ORDER : Sanjay S. Agrawal, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendants under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, questioning the legality and propriety of the judgment and decree dated 11.09.2014 passed by the learned First Additional District Judge, Ambikapur, District Surguja in Civil Suit No.11-A/2013, whereby the learned trial Court has dismissed the plaintiff’s claim for specific performance of contract. The parties shall be referred hereinafter as per their descriptions before the Court below. 2. The facts, which are essential for adjudication of this appeal, are that a suit for specific performance of contract was instituted by the plaintiff on 05.09.2013 alleging, inter alia, that the defendants No.1 & 2, who have inherited the land in question bearing Khasra No.2945 admeasuring 0.06 acres constructed with an old house situated at Sadar Road, Ambikapur, upon the sad demise of their father-Krishna Chand Gupta agreed to alienate the same to him by executing an agreement to sale dated 07.06.2008 for a consideration of Rs.10,00,000/-, upon receiving the earnest amount of Rs.1,00,000/-. The alleged agreement was in existence for a period of one year and within the said period, the vendors/defendants No.1 & 2 were required to obtain the permission from the competent authority for its alienation and to execute the registered deed of sale in his favour upon receiving the balance amount of sale consideration of Rs.9,00,000/-and it stipulates further that in case, the registered deed of sale is not executed within a period of one year, it will then ceased to exist and the earnest amount, so paid, shall be forfeited. It is pleaded further that in pursuance to the alleged agreement to sale, an application was moved by defendants No.1 & 2 on 12.08.2008 before the Nazul Officer, Ambikapur, seeking no objection certificate for its alienation and during its pendency, a general power of attorney was executed and registered in his favour by defendants No.1 & 2 on 19.08.2008 authorizing him for alienation of the suit land and have received the entire sale consideration from him as well on the said date itself. It is pleaded further that in the said proceedings, an objection was raised by one Shatrughan Swarnkar S/o Rambali Swarnkar by alleging that he had already agreed to purchase the suit land from its co-owner namely Girija Shankar under an agreement to sale dated 02.11.2006 and after considering the same, the said application made on 12.08.2008 was rejected by the said authority on 24.07.2009. 2.1 Further contention of the plaintiff is that on 12.09.2012, defendants No.1 & 2 have moved an application before the Nazul Officer, Ambikapur seeking permission for alienation of the land in question to one Jai Hanuman Infrastructure Private Limited Company through its Proprietor Anil Agrawal (the defendant No.3 herein) and despite the objection being raised by the plaintiff on the basis of the alleged agreement to sale dated 07.06.2008, it was allowed by the said authority vide its order dated 04.07.2013 and no objection certificate has been granted while permitting them (defendants No.1 & 2) for the alienation of the suit land in favour of said Jai Hanuman Infrastructure Private Limited Company through its Proprietor and accordingly, the registered deed of sale was executed on 14.07.2013 which led to the institution of the suit in the instant nature, instituted on 05.09.2013 by saying that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of contract to purchase the suit land on the basis of the alleged agreement to sale dated 07.06.2008. 3. In reply to the aforesaid claim, it is pleaded by defendants No.1 & 2/vendors that the alleged agreement to sale was valid only for a period of one year commencing with effect from 07.06.2008 up to 06.06.2009, but, the plaintiff has failed to perform his part of the contract during the said period or was ever ready and willing to get the sale deed executed based upon it. It is contested further on the ground that when these defendants have moved an application on 12.09.2012 before the Nazul Officer, Ambikapur, seeking permission for the alienation of the land in question in favour of said Jai Hanuman Infrastructure Private Limited Company through its Proprietor Anil Agrawal (the defendant No.3), an objection was raised therein by the plaintiff on the basis of the alleged agreement to sale and only after considering the same, the permission was accorded by the said authority vide its order dated 04.07.2013 and the registered deed of sale was accordingly executed on 14.07.2013. It is contended further that the plaintiff, instead of purchasing the property in question on the basis of the alleged agreement to sale, was, in fact, tried to alienate the same not only to his sister namely Smt. Meenakshi Somsukha on the basis of the alleged general power of attorney dated 19.08.2008, but, had tried to sale the same to one Sulochana Agrawal and Dayawanti also and had submitted an application for the said purpose before the Nazul Officer, Ambikapur. It is, therefore, contended that the plaintiff was never ready and willing to purchase the property in question or had received the amount of sale consideration on 19.08.2008. The suit, as framed and instituted, is therefore, liable to be dismissed. 