JUDGMENT : Sanjay S. Agrawal, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendants-South Eastern Coalfields Limited (hereinafter referred to as “SECL”) under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (hereinafter referred to as 'CPC') questioning the legality and propriety of the judgment and decree dated 05.05.2016 passed by Third Additional District Judge, Surguja at Ambikapur in Civil Suit No.21-B/2012, whereby the learned trial Court has decreed the plaintiff’s claim in part entitling him to a total sum of Rs.14,52,761/- payable by the defendants-SECL within a period of two months from the date of pronouncement of the judgment, while the cross appeal has been preferred by the plaintiff under Order 41 Rule 22 of CPC against the findings recorded in relation to issues No.1-a & 1-b. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the plaintiff, a proprietorship firm engaged in the business of contractorship carrying out work for various government, semi-government and public sector undertaking, was awarded the work of “hiring of HEMM for excavating (including drilling in all kinds of Strata/overburden) loading into tippers, transportation and unloading the excavated material and slit; dumping, dozing and scraping (removal of bands, preparation) maintenance of haul road, water sprinkling and spreading of materials at the site shown and as per the directives of the Management/Engineer-in-chief at Amera OC project with minimum 1,01,290 cubic meter per month.” The said contract work was allotted to the plaintiff in pursuance to the tender/NIT floated by the defendants-SECL on 11.03.2008, where the plaintiff was declared the successful bidder and work order was issued to him on 20.01.2009 and, an agreement was executed on 10.02.2009 and the plaintiff was to carry out the said work as per the terms and conditions stipulated therein. 3. According to the plaintiff, the defendants-SECL was to provide the land for carrying out the alleged contract work along with the layout, but, since the defendants-SECL has failed to provide the land for the said purpose, therefore, he failed to perform his part of the contract. 3. According to the plaintiff, the defendants-SECL was to provide the land for carrying out the alleged contract work along with the layout, but, since the defendants-SECL has failed to provide the land for the said purpose, therefore, he failed to perform his part of the contract. It is pleaded further that owing to non-performance of the terms and conditions of the alleged agreement by the defendants-SECL, the alleged contract work becomes unworkable and request was, therefore, made for its repudiation vide letter dated 01.06.2009 while raising the final bills amounting to Rs.20,42,704/- and since the bank guarantee furnished by him of Rs.5,89,943/- was never renewed, therefore, after adjusting the same, (Rs.20,42,704-Rs.5,89,943), the plaintiff has claimed total sum of Rs.14,52,761/- along with the interest at the rate of 24% per annum from the date of institution of the suit till its realization. 4. While contesting the aforesaid claim, it was pleaded by the defendants-SECL that despite being made available the necessary layout, the plaintiff has failed to perform the work in time as per the terms and conditions stipulated in the alleged agreement dated 10.02.2009 as he failed to make out requisite arrangements of machines for doing the alleged contract work in time which was the essential term of the alleged agreement. It is contended further that a hindrance register was made for the purposes of recording all kinds of obstruction in pursuing the said contract work in which the representatives of both plaintiff and the defendants-SECL have put their signatures and in the said register, a complaint pertaining to the deficiency in providing the land was neither made by the plaintiff nor was it a serious dispute exists between the parties. It is, therefore, contended that it was not the reasons for which the plaintiff has failed to perform his work in time. It is contended further that since the plaintiff has failed to complete the alleged contract work in time, therefore, he is not entitled to obtain the amount as mentioned in his three running bills i.e. 13.02.2009, 03.03.2009 and 31.03.2009 and owing to his failure in performing the work in time, a proceeding for imposing the penalty is being carried out against him under clause 6.2 of the alleged agreement. 5. 5. Based upon the aforesaid pleadings of the parties, the trial Court has framed the following issues:- 1(a) Whether the defendants-SECL, after awarding the alleged contract work to the plaintiff has failed to provide him the requisite facilities for doing the said work? 1(b) Whether the plaintiff has validly terminated the alleged agreement vide its letter dated 01.06.2009? (2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover the alleged amount of Rs.14,52,761/- ? (3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to interest on the said amount of (4) To what relief and costs ? 