae can also be used as corroboration to the statements of any other evidence whether circumstantial or direct. 21. Now, we may consider the statements of Janki (PW-4), Gangaram Nag (PW-5) and Jagmoti (PW-7), which the learned trial Court has also relied upon precisely to hold the appellant guilty for the offences in question. 22. Janki (PW-4) is the wife of the appellant and, on the date and time of the offence, she was also in the house of Thabir Sai (PW-1) and, with whom, firstly in afternoon hours, the appellant quarreled and, thereafter, assaulted Dholi Bai by means of knife and caused her murder. In Para-2 of her statement before the Court, she has stated that in the night at about 02:00 AM the appellant entered into the house and assaulted deceased- Jagdish by means of ‘basula’, while he was sleeping and she has further stated that she has seen the appellant absconding from the spot with iron adze (basula) and blood was oozing out from the neck of the deceased. However, in her cross-examination, she has only stated that she has seen the appellant standing armed with iron adze and he was under the influence of liquor. As such, considering the statement of Janki (PW-4), it cannot be held that she is the eye-witness to the incident. At best, it can only be held that she has only seen the appellant running/absconding from the spot armed with iron adze (basula), which is relevant fact under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. 23. As such, considering the statement of Janki (PW-4), it cannot be held that she is the eye-witness to the incident. At best, it can only be held that she has only seen the appellant running/absconding from the spot armed with iron adze (basula), which is relevant fact under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. 23. Similarly, Jagmoti (PW-7), who is sister of the deceased and was also present in the same house on the date and time of the offence, has stated before the Court that she came to know from Thabir Sai (PW-1) and Mahesh (not examined) that the appellant assaulted his brother-Jagdish (deceased) by means of iron adze (basula) on his neck and caused his murder and upon the shot made by Thabir Sai (PW-1) and Mahesh (not examined) she alongwith other family members reached to the spot and saw the appellant running/absconding from their house armed with iron adze (basula). As such, from the statement of Jagmoti (PW-7) it is quite clear that she has also not seen the appellant hitting the deceased by means of iron adze, in fact, she has seen the appellant absconding from the spot armed with iron adze (basula) and, thus, she is also not an eye-witness and has not seen the incident. 24. Gangaram Nag (PW-5) is the father of the deceased. He has stated that on the date and time of the offence deceased alongwith Thabir Sai (PW-1) and one Mahesh (not examined) were sleeping in one room and door of the house was opened. Thereafter, when Thabir Sai and Mahesh shouted that the appellant has killed the deceased by iron adze, he reached to the spot and saw the appellant absconding from his house. As such, Gangaram Nag (PW-5) is also not the eye-witness and has not seen the incident. He has only seen the appellant absconding from the spot armed with iron adze (basula). Further, though the iron adze (basula) has been seized pursuant to the memorandum statement of the appellant, but no FSL report has been brought on record to substantiate the fact that stains of human blood were found on the said iron adze (basula), which is of no use to the prosecution. 25. Further, though the iron adze (basula) has been seized pursuant to the memorandum statement of the appellant, but no FSL report has been brought on record to substantiate the fact that stains of human blood were found on the said iron adze (basula), which is of no use to the prosecution. 25. Thus, on the basis of aforesaid evidence and statement of witnesses, it appears that only Thabir Sai (PW-1) [res gestae witness], Janki (PW-4), Gangaram Nag (PW-5) and Jagmoti (PW-7) have seen the appellant absconding from the spot armed with iron adze (basula), which is relevant fact under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. In light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Subramanya vs. State of Karnataka, 2022 SCC Online SC 1400 though subsequent conduct of an accused may be relevant fact under Section 08 of the Evidence Act, but it cannot form basis for recording his conviction. Further, it is trite law that on the basis of testimony of res gestae witness the accused in question could only be convicted on the basis of corroboration furnished by evidence of such witness (See: Badruddin Rukonddim Karpude (supra) and Sukhar (supra). In the instant case, there is no corroboration of the statement of Thabir Sai (PW-1), however, Janki (PW-4), Gangaram Nag (PW-5) and Jagmoti (PW-7) have seen the appellant absconding from the spot armed with iron adze (basula), which is relevant fact under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. Furthermore, though pursuant to the memorandum statement of the appellant, iron adze (basula) has been seized, but there is no FSL report available on record to hold that stains of human blood were found on the said basula. In absence of which and only on the basis of the statements of Thabir Sai (PW-1), Janki (PW-4), Gangaram Nag (PW-5) and Jagmoti (PW-7) that have seen the appellant absconding from the spot armed with iron adze (basula), it would be unsafe to hold the appellant guilty