3.1 While reiterating the aforesaid contention of defendants No.1 & 2, it is pleaded by defendant No.3 that the property in question was duly purchased under the registered deed of sale dated 14.07.2013 and therefore, the suit, as framed and instituted, deserves to be dismissed. 4. Based upon the aforesaid pleadings of the parties, the trial Court has framed the following issues:- (i) Whether an agreement to sale was executed by the defendants No.1 & 2 in favour of the plaintiff on 07.06.2008 agreeing to alienate the property in question bearing Khasra No.2945 admeasuring 0.06 acres constructed with an old house situated at Sadar Road, Ambikapur for a consideration of Rs.10,00,000/- upon receiving the earnest amount of Rs.1,00,000/-? (ii) Whether the alleged agreement to sale dated 07.06.2008 is null and void for its non-registration? (iii) Whether the registered deed of sale dated 14.07.2013 has been illegally executed by the defendants No.1 & 2 in favour of Jai Hanuman Infrastructure Private Limited Company through its Proprietor Anil Agrawal (the defendant No.3) and is, therefore, inoperative and was not acted upon? (iii) Whether the registered deed of sale dated 14.07.2013 has been illegally executed by the defendants No.1 & 2 in favour of Jai Hanuman Infrastructure Private Limited Company through its Proprietor Anil Agrawal (the defendant No.3) and is, therefore, inoperative and was not acted upon? (iv) Whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract in pursuance to the alleged agreement to sale dated 07.06.2008? (v) Whether the plaintiff was entitled to enforce the alleged agreement to sale dated 07.06.2008 against the defendants No.1 to 3 and entitled to get the decree of specific performance of contract based upon it? (vi) Whether the suit has been instituted beyond the prescribed period of limitation? (vii) To what relief and costs? 5. The trial Court, after considering the evidence led by the parties arrived at a conclusion that the alleged agreement to sale was executed by defendants No.1 & 2 in favour of the plaintiff on 07.06.2008 agreeing to alienate the land in question for a consideration of Rs.10,00,000/- upon receiving earnest amount of Rs.1,00,000/-. It held further that the plaintiff was trying to alienate the land in question to someone else, like his sister-Minakshi Somsukha and also to Sulochana and Dayawanti on the basis of general power of attorney which was executed in his favour on 19.08.2008 by defendants No.1 and 2, therefore, it cannot be said that he was ever ready and wiling to perform his part of the contract and, it was held further that the suit instituted on 05.09.2013, much beyond the prescribed period of limitation, is bared by time. As a consequence, the plaintiff’s claim has been dismissed which has been impugned by way of preferring this appeal. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant/plaintiff submits that the finding of the court below holding that the plaintiff has failed to perform his part of the contract and the suit as instituted is beyond the time, is apparently contrary to law. It is contended further that the cause of action was arose on 14.07.2013 when the registered deed of sale was executed in favour of defendant No.3, therefore, the trial Court has committed a serious illegality in holding that the suit is bared by time. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents/defendants have supported the impugned judgment and decree as passed by the court below. 8. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents/defendants have supported the impugned judgment and decree as passed by the court below. 8. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the entire record carefully. 9. The questions, which arise for determination in this appeal are:- i. Whether the plaintiff was ready and wiling to perform his part of the contract dated 07.06.2008? ii. Whether the suit as framed and instituted on 05.09.2013 seeking enforcement of the alleged agreement of sale dated 07.06.2008, is within time? Reference to Question No.i 10. From perusal of the record, it appears that the land in question bearing Khasra No.2945 admeasuring 0.06 acre constructed with an old house situated at Sadar Road, Ambikapur was agreed to be sold by defendants No.1 and 2 under an agreement to sale dated 07.06.2008 (Ex. P/1) to the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs.10,00,000/- upon receiving earnest amount of Rs.1,00,000/-. The alleged agreement to sale was enforceable for a period of one year commencing with effect from 07.06.2008 up to 06.06.2009 and during the said period of one year, the defendants No.1 and 2/vendors were required to obtain the permission for its alienation from the competent authority and it stipulates further that in case, the registered deed of sale is not executed within the said period of one year, the alleged agreement to sale would be ceased to exist and the earnest amount, so paid, by the plaintiff shall be forfeited. 