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2023 DIGILAW 615 (KER)

Mohanan S/o Guruswami v. State of Kerala

2023-08-07

C.S.SUDHA, P.B.SURESH KUMAR

body2023
JUDGMENT : P.B. SURESH KUMAR, J. 1. This is an appeal under Section 374 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the Code). The appellant is the sole accused in S.C. No. 496 of 2011 on the files of the Additional Sessions Court-II, Thodupuzha. He stands convicted and sentenced for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). 2. The wife of the accused Radha was found dead in their house on 28.02.2009. The accused has three children in his wedlock with the deceased. The first person to arrive at the house of the deceased on coming to know of the death is the mother of the deceased, Koluthai. On receiving information from Koluthai, the brother of the deceased, Rajan informed the death to the police on the following day and a crime was accordingly registered at about 9 a.m. on that day. Rajan had no clues as to the cause of death at the time of furnishing the information to the police. Consequently, the case was registered only under Section 174 of the Code. Later, the case was converted as one under Sections 306, 498A and 201 IPC. The investigation conducted thereupon revealed that it is a case of uxoricide and consequently final report has been filed against the accused under Sections 302, 498A and 201 IPC. 3. The essence of the accusation is that the accused used to quarrel with the deceased and torture her physically as also mentally doubting her chastity, and that at about 11 p.m. on 28.02.2009, the accused struck on the head of the deceased with the handle of a spade and thereafter hanged her, after tying a knot around her neck with a saree in the iron hook on the roof of their house. It is also the accusation that the accused thereafter cut the saree used for hanging the deceased into a few pieces, concealed the same so as to destroy evidence and caused the body to lie on the floor on a mat. 4. On the accused pleading not guilty of the charges framed against him by the Court of Session on committal of the case for trial, the prosecution examined 13 witnesses as PWs 1 to 13 and proved through them 24 documents as Exts.P1 to P24. MOs 1 to 16 are the material objects in the case. 4. On the accused pleading not guilty of the charges framed against him by the Court of Session on committal of the case for trial, the prosecution examined 13 witnesses as PWs 1 to 13 and proved through them 24 documents as Exts.P1 to P24. MOs 1 to 16 are the material objects in the case. Ext.D1 is the portion of the statement given by the witness who gave evidence as PW13. 5. After the prosecution tendered its evidence, when the accused was questioned under Section 313 of the Code, he denied the incriminating circumstances brought out in evidence against him and maintained that he is innocent. In addition, he also stated that his wife committed suicide. 6. The Court of Session, on an appraisal of the materials on record, found the accused guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 25,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 302 I.P.C. and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 201 I.P.C. Default sentences were also imposed on the accused. The accused is aggrieved by the said decision of the Court of Session and hence this appeal. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the accused as also the learned Special Public Prosecutor. 8. The essence of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the accused was that it is a case of suicide and not homicide. We are not referring to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the accused here as we propose to deal with the same elaborately in the latter part of this judgment. Per contra, the learned Special Public Prosecutor asserted, placing reliance on the materials on record, that it is a case of homicide and not a suicide at all. 9. In the light of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, the questions that arise for consideration are (1) whether it is a case of homicide and (2) if so, whether the conviction and sentence imposed on the accused are sustainable in law. 10. Questions 1 and 2: PW6 is the doctor who conducted post-mortem examination of the body of the deceased. Ext.P5 is the post-mortem certificate issued by PW6. 10. Questions 1 and 2: PW6 is the doctor who conducted post-mortem examination of the body of the deceased. Ext.P5 is the post-mortem certificate issued by PW6. It was deposed by PW6 that the post-mortem findings are consistent with death due to constriction force around the neck. In the light of the said evidence, the cause of death can either be homicide or suicide. In cross-examination, PW6 deposed that he cannot say definitely as to whether the constriction force applied is homicidal or suicidal. The attempt of the counsel for the accused while cross-examining PW6 was to establish that homicidal hanging was not possible without involving more than one person. To a direct question on this point, the answer given by PW6 was that he cannot definitely say so. It can thus be seen that the evidence of PW6 is not sufficient to come to a definite conclusion as to whether the death is homicidal or suicidal. 