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2023 DIGILAW 601 (PAT)

Amar Kumar @ Aman Kumar Son of Kusheshwar Paswan v. State Of Bihar

2023-05-15

CHAKRADHARI SHARAN SINGH, RAJIV ROY

body2023
JUDGMENT : CHAKRADHARI SHARAN SINGH, J. This appeal has been preferred by the sole appellant under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C. for short), putting to challenge the impugned judgment of conviction dated 12.10.2018 and the order of sentence dated 25.10.2018, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-X, Patna, in Sessions Trial No.469 of 2016, arising out of Ramkrishna Nagar P.S. Case No.61 of 2015, whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under: Conviction under Section Sentence Imprisonment Fine (Rs.) In default of fine under Sections, 363, 365 and 364(A) of the IPC. Imprisonment for life for the offence under Section 364A of the IPC. No separate sentence for other proved offence. 50,000/- SI for 6 months 2. We have heard Mr. Rajesh Kumar Singh, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant and Mr. Dilip Kumar Sinha, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State as also Mr. Arvind Kumar Mouar, learned counsel for the informant. 3. The criminal case was set in motion with the informant (PW.4) furnishing a written report to the Officer-in-Charge, Ramkrishna Nagar Police Station, Patna on 28.03.2015 stating therein that his younger brother, Laxmi Kumar, a minor, who had left the house at 6 am had not returned and despite all efforts having been made to find his whereabouts, he remained traceless. The written report was apparently in the nature of missing report with a request to the Officer-in-charge to take appropriate action for searching out the informant's brother. Based on the said written report, an FIR was registered giving rise to Ramkrishna Nagar P.S. Case No.61 of 2015. 4. From the formal FIR, it can be discerned that the information was received at the police station at 08:00 PM. The FIR levelled offences punishable under Sections 363 and 365 of the Indian Penal Code against unknown. It is further case of the prosecution that after registration of FIR on 02-04-2015, the informant’s father received a call on his mobile phone, the caller claiming to be making the call from Chennai. The caller is said to have demanded ransom amount of Rupees seven lacs, else the victim would be killed. 5. It is the deposition of the Investigating Officer (PW-7), at the trial, that the said phone call was made from the number 9973864195 which was received by the informant on his mobile number 8084946006. The caller is said to have demanded ransom amount of Rupees seven lacs, else the victim would be killed. 5. It is the deposition of the Investigating Officer (PW-7), at the trial, that the said phone call was made from the number 9973864195 which was received by the informant on his mobile number 8084946006. It is the prosecution’s case that the informant presumed the voice of the caller making demand of ransom to be that of this appellant and further that during the course of investigation a mobile phone was recovered from the possession of this appellant which was used for making the call with SIM No. 9973864195 to 8084946006. 6. Recovery of a mobile phone from the appellant, with the help of the IMEI number of the said mobile phone set led to his arrest. As the victim could not be found, the Investigating Officer submitted his charge sheet for commission of the offence punishable under Section 364A of the IPC against the appellant. Cognizance was taken of the offences punishable under Section 363, 365 and 364A of the Indian Penal Code. Charges were subsequently framed for the aforesaid offences. The appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 7. At the trial, seven prosecution’s witnesses came to be examined including the informant (PW.4), the informant’s wife (PW.2), the informant’s father Ramanuj Mahto (PW.3) and his brother-in-law (PW.5). PW 6 an independent witness came to be declared hostile at the instance of the prosecution. The Investigating Officer was examined as PW.7. The prosecution got exhibited the documentary evidence to substantiate the charges at the trial, namely signature on the seizure list (Ext.1), and signature of the informant on the written report (Ext.2), Seizure list (Ext.3), Charge sheet (Ext.4). Certain documents were exhibited at the trial for the defence as Exhibit-A, Ext.A/1 and Ext.B. 8. The Investigating Officer was examined as PW.7. The prosecution got exhibited the documentary evidence to substantiate the charges at the trial, namely signature on the seizure list (Ext.1), and signature of the informant on the written report (Ext.2), Seizure list (Ext.3), Charge sheet (Ext.4). Certain documents were exhibited at the trial for the defence as Exhibit-A, Ext.A/1 and Ext.B. 8. After closure of the evidence of the prosecution’s witnesses, the appellant was questioned by the learned trial court in purported compliance of Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. Since we intend to consider the merits of this appeal also with reference to the requirements under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. and the nature of questions which were put to the appellant trial invoking the said provision we deem it proper to reproduce the questions put by the trial court under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. and the answers furnished by the appellant in response to the said questions which are as under: iz'u%&Dk vkius xokgks dk xokgh lquk gS \ mRrj%& th gkWA iz'u%&vkids fo:} lk{; gS fd vki lwpd Jo.k egrks ds NksVk HkkbZ y{eh dqekj dk vigj.k fd;s Fks\ mRrj%& th ughaA iz'u%&lQkbZ esa D;k dguk gS\ mRrj%& eSa funksZ"k gwWA 9. Learned trial court, after having appreciated and evaluated the evidence adduced at the trial reached a conclusion by the impugned judgment of conviction dated 12.10.2018 that the