ORDER : This application is filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short ‘the Act’), seeking the following reliefs: (a) An order directing the Respondent to secure the Petitioner’s claim by furnishing security in the form of a cash deposit or an unconditional Bank Guarantee of a notarized bank for a sum of USD 3,233,062.79 (United States Dollars Three Million, Two Hundred and Thirty-Three Thousand and Sixty Two and Seventy-Nine Cents Only) and GBP 18,708.34 (Eighteen Thousand Seven Hundred Eight Pounds and Thirty-Four pence). (b) An order appointing a Court Receiver or Court Commissioner to take possession of the Respondent company’s assets that is equivalent to the awarded sum by the Sole Arbitrator and in the interim to direct the Respondent to not dissipate or deal with any of its assets. (c) For awarding costs of the present proceedings and (d) Pass such other Order or Orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. 2.1 The petitioner (owner) and the respondent (charterer) entered into a charterparty agreement evidenced by signed fixture note dated 26.08.2021 (herein after referred to as “the Charterparty") incorporating the terms of a charter relating to the vessel “M.V. Faith” by time charter document of 30.06.2020. The charter party provided that it should be subject to English Law and for any disputes arising to be referred to arbitration in London. The Charterparty entered between the parties was for the shipment of Bagged Rice (24INX36INX26IN 5OKG BAGS) from Krishnapatnam, India to Cotonou (Benin) and Tema (Ghana) and the time period was for about 80 days without guarantee. 2.2. It is claimed by the petitioner that the Charterparty entered between the parties on a daily hire rate of USD 38,500 PDPR INCLOT (Per Day Pro Rata Including Overtime) was agreed and fixed under Clause 30 of the Charterparty. Clause 31 of the Charterparty provided that the first 45 days of hire was to be paid within five (5) banking days after delivery into the charter service and thereafter, hire was payable every fifteen (15) days in advance. The Charterparty provided for an arbitration clause at Clause 38 of the fixture Note. The parties, in furtherance to the arbitration clause, also incorporated the BIMCO Standard Dispute Resolution Clause which stood incorporated into the Charterparty 2.3. The Charterparty provided for an arbitration clause at Clause 38 of the fixture Note. The parties, in furtherance to the arbitration clause, also incorporated the BIMCO Standard Dispute Resolution Clause which stood incorporated into the Charterparty 2.3. According the petitioner, the respondent delayed made payment of its first hire charges and subsequently made payment of the second hire. The respondent had since then failed to make payment of the outstanding hire in terms of the Charterparty. Thus, after the payment of the first and the second hire payment the respondents became obliged to make payment of hire of a net USD 556.593.75 each from 15.12.2021 on each 15 day anniversary thereafter. However, the respondent failed to make payment of hire in time with the Charterparty. 2.4. Due to the breach of the respondent for non-payment of the charter hire, the petitioner on 04.01.2022 invoked arbitration against the respondent and appointed Mr. Bruce Harris as petitioner's arbitrator in terms of the arbitration clause as set out under Clause 38 of the Charterparty and the BIMCO Standard Dispute Resolution Clause incorporated into the Charterparty. The petitioner, thereafter, called upon the respondent to appoint its arbitrator within fourteen (14) days. It was clearly stated by the petitioner in its notice invoking arbitration that in case the respondent fails to appoint an arbitrator within fourteen (14 days), Mr. Bruce Harris will be appointed as a Sole Arbitrator as per the arbitration clause in the Charterparty. The respondent failed to appoint/nominate an arbitrator within fourteen (14) days and accordingly, the Petitioner that Mr. Bruce Harris has been appointed as the Sole Arbitrator as per the arbitration clause provided under the Charterparty. 2.5. It is stated that in the meantime while the hire payment became outstanding and the vessel was still yet to discharge its cargo in two discharge ports being Cotonou and Tema, the parties entered into discussions and agreed to an Addendum dated 24.01.2022. The Addendum contemplated that the petitioner would consider all dues settled under the Charterparty provided the respondent complied with all the terms of the Addendum, namely paragraphs A to I of the said Addendum. The Addendum contemplated that the petitioner would consider all dues settled under the Charterparty provided the respondent complied with all the terms of the Addendum, namely paragraphs A to I of the said Addendum. The Addendum contemplated that upon the Respondent making payment of USD 1,000,000 (United States Dollars One Million) together with any disbursement at the discharge ports and payment