11. The oral evidence in the case consists of PW1, the brother of the deceased who gave the First Information Statement, PW3, the mother of the deceased and PW4, the elder son of the deceased, Unni, who was aged 9 years at the time of occurrence. As already noticed, PW1 is not an eyewitness to the occurrence. He came to the scene only on the following morning after receiving information as to the death of the victim from PW3. He deposed that the accused used to quarrel with the deceased and assault her and due to this reason, on several occasions, the deceased and her children returned to their house. PW3 is also not an eyewitness to the occurrence. PW3 is residing half a kilometer away from the place of occurrence. PW3 deposed that by about 11 p.m. on the date of occurrence, one Mani informed her that the deceased was lying unconscious in her house and when she reached the house of the deceased, she found the body of the deceased lying on a mat on the floor. PW3 deposed that on examination, she found that her daughter is no more. PW3 deposed that she thereupon took the children of the deceased and went back to her house along with her husband. PW3 deposed that while going back home, she was carrying the second child and her husband was carrying the youngest child. PW3 deposed that on examination, she found that her daughter is no more. PW3 deposed that she thereupon took the children of the deceased and went back to her house along with her husband. PW3 deposed that while going back home, she was carrying the second child and her husband was carrying the youngest child. It was deposed by her that PW4 was walking along with her. PW3 also deposed that the accused used to quarrel with the deceased doubting her chastity and assault her, after consuming liquor. PW3 deposed that there is a wooden bridge over a stream in between the houses; that when they reached the said wooden bridge, PW4 told her that his mother was struck with a spade and hanged live and that she was brought down thereafter using a chopper. She explained in her evidence that since she was upset, she did not disclose anything to the police initially and it is only later that she informed the Police about the information passed on to her by PW4. While cross-examining PW3, even though a suggestion was put to her by the counsel for the accused that PW4 has not informed anything to her about the cause of the death of the deceased, she denied the same. 12. PW4 deposed that the accused came home on the date of occurrence after consuming liquor and began quarrelling with the deceased; that the accused struck on the front side of the head of the deceased using the handle of a spade while the deceased was standing in the veranda of the house; that when the deceased fell down on account of the impact of the hit, the accused hanged her after tying a knot around her neck with a saree in the iron hook on the roof of the house and that after sometime, the accused cut the saree and caused the body to lie on the floor. PW4 deposed that he gave a statement before the Magistrate earlier in connection with the occurrence. In cross-examination, in the answer to a question put to him, PW4 deposed that when his father struck his mother using the handle of a spade, she did not cry while falling down, although she was conscious. PW4 deposed that he gave a statement before the Magistrate earlier in connection with the occurrence. In cross-examination, in the answer to a question put to him, PW4 deposed that when his father struck his mother using the handle of a spade, she did not cry while falling down, although she was conscious. In reply to the question put to PW4 in cross-examination as to how his father carried his mother to the inside room from the veranda of the house, PW4 demonstrated to the court as to how his father carried his mother by using gestures. Similarly, in answer to the question put to PW4 in cross-examination as to how his father was able to hang his mother by carrying her, PW4 explained that his father first made his mother to lay down on the floor and then he brought the saree and thereafter hanged her. Again, in reply to the specific question in cross-examination as to whether his mother stated anything while his father carried her to the inside room, PW4 answered that she was saying something and he could not understand the same. Similarly, in cross-examination, PW4 clarified that after tying a knot on the neck of his mother with a saree, his father pulled the saree to lift the body of his mother and that after lifting her about 2 feet from the ground, he tied the knot and after sometime, he chopped the saree and brought the body down by supporting the body and made the body lie down on the floor. 13. PW7 is the Scientific Assistant who examined the scene of occurrence and obtained the cellophane tape pressings from the iron hook on the ceiling of the house. PW11 is the Joint Director of the Forensic Science Laboratory, Thiruvananthapuram, who issued Ext.P11 report after comparing the fibres contained in the said cellophane tape pressings and the fibres contained in the cellophane tape pressing obtained from the body of the deceased. PW11 is the Joint Director of the Forensic Science Laboratory, Thiruvananthapuram, who issued Ext.P11 report after comparing the fibres contained in the said cellophane tape pressings and the fibres contained in the cellophane tape pressing obtained from the body of the deceased. Item No. 1 referred to in Ext.P11 report is the cellophane tape pressings taken from the right palm of the deceased, item No. 2 referred to therein is the cellophane tape pressings taken from the left palm of the deceased, item No. 3 referred to therein is the cellophane tape pressings taken from the front portion of the neck of the deceased and item No. 4 referred to therein is the cellophane tape pressings taken from the back portion of the neck of the deceased. Item No. 5 referred to in Ext.P11 report is the cellophane tape pressings taken from the iron hook of the roof of the house and item No. 6 referred to therein are the cut pieces of the saree discovered and seized based on the disclosure statement given by the accused while in police custody. PW11 deposed that the cellophane tape pressings referred to in item Nos.1 to 5, contained fibres similar to those in item No. 6. 