JUDGMENT : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. Satyawan Sao (A-1) has independently preferred Cr.A.No.44/2017, whereas Jageshwar Sao (A-2), Satyanand Sao (A-3) & Kanti Bai Sao (A-4) have jointly preferred Cr.A.No.369/2016 under Section 374(2) of the CrPC questioning the impugned judgment & order dated 19-2-2016 passed by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Raigarh, in Sessions Trial No.215/2014, by which they have been convicted for offences under Sections 304B read with Section 34 & 201 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life & pay fine of Rs.5,000/- each, in default of payment of fine to further undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for five months and rigorous imprisonment for one year & pay fine of Rs.1,000/- each, in default of payment of fine to further undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for one month, respectively, with a direction to run the sentences concurrently. 2. Since both the criminal appeals have arisen out of one and same judgment dated 19-2-2016 passed by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Raigarh, in Sessions Trial No.215/2014 and since common question of fact and law is involved in both the appeals, they have been clubbed together, heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 3. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that marriage of deceased Siddhi was solemnized with accused/appellant Satyawan Sao (A-1) on 7-5-2013 and thereafter, they started living with accused/appellants Jageshwar Sao (A-2) & Kanti Bai Sao (A-4) being father-in-law & mother-in-law of deceased Siddhi, respectively, and also with Satyanand Sao (A-3) being brother of Satyawan Sao (A-1). The accused/appellants started treating the deceased with cruelty for demand of dowry and on that account, on 2-8-2014 at about 10 a.m. at Village Tarda, Police Station Pusour, District Raigarh, they are said to have strangulated the deceased and in order to kill her, they poured kerosene oil on her body and set her ablaze. 4. The matter was reported to the police pursuant to which inquest was conducted vide Ex.P-4 and FIR was registered vide Ex.P-11. Crime details form was prepared vide Ex.P-7 and morgue intimation was registered vide Ex.P-8. The dead body of the deceased was sent for postmortem which was conducted by Dr. A.K. Bhagat (PW-10) vide postmortem report Ex.P-17 in which cause of death was stated to be asphyxia due to throttling and death was homicidal in nature. Crime details form was prepared vide Ex.P-7 and morgue intimation was registered vide Ex.P-8. The dead body of the deceased was sent for postmortem which was conducted by Dr. A.K. Bhagat (PW-10) vide postmortem report Ex.P-17 in which cause of death was stated to be asphyxia due to throttling and death was homicidal in nature. Articles were seized and seized articles were sent for chemical examination to the FSL, but FSL report has not been brought on record. 5. Statements of the witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC. After due investigation, the accused/appellants were charge-sheeted for offences under Sections 302 read with Section 34, 304B read with Section 34 & 201 of the IPC and charge-sheet was filed before the jurisdictional criminal court and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions, Raigarh, from where the learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Raigarh, received the case on transfer for conducting the trial and for hearing and disposal in accordance with law. 6. The prosecution, in order to bring home the offence, has examined as many as 11 witnesses and exhibited 17 documents Exs.P-1 to P-17. The appellants abjured the guilt and entered into defence. They have examined none, but exhibited five documents namely, Exs.D-1 to D-5 i.e. the statements of Jitendra Kumar Sao, Naresh Chandra Sahu, Smt. Kheermati, Ghasiya Ram Sao & Panku Sao recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC at their instance in support of their case. The appellants were examined under Section 313 of the CrPC in which they denied the guilt. 7. The trial Court after considering ocular, oral and documentary evidence on record, convicted the accused/appellants only under Sections 304B read with Section 34 & 201 of the IPC against which these appeals have been preferred by the appellants. 8. Mr. Vivek Kumar Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, would submit that at the time of incident, the appellants were not present in the house and they were working in their field. He would further submit that morgue intimation Ex.P-8 was lodged by accused/appellant Jageshwar (A-2) clearly mentioning therein that at the time of incident, they were not in the house. He would also submit that there is no independent witness to the incident and conviction of the appellants is based on the statements of interested witnesses. He would further submit that morgue intimation Ex.P-8 was lodged by accused/appellant Jageshwar (A-2) clearly mentioning therein that at the time of incident, they were not in the house. He would also submit that there is no independent witness to the incident and conviction of the appellants is based on the statements of interested witnesses. In alternative, he would submit that even otherwise, if conviction of the appellants for offence under Section 304B of the IPC is upheld, only 7 years of imprisonment has been prescribed by virtue of Section 304B of the IPC and no extraordinary reasons for awarding the sentence of imprisonment for life, which is the maximum sentence prescribed under this provision, have been recorded, therefore, the appellants be sentenced to the period already undergone by them, as they are in jail since 4-8-2014. 