towards waiting time at the discharge ports beyond 10 days at each of the discharge ports as more fully set out in paragraph E of the Addendum, the petitioner would not have any further claim against the respondent. The Addendum, however, provided that the Charterparty would continue to have full force. The Respondent only paid USD 999,778.30 (United States Dollars Nine Hundred Ninety-Nine Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy Eight and Thirty cents) in terms with Clause B of the said Addendum as bank charge was deducted from one of the two payments. The respondent failed to pay the costs as agreed for the waiting time at each of the discharge ports in terms with Clause I of the Addendum and the respondent was therefore in repudiatory breach, which, was accepted by the petitioner and hence the Addendum fell, though as the respondent failed to pay all sums due under the said Addendum, as determined by Sole Arbitrator in his Partial Final Award dated 26.07.2022. 2.6. It is stated that claim submissions were filed by the petitioner on 04.06.2022. The respondent filed reply statement to the claim submissions along with the counter claim submissions on 02.07.2022. The petitioner thereafter filed a reply to the respondent's reply statement and counter claim submissions on 21.07.2022. The Sole Arbitrator passed two awards i.e. first Award dealing with the petitioner's claims and the second Partial Award dated 24.08.2022 dealing with the respondent's counterclaim. In the first Award, the sole arbitrator held that the respondent is liable to pay an amount of USD 3,233,062.79 (United States Dollars Three Million Two Hundred and Thirty Three Thousand and SixtyTwo and Seventy-Nine Cents Only) together with interest thereon at the rate of 5% (five percent) per annum, compounded three (3) monthly rests, from 01.02.2022 down to the date of the payment. The petitioner vide its letter dated 28.07.2022 duly intimated the respondent with regard to the Foreign Award dated 26.07.2022 and demanded payment of the principal sum awarded together with the interest thereon. The petitioner vide its letter dated 28.07.2022 duly intimated the respondent with regard to the Foreign Award dated 26.07.2022 and demanded payment of the principal sum awarded together with the interest thereon. The sole Arbitrator, while dismissing the counterclaim of the respondent, awarded the costs of GBP 10,966.67 together with costs of dealing with the counter claim of GBP 875 and costs of assessment of costs of GBP 186.67. 3.1. The respondent defended the instant application by contending that the respondent agreed to pay a lump sum payment of USD $1,000,000 (US Dollars One Million) to the Petitioner. Upon payment of the settlement amount, the respondent was not required to make any further payments to petitioner under the charterparty. It was also agreed in the Addendum that in case of conflict between the charterparty and the Addendum, the Addendum shall prevail. 3.2. The respondent via email dated 07.03.2022 issued instructions to the petitioner not to discharge the cargo. However, the petitioner and Master of the Vessel contrary to the respondent’s instructions followed the Sub-charterers' instructions and discharged the cargo. The respondent via email dated 10.03.2022 lodged its protest. It is stated that the petitioner colluded with the Sub-Charterer i.e., E-Star Shipping & Trading Company by receiving an amount of US $ 500,000/- from the Sub-Charterer and released the cargo against the Bill of Lading, which was issued without authorisation. In the circumstances, the respondent filed a complaint under Section 200 of the Criminal Procedure Code before the Hon'ble XXII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Secunderabad. Vide order dated 04.08.2022, the Hon'ble XXII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Secunderabad, took cognizance against the petitioner and the Sub-Charter for the offences under Sections 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. 3.3. The Petitioner, who received US $ 999,778 30 (as against the USD 1 million) under the Addendum, still filed a claim before the Arbitrator contending that the Addendum has 'no effect’. The Arbitrator erroneously allowed the claim filed by the petitioner by the Partial Final Award dated 26.07.2022 for USD $3,233,062.79 and dismissed the counterclaim filed by the respondent and passed Second Partial Award dated 24.08.2022. 3.4. It is stated that the present application is not maintainable as the petitioner has approached this Court after seven (7) months have elapsed from the date of First Award was passed. 