14. PW12 is the Sub Inspector of Police who investigated the case initially. He deposed that when the accused was interrogated, he informed him that he concealed the saree in a place in his house and that he can get it if he is taken there. He deposed that the accused was accordingly taken to the place led by him and he took MO2 series pieces of saree from beneath the wooden plank on which a stone grinder was kept in the house. Ext.P5 is the mahazar prepared in connection with the seizure of the saree pieces and Ext.P5(a) is the disclosure statement. PW13 is the police officer who conducted the investigation subsequently. He deposed that when the accused was interrogated, he informed him that he concealed a chopper in a place in his house and that he can get it, if he is taken there. PW13 deposed that the accused was accordingly taken to his house and he took out MO6 chopper from his house and handed over the same to the investigating officer. Ext.P9 is the mahazar prepared in connection with the seizure of MO6 chopper and Ext.P9(a) is the disclosure statement. 15. PW13 deposed that the accused was accordingly taken to his house and he took out MO6 chopper from his house and handed over the same to the investigating officer. Ext.P9 is the mahazar prepared in connection with the seizure of MO6 chopper and Ext.P9(a) is the disclosure statement. 15. As noticed, the only eye witness to the occurrence is PW4. PW1 was examined by the prosecution only to prove the motive of the accused to cause the death of the victim. Whereas, PW3 was examined by the prosecution not only to prove the motive but also the fact that PW4 stated to her on the date of occurrence itself that the death of the victim was caused by the accused, which if falls under Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act, would be admissible in evidence as a relevant fact. Apart from the evidence of PWs 1, 3 and 4, there is only the evidence of PW11 and the evidence of PWs 12 and 13, the investigating officers. 16. One of the arguments seriously pressed into service by the learned counsel for the accused is that the evidence of PW4 is not believable at all. As far as the evidence let in by PW3 is concerned, the argument advanced by the learned counsel is that the evidence let in by her that PW4 informed her on the day of occurrence that it is the accused who caused the death of the victim, is not admissible as res gestae in terms of Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act. 17. Let us first consider the argument as regards the acceptability of the evidence of PW4. As already indicated, PW4 was only 9 years of age at the time of occurrence. Voir dire was conducted, as PW4 was aged only 13 years at the time of trial. It is having found that PW4 is able to understand and comprehend the questions put to him and give rational answers to those questions, that he was permitted to give evidence in the case. Having gone through the evidence tendered by PW4, we agree with the finding rendered by the Court of Session that PW4 was able to understand the questions put to him and give rational answers. Having gone through the evidence tendered by PW4, we agree with the finding rendered by the Court of Session that PW4 was able to understand the questions put to him and give rational answers. Even though PW4 got emotional on a few occasions while referring to his mother and started weeping, we find that the answers given by PW4 to various questions put to him, especially during cross-examination, were not only rational, but also appeared to be natural and real. In the chief-examination, PW4 deposed only the skeleton facts required for the prosecution, giving ample scope to the defence to cross-examine him. It is seen that the answers given by PW4 in cross-examination not only filled up the gaps in the evidence tendered by him in chief-examination, but also reinforced the same. Having examined carefully the evidence of PW4, we do not find any reason to disbelieve his evidence. As noted, the occurrence took place on the night of 28.02.2009 and the occurrence was informed to the police on 01.03.2009 itself. Even though the police registered a crime pursuant to the information and came to the scene thereafter, the statement of PW4 was taken only on 07.03.2009. This delay was highlighted as a fatal delay affecting the genuineness of the prosecution case by the learned counsel for the accused, for there was enough time in between for interested persons to tutor PW4. According to the learned counsel, on that sole ground, the evidence of PW4 is liable to be rejected. We are unable to accept the broad submission made by the learned counsel for the accused that whenever there is delay in recording the statement of crucial witnesses, their evidence is liable to be rejected. The question as to whether the delay on the part of the police in recording the statement of a crucial witness is fatal is one to be decided having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances of each case. As far as the present case is concerned, the parties being tribals, merely for the reason that the Sub Inspector of Police who conducted the investigation did not question the child or merely because the relatives of the deceased did not cause the child to give a statement to the police, it cannot be said that the evidence given by the child is liable to be rejected, if the same is otherwise acceptable. 