6. The trial Court after considering the evidence led by the parties, particularly by taking note of the alleged agreement dated 10.02.2009 (Ex.D-2) and the issuance of the work order dated 20.01.2009 where the alleged allegation of the plaintiff that the workplace was not provided to him, is neither included, nor any complaint was made to this effect in the Hindrance Register (Ex.D-1), held that the plaintiff has failed to perform his work in time as per the terms and conditions stipulated in the alleged agreement. It held further that although the plaintiff has failed to perform his work in time, but, since he has done 1,53,900 cubic meter overburden digging work from November, 2008 up to March, 2009 and as the alleged agreement was not terminated by the defendants-SECL, therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to a total sum of Rs.14,52,761/- for the work done by him without any interest within a period of two months. 7. Being aggrieved, the defendants-SECL has preferred this appeal while the plaintiff has questioned the findings which have been recorded against him under Order 41 Rule 22 of CPC. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants/defendants-SECL submits that despite holding that there was no breach on the part of the defendants-SECL while deciding the issues 1-a & 1-b, the trial Court ought not to have decreed the plaintiff’s claim in part. It is contended further that despite recording a finding, while entertaining the issue No.2 that the plaintiff has failed to complete the alleged contract work in time, yet the trial Court has committed a serious illegality in decreeing the plaintiff’s claim as such. It is contended further that since the plaintiff himself was found to be the guilty of the terms and conditions of the alleged contract, therefore, his claim ought to have been dismissed. 9. It is contended further that since the plaintiff himself was found to be the guilty of the terms and conditions of the alleged contract, therefore, his claim ought to have been dismissed. 9. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff, while referring to clause-5 & 10 of the alleged agreement, submits that the layout of the hindrance free site was required to be provided by the defendants-SECL, but, despite of repeated request being made, it was not provided, owing to which, the plaintiff was unable to execute the work within the stipulated time, therefore, the issue No.1(a) & 1(b) ought not to have decided against the plaintiff. 10. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the entire record carefully. 11. The main question, which arises for determination in this appeal is as to :- “Whether finding of the Court below decreeing the plaintiff’s claim in part despite holding that the plaintiff has failed to establish the fact that on account of non-compliance of the terms and conditions of the alleged agreement (Ex.D-2) by the defendants-SECL, he failed to complete the alleged contract work within the period provided therein, is perverse? 12. From perusal of the record, it appears that after accepting the offer of the plaintiff in pursuance to the tender floated by the defendants-SECL on 11.03.2008 (Ex.P-2), he was awarded the work of “hiring of HEMM for excavating (including drilling in all kinds of Strata/overburden) loading into tippers, transportation and unloading the excavated material and slit; dumping, dozing and scrapling (removal of bands, preparation) maintenance of haul road, water sprinkling and spreading of materials at the site shown and as per the directives of the Management/Engineer-in-chief at Amera OC project with minimum 1,01,290 cubic meter per month” and an agreement dated 10.02.2009 (Ex.D-2) was executed in this regard and the plaintiff has furnished the bank guarantee of Rs.5,89,943/-. The plaintiff was, thus, required to remove the overburden from the Amera Open Cast mines and for its dumping at different places and according to the terms and conditions stipulated therein, total area for removal for overburden was 3,03,859 cubic meter and which has to be done within the period of three months commencing with effect form 01.11.2008 to 31.01.2009 and one of the condition provided therein was to remove 1,01,290 cubic meter overburden per month and the rate has been fixed at Rs.38.83 per cubic meter, total amounting to Rs.1,17,98,844.97. 13. It, however, appears that the plaintiff has failed to complete the said work even the extended period provided to him was over and, in fact, he has done only 1,53,900 cubic meter by March, 2009 out of total 3,03,889 cubic meter. According to the plaintiff, hindrance free site along with layout was to be provided by the defendants-SECL, but, despite of his repeated request being made, it was not provided and that was the reason why he could not execute the work in time, which compelled him to issue a letter dated 01.06.2009 (Ex.P-32) to the defendants-SECL requesting for repudiation of the alleged work while raising his final bills. 