11. It appears further that according to the terms and conditions stipulated in the alleged agreement to sale, an application dated 12.08.2008 (Part of Ex. P/1) was made by vendors before the Nazul Officer, Ambikapur, where the said proceeding was registered as Revenue Case No.116/A-20(3)/2007-08. It appears further that an objection was raised therein by one Satrughan Swarnkar son of Rambali Prasad saying that an agreement to sale was executed in his favour on 02.11.2006 by its co-owner namely Girjashankar and after considering the said objection, application as made by the vendors on 12.08.2008 was rejected by the Nazul Officer, Ambikapur vide its order dated 24.07.2009 (forming part of Ex.P/1) and which has attained its finality by efflux of time. It, thus, appears that the registered deed of sale in pursuance to the alleged agreement to sale dated 07.06.2008 (Ex.P/1) was not executed. It, thus, appears that the registered deed of sale in pursuance to the alleged agreement to sale dated 07.06.2008 (Ex.P/1) was not executed. It is to be seen at this juncture that during the pendency of the said proceeding before the Nazul Officer, Ambikapur, a general power of attorney (Ex.P/4) was executed on 19.08.2008 by defendants No.1 and 2 within a period of 2 ½ months from the date of execution of the alleged agreement authorizing the plaintiff to alienate the land in question to someone else. It, thus, appears that although the alleged agreement to sale (Ex.P/1) was executed as such in favour of the plaintiffs, but he never intended to purchase the same, else he would not be permitted for the execution of the said power of attorney (Ex. P/4) in his favour. 12. Be that as it may, the plaintiff while acting as a power of attorney holder of the defendants No.1 and 2 had moved an application on 09.06.2009 (Ex.D/1) before the competent authority seeking permission to alienate the land in question to his sister Smt. Minakshi Somsukha and has also tried to alienate the same to one Sulochana Agrawal and Dayawanti. The alleged act of the plaintiff would, thus, lead to an irresistible conclusion that he was neither the real purchaser of the suit land nor was ever ready and wiling to purchase the same under the alleged agreement to sale dated 07.06.2008 (Ex.P/1), else he would have immediately assailed the order dated 24.07.2009 rejecting the application made on 12.08.2008. He, however, kept silent for a considerable period of more than 5 years and has instituted the suit only on 05.09.2013 and that too when the registered deed of sale was executed in favour of defendant No.3 on 14.07.2013. 13. Pertinently to be noted here further that on 12.09.2012, an application (Ex.P/13) was filed by defendants No.1 and 2 before the Nazul Officer, Ambikapur seeking permission for alienation of land in question to one Jai Hanuman Infrastructure Private Limited through its Director Anil Agrawal, where an objection was raised by the plaintiff based upon the alleged agreement to sale dated 07.06.2008 (Ex.P-1) and the said authority after considering the same has permitted the vendors/defendants No.1 & 2 for its alienation to said defendant vide its order dated 04.07.2013 (Ex.P-14). It is to be noted here at this juncture that despite of raising an objection as such, it was pleaded by the plaintiff at para-16 in the plaint that without hearing him, the said order (Ex.P-14) was passed. It, thus, appears to be a false plea, which has been taken in a suit for discretionary relief of specific performance of contract. 14. The aforesaid conduct of the plaintiff is an important factor to be considered in a suit for specific performance of contract as held by the Supreme Court in the matter of Atma Ram vs. Chanranjit Singh, reported in (2020) 3 SCC 311 , wherein it has been held at para 9 as under:- “.......The fact that the petitioner chose to issue a legal notice dated 12.11.1996 and the fact that the petitioner created an alibi in the form of an affidavit executed before the Sub Registrar on 7.10.1996 (marked as Ext. P2) to show that he was present before the Sub Registrar for the purpose of completion of the transaction, within the time stipulated for its performance, was not sufficient to conclude that the petitioner continued to be ready and willing even after three years, on 13.10.1999 when the plaint was presented. No explanation was forthcoming from the petitioner for the long delay of three years, in filing the suit (on 13.10.1999) after issuing a legal notice on 12.11.1996. The conduct of a plaintiff is very crucial in a suit for specific performance. A person who issues a legal notice on 12.11.1996 claiming readiness and willingness, but who institutes a suit only on 13.10.1999 and that too only with a prayer for a mandatory injunction carrying a fixed court fee relatable only to the said relief, will not be entitled to the discretionary relief of specific performance.” 