3.4. It is stated that the present application is not maintainable as the petitioner has approached this Court after seven (7) months have elapsed from the date of First Award was passed. The petitioner has chosen not to file execution proceedings under Sections 47 and 48 of the Act. The petitioner has mischievously not chosen to file the execution proceedings because the petitioner is fully aware that the First Award will not pass muster of Section 47 and Section 48 of the Act and that the First Award is not enforceable under the Act because the subject matter of the dispute between the parties is not arbitrable and also because the arbitrator was unilaterally appointed by the petitioner. Further, the First Award is contrary to the Contract Law in India and the principles of justice and morality and therefore, contrary to the public policy of India. 3.5. By filing the present application, the petitioner is seeking to by-pass the procedure for execution of foreign awards as set out in Section 47 and 48 of the Act and is seeking to execute the award through proceedings under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, which is not permissible under the Act. 3.6. It is stated that on account of settlement for an amount of US $ 1,000,000 and additional hire as agreed in Clause E of the Addendum, the petitioner relinquished all its other claims against the respondent under the charterparty in terms of Clause G of the Addendum. The petitioner received the settlement amount of US $ 999,778.30. 3.7. It is stated that one of the prerequisites for grant of interim relief under Section 9 of the Act is to approach the Court with reasonable expedition. The concept of the reasonable expedition mandates that the individual/party approaching a Court for discretionary interim relief should demonstrate that they approached the Court at the earliest possible time. The petitioner filed the instant application almost seven (7) months after passing of the award and this conduct of the petitioner disentitles the petitioner from seeking discretionary interim relief under Section 9 of the Act. 4. Mr. Amitava Majumdar, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that arbitrator was appointed in accordance with the Charterparty agreement dated 26.08.2021, which was governed by English Law. The respondent appeared before the arbitrator and filed counter claim without raising any objection to the appointment of arbitrator. 4. Mr. Amitava Majumdar, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that arbitrator was appointed in accordance with the Charterparty agreement dated 26.08.2021, which was governed by English Law. The respondent appeared before the arbitrator and filed counter claim without raising any objection to the appointment of arbitrator. It is settled law that Section 9 of the Act can be invoked post-award. It is not necessary to file execution petition and then only seek relief under Section 9 of the Act. The petitioner being an awardee/decree holder is always entitled to take immediate steps to seek interim measures for enforcing the award and to see that award is not frustrated. 5. Learned counsel relied on the following decisions: ESSAR HOUSE PRIVATE LIMITED v. ARCELLOR MITTAL NIPPON STEEL INDIA LIMITED, 2022 SCC OnLine 1219 ; AIRCON BEIBARS FZE v. HELIGO CHARTERS (P) LTD., 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 631 ; HELIGO CHARTERS (P) LTD. v. AIRCON FEIBARS FZE, 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 1388 ; SCAN-SHIPPING PTE. LTD v. ANUPAM PORT CRANES CORPORATION (2019: GUJHC:59497 ARBI.P/2825/2019 dated 30.08.2019); SLP(CIVIL) DIARY No.21015 of 2020 (dated 06.11.2020). 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the jurisdiction of the Court to pass orders under 9 of the Act postaward is well settled. The provisions under Section 9 of the Act clearly lays down that Court has jurisdiction under Section 9 to pass orders before, during and after making arbitral award. He relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in ESSAR HOUSE PRIVATE LIMITED’s case (1 supra) wherein it was held at para 48 as follows: “48. Section 9 of the Arbitration Act confers wide power on the Court to pass orders securing the amount in dispute in arbitration, whether before the commencement of the arbitral proceedings, during the arbitral proceedings or at any time after making of the arbitral award, but before its enforcement in accordance with Section 36 of the Arbitration Act. All that the Court is required to see is, whether the applicant for interim measure has a good prima facie case, whether the balance of convenience is in favour of interim relief as prayed for being granted and whether the applicant has approached the court with reasonable expedition.” 7. Mr. All that the Court is required to see is, whether the applicant for interim measure has a good prima facie case, whether the balance of convenience is in favour of interim relief as prayed for being granted and whether the applicant has approached the court with reasonable expedition.” 