JUDGMENT : Vivek Singh Thakur, J. CMP No.964 of 2018 Main appeal has been preferred by appellant-Insurance Company against Award dated 16.04.2016, passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal(I), Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P., in MACP No.(RBT)59-K/13/07, titled as Mukesh Kumar alias Sonnu vs. Sanjay Mehta & others, whereby claim of Mukesh Kumar- petitioner/respondent No.1, has been allowed by the MACT, by awarding compensation of Rs.30,27,400/- payable by appellant-Insurance Company alongwith interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of petition till the date of actual payment being insurer of the offending vehicle bearing Registration No.HP-53-A-0206 owned by respondent No.2-Sanjay Mehta, being driven by respondent No.3-Sanjeev Kumar. 2. Claim petitioner was pillion rider on the Motorcycle owned and being driven by respondent No.4-Vikas. Respondent No.5-ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company Ltd., is insurer of Motorcycle bearing Registration No.HP-40-A-2729 belonging to respondent No.4-Vikas. 3. As per claimant, on 30.06.2006, he was going from his native Village to Mandi, via Palampur, on Motorcycle HP-40-A-2729 as a pillion rider, being driven by respondent No.4-Vikas and near Veterinary Hospital Holta Camp, Palampur, at about 2.20 p.m. a Jeep bearing Registration No.HP-53-A-0206, owned by respondent No.2-Sanjay Mehta and being driven by respondent No.3-Sanjeev Kumar, in a rash and negligent manner, hit the Motorcycle causing injuries to the claimant leading to 75% permanent disability. 4. As per claimant, before accident, he was earning Rs.10,000/- per month, by running a shop of Goldsmith in Village and Post Office Suni, Tehsil Baroh, District Kangra, H.P., but after the accident he was not able to earn anything and he has to spend Rs.4,00,000/- for his treatment till the date of filing of the petition and at that time treatment was still going on. He has prayed for awarding compensation to the tune of Rs.20,00,000/-from the owner, driver and insurer of the offending Jeep. To substantiate the claim of rash and negligent driving, reliance was also placed on Registration of FIR No.165 of 2006 against respondent No.3-Sanjeev Kumar driver of the Jeep. 5. Appellant-Insurance Company has taken a specific defence that accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the Motorcycle, and driver of the Jeep was not possessing valid and effective Driving Licence at the time of accident and, therefore, for breach and for violation of terms and conditions of the Policy, appellant-Insurance Company was not liable to indemnify the insured. It is further stand of the appellant-Insurance Company that claimant is working normal as before and was not running shop of Goldsmith, rather he was earning nothing and the accident was result of rash and negligent driving of the motorcyclist. 6. Appellant-Insurance Company has assailed the Award also on the ground that quantum of compensation determined by the MACT is on higher side, and is contrary to the parameters and factors propounded by the Supreme Court in its various pronouncements. 7. Owner and driver of the offending Jeep have not preferred any appeal. 8. Alongwith appeal, present application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure (in short ‘CPC’) has also been filed for leading additional evidence with respect to genuineness and validity of the Driving Licence of Jeep driver respondent No.3-Sanjeev Kumar in order to absolve the appellant-Insurance Company from its liability to indemnify the owner and driver of the offending Jeep. It would be appropriate to adjudicate this application first, before deciding the main appeal. 9. Claim petition was preferred on 07.08.2007, wherein appellant-Insurance Company was impleaded as party in October 2009 on its disclosure as an insurer by the owner of the Jeep and, thereafter, appellant-Insurance Company was served for 8.04.2011 and since then appellant-Insurance Company was duly represented before MACT. 10. Reply on behalf of appellant-Insurance Company was prepared on 18.09.2011 and was filed on 26.09.2011, wherein specific objection with respect to validity and genuineness of the Driving Licence of Jeep driver respondent No.3-Sanjeev Kumar was taken. 11. It is admitted case of the appellant-Insurance Company, as apparent from the averments of the application, that details of the Driving LIcence of respondent No.3-Sanjeev Kumar came in the knowledge of appellant-Insurance Company on 03.01.2015. Record reveals that on 09.01.2015, application of appellant-Insurance Company to summon respondent No.3-Sanjeev Kumar alias Soni as a witness alongwith Driving Licence No.1506/T/TV/05 was allowed by the Presiding Officer of MACT and on 25.06.2015 Driving Licence of respondent No.3-Sanjeev Kumar was tendered in evidence in original as Ex.PW.3/A. 12. It is claim of the appellant-Insurance Company that verification of the aforesaid Licence, claimed to have been issued by District Transport Officer, Tuensang, Nagaland on 08.09.2015, came in possession of the appellant-Insurance Company on 16.10.2015 alongwith forwarding letter sent by Divisional Manager of National Insurance Company Limited, Dimapur