14. In order to establish the aforesaid fact, the burden was upon the plaintiff, however, no cogent and reliable evidence has been led by him in order to establish the fact that because of non-performance of the alleged terms and conditions by the defendants-SECL, he failed to complete the contract work in time. It is to be seen that neither in the alleged agreement, nor in the work order, issued on 20.01.2009, the alleged term for providing the layout of hindrance free site was the condition precedent for performing the said work, nor even the complaint was made by the plaintiff in this regard in the said hindrance register (Ex.D-1), so as to hold that he failed to complete the alleged work because of non-compliance of any of the terms and conditions by the defendants-SECL. 15. That apart, the plaintiff has stopped the alleged contract work since 01.04.2009, as reflected by the testimony of his Power of Attorney Holder namely Rajendra Rajput (PW-1), yet the plaintiff was kept silent for a considerable period of two months and issued a letter (Ex.P-32) only on 01.06.2009 seeking repudiation of the alleged agreement (Ex.D-2) while raising final bills. 15. That apart, the plaintiff has stopped the alleged contract work since 01.04.2009, as reflected by the testimony of his Power of Attorney Holder namely Rajendra Rajput (PW-1), yet the plaintiff was kept silent for a considerable period of two months and issued a letter (Ex.P-32) only on 01.06.2009 seeking repudiation of the alleged agreement (Ex.D-2) while raising final bills. No explanation whatsoever has been offered by him as to why he was kept silent for such a long time, particularly when the time was the essence for performance of the alleged contract work. 16. Be that as it may, although the aforesaid letter (Ex.P-32) was issued by the plaintiff, but, the defendants-SECL has neither taken any decision on it, nor has exercised its power for its termination, suspension, cancellation or foreclosure of the alleged contract work as provided under Clause-9 of the alleged agreement. In view thereof, the plaintiff cannot be deprived for obtaining the amount for the work done by him. It is to be seen further at this juncture the clause 6.2 of the alleged agreement which provides for imposition of penalty, if the work is not completed within the stipulated time. The said clause reads as under:- 6.0 “TIME FOR COMPLETION OF CONTRACT – EXTENSION THEREOF, DEFAULTS & COMPENSATION FOR DELAY Immediately after the contract is concluded the Engineer-in-charge and the contractor shall agree upon time and progress chart prepared on the basis of a schedule of excavation to be submitted by the contractor showing the order in which the work is proposed to be carried out within the time specified in the contract document. For the purpose of this time and progress chart, the work shall be deemed to have commenced on the expiry of 10 (ten) days from the issue of letter of acceptance/work order of handing over the site of work whichever is later. The successful tenderer(s), to whom the work shall be awarded by SECL, shall execute the work by themselves by deploying HEMM and the same will be operated by their trained permanent employees only. They shall not sublet the work or give the work to sub-contractor or execution of work, no contract labour shall be employed/engaged in any work at any time. They shall not sublet the work or give the work to sub-contractor or execution of work, no contract labour shall be employed/engaged in any work at any time. 6.1 --- xxx ---- 6.2 In the event of the contractor’s failure to comply with the required progress in terms of the agreed time and progress chart or to complete the work and clear the site on or before the contract or the extended date of completion, he shall without prejudice to any other right or remedy available under the law to the Company, on account of such breach, shall become liable to pay for penalty as under: a) If the average daily progress of work during the calendar months is less than the stipulated rate as stated in the detailed tender notice, penalty as detailed below will be levied. (i) If the average daily progress of work executed during the calendar months is more than 80% and less than 100% of stipulated rate of progress, penalty equal to 10% of the contract value of the shortfall in work shall be levied. (ii) The average daily progress of work executed during the calendar month is less than 80% of stipulated rate, penalty equal to 20% of contract value of the shortfall in work shall be levied. (iii) The aggregate of the penalties so levied shall not exceed 10% of the total contract value. Penalties will be calculated every month and withheld. The Contractor shall be allowed to makeup the shortfall in the succeeding three month within the stipulated time of completion. Once the shortfall is fully made up, the so withheld penalty will be released.” 17. In view of the aforesaid clause, the plaintiff was, thus, become liable to pay for penalty and the penalties were required to be calculated every month and that could be withheld and, could be released, if the shortfall is removed by the contractor/plaintiff. The mode is, thus, provided that what action could be taken, if the contractor/plaintiff fails to complete the work within the time as per the terms and conditions of the alleged agreement. However, in the instant matter, neither the alleged contract (Ex.D-2) was terminated by the defendants-SECL in exercise of the powers provided under Clause-9 of the agreement, nor any proceeding imposing the penalty upon the plaintiff was initiated under the aforesaid clause for not completing the alleged work in time. However, in the instant matter, neither the alleged contract (Ex.D-2) was terminated by the defendants-SECL in exercise of the powers provided under Clause-9 of the agreement, nor any proceeding imposing the penalty upon the plaintiff was initiated under the aforesaid clause for not completing the alleged work in time. In such circumstances, the bills raised by the plaintiff cannot be withheld and he is, thus, entitled for obtaining the same with regard to the work done by him. 18. In view of the aforesaid background, we do not find any infirmity in the impugned judgment and decree dated 05.05.2016 passed by learned Third Additional District Judge, Surguja at Ambikapur in Civil Suit No.21-B/2012, so as to call for any interference in this appeal. The appeal and cross-appeal both are, accordingly, dismissed. 