7. Mr. Sanjay Suraneni, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that the petitioner has to necessarily file execution petition only after the award is recognized in terms of Sections 48 and 49 of the Act. The award is against fundamental policy of India as arbitrator was unilaterally appointed and contrary to the contract law of India. The petitioner cannot be permitted to seek interim relief under Section 9 of the Act without filing execution petition otherwise it would cause prejudice to the respondent inasmuch as the respondent will be deprived of his valuable legal right to oppose execution petition. If execution petition is filed, then the respondent would oppose the execution petition and in view of the objection of the respondent, there are good chances of the execution petition being dismissed. According to the learned counsel for the respondent, the arbitrator was unilaterally appointed contrary to the law of India and thus, it is opposed to fundamental policy of India as per Section 48(2)(b) of the Act. He relied on a judgment of the Madras High Court in HINA SUNEET SHARMA v. NISSAN RENAULT FINANCIAL SERVICES INDIA (P) LTD, 2023 SCC OnLine Mad 758. 8. The issue whether simplicitor Section 9 petition can be filed without filing execution petition came up for consideration before the Bombay High Court in AIRCON BEIBARS FZE’s case (2 supra). Interim relief application under Section 9 of the Act filed by the petitioner in whose favour the award was passed was opposed by the respondent contending that in case of foreign award unless it is made enforceable and recognized under Section 48 of the Act, Section 9 cannot be invoked. Learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in AIRCON BEIBARS FZE’s case (2 supra) while recording the contentions of the learned counsel for the respondent made the following observations: “8. Mr. Nankani's second submission is this : even if there is no exclusionary agreement, Section 9 still cannot be invoked until the foreign award is made enforceable, that is to say, until it passes through the discipline and rigour of Section 48 of the Arbitration Act. Mr. Nankani's second submission is this : even if there is no exclusionary agreement, Section 9 still cannot be invoked until the foreign award is made enforceable, that is to say, until it passes through the discipline and rigour of Section 48 of the Arbitration Act. Section 48 is entirely discretionary. It permits an Indian court to refuse enforcement of a foreign award if it is satisfied about the existence of one or more of various conditions set out in that section. According to Mr. Nankani, the words used in the proviso to Section 2(2) are that the award made or to be made must be one that “is enforceable and recognized”. In his reading of it, this can only be a reference to a foreign award that passes through Section 48 and emerges enforceable in India and thus recognized. Until that happens, no relief under Section 9 can be claimed. A protective order under Section 9 may be sought by a holder of a foreign award that has become enforceable and recognized under Section 48, i.e., in the period between the time of that Section 48 order and the time of its execution. 9. The procedure of Section 48, Mr. Nankani says (and correctly), is in direct contract to the procedure followed for a domestic award. There, once a challenge under Section 34 fails, or the time available for that challenge passes, the award automatically becomes enforceable as a decree of the Court without anything further being needed. This is what Section 36(1) says. Section 9 relief, therefore, is always available after a domestic award is made but before it is put into execution. This is untrue of a foreign award, for that has to go through one more step of being rendered enforceable and being recognized. Plainly, in his view, Section 2(2)'s proviso limited itself to that period between the time when a foreign award being made enforceable under Section 48 and it being put into execution. 10. I do not believe this to be a correct reading of the proviso. If this was so, then between the time of passing a foreign award and until an order is made on it under Section 48, the only remaining asset in India might well be dissipated if not protected by order under Section 9. 10. I do not believe this to be a correct reading of the proviso. If this was so, then between the time of passing a foreign award and until an order is made on it under Section 48, the only remaining asset in India might well be dissipated if not protected by order under Section 9. What the proviso seeks to do by amendment is to make available a remedy or recourse under Section 9 as a transitory provision pending the process contemplated by Section 48. This is obviously intended to ensure that a court can step in to protect an asset from being diverted or dissipated, and to ensure that the holder of a foreign award has, if he is able to get his foreign award pronounced enforceable, an asset against which he can proceed. If the foreign award does not result in an order of enforceability, then of course a protective order under Section 9 cannot continue. But equally, it cannot have been the statutory intent to the amendment that should the holder of a foreign award obtain an order pronouncing it enforceable and recognizing it, he finds in his hands nothing but paper, since, for want of a protective order under Section 9, or something like it, the only available asset has been lost. This might actually happen more often that one imagines : it is entirely conceivable that in anticipation of losing a Section 48 litigation, a party that has suffered an award might take rapid steps to dissipate and distribute assets to frustrate the execution of a foreign award. That, it seems to me, is precisely what the proviso to Section 2 sought to avoid.” 