prosecution had been able to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts and accordingly held the appellant guilty of commission of the offences punishable under Sections 363, 365 and 364A of the IPC. 10. Mr. Rajesh Kumar Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has submitted that it is a case of no evidence and the finding of the trial court convicting the appellant verges on perversity. He contends that not only that the evidence of the prosecution’s witnesses are self-contradictory, there is no evidence adduced at the trial even to establish strong suspicion against the appellant that he had kidnapped the victim or any demand of ransom was made by him. He has submitted that the prosecution, during the course of investigation, appears to have intentionally not gone deep into the matter inasmuch as the phone number from which the call was said to have been received by the informant i.e. 9973864195 was in use by the brother of PW-2. He has submitted that the prosecution, during the course of investigation, appears to have intentionally not gone deep into the matter inasmuch as the phone number from which the call was said to have been received by the informant i.e. 9973864195 was in use by the brother of PW-2. The PW-2 is the wife of the informant, PW-4. He has submitted that the I.O. in his evidence has clearly deposed that the said number 9973864195 was found to have been used with four different mobile phone sets. Except for the allegation that a mobile phone was recovered from the appellant's possession which was used for making a call on the informant's phone number 8084946006 from 9973864195, there is absolutely no evidence against the appellant to connect him with the allegation of the demand of ransom. 11. He has contended that there are inherent contradictions in the prosecution’s case, right from the beginning and despite the fact that there was absolutely no material to prove the charge of commission of the offence punishable under Section 364A of the IPC, the appellant has been held guilty by the trial court by the impugned judgment of conviction. It has also been argued that there has been no due compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 313 of the Cr.PC and for the said reason also the impugned judgment of conviction is untenable. 12. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State and learned counsel for the informant have argued that the trial court has rightly held the appellant guilty of the offence punishable under Sections 363, 365 and 364A of the IPC as the mobile phone which was used for the demand of ransom was recovered from the possession of this appellant by the police during the course of investigation. They have submitted that there has been substantial compliance of provision under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. and the finding of conviction does not suffer from any legal infirmity on that count. They have accordingly submitted that impugned finding of conviction recorded by the trial court does not require any interference by this Court. 13. We have perused the impugned judgment and order of the trial court as well as the lower court's records. We have given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions made on behalf of the parties. 14. They have accordingly submitted that impugned finding of conviction recorded by the trial court does not require any interference by this Court. 13. We have perused the impugned judgment and order of the trial court as well as the lower court's records. We have given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions made on behalf of the parties. 14. We, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case consider it desirable to begin with the evidence of PW-2, the wife of the informant. In paragraph-10 of her cross-examination, she deposed that on the date of occurrence, she had seen the victim till 8-9 pm when food was being cooked. She further deposed that in the next morning, despite search having been made, the victim could not be located till 4-5 pm. Thereafter they went to the police station for lodging the FIR, but the papers submitted to the police were torn by the Officer-in-charge of the police station and he (the Officer-in-charge) had himself prepared a missing report. She also deposed that at the time of occurrence, Lal Babu (PW-6, declared hostile), Dinesh Ram (PW-1), Pankaj Mahto and this appellant were the tenants. On close scrutiny of her evidence it cannot be said that the same, in any manner, proves or supports the prosecution’s case of kidnapping of the informant's brother and demand of ransom having been made by this appellant. 15. PW-4 deposed at the trial that the mother of the appellant had told him that the victim had gone with this appellant and one Raghunath. He further deposed that 3-4 days after the date of disappearance of the victim, a phone call was received making demand of ransom and he could discern from the voice of the caller that it was the appellant who was calling. It is easily deducible from the evidence of the witnesses that the informant’s assessment that it appeared to be appellant, who had made the call for ransom, was not disclosed to the police and the appellant came to be apprehended six months after the date of occurrence based on recovery of the mobile-phone set from his possession, which at some point had SIM Card bearing No.9973864195. 16. In any view of the matter, it was not disclosed in the First Information Report that at any point of time this appellant was seen with the victim before or after his disappearance. 16. In any view of the matter, it was not disclosed in the First Information Report that at any point of time this appellant was seen with the victim before or after his disappearance. The informant introduced improvement at the trial by deposing that the appellant’s mother had told him that the victim had gone with the appellant and one Raghunath. 