for the offence of committing murder of the deceased. In absence of which and only on the basis of the statements of Thabir Sai (PW-1), Janki (PW-4), Gangaram Nag (PW-5) and Jagmoti (PW-7) that have seen the appellant absconding from the spot armed with iron adze (basula), it would be unsafe to hold the appellant guilty for the offence of committing murder of the deceased. As such, in absence of corroboration by other reliable piece of evidence, we are unable to hold that the prosecution has been able to prove the five golden principles to constitute the ‘panchsheel’ of proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence, as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 and, therefore, it cannot be held that the appellant herein is the author of the crime and has committed offence under Section 302 of IPC. 26. The appellant has also been convicted for offence under Section 450 of IPC, which is an offence of house-trespass in order to commit offence, punishable with imprisonment for life. In order to bring home an offence of house-trespass, the prosecution has to firstly prove that the accused committed house trespass as defined under Section 442 of IPC and secondly the purpose of such house-trespass was to commit an offence which can be visited by imprisonment of life. House-trespass has been defined under Section 442 of IPC, which states that whoever commits criminal trespass by entering into or remaining in any building, tent or vessel used as a human dwelling or any building used as a place for worship, or as a place for the custody of property, is said to commit “house-trespass.” Whereas, criminal trespass has been defined under Section 441 of IPC, which states that whoever enters into or upon property in the possession of another with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property, or having lawfully entered into or upon such property, unlawfully remains there with intent thereby to intimidate, insult or annoy any such person, or with intent to commit an offence, is said to commit “criminal trespass.” 27. In the instant case, the house in question where the appellant is said to have committed the offence of murder in the house of his own in-laws, where the appellant alongwith his wife-Janki (PW-4) both were invited as guest on 10th day ceremony of Smt. Samari Bai (grand-mother of the appellant’s wife). Though, in the afternoon, the appellant is said to have committed an offence of murder of one Dholi Bai, which is punishable with imprisonment for life and same is subject matter of separate Criminal Appeal No. 1418 of 2023 arising out of Sessions Trial No. 166 of 2013, but it is not the case of the prosecution in the instant case that owing to said incident the appellant had already been identified as an accused for murder of Dholi Bai and was restricted from entering into the house of Thabir Sai (PW-1). No evidence has been brought on record to hold that on account of previous conduct of the appellant or incident of murder of Dholi Bai committed by the appellant herein in the afternoon, he was not authorized to enter into the house in question i.e. his own in-laws house and even Thabir Sai (PW-1), in whose house the incident took place, has also not stated the same in his statement before the Court. Even otherwise, the prosecution must have brought on record that accused was not authorized to enter into the house in question or he was advised not to enter into his own in-laws house. As such, the prosecution has failed to prove that the appellant has committed house-trespass (i.e. entered into his in-law house unauthorized and illegally) with the intent to commit the offence punishable for imprisonment of life, that too when he and his wife-Janki (PW-4) were present in the said house as they were called/invited on 10th day ceremony of Smt. Samari Bai (grand-mother of appellant’s wife). In that view of the matter and following the principles of law laid in this regard by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the matter of Samay Lal Dohar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2010 Cri. L.J. (NOC) 401 (MP) the conviction of the appellant for offence under Section 450 of IPC is also not sustainable and liable to be set aside. 28. L.J. (NOC) 401 (MP) the conviction of the appellant for offence under Section 450 of IPC is also not sustainable and liable to be set aside. 28. The next question for consideration would be whether the learned trial Court is justified in directing two sentences of life imprisonment to run consecutively (as awarded in the present case i.e. arising out of S.T. No. 167/2013) and to commence after completion of the punishment awarded in connected matter which is arising out of S.T. No. 166/2013, wherein the appellant has been awarded two term sentences of 03-03 years’ RI under Section 324 of IPC and one life imprisonment under Section 302 of IPC, which is subject matter of separate Criminal Appeal No. 1418 of 2023, completely ignoring the mandate provided under sub-section (2) of Section 427 of Cr.P.C. 29. In order to consider the aforesaid plea, it would be appropriate to notice here sub-section (2) of Section 427 of Cr.P.C. which states as under: “427. Sentence on offender already sentenced for another offence: (1) xxx xxx xxx (2) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence.” 30. A careful perusal of afore-quoted provision would clearly show that if an accused is already undergoing sentence of imprisonment for life and