9. The recommendation of Law Commission in its report No.246 in para 41(i) and (ii) was taken into consideration by the learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court AIRCON BEIBARS FZE’s case (2 supra) in para 11 of the said judgment as under: 11. I believe think Report No. 246 of the Law Commission actually supports this. In paragraph 41(i) and (ii) this is what the Law Commission said: "41. While the decision in BALCO is a step in the right direction and would drastically reduce judicial intervention to foreign arbitrations, the commission feels that there are still a few areas that are likely to be problematic. In paragraph 41(i) and (ii) this is what the Law Commission said: "41. While the decision in BALCO is a step in the right direction and would drastically reduce judicial intervention to foreign arbitrations, the commission feels that there are still a few areas that are likely to be problematic. (i) Where the assets of a party are located in India, and there is a likelihood that that party will dissipate its assets in the near future, the other party will lack an efficacious remedy if the seat of the arbitration is abroad. The latter party will have two possible remedies, but neither will be efficacious. First the latter party can obtain an interim order from a foreign Court or the arbitral tribunal itself and file a civil suit to enforce the right created by the interim order. The interim order would not be enforceable directly by filing an execution petition as it would not qualify as a "judgment" or "decree" for the purposes of sections 13 and 44A of the Code of Civil Procedure (which provide a mechanism for enforcing foreign judgments). Secondly, in the event that the former party does not adhere to the terms of the foreign Order, the latter party can initiate proceedings for contempt in the foreign Court and enforce the judgment of the foreign Court under sections 13 and 44A of the Code of Civil Procedure. Neither of these remedies is likely to provide a practical remedy to the party seeking to enforce the interim relief obtained by it. That being the case, it is a distinct possibility that a foreign party would obtain an arbitral award in its favour only to realise that the entity against which it has to enforce the award has been stripped of its assets and has been converted into a shell company. (ii) While the decision in BALCO was made prospective to ensure that hotly negotiated bargains are not overturned overnight, it results in a situation where Courts, despite knowing that the decision in Bhatia is no longer good law, are forced to apply it whenever they are faced with a case arising from an arbitration agreement executed pre- BALCO." (Emphasis added) The objection of the respondent counsel therein about enforceability of foreign award unless it survives the test of Section 48 of the Act was rejected by making the following observations: 13. Mr. Mr. Nankani is at some pains to emphasize that the recommendation of the Law Commission was in respect of a foreign award that “would be enforceable and recognized”, i.e., a foreign award even potentially enforceable, whereas the final amendment speaks of a foreign award that “is enforceable and recognize”, a reference, in his submission, to a foreign award that has survived the test of Section 48 and become enforceable. It is between “would be” and “is”, according to Mr. Nankani, that the discrepancy lies; and, in his formulation, the final amendment does not permit the holder of a foreign award to apply for protection till he has obtained an order of enforceability under Section 48. 14. Again, I think this would be an unfair way of approaching the statutory intent given what the Law Commissioner itself said especially in the note below the very portion Mr. Nankani emphasizes. If there is an ambiguity about this, it is eliminated by the fact that this is not the only departure in the amendment from the recommendation. The phraseology has slightly changed from “if an award made or that might be made” to “an arbitral award made or to be made”. It seems to me that the amendment and introduction of the proviso was nothing but a linguistically more compact rewording of the recommendation, and not an attempt to curtail or limit the Law Commission's proposal. Learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court concluded that Section 9 petition is maintainable even before the award is put to actual enforcement. 