17. From the evidence of the prosecution's witnesses, it transpires that the suspicion of the informant that this appellant had made the call for demand of ransom is the only evidence adduced at the trial to bring home the charge of kidnapping and demand of ransom. Nearly six months after the date of occurrence, the mobile phone, which according to the prosecution was recovered from the petitioner's possession was the one which was used for demand of ransom. 18. In our considered view, it would be too far fetched a conclusion that it was the appellant who had made a call for ransom 3-4 days after the disappearance of the victim, based on evidence of the prosecution’s witnesses. It has come in the course of trial by way of evidence of the I.O. that on 07.04.2015, he had furnished the IMEI number of the mobile phone by which the call was made with the touch number of the SIM No. 9973864195. In paragraph 6 of his cross-examination the I.O. deposed that the said touch number of mobile number 9973864195 belonged to one Rohit Kumar/Jai Pal who were the relatives of the informant himself. The evidence of the prosecution as regards the phone call, though not proved in accordance with the requirements under Section 65B of the Evidence Act, goes to suggest that the informant's relatives (brother-in-law) were in fact using the number from which the call for ransom was made. 19. It has also come in the evidence of the Investigating Officer that Rohit Kumar happened to be the own brother-in-law of the informant (PW-4). The statement of Rohit Kumar was recorded by the Investigating Officer who is said to have disclosed that the phone no. 9973864195 might be of Jai Pal who was a tenant of the informant. Despite having noted that Rohit and Jai Pal did not give any satisfactory reply as regards the use of the no. 9973864195, they were neither further interrogated nor made an accused in the case. 20. 9973864195 might be of Jai Pal who was a tenant of the informant. Despite having noted that Rohit and Jai Pal did not give any satisfactory reply as regards the use of the no. 9973864195, they were neither further interrogated nor made an accused in the case. 20. We reemphasize here that the entire case of the prosecution of demand of ransom is based on the phone call said to have been received by the informant from the mobile no. 9973864195. The Investigating Officer deposed at the trial that the said phone number i.e. 9973864195 was used in four different mobile phones. Further during the course of investigation, in his restatement before the police, the informant had disclosed on 10.07.2015 that he had received a call on his phone number from phone no. 7631196121 disclosing that the victim was at Danapur and that his brother (the victim) would soon reach him. The said mobile phone no. 7631196121 was found to be in the name of Neelam Sinha, but the Investigating Officer did not make inquiry in that regard. 21. In paragraph 62 of his evidence, the Investigating Officer deposed at the trial that though at the time of production of the appellant before the Court after his arrest, the mobile phone recovered from the appellant's possession was produced but he had not made any entry regarding production of the mobile phone nor the same was mentioned in the forwarding report to the court. The mobile phone said to have been recovered from the appellant's possession, was not produced at the trial as material exhibit. 22. Taking into account a holistic view of the evidence of the prosecution's witnesses, we find that recovery of a mobile phone said to have been used by the appellant with SIM no. 9973864195 is the sole basis for the prosecution to bring home to the charge of kidnapping and demand of ransom. The prosecution miserably failed to prove recovery of the mobile phone from the appellant's possession at the trial nor could it prove that any demand was made by the appellant using the said mobile phone with sim no. 9973864195. 23. 9973864195 is the sole basis for the prosecution to bring home to the charge of kidnapping and demand of ransom. The prosecution miserably failed to prove recovery of the mobile phone from the appellant's possession at the trial nor could it prove that any demand was made by the appellant using the said mobile phone with sim no. 9973864195. 23. We are surprised to notice that the police did not proceed any further against Rohit and Jai Pal though during the investigation the materials had come to the effect that the said SIM No. 9973864195 was in the name of Rohit/Jai Pal, despite the fact that on being interrogated by the police, they had not given any satisfactory answer to the police in this regard. 24. The last but not the least, it is manifest from the record that there has not been proper compliance of the requirement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. inasmuch as the questions which were put by the trial court to the accused were utterly vague. The significance of substantial compliance of the requirements under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. has been reiterated in catena of Supreme Court’s decisions, the foremost being the case of Tara Singh Vs State ( AIR 1951 SC 441 ). In case of Tara Singh (supra) the Supreme Court had the occasion to deal with Section 342 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (for short Cr.P.C. of 1898). It is noteworthy that Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. and Section 342 of Cr.P.C. 1898 are in pari materia. Relying on the Privy Council decision in case of Dwarkanath Verma Vs Emperor ( AIR 1933 PC 124 ), the Supreme Court laid down in case of Tara Singh (supra) that if a point in the evidence is considered important against the accused and the conviction is intended to be based upon it, then it is right and proper that the accused should be questioned about the matter and be given an opportunity of explaining it if he so desires. The Supreme Court noted that it was an important and salutary provision which cannot be permitted to be slurred over. 25. The Supreme Court noted that it was an important and salutary provision which cannot be permitted to be slurred over. 25. In the case of Shivaji Saha Brao Bobade Vs the State of Maharashtra reported in (1973) 2 SCC 793 , echoing the view expressed in the case of Tara Singh (supra), the Supreme Court opined that great care is expected of Sessions Judges who try grave cases to collect every incriminating circumstance and put it to the accused. 