9. Mr. Sudeep Verma, learned State counsel, would support the impugned judgment and submit that the prosecution has been able to prove the case against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt and the trial Court has rightly convicted and sentenced them. He would further submit that the deceased died inside her house where she was residing along with the appellants. The burn injuries sustained by her have been found to be postmortem in nature. None of the appellants have offered any explanation in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC as to how the deceased died. As such, the appeals deserve to be dismissed. 10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 11. In order to consider the plea raised at the Bar, it would be appropriate to extract relevant provisions of Section 304B of the IPC which relates to dowry death:- “304-B. Dowry death.-(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-section, "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.” The above provision was inserted by Act 43 of 1986 and came into force with effect from 19-11-1986. 12. In order to convict an accused for the offence punishable under Section 304B of the IPC, the following essentials must be satisfied- The death of a woman should be caused by burn or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances. Such death should have occurred within seven years of the marriage. Soon before the death of deceased, she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her Husband or any relative of her Husband. Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand for dowry. Thus, if the aforesaid ingredients are established by the prosecution by leading appropriate reliable evidence, such death shall be called dowry death and the court shall presume and it shall record such fact as proved unless and until it is disproved by the accused. 13. Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 speaks about presumption as to dowry death, which reads as under:- "113B. Presumption as to dowry death.-When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, "dowry death" shall have the same meaning as in section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)." 14. The aforesaid provision shows that if the woman has been subjected to cruelty as defined in Section 498A of the IPC, the court may presume that such person has caused dowry death. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 provides as under:- 2. Definition of "dowry". The aforesaid provision shows that if the woman has been subjected to cruelty as defined in Section 498A of the IPC, the court may presume that such person has caused dowry death. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 provides as under:- 2. Definition of "dowry". In this Act," dowry" means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly- a. by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or b. by the parents of either party to a marriage or by a other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person; at or before or after the marriage us consideration for the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies." 15. To attract the provisions of Section 304B of the IPC, one of the main ingredients of the offence, which is required to be established is that "soon before her death" she was subjected to cruelty or harassment "for, or in connection with the demand for dowry". The expression "soon before her death" used in Section 304B of the IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. 16. In the matter of Appasaheb and another v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 9 SCC 721 , it has been held by the Supreme Court as under:- “9. Two essential ingredients of Section 304-B IPC, apart from others, are (i) death of woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances, and (ii) woman is subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for “dowry”. The explanation appended to sub section (1) of Section 304-B IPC says that “dowry” shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. 10. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act reads as under: “2. Definition of ‘dowry’.- In this Act, "dowry" means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly. 10. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act reads as under: “2. Definition of ‘dowry’.- In this Act, "dowry" means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly. (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or (b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person, at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies.” 11. In view of the aforesaid definition of the word “dowry” any property or valuable security should be given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly at or before or any time after the marriage and in connection with the marriage of the said parties. Therefore, the giving and taking of property or valuable security must have some connection with the marriage of the parties and a correlation between the giving or taking of property or valuable security with the marriage of the parties is essential. Being a penal provision it has to be strictly construed. Dowry is a fairly well known social custom or practice in India. It is well settled principle of interpretation of statute that if the Act is passed with reference to a particular trade, business or transaction and words are used which everybody conversant with that trade, business or transaction knows or understands to have a particular meaning in it, then the words are to be construed as having that particular meaning. (see Union of India v. Garware Nylons Ltd and Chemical and Fibres of India Ltd. v. Union of India). A demand for money on account of some financial stringency or for making some urgent domestic expenses or for purchasing manure cannot be termed as a demand for dowry as the said word is normally understood. The evidence adduced by the prosecution does not, therefore, show that any demand for 'dowry' as defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was made by the appellants as what was allegedly asked for was some money for meeting domestic expenses and for purchasing manure. The evidence adduced by the prosecution does not, therefore, show that any demand for 'dowry' as defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was made by the appellants as what was allegedly asked for was some money for meeting domestic expenses and for purchasing manure. Since an essential ingredient of Section 304-B IPC viz demand for dowry is not established, the conviction of the appellants cannot be sustained.” 