is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for life or a specified term, his subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence. A careful perusal of afore-quoted provision would clearly show that if an accused is already undergoing sentence of imprisonment for life and is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for life or a specified term, his subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence. In the instant case, the appellant herein is already undergoing imprisonment for life as awarded to him by the learned trial Court in Sessions Trial No. 166/2013, which is subject matter of Criminal Appeal No. 1418/2013 before this Court and in the present case also the appellant has been awarded sentence for imprisonment for life (two terms) for having committed offences under Section 302 & 450 of IPC and, therefore, Section 427 (2) of Cr.P.C. would apply and appellant’s subsequent conviction of imprisonment for life shall have to run concurrently by virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 427 of Cr.P.C. Thus, the learned trial Court has erred in law while directing the sentences imposed upon the appellant to run consecutively, which is against the mandate provided in sub-section (2) to Section 427 of Cr.P.C. Apart from this, learned counsel for the appellant has raised further plea that the appellant has been sentenced for imprisonment of life 02 times for having committed offence under Section 302 & 450 of IPC and the learned trial Court has further directed that both the sentences shall run consecutively, which is apparently contrary to the well settled law in this behalf and learned counsel would rely upon the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Muthuramalingam (supra) to buttress his submission and would submit that while multiple sentences for imprisonment for life can be awarded for multiple murders or other offences punishable with imprisonment for life, however, the life sentences so awarded cannot be directed to run consecutively and therefore that part of the order be set aside in light of judgment of Supreme Court in the matter of Muthuramalingam (supra). 31. We find force in this submission of learned counsel for the appellant. 31. We find force in this submission of learned counsel for the appellant. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Muthuramalingam (supra) have formulated following question in paragraph 1 of the report regarding, “Whether consecutive life sentences can be awarded to a convict on being found guilty of a series of murders for which he has been tried in a single trial?” and their Lordships considered the issue and pertinently answered the question in paragraphs 34 and 35 as under: “34. In conclusion our answer to the question is in the negative. We hold that while multiple sentences for imprisonment for life can be awarded for multiple murders or other offences punishable with imprisonment for life, the life sentences so awarded cannot be directed to run consecutively. Such sentences would, however, be superimposed over each other so that any remission or commutation granted by the competent authority in one does not ipso facto result in remission of the sentence awarded to the prisoner for the other. 35. We may, while parting, deal with yet another dimension of this case argued before us namely whether the court can direct life sentence and term sentences to run consecutively. That aspect was argued keeping in view the fact that the appellants have been sentenced to imprisonment for different terms apart from being awarded imprisonment for life. The trial court’s direction affirmed by the High Court is that the said term sentences shall run consecutively. It was contended on behalf of the appellants that even this part of the direction is not legally sound, for once the prisoner is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life, the term sentence awarded to him must run concurrently. We do not, however, think so. The power of the court to direct the order in which sentences will run is unquestionable in view of the language employed in Section 31 Cr.P.C. The court can, therefore, legitimately direct that the prisoner shall first undergo the term sentence before the commencement of his life sentence. Such a direction shall be perfectly legitimate and in tune with Section 31 Cr.P.C. The converse however may not be true for if the court directs the life sentence to start first it would necessarily imply that the term sentence would run concurrently. Such a direction shall be perfectly legitimate and in tune with Section 31 Cr.P.C. The converse however may not be true for if the court directs the life sentence to start first it would necessarily imply that the term sentence would run concurrently. That is because once the prisoner spends his life in jail, there is no question of his undergoing any further sentence. Whether or not the direction of the court below calls for any modification or alteration is a matter with which we are not concerned. The regular Bench hearing the appeals would be free to deal with that aspect of the matter having regard to what we have said in the foregoing paragraphs.” 