10. The respondent in AIRCON BEIBARS FZE’s case (2 supra) case challenged the order of the learned single Judge before a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in HELIGO CHARTERS (P) LTD.’s case (3 supra) and it was held in para 17 as follows: “17. In respect of interpretation placed by the Counsel appearing for the appellant under the provisions of Section 2(2), 9 and 48, we are of the view that the interim protection in the facts cannot be denied to the respondent irrespective of as to whether the award was put to execution or not? Such a measure is made available in law under Section 9 of the Act so as to prevent dissipation and diversion of assets. This being the object and purpose behind the amended provisions which is based on the recommendations of the Law Commission. Such a measure is made available in law under Section 9 of the Act so as to prevent dissipation and diversion of assets. This being the object and purpose behind the amended provisions which is based on the recommendations of the Law Commission. We do not find any error in the view adopted by the learned Single Judge on this count. The judgments cited supra by the Counsel appearing for the appellant do not support and sustain the interpretation placed by the counsel.” 11. The High Court of Gujarat in SCAN-SHIPPING PTE. LTD (supra) placed reliance on the judgment of the Bombay High Court in AIRCON BEIBARS FZE’s case (2 supra) and held in para 39 as follows: “39. Being satisfied that in absence of any agreement to contrary, section 9 of the Arbitration Act would have an applicability even though it is a case of International Commercial Arbitration as provided in proviso to section 2(2) of the Arbitration Act, although interim injunction is in operation of not to transfer the assets, there would be a need to specifically direct furnishing of security to protect the petitioner so as not to frustrate the very cause, as the execution of award is yet pending.” 12. The judgment of the Gujarat High Court in SCAN-SHIPPING PTE. LTD’s case (supra) was challenged by the respondent therein before the Supreme Court in SLP(Civil).No.21015 of 2020, which came to be dismissed by order dated 06.11.2020. 13. Learned counsel for the respondent by placing reliance on HINA SUNEET SHARMA’s case (4 supra) submitted that merely because the respondent participated in the arbitral proceedings, the principle of estoppel would not operate against him. The appointment of arbitrator unilaterally is contrary to the law of this country. The arbitral award is thus contrary to the fundamental policy of India and becomes unenforceable. That assuming this Court has got power under Section 9 of the Act to grant interim relief even before the award is put for execution, the objection about the enforceability and the award being contrary to the fundamental policy of India will have to be considered by this Court, in which event, it cannot be held that the petitioner has made out a prima facie case for grant of interim order under Section 9 of the Act. In HINA SUNEET SHARMA’s case (4 supra) it was held as follows: “17. In HINA SUNEET SHARMA’s case (4 supra) it was held as follows: “17. Now the question that arise for consideration is if the petitioners participated in the arbitral proceedings or after having the knowledge of the appointment of the sole Arbitrator failed to challenge the said appointment in terms of Section 13 of the Act, would the same deprive the rights of the petitioners to challenge the said appointment of the Arbitrator in terms of the provisions of Section 34 of the Act for the violations of provisions of Section 12(5) of the Act? 18. In my considered view, the answer is no. The petitioners can certainly entitled to challenge under Section 34 of the Act, if there is any violation of the provisions of the Act. Even though, the petitioners have not challenged the unilateral appointment of the sole Arbitrator under Section 13 of the Act, it would not take away the rights of the petitioners to challenge under Section 34 of the Act. Even if there is any participation by the petitioners in the arbitral proceedings, the petitioners still have the right to challenge about the violations of the provisions of Section 12(5) of the Act under Section 34 of the Act. Any violation of provisions of the Act, is amount to against the public policy of India. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has also held at paragraph No.27 in the case of “Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authorities” reported in (2015) 3 SCC 49 , which reads as follows: “Fundamental Policy of Indian Law 27. Coming to each of the heads contained in the Saw Pipes judgment, we will first deal with the head “fundamental policy of Indian Law”. It has already been seen from the Renusagar judgment that violation of the Foreign Exchange Act and disregarding orders of superior courts in India would be regarded as being contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law. To this it could be added that the binding effect of the judgment of a superior court being disregarded would be equally violative of the fundamental policy of Indian law.” 19. A perusal of the above judgment makes it clear that if any award passed in violation of the provisions of the Act, the same would be against the public policy of India.” 