JUDGMENT : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. This criminal appeal preferred by the appellant, under Section 374(2) of CrPC, is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 19.7.2016 passed by Additional Sessions Judge (F.T.C.), District Raigarh in Special Sessions Case No.47/2015, by which the appellant herein has been convicted and sentenced in the following manner:- Conviction Sentence U/s 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. R.I. for 14 years and to pay fine of Rs.500/- in default whereof, additional R.I. for 6 months. U/s 342 of Indian Penal Code. R.I. for 6 months and to pay fine of Rs.50/- in default whereof, additional R.I. for 5 days. U/s 506(II) of Indian Penal Code. R.I. for 3 years and to pay fine of Rs.100/- in default whereof, additional R.I. for 15 days. All sentences have been directed to run concurrently. 2. Case of the prosecution, in nutshell, is that on 28.3.2015 at about 4:15 p.m., the appellant herein confined the minor victim (PW-1), aged less than 7 years, in the house of one Chaitu at Village Kodatarai and committed aggravated penetrative sexual assault with him and also threatened him to life; thereby committed the aforesaid offences. 3. Further case of the prosecution is that on 28.3.2015 in the evening at about 4:00 p.m., the victim (PW-1) was found missing. A search was made for him and his crying was heard from the house of Chaitu where he was found without his clothes and the appellant was found involved in the act of unnatural penetrative sexual assault with him, by Krishna (PW-2) and Dilip (PW-6) who then brought the victim to his house and narrated the incident to his father Mandhar (PW-4) who lodged the FIR (Exhibit P-4) and wheels of investigation started running. Nazri Naksha was prepared vide Exhibit P-13. The victim (PW-1) was subjected to medical examination vide Exhibit P-7 conducted by Dr. S. Lakda (PW-10) who found tender redness in perianal region of the victim and his anus was found ruptured. The anus slide (Exhibit 'A') of the victim was sent to the FSL for chemical examination in which no human sperms were found. The appellant was also medically examined vide Exhibit P-6. Statements of witnesses were recorded. Appellant was apprehended vide Arrest Memo (Exhibit P-14). 4. The anus slide (Exhibit 'A') of the victim was sent to the FSL for chemical examination in which no human sperms were found. The appellant was also medically examined vide Exhibit P-6. Statements of witnesses were recorded. Appellant was apprehended vide Arrest Memo (Exhibit P-14). 4. After completion of investigation, the appellant was charge-sheeted for the offences punishable under Sections 342, 506 (II), 377 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short, 'IPC') as well as under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (in short, 'POCSO Act') before the concerned jurisdictional Criminal Court from where, after committal, the case was transferred to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, (F.T.C.), Raigarh for trial and its disposal in accordance with law, in which the appellant abjured his guilt, took a plea of false implication and entreated for trial. 5. During the course of trial, in order to bring home the offence, the prosecution has examined as many as 14 witnesses and exhibited 18 documents. In defence, though no witness has been examined but the statement of one Sanju Khadia has been enclosed as Exhibit D-1. Statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of CrPC in which he denied circumstances appearing against him in prosecution case, pleaded innocence and false implication. 6. After conclusion of trial, the Trial Court, by impugned judgment dated 19.7.2016, on appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, convicted the appellant for the offences punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act as well as under Sections 342 & 506 (II) of IPC and sentenced him as mentioned in para-1 of this judgment, against which the present appeal has been filed by the appellant calling in question the legality, validity and correctness of the impugned judgment. 7. Ms. Ranjana Jaiswal, learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the Trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellant for the aforesaid offences. In view of questions framed and answers given by the victim (PW-1) in his statement before the Court, the Trial Court has erred in law while holding the appellant guilty for offence under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. In view of questions framed and answers given by the victim (PW-1) in his statement before the Court, the Trial Court has erred in law while holding the appellant guilty for offence under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. She would also submit that even if the date of incident i.e., 28.3.2015, when the offence in question is said to have been committed is considered, the unamended provision of Section 6 of the POCSO Act will come into play, wherein the minimum punishment for offence punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act was 10 years’ RI and the same was amended w.e.f. 16.8.2019. In that view of the matter, the Trial Court has not assigned any special reason for awarding more than the minimum sentence and, therefore, the present appellant be sentenced for a period of 10 years’ RI by reducing it from 14 years' RI, as awarded by the Trial Court. She would rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the matter of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sonu Kushwaha, (2023) 7 SCC 475 to buttress her submission. 8. Per contra, Mr. Sudeep Verma, learned State Counsel, would submit that prosecution has been able to prove the offences beyond reasonable doubt by leading evidence of clinching nature. He would further submit that in view of the statements of prosecution witnesses, especially the statement of victim (PW-1) coupled with other evidence available on record i.e. medical evidence, the Trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for the aforesaid offences and the appeal therefore deserves to be dismissed. 9. We have heard learned counsels for parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and have also gone through the records with utmost circumspection. 