32. The aforesaid conclusion of their Lordships would show that multiple sentences for imprisonment for life can be awarded for multiple murders or other offences punishable with imprisonment for life, but the life sentences so awarded cannot be directed to run consecutively, however, such sentences would be superimposed over each other for the purposes of any remission or commutation. Accordingly, though it is permissible that first term sentence would undergo and thereafter life sentence would undergo, but considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the trial Court is absolutely unjustified in directing two sentences of imprisonment for life to run consecutively, we hereby set aside that direction. 33. Accordingly, though it is permissible that first term sentence would undergo and thereafter life sentence would undergo, but considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the trial Court is absolutely unjustified in directing two sentences of imprisonment for life to run consecutively, we hereby set aside that direction. 33. In the present case, the learned trial Court has also not granted the benefit of setting off the period already undergone by the appellant as provided under Section 428 of Cr.P.C. and observed in Para-26 as under: ^^¼26½ vkjksih U;kf;d fujks/k esa gS og fnukad 10-07-2013 ls vc rd U;kf;d fujks/k esa gS mDr n.Mkfn"V vof/k esa eqtjk gks] bl O;oLFkk dk ykHk vkjksih dks rc gh feysxk tc vkjksih ek= bl fuf.kZr vijk/k esa gh can gks] vkjksih ds laca/k esa bl U;k;ky; }kjk vkt l= Ádj.k Øekad 166@13 varxZr /kkjk 320 ,oa 324 dk Hkh fu.kZ; ,oa n.Mkns’k fn;k tkdj mls vkthou dkjkokl vkSj vU; vijk/kksa esa rhu&rhu o"kZ ds dBksj dkjkokl dk n.Mkns’k fn;k x;k gSA bl Ádkj dk mDr n.Mkns’k l= Ádj.k Øekad 166@13 esa fuf.kZr n.Mkns’k vkjksih ds }kjk Hkqxrus ij gh ykxw gksxkA eqtjk dk ykHk vkjksih dks blh Ádj.k esa ÁkIr gksxhA /kkjk 428 ds varxZr lsV vi Áek.ki= cuk;k tk,A vkjksih dks l= Ádj.k Øekad 166@2013 esa U;kf;d vfHkj{kk esa fcrkbZ xbZ vof/k dk ykHk ÁkIr ugh gksxkA** 34. The aforesaid finding recorded by the learned trial Court would show that since the appellant is in custody with reference to Sessions Trial No. 163 of 2013 for having committed offence under Sections 320 & 324 (on two counts) of IPC, which is subject matter of Criminal Appeal No. 1418 of 2023 before this Court, therefore, he would not be entitled for set off provided under Section 428 of Cr.P.C. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the matter of Bhagirath vs. Delhi Administration, (1985) 2 SCC 580 has held that expression “imprisonment for a term” includes life imprisonment and further held that set offs and remissions are more required where sentence is longer. Earlier, the Supreme Court in the matter of Raghbir Singh vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1984 SC 1796 has held qua the setting of period of detention under Section 428 of Cr.P.C. that where the accused is undergoing imprisonment in former case, the period occupied by such investigation, inquiry or trial cannot be set off against sentence to be imposed in latter case. However, in a Three-Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court rendered in State of Maharashtra vs. Najakat Alia Mubarak Ali, (2001) 6 SCC 311 by majority it has been held that Section 428 of Cr.P.C. permits set off of the period already undergone by the accused, who is already in jail as an under-trail prisoner, against the period of sentence imposed on him irrespective of whether he was in jail in connection with same case during that period and observed in Para-14 to 18 as under: “14. The purpose of Section 428 of the Code is also for advancing amelioration to the prisoner. We may point out that the section does not contain any indication that if the prisoner was in jail as an under-trial prisoner in a second case the benefit envisaged in the section would be denied to him in respect of the second case. However, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the words “of the same case” in the section would afford sufficient indication that the benefit is intended to cover only one case and not more than that. It must be remembered that the ideology enshrined in Section 428 was introduced for the first time only in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. For understanding the contours of the legislative measure involved in that section, it is advantageous to have a look at the Objects and Reasons for bringing the above legislative provision. We therefore extract the same here: “The Committee has noted the distressing fact that in many cases accused persons are kept in prison for very long period as undertrial prisoners and in some cases the sentence of imprisonment ultimately awarded is a fraction of the period spent in jail as undertrial prisoner. Indeed, there may even be cases where such a person is acquitted. No doubt, sometimes courts do take into account the period of detention undergone as undertrial prisoner when passing sentence and occasionally the sentence of imprisonment is restricted to the period already undergone. Indeed, there may even be cases where such a person is acquitted. No doubt, sometimes courts do take into account the period of detention undergone as undertrial prisoner when passing sentence and occasionally the sentence of imprisonment is restricted to the period already undergone. But this is not always the case so that in many cases the accused person is made to suffer jail life for a period out of all proportion to the gravity of the offence or even to the punishment provided in the statute. The Committee has also noted that a large number of persons in the overcrowded jails of today are undertrial prisoners. The new clause seeks to remedy this unsatisfactory state of affairs. The new clause provides for the setting-off of the period of detention as an