Division, to Development Officer Palampur and verification report submitted by Insurance Investigator. It is claim of the appellant-Insurance Company that verification of the aforesaid Licence, claimed to have been issued by District Transport Officer, Tuensang, Nagaland on 08.09.2015, came in possession of the appellant-Insurance Company on 16.10.2015 alongwith forwarding letter sent by Divisional Manager of National Insurance Company Limited, Dimapur Division, to Development Officer Palampur and verification report submitted by Insurance Investigator. Whereas, evidence of the appellant-Insurance Company was closed by the order of the Tribunal on 15.10.2015 and, therefore, it has been contended that at the time of leading evidence before MACT, appellant-Insurance Company was not in possession of the relevant necessary piece of evidence, i.e. verification of Driving Licence of the Jeep driver respondent No.3-Sanjeev Kumar and, thus, additional evidence sought to be brought on record in appeal could not be produced before MACT despite due diligence on the part of appellant-Insurance Company. 13. Copy of forwarding letter, verification report of Investigator dated 08.10.2015 and verification issued by District Transport Officer, Tuensang, Nagaland dated 08.09.2015 have been placed on record with application. Record reveals that after closing the evidence of appellant-Insurance Company on 15.10.2015, claim petition was fixed for arguments on 27.10.2015, but arguments were not heard on that day. Thereafter, petition was listed on 09.11.2015 on which date arguments were heard. However, Award could not be pronounced on 18.11.2015, 07.12.2015, 31.12.2015 and 12.01.2016 because of paucity of time as the Presiding Officer remained busy in conducting and disposing of other matters, including Criminal Trials. On 12.01.2016, Presiding Officer fixed next date as 16.02.2016 for addressing fresh arguments because of lapse of sufficient time from conclusion of arguments till that date. On 16.12.2016, Presiding Officer was on Medical Leave and case was fixed for arguments on 06.04.2016 on which date, arguments were heard and order was reserved for 12.04.2016, however, it was pronounced on 16.04.2016. 14. It is claim of the appellant-Insurance Company itself that documents, sought to be produced in evidence as additional evidence, were available with the Company at Palampur on 16.10.2015. But no steps were taken by the appellant-Insurance Company to place the same on record of the MACT by filing an appropriate application till April 2016. 15. 14. It is claim of the appellant-Insurance Company itself that documents, sought to be produced in evidence as additional evidence, were available with the Company at Palampur on 16.10.2015. But no steps were taken by the appellant-Insurance Company to place the same on record of the MACT by filing an appropriate application till April 2016. 15. It is also noticeable that application filed for additional evidence does not disclose the steps taken by the appellant-Insurance Company for verification of the Driving Licence immediately after filing of reply or at least after 3.01.2015 on which date details of Driving Licence came in the knowledge of the appellant-Insurance Company, as itself claimed by the appellant-Insurance Company regarding acquisition of knowledge of details of Driving Licence on that day, i.e. 03.01.2015. Verification by Surveyor of the Company was obtained on 08.09.2015 and was submitted in the Company Office at Dimapur on 08.10.2015 which was further transmitted to Palampur in the same month. It is not a case that appellant-Insurance Company was incapacitated or was not having sufficient means to take appropriate steps for verification of Driving Licence well in time immediately after 03.01.2015. Rather it is apparent from the record that appellant-Insurance Company was having its Office at Dimapur, Nagaland, which is near to Tuensang, Nagaland. Therefore, due diligence on the part of appellant-Insurance Company is lacking in present case. 16. In present case, Driving Licence has been placed on record as Ex.PW.3/A issued by District Transport Officer, Tuensang, Nagaland, and appellant-Insurance Company is raising doubt about its validity. Verification of Driving Licence obtained from District Transport Officer, Tuensang, Nagaland, is not sufficient to establish that the said Driving Licence is not valid at all because verification does not say that Driving Licence No.1506/T/TV/05 in the name of respondent No.3-Sanjeev Kumar was not issued by District Transport Officer, Tuensang, Nagaland. Rather it says that no record has been found/available with respect of this Licence in the name of Sanjeev Kumar, in the Office of District Transport Officer. Therefore, even if, additional evidence is permitted to be brought on record, it shall not remove any cloud of doubt about the Driving Licence in reference because verification report is not sufficient to hold positively that Driving Licence Ex.PW.3/A is fake or invalid Driving Licence. Therefore, proposed evidence is not going to render any assistance to the Court for deciding the matter. Therefore, proposed evidence is not going to render any assistance to the Court for deciding the matter. Rather, it will create confusion only. 17. It is not a case where, in absence of additional evidence sought to be produced, Award/judgment could not be pronounced. For the aforesaid reasons, document sought to be produced in additional evidence is not going to enable the Court to lead any definite conclusion for pronouncing judgment and, it is not required for any other specific cause. It is not a case where, after obtaining the documents, efforts were made by the appellant-Insurance Company to produce the same in evidence before MACT or the MACT had refused to accept these documents in evidence. 