18. 18. The learned counsel for the accused highlighted trivial discrepancies in the evidence tendered by PW4 as to the time of occurrence, the background light on the basis of which PW4 witnessed the occurrence and also the improbability in the evidence of PW4 that the deceased did not cry on receiving the strike with the handle of the spade on her head, to contend that the witness cannot be believed, especially when PW4 was being taken care of by his grandmother, who maintained hostility towards the accused after the occurrence. According to us, the aforesaid discrepancies are trivial in nature and not sufficient to entertain any doubt as to the genuineness of the evidence. True, a suspicion would arise as to why the deceased did not cry on receiving a severe strike on her head. But, it is seen that on being struck, she fell down. Even though PW4 stated that the deceased was conscious at the relevant time, from the evidence tendered by PW4 itself, it could be seen that she was in an unconscious state, for PW4 could not understand what she was uttering while she was being carried by the accused to the room. In other words, we do not find any improbability in the evidence of PW4 to disbelieve the same in toto. 19. As far as the evidence tendered by PW3 is concerned, as noted, the objection of the learned counsel for the accused is only on the point as to whether PW4 made any statement to her as regards the cause of death of the deceased. It is seen that the said part of the evidence has been accepted by the Court of Session as res gestae in terms of Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act to corroborate the evidence tendered by PW4. It is beyond doubt that if the said part of the evidence of PW3 would not fall under Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act, the evidence of PW3 could be availed of by the prosecution only to prove the motive. It is beyond doubt that if the said part of the evidence of PW3 would not fall under Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act, the evidence of PW3 could be availed of by the prosecution only to prove the motive. In the circumstances, we propose to consider the question whether the said part of the evidence would fall within the scope of Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act rather than considering the acceptability of the evidence tendered by PW3 in respect of the same, for if it is not admissible under Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act, that part of the evidence would only be hearsay. 20. Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that facts which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue as to form part of the same transaction, are relevant, whether they occurred at the same time and place or at different times and places. Section 6 recognizes the principle of res gestae which enables the court to admit facts which are otherwise not admissible. Section 6 reads thus: “6. Relevancy of facts forming part of same transaction - Facts which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue as to form part of the same transaction, are relevant, whether they occurred at the same time and place or at different times and places. Illustrations (a) A is accused of the murder of B by beating him. Whatever was said or done by A or B or the bystanders at the beating, or so shortly before or after it as to form part of the transaction, is a relevant fact. (b) A is accused of waging war against the Government of India by taking part in an armed insurrection in which property is destroyed, troops are attacked, and goals are broken open. The occurrence of these facts is relevant, as forming part of the general transaction, though A may not have been present at all of them. (c) A sues B for a libel contained in a letter forming part of a correspondence. Letters between the parties relating to the subject out of which the libel arose, and forming part of the correspondence in which it is contained, are relevant facts, though they do not contain the libel itself. (c) A sues B for a libel contained in a letter forming part of a correspondence. Letters between the parties relating to the subject out of which the libel arose, and forming part of the correspondence in which it is contained, are relevant facts, though they do not contain the libel itself. (d) The question is, whether certain goods ordered from B were delivered to A. The goods were delivered to several intermediate persons successively. Each delivery is a relevant fact.” The facts admissible under Section 6 as relevant are facts which are so connected with the fact in issue, if not the fact in issue, so as to form part of the same transaction, whether they occur at the same time and place or at different times and places. The rationale in making