undertrial prisoner against the sentence of imprisonment imposed on him. The Committee trusts that the provision contained in the new clause would go a long way to mitigate the evil.” (Emphasis supplied) 15. The purpose is therefore clear that the convicted person is given the right to reckon the period of his sentence of imprisonment from the date he was in jail as an undertrial prisoner. In other words, the period of his being in jail as an undertrial prisoner would be added as a part of the period of imprisonment to which he is sentenced. We may now decipher the two requisites postulated in Section 428 of the Code: (1) During the stage of investigation, inquiry or trial of a particular case the prisoner should have been in jail at least for a certain period. (2) He should have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment in that case. 16. If the above two conditions are satisfied then the operative part of the provision comes into play i.e. if the sentence of imprisonment awarded is longer than the period of detention undergone by him during the stages of investigation, inquiry or trial, the convicted person need undergo only the balance period of imprisonment after deducting the earlier period from the total period of imprisonment awarded. The words “if any” in the section amplify that if there is no balance period left after such deduction the convict will be entitled to be set free from jail, unless he is required in any other case. The words “if any” in the section amplify that if there is no balance period left after such deduction the convict will be entitled to be set free from jail, unless he is required in any other case. In other words, if the convict was in prison, for whatever reason, during the stages of investigation, inquiry or trial of a particular case and was later convicted and sentenced to any term of imprisonment in that case the earlier period of detention undergone by him should be counted as part of the sentence imposed on him. 17. In the above context it is apposite to point out that very often it happens when an accused is convicted in one case under different counts of offences and sentenced to different terms of imprisonment under each such count, all such sentences are directed to run concurrently. The idea behind it is that the imprisonment to be suffered by him for one count of offence will, in fact and in effect be imprisonment for other count as well. 18. Reading Section 428 of the Code in the above perspective, the words of the same case are not to be understood as suggesting that the set off is allowable only if the earlier jail life was undergone by him exclusively for the case in which the sentence is imposed. The period during which the accused was in prison subsequent to the inception of a particular case, should be credited towards the period of imprisonment awarded as sentence in that particular case. It is immaterial that the prisoner was undergoing sentence of imprisonment in another case also during the said period. The words of the same case were used to refer to the pre-sentence period of detention undergone by him. Nothing more can be made out of the collocation of those words.” 35. The principles of law laid down in Najakat Alia Mubarak Ali (supra) has been followed with approval by the Supreme Court in the matter of State of Punjab vs. Madan Lal, (2009) 5 SCC 238 . In that view of aforesaid legal position, the finding of the learned trial Court that the appellant is not entitled for the benefit of set off provided under Section 428 of Cr.P.C. as he is already undergoing sentence in another criminal case, is clearly contrary to the well settled law in that behalf. In that view of aforesaid legal position, the finding of the learned trial Court that the appellant is not entitled for the benefit of set off provided under Section 428 of Cr.P.C. as he is already undergoing sentence in another criminal case, is clearly contrary to the well settled law in that behalf. It is also accordingly set aside. 36. Concludingly, in view of forgoing analysis, it can be safely concluded that the appellant herein is not the author of the crime, as it is not established beyond reasonable doubt that on the date and time of the offence he trespassed into the house of deceased and assaulted him by means of iron adze (basula) on his neck, due to which, he suffered grievous injuries and died. Consequently, the conviction of the appellant for offences under Sections 302 & 450 of IPC alongwith sentences of imprisonment for life, awarded by the learned trial Court, are hereby set aside. Further, the direction of the learned trial Court that both the sentences to run consecutively and to commence after the punishment imposed on the appellant in connected Sessions Trial No. 166 of 2013, which is subject matter of Criminal Appeal No. 1418 of 2023, alongwith the finding that the appellant herein is not entitled to get the benefit of set off the period already undergone by him as provided under Section 428 of Cr.P.C. are also set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the said charge by giving him benefit of doubt. As the appellant is reported to be in jail, he be released from jail forthwith, if not required in any other matter/crime. 37. This criminal appeal is allowed. 38. Let a certified copy of this order alongwith the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned as well as to the Superintendent of Jail where the appellant is languishing for necessary information and action, if any.