17. The Supreme Court in the matter of Mustafa Shahadal Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, 2012 (11) SCC 397 , while considering the term "soon before her death", has held that term of the period which can come within the term "soon before her death" is to be determined by the courts, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the concerned cruelty or harassment and the death in question and there must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the concerned death. It has been further held that if the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence. 18. Reverting to the facts of present case, it is quite vivid that marriage of deceased Siddhi was solemnized with accused/appellant Satyawan Sao (A-1) on 7-5-2013 and on 2-8-2014, she died unnatural death. From the statements of Jitendra Kumar (PW-1) – father of the deceased, Naresh Chandra (PW-2) – uncle of the deceased, Smt. Kheermati (PW-4) – mother of the deceased and Dhaniram Ratre (PW-6), it is quite vivid that the appellants used to demand dowry immediately after marriage and thereafter, on that count, the deceased was being treated with cruelty and on the date of offence, she suffered unnatural death. The finding recorded by the trial Court in this regard is the correct finding of fact based on the evidence available on record. The trial Court has rightly convicted the appellants under Section 304B of the IPC and the four ingredients of offence under Section 304B of the IPC are fully established. 19. Now, the question is, whether the sentence of imprisonment for life awarded to the appellants under Section 304B of the IPC is correct sentence or not? 20. The trial Court has rightly convicted the appellants under Section 304B of the IPC and the four ingredients of offence under Section 304B of the IPC are fully established. 19. Now, the question is, whether the sentence of imprisonment for life awarded to the appellants under Section 304B of the IPC is correct sentence or not? 20. As has been argued by learned counsel for the appellants, no extraordinary reason has been assigned by the trial Court for awarding life sentence to the appellants, whereas sub-section (2) of Section 304B of the IPC provides that whoever commits dowry deaths shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life. 21. The Supreme Court in the matter of Hem Chand v. State of Haryana, AIR 1995 SC 120 has held that extreme punishment of life imprisonment under Section 304B of the IPC should be awarded in rare cases and not in every case. It has been held as under in paragraphs 7 & 8 of the report: - “7. … Therefore at the most it can be said that the prosecution proved that it was an unnatural death in which case also Section 304, I.P.C. would be attracted. But this aspect has certainly to be taken into consideration in balancing the sentence to be awarded to the accused. As a matter of fact, the trial court only found that the death was unnatural and the aspect of cruelty has been established and therefore the offences punishable under Sections 304-B and 201, I.P.C. have been established. The High Court in a very short judgment concluded that it was fully proved that the death of the deceased in her matrimonial home was a dowry death otherwise than in normal circumstances as a result of cruelty meted out to her and therefore an offence under S. 304-B, I.P.C. was made out. Coming to the sentence the High Court pointed out that the accused-appellant was a police employee and instead of checking the crime he himself indulged therein and precipitated in it and that bride killing cases are on the increase and therefore a serious view has to be taken. As mentioned above Section 304-B, I.P.C. only raises presumption and lays down that minimum sentence should be seven years but it may extend to imprisonment for life. As mentioned above Section 304-B, I.P.C. only raises presumption and lays down that minimum sentence should be seven years but it may extend to imprisonment for life. Therefore awarding extreme punishment of imprisonment for life should be in rare cases and not in every case. 8. Hence, we are of the view that a sentence of 10 years' R.I. would meet the ends of justice. We, accordingly while confirming the conviction of the appellant under S. 304B, I.P.C., reduce the sentence of imprisonment for life to 10 years' R.I. ...” 22. In the instant case, though the trial Court has attempted to record specific reasons as contained in paragraph 39 of the judgment, but that cannot be held to be extraordinary reasons or it cannot be said to be a rare case in which imprisonment for life can be awarded. In our view, the interest of justice would be served if the appellants are awarded 10 years’ of rigorous imprisonment under Section 304B of the IPC, however, their conviction and sentences under Section 201 of the IPC is well merited. 23. In view of the aforesaid finding, while confirming the conviction of the appellants under Section 304B read with Section 34 of the IPC, we reduce the sentence of imprisonment for life to 10 years' RI, however, sentence of fine with default stipulation shall remain intact. Further, their conviction and sentences under Section 201 of the IPC are also maintained. 24. In that view of the matter, both the appeals are allowed partly to the extent of their sentence under Section 304B of the IPC. 25. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned for necessary information and action, if any. A certified copy of the judgment may also be sent to the concerned Jail Superintendent forthwith wherein the appellants are suffering the jail sentence.