such facts admissible in evidence is on account of the spontaneity and immediacy of such facts in relation to the fact in issue. In other words, it is necessary that such facts must be part of the same transaction and if it is in relation to a statement, the same must have been made contemporaneous with the transaction or at least immediately thereafter. The illustrations to Section 6 demonstrates the different contexts of the application of the provision. It is trite that an illustration to a statutory provision is a useful aid in the interpretation of the provision, though the same does not exhaust the full content of the Section which it illustrates nor does it curtail or expand the ambit of the Section [See Shambhu Nath Mehra vs. State of Ajmer, AIR 1956 SC 404 ]. If the provision is understood keeping in mind illustration (a), it could be seen that whatever is said and done by PW4 at the time of occurrence or so shortly after the occurrence as to form part of the occurrence, is admissible. In other words, the statement of PW4 would be admissible only had the statement been made contemporaneous to the occurrence and interwoven with the fact in issue. If the transaction is terminated and thereafter a statement is made narrating the transaction, the same would not fall under Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act [See Bhaskaran vs. State of Kerala, 1985 KLT 122 ]. As noticed, the occurrence took place in the night of 28.02.2009. If the transaction is terminated and thereafter a statement is made narrating the transaction, the same would not fall under Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act [See Bhaskaran vs. State of Kerala, 1985 KLT 122 ]. As noticed, the occurrence took place in the night of 28.02.2009. The evidence indicates that by about 11 p.m. the matter was informed by one Mani to PW3. PW3 who was residing about half a kilometer away from the place of occurrence came to the scene by walk along with her husband, remained at the scene for sometime, went to the neighbouring house and waited there for sometime and thereafter proceeded back to her residence with the children of the deceased including PW4. It was while so, PW4 stated to have made some utterances. The said part of the evidence of PW3 reads thus: According to us, the said evidence is only a narration of the occurrence, made several hours after the culmination of the occurrence and therefore the same is not admissible in evidence under Section 6 of the Act.” 21. As regards the evidence let in by PW12 in connection with the discovery and consequent seizure of MO2 series pieces of saree, the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the accused is only that the confessional statement associated with the discovery has not been marked and instead, only the admissible portion of the confession was recorded in the mahazar. According to the learned counsel, the confession made by the accused during interrogation should have been recorded separately by the investigating officer, instead of showing only the admissible part of the confession in the mahazar. There is no substance in this argument. Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act only provides that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as it relates distinctly by the fact discovered, may be proved. In other words, if the evidence tendered by the investigating officer as to any fact discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence is found acceptable to a court, then, so much of the information stated to have been received from the accused by the investigating officer as it relates distinctly by the fact discovered is admissible in evidence. There is no requirement under law that the confession made by the accused which led to the discovery shall be recorded [See Suresh Chandra Bahri vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1994 SC 2420 ]. That apart, the tendency of the prosecution agency in getting the entire statement of the accused recorded rather than only that part of the statement which leads to the discovery is one deprecated by the Apex Court [See Venkatesh vs. State of Karnataka, 2022 SCC Online SC 765]. 22. Coming to the evidence tendered by PW13 in connection with the discovery and consequent seizure of MO6 chopper, the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the accused is that the information relied on is one stated to have been given by the accused to PW13 while in judicial custody. The learned counsel relied on Ext.P9 mahazar in support of the said argument. Ext.P9 mahazar indicates that the information which led to the discovery and consequent seizure of MO6 chopper was given by the accused to PW13 while the accused was in jail. There is no dispute to the fact that the investigating officer has interrogated the accused in jail with the permission of the jurisdictional Magistrate. On a query from the Court, the learned counsel for the accused conceded that the discovery and consequent seizure based on the information furnished by the accused has been effected within fifteen days from the date of his arrest. It is trite that the custody of an accused for the initial period of fifteen days can either be judicial custody or police custody and during this period, the competent Magistrate is empowered to convert judicial custody to police custody and vice versa [See CBI vs. Anupam J. Kulkarni, (1992) 3 SCC 141 and State of Kerala vs. Sadanandan, 1984 KLT 747 ]. If that be so, according to us, while interrogating an accused who is in jail with the permission of the competent Magistrate, the accused is presumed to be in police custody and the discovery and seizure of the weapon would therefore fall under Section 27. We are fortified in this view as it is settled by now that even if the accused is within the ken of surveillance of the police during which his movements are restricted, he is deemed to be in custody [See State of A.P. vs. Gangula Satya Murthy, AIR 1997 SC 1588 ]. It is all the more so since the Code does not contemplate any formality before a person can be said to be taken into custody [See State of U.P. vs. Deoman Upadhyaya, AIR 1960 SC 1125 ]. 