19. Before parting with the matter, it is to be seen that the respondent/plaintiff in exercise of powers provided under Order 41 Rule 22 of CPC has questioned the findings recorded against him with regard to Issue Nos.1(a) & 1(b) while paying the ad-valorem Court fee of Rs.1,02,400/-, as was deposited by the appellant/defendant-SECL against the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Court below in an appeal preferred under Section 96 of CPC. 20. Section 96 of CPC is relevant for the purpose, which provides as under:- 96. Appeal from original decree (1) “Save where otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any Court exercising original jurisdiction to the Court authorized to hear appeals from the decisions of such Court. (2) An appeal may lie from an original decree passed ex parte. (3) No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of parties. (4) No appeal shall lie, except on a question of law, from a decree in any suit of the nature cognizable by Courts of Small Causes, when the amount or value of the subject-matter of the original suit does not exceed [ten thousand rupees].” 21. The aforesaid provision deals with the right of appeal and sub-section(1) of it provides that “save where otherwise expressly provided” in the body of the Code, or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal is maintainable against any “decree” passed by a Court exercising original jurisdiction. The aforesaid provision deals with the right of appeal and sub-section(1) of it provides that “save where otherwise expressly provided” in the body of the Code, or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal is maintainable against any “decree” passed by a Court exercising original jurisdiction. The two conditions are, therefore, required to be satisfied before an appeal is preferred; firstly, the subject matter of appeal must be a “decree”, i.e., a conclusive determination of the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit; secondly, that the party appearing must have been adversely affected by such determination. It is, thus, provided in Section 96 of CPC that an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any court exercising original jurisdiction to the court authorised to hear appeal from the decision of such court. So also, Section 100 provides that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal. Thus, sine qua non in both the provisions is the ‘decree’ and unless the decree is passed, an appeal would neither lie under Section 96 nor would lie under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 22. In view of the aforesaid provision, it is, thus, clear that no appeal can be preferred against a mere “finding” recorded by the Court for the reason that the Code does not provide for the same. Although, in view of the aforesaid provision, an appeal is not provided against a mere finding, but, the “Explanation” to Order 41 Rule 22 of CPC, as inserted by the Code of Civil Procedure(Amendment) Act of 1976, would, however, empowers the respondent to file the cross-objection against any “finding”, which is recorded against him irrespective of the fact that the decree is passed eventually in his favour. 23. 23. Explanation to sub rule(1) of Rule 22 of Order 41 of CPC is relevant for the purpose which reads as under:- ORDER XLI APPEALS FROM ORIGINAL DECREES RULE 22- Upon hearing respondent may object to decree as if he had preferred a separate appeal.---(1) Any respondent, though he may not have appealed from any part of the decree, may not only support the decree but may also state that the finding against him in the Court below in respect of any issue ought to have been in his favour; any may also take any cross-objection to the decree which he could have taken by way of appeal provided he has filed such objection in the Appellant Court within one month from the date of service on him or his pleader of notice of the day fixed for hearing the appeal, or within such further time as the Appellate Court may see fit to allow. [Explanation: A respondent aggrieved by a finding of the Court in the judgment on which the decree appealed against is based may, under this rule, file cross-objection in respect of the decree in so far as it is based on that finding, notwithstanding that by reason of the decision of the Court on any other finding which is sufficient for the decision of the suit, the decree, is, wholly or in part, in favour of that respondent.] (2) to (5) --- xxxx ---- xxxx ----- xxxx ----- 24. Explanation to sub rule(1) of the aforesaid provision as inserted