26. In the case of Asraf Ali Vs State of Assam reported in (2008) 16 SCC 328 , the Supreme Court explained the object of Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. by stating that its object is to establish a direct dialogue between the Court and the accused. If a point in the evidence is important against the accused, and the conviction is intended to be based upon it, it is right and proper that the accused should be questioned about the matter and be given an opportunity of explaining it. 27. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court in case of Raj Kumar Vs State (NCT of Delhi) reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 609, after having noticed the precedents has summarized the law pertaining to the scope of Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. in paragraph 17 as under: “17. The law consistently laid down by this Court can be summarized as under: (i) It is the duty of the Trial Court to put each material circumstance appearing in the evidence against the accused specifically, distinctively and separately. The material circumstance means the circumstance or the material on the basis of which the prosecution is seeking his conviction; (ii) The object of examination of the accused under Section 313 is to enable the accused to explain any circumstance appearing against him in the evidence; (iii) The Court must ordinarily eschew material circumstances not put to the accused from consideration while dealing with the case of the particular accused; (iv) The failure to put material circumstances to the accused amounts to a serious irregularity. It will vitiate the trial if it is shown to have prejudiced the accused; (v) If any irregularity in putting the material circumstance to the accused does not result in failure of justice, it becomes a curable defect. It will vitiate the trial if it is shown to have prejudiced the accused; (v) If any irregularity in putting the material circumstance to the accused does not result in failure of justice, it becomes a curable defect. However, while deciding whether the defect can be cured, one of the considerations will be the passage of time from the date of the incident; (vi) In case such irregularity is curable, even the appellate court can question the accused on the material circumstance which is not put to him; and (vii) In a given case, the case can be remanded to the Trial Court from the stage of recording the supplementary statement of the concerned accused under Section 313 of CrPC. (viii) While deciding the question whether prejudice has been caused to the accused because of the omission, the delay in raising the contention is only one of the several factors to be considered.” 28. In the present case, the only question which was put to the appellant by the trial court was as what he had to say, there being evidence that he had kidnapped the informant’s brother. No incriminating circumstance was explained to him based on which the said question was put. No question pertaining to evidence of demand of ransom was put to the appellant. We are of the considered view, on analysis of the evidence on adduced at the trial in the present case, that the failure on the part of the trial court to put material circumstances to the appellant resulted into miscarriage of justice, which occasioned prejudice to the appellant’s case. After having discussed the evidence adduced at the trial as above, we do not find it to be a fit case to be remanded to the trial court from the stage of recording supplementary statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C.. 29. In our view thus, neither of the offences for which the appellant was put on trial can be said to have been proved against him beyond all reasonable doubt. There is no evidence on record to prove that the appellant had taken or enticed the victim out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of the victim, so as to attract the punishment under Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code. There is no evidence on record to prove that the appellant had taken or enticed the victim out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of the victim, so as to attract the punishment under Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code. Once the prosecution failed to establish a case of kidnapping against the appellant, the charges for commission of offences punishable under Sections 364A & 365 of the I.P.C. cannot said to have been proved. Unless kidnapping within the meaning of Section 361 of the IPC is proved, the offences punishable under Sections 363, 364A & 365 of the I.P.C. cannot said to have been proved. 30. We are accordingly of the view that the impugned finding of conviction recorded by the trial court deserves interference and the appellant deserves to be acquitted giving him benefit of doubt. The appellant is accordingly acquitted of the charges of commission of the offences punishable under Sections 363, 364A & 365 of the IPC. The impugned judgment of conviction dated 12.10.2018 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-X, Patna in Sessions Trial No. 469 of 2016 is hereby set aside. The order of sentence dated 25.10.2018 is also set aside. 31. This appeal is allowed. 32. The appellant is in custody. Let him be released forthwith.