15. Applying the aforesaid principles to the case in hand, coupled with the conduct of the plaintiff, as observed hereinabove, it is difficult to hold that he was ever ready and willing to get the sale deed executed in his favour on the basis of the alleged agreement to sale dated 07.06.2008 (Ex.P-1). The first question is, thus, answered in negative. Reference to Question No.ii 16. The first question is, thus, answered in negative. Reference to Question No.ii 16. An agreement to sale (Ex.P-1) is found to be executed by defendants No.1 & 2 in favour of the plaintiff on 07.06.2008 agreeing to alienate the land in question for a consideration of Rs.10,00,000/- upon receiving earnest amount of Rs.1,00,000/-. According to the terms and conditions stipulated therein, it was in existence for a period of one year i.e. up to 06.06.2009 and during the said period, the vendors were required to execute the registered deed of sale in favour of the plaintiff after obtaining the permission from the competent authority. It appears that in pursuance to the terms and conditions stipulated therein, an application was made by defendants No.1 & 2 on 12.08.2008 (forming part of Ex.P-1) before the Nazul Officer, Ambikapur, where the case was registered as Revenue Case No.116/A-20(3)/2007-08. The said application was, however, found to be rejected by the said authority vide its order dated 24.07.2009 (forming part of Ex.P-1) and despite of the rejection of the said application as such and even expiry of the said period of one year on 06.06.2009, the plaintiff has failed to institute the suit within the period of 3 years as prescribed under Article 54 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 and, instead, it was instituted much beyond the said period of limitation i.e. on 05.09.2013. The suit, thus, appears to be instituted beyond the prescribed period of the limitation. 17. Article 54 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, which is relevant for the purpose, reads as under :- Description of suit Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run Xxxxxxxxxx Xxxxxxxxxx Xxxxxxxxxx Xxxxxxxxxx Xxxxxxxxxx Xxxxxxxxxx 54. For specific performance of a contract Three years The date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused 54. For specific performance of a contract Three years The date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused 18. The limitation of three years as provided in the above referred provision is in two parts. Firstly, when the date is fixed for the performance of the contract and secondly, when the date is not fixed, but, the Appellant/Plaintiff has noticed that the performance is refused. 19. The limitation of three years as provided in the above referred provision is in two parts. Firstly, when the date is fixed for the performance of the contract and secondly, when the date is not fixed, but, the Appellant/Plaintiff has noticed that the performance is refused. 19. As observed hereinabove, the plaintiff has failed to institute the suit within the period of three years after the expiry of one year period as provided in the alleged agreement to sale (Ex.P-1) and/or, even after the rejection of the said application dated 12.08.2008 by the competent authority on 24.07.2009. The plaintiff has, thus, utterly failed to institute the suit within the period of limitation as prescribed under the aforesaid provision. 20. The aforesaid observation is fortified by the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of Venkappa Gurappa Hosur vs. Kasawwa C/o Rangappa Kulod reported in (1997) 10 SCC 66 , wherein it has been held at para 2 as under:- “2. The appellant had filed a suit for specific performance of the sale agreement dated 9-8-1959 in respect of the land in Village Linganur for a consideration of Rs.10,200. It is the case of the appellant that he paid as part consideration a sum of Rs.501 on the said date and a further sum of Rs 700 on 4-3-1960. In the meanwhile, the defendant filed Suit No.9 of 1960 for possession of the said properties. The suit was decided in his favour on 9-11-1971.The appellant, therefore, issued notice for the first time on 22-8-1972. Thereon, the respondent denied execution of the agreement. Then the appellant filed the suit on 5-11-1972. Thus, according to the plaintiff the suit was filed within limitation. The respondent has denied the execution of the agreement of sale, but the courts below have found that it is one of money transaction. It is, therefore, clear from Suit No.9 of 1960 itself that he had asserted to be the owner of the property and the property is unencumbered property. Therefore, no one has a right to interfere with his possession. Thus, it could be seen that the suit document itself was denied as early as in 1960. As a consequence, mere issuance of notice dated 22.8.1972 does not stop the running of limitation period. Once the same has begun to run, it runs its full course. Therefore, no one has a right to interfere with his possession. Thus, it could be seen that the suit document itself was denied as early as in 1960. As a consequence, mere issuance of notice dated 22.8.1972 does not stop the running of limitation period. Once the same has begun to run, it runs its full course. Therefore, the suit having been filed after the expiry of 3 years from the date of the knowledge of denial, by operation of Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation. The High Court, therefore, is right in dismissing the suit in the second appeal.” 21. In view of above, the second question is, thus, answered in negative. 22. Consequently, the appeal being devoid of merit, is dismissed. No order as to costs. A decree be drawn accordingly.