18. There is no justifiable reason for not filing evidence before the MACT immediately after having possession thereof. Moreover, additional evidence is not material for deciding the issue of valid licence, being vague in nature. The verification report does not say that against Licence No. 1506/T/TV/05, no licence was ever issued to respondent No.3-Sanjeev Kumar or no licence bearing such number was issued or the Driving Licence bearing the said number has been issued in favour of someone else or the Serial Number of Driving Licence issued by the concerned DTO is different than the licence and Serial Number mentioned in Ex.PW.3/A. Therefore, verification report is not conclusive, but vague in nature. 19. With reference to the issue of additional evidence, pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Ibrahim Uddin and another, (2012) 8 SCC 148 , would be relevant wherein Supreme Court has held as under:- Order 41 Rule 27 CPC 36. The general principle is that the Appellate Court should not travel outside the record of the lower court and cannot take any evidence in appeal. However, as an exception, Order 41 Rule 27 CPC enables the Appellate Court to take additional evidence in exceptional circumstances. The Appellate Court may permit additional evidence only and only if the conditions laid down in this rule are found to exist. The parties are not entitled, as of right, to the admission of such evidence. Thus, provision does not apply, when on the basis of evidence on record, the Appellate Court can pronounce a satisfactory judgment. The matter is entirely within the discretion of the court and is to be used sparingly. The parties are not entitled, as of right, to the admission of such evidence. Thus, provision does not apply, when on the basis of evidence on record, the Appellate Court can pronounce a satisfactory judgment. The matter is entirely within the discretion of the court and is to be used sparingly. Such a discretion is only a judicial discretion circumscribed by the limitation specified in the rule itself. (Vide: K. Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy & Ors., AIR 1963 SC 1526 ; The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Lala Pancham & Ors., AIR 1965 SC 1008 ; Soonda Ram & Anr. v. Rameshwaralal & Anr., (1975) 3 SCC 698 ; and Syed Abdul Khader v. Rami Reddy & Ors., (1979) 2 SCC 601 ). 37. The Appellate Court should not, ordinarily allow new evidence to be adduced in order to enable a party to raise a new point in appeal. Similarly, where a party on whom the onus of proving a certain point lies fails to discharge the onus, he is not entitled to a fresh opportunity to produce evidence, as the Court can, in such a case, pronounce judgment against him and does not require any additional evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment. (Vide: Haji Mohammed Ishaq Wd. S. K. Mohammed & Ors. v. Mohamed Iqbal and Mohamed Ali and Co., (1978) 2 SCC 493 ). 38. Under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC, the appellate Court has the power to allow a document to be produced and a witness to be examined. But the requirement of the said Court must be limited to those cases where it found it necessary to obtain such evidence for enabling it to pronounce judgment. This provision does not entitle the appellate Court to let in fresh evidence at the appellate stage where even without such evidence it can pronounce judgment in a case. It does not entitle the appellate Court to let in fresh evidence only for the purpose of pronouncing judgment in a particular way. In other words, it is only for removing a lacuna in the evidence that the appellate Court is empowered to admit additional evidence. (Vide: Lala Pancham). 39. It is not the business of the appellate court to supplement the evidence adduced by one party or the other in the lower Court. In other words, it is only for removing a lacuna in the evidence that the appellate Court is empowered to admit additional evidence. (Vide: Lala Pancham). 39. It is not the business of the appellate court to supplement the evidence adduced by one party or the other in the lower Court. Hence, in the absence of satisfactory reasons for the non-production of the evidence in the trial court, additional evidence should not be admitted in appeal as a party guilty of remissness in the lower court is not entitled to the indulgence of being allowed to give further evidence under this rule. So a party who had ample opportunity to produce certain evidence in the lower court but failed to do so or elected not to do so, cannot have it admitted in appeal. (Vide: State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, AIR 1957 SC 912 ; and S. Rajagopal v. C.M. Armugam & Ors., AIR 1969 SC 101 ). 