23. In the light of the discussion aforesaid, it could be seen that what is left is the oral testimonies of PWs 1, 3 and 4 and the discovery of MO2 series saree pieces and MO6 chopper. As already noticed, the evidence tendered by PWs 1 and 3 would only indicate that the accused used to pick up quarrels and used to assault the deceased doubting her chastity. We have already found that there is absolutely no reason to disbelieve the evidence tendered by PW4 as to the occurrence. The evidence tendered by PW11 would corroborate the evidence tendered by PW4 that the accused hanged the deceased live using the saree, the pieces of which are marked in the proceedings as MO2 series. The subsequent conduct of the accused in concealing MO2 series beneath the wooden plank over which a stone grinder was placed in the house is also an incriminating material which would strengthen the evidence tendered by PW4. The aforesaid evidence establishes beyond reasonable doubt that the death of the victim was caused by hanging, and therefore, the case is one of homicide and not suicide and that it is the accused who caused the death of the deceased. 24. The learned counsel for the accused vehemently argued that the prosecution gave up almost 15 witnesses including persons who are residing in the neighbourhood of the place of the occurrence. According to the learned counsel, the said conduct on the part of the prosecution creates a doubt that the prosecution intends to suppress relevant facts. 24. The learned counsel for the accused vehemently argued that the prosecution gave up almost 15 witnesses including persons who are residing in the neighbourhood of the place of the occurrence. According to the learned counsel, the said conduct on the part of the prosecution creates a doubt that the prosecution intends to suppress relevant facts. No doubt, in a case of this nature, it would have been prudent on the part of the prosecution to examine some among the persons who are residing in the neighbourhood of the scene of occurrence as well, in order to enable the court to come to a conclusion on the factual issues without any semblance of doubt. But, on the facts of this case, we do not find any reason to doubt the genuineness of the case put forward by the prosecution for that reason. 25. Yet another argument advanced by the learned counsel for the accused is based on the evidence tendered by PW11. As already noticed, it was deposed by PW11 that the fibres present on the palms of the deceased are the fibres similar to the fibres in MO2 series saree pieces. According to the learned counsel, it was obligatory on the part of the prosecution to explain as to how the same fibres of MO2 series pieces of saree appeared in the palms of the deceased. The argument is that in the case of homicidal death by hanging, the possibility of fibres in the hands of the victim, is remote. It was conceded by the learned counsel that the only possibility is a defensive catch on the saree by the victim at the time of hanging. According to the learned counsel, the said possibility is remote in this case as PW4 has no case that there was struggle at the time of hanging. Contamination during cutting of the saree is also not a possibility in this case, according to the learned counsel, since there is no evidence to show as to how and where the saree was cut by the accused. We do not find any merit in this argument also. Merely for the reason that the fibres of MO2 series saree pieces were found in the palms of the deceased, it cannot be straight away held that this is a case of suicide. We do not find any merit in this argument also. Merely for the reason that the fibres of MO2 series saree pieces were found in the palms of the deceased, it cannot be straight away held that this is a case of suicide. Contamination, according to us, is the only possibility on the facts of this case to justify the presence of fibres in the palms of the deceased. 26. Placing reliance on Modi, a Textbook of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, the learned counsel for the accused argued that one single person without the assistance of another cannot cause homicidal death by hanging, unless the victim is a child or very weak and feeble or is rendered unconscious by some intoxicating or narcotic drug. It is a general statement. According to us, there can be exceptions to this general statement. Even otherwise, the victim in the case on hand was proved to be weak and feeble, if not, unconscious after the accused gave the initial strike on her head using the handle of the spade. The argument is only to be rejected and we do so. 27. In the result, we do not find any merit in this appeal and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.