14. A perusal of the above judgment makes it clear that if any award passed in violation of the provisions of the Act, the same would be against the public policy of India.” 14. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is countered by the learned counsel for the petitioner submitting that the judgment of the Madras High Court HINA SUNEET SHARMA’s case (4 supra) is applicable only to the domestic award and not foreign award. The notice invoking arbitration issued by the petitioner was not replied to by the respondent and in terms of the Charterparty agreement dated 26.08.2021 the arbitrator was appointed, which is in conformity with the English Law. 15. This Court finds force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The judgment in HINA SUNEET SHARMA’s case (4 supra) is not applicable to the facts of this case as the instant award is a foreign award and not domestic award. Proviso to Section 2(2) of the Act was inserted by way of amendment under the Act 3 of 2016, which reads as follows: “2. Amendment of Section 2.- In the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) (hereinafter referred to as the principal Act), in section 2, - I … II in sub-section (2), the following proviso shall be inserted, namely:- “Provided that subject to an agreement to the contrary, the provisions of sections 9, 27 and clause (a) of sub-section (1) and sub-section (3) of section 37 shall also apply to international commercial arbitration, even if the place of arbitration is outside India, and an arbitral award made or to be made in such place is enforceable and recognised under the provisions of Part II of this Act.”. Thus, Section 9 of the Act is applicable even to the foreign awards, unless the parties specifically have restricted applicability of the said provision by an agreement. 16. The conditions for enforcement of foreign awards are enumerated under Section 48 of the Act. However, the only contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent is that the instant foreign award is in conflict with the fundamental policy of India. The Explanation 1 to Section 48(2)(b) of the Act reads as under: “48. 16. The conditions for enforcement of foreign awards are enumerated under Section 48 of the Act. However, the only contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent is that the instant foreign award is in conflict with the fundamental policy of India. The Explanation 1 to Section 48(2)(b) of the Act reads as under: “48. Conditions for enforcement of foreign awards.- (1) … (2) Enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the Court finds that – (a) … (b) the enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of India [Explanation 1. For the avoidance of any doubt, it is clarified that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India, only if,- (i) the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of section 75 or section 81; or (ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law; or (iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice.] 17. The charterparty agreement dated 26.08.2021 is governed by English Law. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the procedure for appointment under the Arbitration Act, 1996 (English Law) in terms of Section 16 and 17, which read as under: 16. Procedure for appointment of arbitrators. (1) The parties are free to agree on the procedure for appointing the arbitrator or arbitrators, including the procedure for appointing any chairman or umpire. (2) If or to the extent that there is no such agreement, the following provisions apply. (3) If the tribunal is to consist of a sole arbitrator, the parties shall jointly appoint the arbitrator not later than 28 days after service of a request in writing by either party to do so. (4) If the tribunal is to consist of two arbitrators, each party shall appoint one arbitrator not later than 14 days after service of a request in writing by either party to do so. (7) In any other case (in particular, if there are more than two parties) section 18 applies as in the case of a failure of the agreed appointment procedure. 17. Power in case of default to appoint sole arbitrator. (7) In any other case (in particular, if there are more than two parties) section 18 applies as in the case of a failure of the agreed appointment procedure. 17. Power in case of default to appoint sole arbitrator. 1) Unless the parties otherwise agree, where each of two parties to an arbitration agreement is to appoint an arbitrator and one party (“the party in default”) refuses to do so, or fails to do so within the time specified, the other party, having duly appointed his arbitrator, may give notice in writing to the party in default that he proposes to appoint his arbitrator to act as sole arbitrator. 