40. The inadvertence of the party or his inability to understand the legal issues involved or the wrong advice of a pleader or the negligence of a pleader or that the party did not realise the importance of a document does not constitute a "substantial cause" within the meaning of this rule. The mere fact that certain evidence is important, is not in itself a sufficient ground for admitting that evidence in appeal. 41. The words "for any other substantial cause" must be read with the word "requires" in the beginning of sentence, so that it is only where, for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court requires additional evidence, that this rule will apply, e.g., when evidence has been taken by the lower Court so imperfectly that the Appellate Court cannot pass a satisfactory judgment. 42. Whenever the appellate Court admits additional evidence it should record its reasons for doing so. (Sub-rule 2). It is a salutary provision which operates as a check against a too easy reception of evidence at a late stage of litigation and the statement of reasons may inspire confidence and disarm objection. Another reason of this requirement is that, where a further appeal lies from the decision, the record of reasons will be useful and necessary for the Court of further appeal to see, if the discretion under this rule has been properly exercised by the Court below. Another reason of this requirement is that, where a further appeal lies from the decision, the record of reasons will be useful and necessary for the Court of further appeal to see, if the discretion under this rule has been properly exercised by the Court below. The omission to record the reasons must, therefore, be treated as a serious defect. But this provision is only directory and not mandatory, if the reception of such evidence can be justified under the rule. 47. Where the additional evidence sought to be adduced removes the cloud of doubt over the case and the evidence has a direct and important bearing on the main issue in the suit and interest of justice clearly renders it imperative that it may be allowed to be permitted on record such application may be allowed. 48. To sum up on the issue, it may be held that application for taking additional evidence on record at a belated stage cannot be filed as a matter of right. The court can consider such an application with circumspection, provided it is covered under either of the prerequisite condition incorporated in the statutory provisions itself. The discretion is to be exercised by the court judicially taking into consideration the relevance of the document in respect of the issues involved in the case and the circumstances under which such an evidence could not be led in the court below and as to whether the applicant had prosecuted his case before the court below diligently and as to whether such evidence is required to pronounce the judgment by the appellate court. In case the court comes to the conclusion that the application filed comes within the four corners of the statutory provisions itself, the evidence may be taken on record, however, the court must record reasons as on what basis such an application has been allowed. However, the application should not be moved at a belated stage.” 20. Pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Lekhraj Bansal vs. State of Rajasthan and another, (2014) 15 SCC 686 , is also relevant wherein it has been observed as under:- “The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence in the appellate court unless the conditions stipulated under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC are satisfied. Pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Lekhraj Bansal vs. State of Rajasthan and another, (2014) 15 SCC 686 , is also relevant wherein it has been observed as under:- “The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence in the appellate court unless the conditions stipulated under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC are satisfied. It is not the case of the appellant that the trial court had refused to admit the said evidence which ought to have been admitted. It is also not the case of the appellant that the said evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him during pendency of the suit before the trial court. On the other hand it is vehemently contended that the said evidence, namely, the document was filed but was omitted to be tendered in evidence and got exhibited in the suit. The lower appellate court elaborately considered the factual matrix and held that the appellant has not satisfied any of the conditions stipulated under Order 41 Rule 27 and hence is not entitled to produce additional evidence. In our view the said finding has rightly been confirmed by the High Court.” 21. Taking into consideration facts and circumstances narrated hereinabove, and the pronouncements of the Supreme Court, I am of the considered opinion that necessary ingredients for allowing application to lead additional evidence are missing in present case and, thus, application deserves to be dismissed and is dismissed accordingly.