by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act of 1976 permits the respondent to file the cross-objection not only against a decree, but also against the “finding” recorded adverse to him by the trial Court notwithstanding the fact that the decision, decree or order is passed wholly or partly in his favour and, in view of said provision, the plaintiff has questioned the findings pertaining to the Issues Nos.1(a) & 1(b) which are recorded against him while paying the ad-valorem Court fee of Rs.1,02,400/- (One Lakh two thousand and four hundred) upon it. 25. It is, however, to be noted at this juncture that although, the plaintiff has filed the cross-objection while paying the ad-valorem court fee as such, but, it appears that he is not praying for variation or modification of the impugned decree as the claim for recovery of Rs.14,52,761/- has been granted to him. 25. It is, however, to be noted at this juncture that although, the plaintiff has filed the cross-objection while paying the ad-valorem court fee as such, but, it appears that he is not praying for variation or modification of the impugned decree as the claim for recovery of Rs.14,52,761/- has been granted to him. Therefore, under such circumstances, the ad-valorem court fee is not required to be paid in the light of the principles laid down by the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the matter of Babulal Agrawal vs. Jyoti Shrivastava and others, reported in AIR 2000 MP 83 , wherein it has been held at paragraphs 20-A and 21 as under :- 20 -A. “Under Order 41, Rule 22, C.P.C. cross-objection in lieu of cross appeal is permissible as also cross-objection is permissible against an adverse finding. The Explanation added below Order 41, Rule 22 was introduced by Amendment Act of 1976 with a specific purpose that cross-objection may be allowed to be filed even against adverse finding by the respondent who may have been successful on other findings of the Court below. The cross objection which is merely against an adverse finding would not attract applicability of Art. 1-A but where the cross-objection is in lieu of cross appeal as contemplated by Order 41, Rule 22 (1), C.P.C. it would attract ad valorem Court-Fees under Art. 1-A and omission of the words ‘cross-objection’ in Art. 1-A would have no different legal effect. The cross-objection against adverse finding and cross-objection in lieu of cross appeal have thus to be treated differently for the purpose of Court-fee. 21. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the memorandum of cross-objection in so far as it challenges the adverse finding on legal necessity, order to support of the decree of dismissal of suit for specific performance is, on this additional ground, clearly maintainable and would not attract any payment of ad valorem Court-fees. 26. Similar is the view taken in the matter of Bhagchand and Ors. vs. Laxmi Narayan and Ors., reported in 2002(1) MPLJ 365 , while following the aforesaid principles, at para 10, which reads as under :- 10. 26. Similar is the view taken in the matter of Bhagchand and Ors. vs. Laxmi Narayan and Ors., reported in 2002(1) MPLJ 365 , while following the aforesaid principles, at para 10, which reads as under :- 10. It was also argued on behalf of the appellants that the plaintiff in the second appeal could not be permitted to assail the finding of the Trial Court relating to the ground under Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act as he had not paid any Court-fee on the cross-objection. This argument has no substance in view of the language used in the Explanation to Order 41, Rule 22, Civil Procedure Code. It has been interpreted by a Division Bench of this Court in Babulal Vs Jyoti, 2000 (1) MPLJ 102 wherein it has been held that :- “The Explanation added below Order 41, Rule 22 was introduced by Amendment Act of 1976 with a specific purpose that cross-objection may be allowed to be file even against adverse finding by the respondent who may have been successful on other findings of the Court below.” 27. In view of the aforesaid principles, it is, thus, evident that ad-valorem Court fee is not payable on the cross-objection being preferred by the respondent/plaintiff against the findings in relation to Issue Nos.1(a) & 1(b) and, therefore, the Court fee of Rs.1,02,400/- (One Lakh two thousand and four hundred) was not legally required to be paid under the Court Fees Act. 28. The question now arises for determination at this juncture would be; “whether the court fee paid inadvertently or due to mistake, which is not required to be paid under the law, could be refunded or not? 29. Certain principles are to be seen in order to get the answer of the said question in this regard:- 29.1 The Madras High Court “In Re: Chidambaram Chettiar”, reported in AIR 1934 Madras 566, observed that the Court can order for refund of Court fees under the following three categories of cases:- (i) where the court-fees Act applies; (ii) where there is an excess payment by a mistake ;or (iii) where, on account of the mistake of a Court a party has been compelled to pay court-fees either wholly or in part. 29.2 The aforesaid principles have been followed in the matter of Province of Madras, represented by the Collector of Nellore vs. Kalavakuru Audemma and Ors., reported in AIR 1949 Madras 895 as also by the Andhra Pradesh High Court IN RE: DANDAMUDI SAROJINI DEVI, reported in AIR 1960 AP 34 . 