10. Considering the statement of victim (PW-1) who has categorically named the appellant and which has been supported by Krishna (PW-2) and Dilip (PW-6) coupled with the medical evidence of Dr. S. Lakda (PW-10) who has examined the victim (PW-1) vide Exhibit P-7 whereby anus of the victim was found to be ruptured and redness was there in his perianal region and further the age of victim (PW-1) being duly proved by Dakhil-Kharij register (Exhibit P-10C), the finding recorded by the Trial Court that the appellant is guilty of having committed aggravated penetrative sexual assault on the victim (PW-1), which is punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, is strictly in accordance with law. We therefore do not find any illegality or perversity in said finding. Accordingly, we hereby affirm the said finding. 11. Now the question would be whether the Trial Court is justified in awarding sentence of 14 years' RI to the appellant for having committed offence under Section 6 of the POCSO Act or the same is on higher side and can be reduced, as contended by learned counsel for the appellant by placing reliance on a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sonu Kushwaha (supra). 12. In the matter of Sonu Kushwaha (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court finding the accused therein to be guilty of having committed aggravated penetrative sexual assault punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, proceeded to convict him for the said offence and upon further finding that the minimum punishment prescribed for offence punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act at the time when offence was committed i.e. prior to 16.8.2009, was 10 years’ RI, awarded him sentence for 10 years’ RI with fine of Rs.5,000/- and held in Paras 11, 12 & 13 as under: “11. Section 6, as applicable before its substitution on 16-08-2019, read thus: "6. Punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual assault. Whoever, commits aggravated penetrative sexual assault, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine." On the date of the commission of the offence, rigorous imprisonment for ten years was the minimum sentence prescribed for the offence of aggravated penetrative sexual assault. From 16th August 2019, the minimum sentence has been enhanced to twenty years. However, the amended provision will not apply to this case as the incident has taken place prior to 16th August 2019. 12. Surprisingly, the High Court has observed that Section 5 was not applicable, and the offence committed by the respondent falls under the category of a lesser offence of penetrative sexual assault, which is punishable under Section 4 of the POCSO Act. Thus, the High Court committed an obvious error by holding that the act committed by the respondent was not an aggravated penetrative sexual assault. Thus, the High Court committed an obvious error by holding that the act committed by the respondent was not an aggravated penetrative sexual assault. In fact, the Special Court was right in punishing the respondent under Section 6 and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years with a fine of Rs.5,000/-. 13. The POCSO Act was enacted to provide more stringent punishments for the offences of child abuse of various kinds and that is why minimum punishments have been prescribed in Sections 4, 6, 8 and 10 of the POCSO Act for various categories of sexual assaults on children. Hence, Section 6, on its plain language, leaves no discretion to the Court and there is no option but to impose the minimum sentence as done by the Trial Court. When a penal provision uses the phraseology "shall not be less than.", the Courts cannot do offence to the Section and impose a lesser sentence. The Courts are powerless to do that unless there is a specific statutory provision enabling the Court to impose a lesser sentence. However, we find no such provision in the POCSO Act. 14. Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the respondent may have moved ahead in life after undergoing the sentence as modified by the High Court, there is no question of showing any leniency to him. Apart from the fact that the law provides for a minimum sentence, the crime committed by the respondent is very gruesome which calls for very stringent punishment. The impact of the obnoxious act on the mind of the victim-child will be life-long. The impact is bound to adversely affect the healthy growth of the victim. There is no dispute that the age of the victim was less than twelve years at the time of the incident. Therefore, we have no option but to set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore the judgment of the Trial Court. 15. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 18th November 2021 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Appeal No.5415 of 2018 is quashed and set aside and the judgment and order dated 24th August 2018 passed by the learned 8th Additional Sessions Judge, Special Judge POCSO Act, Jhansi in Special Session Trial No.134 of 2016 is restored. The impugned judgment and order dated 18th November 2021 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Appeal No.5415 of 2018 is quashed and set aside and the judgment and order dated 24th August 2018 passed by the learned 8th Additional Sessions Judge, Special Judge POCSO Act, Jhansi in Special Session Trial No.134 of 2016 is restored. Accordingly, Criminal Appeal No.5415 of 2018 filed before the High Court stands dismissed. The respondent shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years for the offence punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and shall pay a fine of Rs.5,000/-.” 13. In that view of the matter and considering the principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sonu Kushwaha (supra), while affirming the conviction of the appellant for offence under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, we award him sentence for a period of 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment by reducing it from 14 years' rigorous imprisonment. However, in view of the discussions made herein above, the conviction and sentence of the appellant for offences under Sections 342 and 506(II) of IPC, as awarded by the Trial Court, is hereby maintained. All the other conditions enumerated by the Trial Court in the impugned judgment, including the fine amount with default sentence, shall remain intact. 14. In the result, this criminal appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove. 15. Let a certified copy of this order along with the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned as well as to the Superintendent of Jail where the appellant is languishing, forthwith for necessary information and action, if any.