2) If the party in default does not within 7 clear days of that notice being given – (a) make the required appointment, and (b) notify the other party that he has done so, the other party may appoint his arbitrator as sole arbitrator whose award shall be binding on both parties as if he had been so appointed by agreement. 3) Where a sole arbitrator has been appointed under subsection (2), the party in default may (upon notice to the appointing party) apply to the court which may set aside the appointment. 4) The leave of the court is required for any appeal from a decision of the court under this section. 18. It is not the case of the respondent that the procedure under Sections 16 and 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 (English Law) is violated. The parties agreed for Arbitration London Law (English Law) to be applied as per clause 38 of the Charterparty Agreement dated 26.08.2021. It is not explained by the learned counsel for the respondent as to what law/policy of India is violated by the petitioner. The contention in that regard is vague and without any legal basis. Though there is no specific reference to Section 12(5) of the Act impliedly the contention of the learned counsel about unilateral appointment of arbitrator is on the analogy of the said provision, which as discussed above is applicable only to the domestic arbitration and not international. Thus, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the appointment of arbitrator was contrary to the fundamental policy of India is devoid of merit. 19. Thus, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the appointment of arbitrator was contrary to the fundamental policy of India is devoid of merit. 19. Prima facie case for grant of interim order: A letter dated 28.07.2022 was addressed by the petitioner calling upon the respondent to make paying terms of 1st award dated 26.07.2022, which was not replied. According to the petitioner, on comparison of the Financial Report of the respondent for the year 2020-2021 and financial year ending 2021, the assets/earned profits are far less than the awarded sums. The respondent is operating the company with less authorized capital and has minimal assets out of which major assets included two vehicles that already have a charge on them. There is every possibility that the respondent may wind up its business and fraudulently dissipate all its assets beyond the reach the petitioner. These assertions have not been specifically denied. Interim order dated 10.01.2023 was passed by this Court to direct the respondents to place on record full and final disclosure of the particulars of the current status of the assets, audited balance sheets for the preceding three years, all bank accounts statements for the preceding three years and income tax returns for the preceding three years. The order was not complied with. 20. The contention of the respondent is that the dispute between the parties was settled in terms of Addendum dated 24.01.2022; the XXII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Secunderabad, has taken cognizance against the petitioner and the Sub-Charterer for the offences under Sections 406 and 420 IPC on a complaint of the respondent and the first award is contrary to the Policy of India. It is pertinent to note that the respondent has not disclosed its assets pursuant to the interlocutory order and did not rebut the contentions of the petitioner. Thus, in the opinion of this Court, the petitioner has made out a prima facie case for grant of interim relief. It is made clear that the respondent is at liberty to raise all legal contentions to resist the execution petition that may be subsequently filed by the petitioner including the points of non-executability of award and it being contrary to the public policy of India. 21. In view of the above observations, this application is allowed. It is made clear that the respondent is at liberty to raise all legal contentions to resist the execution petition that may be subsequently filed by the petitioner including the points of non-executability of award and it being contrary to the public policy of India. 21. In view of the above observations, this application is allowed. The respondent is directed to secure the Petitioner’s claim by furnishing security in the form of a cash deposit or an unconditional Bank Guarantee of a notarized bank for a sum of USD 3,233,062.79 (United States Dollars Three Million, Two Hundred and Thirty-Three Thousand and Sixty Two and Seventy-Nine Cents Only) and GBP 18,708.34 (Eighteen Thousand Seven Hundred Eight Pounds and Thirty-Four pence) within a period of thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The miscellaneous applications, pending if any, shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.