29.3 It has been held by the Lahore High Court as well as by the Madras High Court in the matter of Anupa Insolvent vs. Official Receiver, Ambala and Ors. Creditors, and Kasi Mangalath Illath Vishnu Nambudiri and Ors. vs. Pattath Ramunni Marar and Ors., reported in AIR 1939 Lahore 237 and AIR 1940 Madras 208, respectively that the Court has got inherent power to refund the Court fee as per the provisions prescribed under Sections 13, 14 & 15 of the Court Fees Act. 29.4 In the matter of Vishnuprasad Narandas Modi vs. Narandas Mohanlal Modi, reported in AIR 1950 Bombay 4, it was held by the Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay that even in the cases which are not covered by Section 13, 14 & 15 of the Court Fees Act, the Court can still has power to direct for refund of court fees under section 151 of CPC, if paid in excess either by inadvertence, by mistake or by oversight. The relevant observation made at paragraph-5 reads as under:- 5. “Then it is urged by Mr. Thakor that even if it be held that excessive court-fee has been paid by the appellant there would be no justification for granting a certificate of refund as claimed by the appellant because this case does not fall within the purview of Ss. 13, 14 and 15, Court-fees Act. The argument is that the power of the Court to issue a certificate of refund of court-fees is confined to cases falling under any of the three aforesaid sections of the Court-fees Act. This contention, however, is not well founded. There is ample authority in support of the proposition that even in cases not covered by Ss. The argument is that the power of the Court to issue a certificate of refund of court-fees is confined to cases falling under any of the three aforesaid sections of the Court-fees Act. This contention, however, is not well founded. There is ample authority in support of the proposition that even in cases not covered by Ss. 13, 14 and 15, Court-fees Act, the court can under S.151, Civil P.C. order refund of court-fees paid in excess either by mistake, inadvertence or oversight: vide Ahmed Ebrahim v. Government of Bombay, ILR (1943) Bom 25 : (AIR (30) 1943 Bom 50), Abdul Majid Mridha v. Amina Khatun, ILR (1942) 2 Cal 253 : (AIR (29) 1942 Cal 889), Vishnu v. Mamunni, AIR (27) 1940 Mad 208 : (1939-2 MLJ 867) and Jagdesh Chodhury v. Radha Dubey, 6 Cal 599 : (AIR (15) 1928 Pat 35). As we have already pointed out, the payment of excessive court-fees in this case was due to the fact that under the earlier decisions of this Court suits for partition and appeals arising therefrom were wrongly treated as falling under S. 7(v), Court-fees Act. In such a case we have no hesitation in holding that it would be open to us to grant a certificate to the appellant entitling him to a refund of the court-fees amount paid by him in excess”. 29.5 It has been held by the Madhya Bharat High Court in the matter of Mahadeo Ganesh vs. Keshav Khanderao and others, reported in AIR 1957 Madhya Bharat 160 that the Court can in exercise of the inherent power under Section 151 of CPC can direct for refund of Court fee, if paid in excess either by mistake, inadvertence or by oversight. The relevant observations made at paragraphs 3 & 4 read as under :- 3. “It was pointed out in this ruling that even in cases not covered by Ss. 13, 14 and 15 of the Court-fees Act, 1870, the Court can, under S.151 of Civil P.C., order refund of court-fees paid in excess either by mistake, inadvertence or by oversight. This view is in consonance with that taken by other High Courts: See Munna Lal v. Ram Chandra, AIR 1930 All 471 (1)(B) ; In re, Narayana Reddiar, AIR 1942 Mad 316 (C ) and Girish Chandra v. Girish Chandra, AIR 1932 Cal 450 (D). This view is in consonance with that taken by other High Courts: See Munna Lal v. Ram Chandra, AIR 1930 All 471 (1)(B) ; In re, Narayana Reddiar, AIR 1942 Mad 316 (C ) and Girish Chandra v. Girish Chandra, AIR 1932 Cal 450 (D). The Allahabad and Madras rulings had been followed by an earlier Bombay decision in Ahmed Ebrahim v. Government of Province of Bombay, AIR 1943 Bom 50 (E). 4. ………………. …………………….. There may be cases where a litigant pays court-fees which he is not liable to pay under the Court-fees Act. The payment may be made either by inadvertence, oversight or mistake. Under these circumstances, the Court orders the revenue authorities to refund either the whole of the court-fees or the excess which was more than what the law required”. 30. Applying the aforesaid principles to the case in hand and that by considering the cross-objection preferred by the respondent-plaintiff without seeking for verification or modification of the impugned decree, he is, therefore, entitled to get back the court fee paid by him inadvertently and/or due to the mistake. 31. The Registry of this Court is accordingly directed to issue a necessary certificate authorizing the respondent/plaintiff to receive back from the concerned Collector, the court fee of Rs.1,02,400/- (One Lakh two thousand and four hundred) as paid by him, inadvertently on his cross-objection/appeal under Order 41 Rule 22 of CPC. No order as to costs. A decree be drawn accordingly.