JUDGMENT : RAMESH SINHA, J. Heard Mr. A.N. Pandey, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Jitendra Pali, learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for the respondent/State. 2. This criminal appeal preferred under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C. is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 06.04.2022 passed by the learned 1st Additional Session Judge, Sakti, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) in Session Trial No. 30 of 2019 by which the appellant has been convicted for offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay fine amount of Rs. 1,000/-, in default of payment of fine additional rigorous imprisonment for 06 months. 3. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the marriage of deceased, namely, Ramshila was solemnized before 25 years of the date of incident and after marriage, accused/appellant was regularly assaulted to the deceased. After consuming the liquor and on the date of incident i.e. 04.02.2019 about 3.00 p.m. the accused/appellant was assaulted to the deceased and sprinkling petrol on the body of deceased and set fire due to which the deceased receive the burn injury and during treatment she has died. On the basis of dying declaration of deceased (Ex.P/14), Police registered the alleged offence under Sections 307 & 302 of the IPC against the accused/appellant and arrested the appellant and after completing the investigation, the Police filed the charge-sheet before the competent Court. 4. Dead body of the deceased was sent for postmortem to Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru Medical College, Raipur, where Dr. Arun Kumar Jaiswani (PW-18) conducted postmortem over the body of the deceased vide Ex.P/31 and found following injuries:- Dead body of an average built female. Rigor mortis present and generalized. Burnt, Eyes closed, cornea hazy, mouth partially open, teeth intact, tongue inside mouth. No oozing from nostrils, mouth or ears. Injuries: 1. Superficial-deep burns present over the body surface in an area of 93% extent. Head, Neck, Face-08%, Chest-09%, Abdomen-09%, Back-18%, Right Upper Limb-09%, Right Lower Limb-15%, Left Upper Limb-09%, Left Lower Limb-15%, Genitals-1%, Total-93%. Singeing of scalp hairs, eyebrows, eyelashes, axillary and pubic hairs present, Signs of vital reaction in the form of line of redness around burnt margins present. 2. Surgical intervention seen as punctured wound of diameter 0.1 cm present over right cubital fossa region (s/o iv puncture mark). Injuries mentioned above are ante-mortem. Dr. Singeing of scalp hairs, eyebrows, eyelashes, axillary and pubic hairs present, Signs of vital reaction in the form of line of redness around burnt margins present. 2. Surgical intervention seen as punctured wound of diameter 0.1 cm present over right cubital fossa region (s/o iv puncture mark). Injuries mentioned above are ante-mortem. Dr. Arun Kumar Jaiswani (PW-18) opined that cause of death was due to burns and its complications with head injury. Inquest was prepared vide Ex.P/29. Appellant-Narayan Sahu was arrested on 04.02.2019 vide arrest memo Ex.P/27. 5. Statements of the witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. After investigation, it was found that deceased Ramshila died on account of burns injuries and its complications with head injury by accused/ appellant Narayan Sahu. The accused was arrested for offence under Section 302 of the IPC and arrest/court surrender memo was prepared vide Ex.P/27. Thereafter, charge-sheet was filed before the learned 1st Additional Session Judge, Sakti, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) for hearing and disposal in accordance with law. 6. The accused/appellant abjured the guilt and entered into witness. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as many as 18 witnesses and exhibited 31 documents. The defence has neither examined any witness nor has exhibited any document. 7. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record and considering that it is the appellant who has committed the murder of his wife, convicted and sentenced him under Section 302 of the IPC, against which the instant appeal under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C. has been preferred. 8. Mr. A.N. Pandey, learned counsel for the appellant would argue that the appellant has been falsely implicated in the present case. It has been further argued that the appellant and deceased are husband and wife. The dying declaration (Ex.P/14) of the deceased, being highly doubtful, is not true and voluntary. He would also submit that the conviction of the appellant based on such dying declaration without appreciating the evidence of Dr. Arun Kumar Jaiswani (PW-18) and his report Ex.P/31 is contrary to law and that motive has not been proved by the prosecution. Hence, the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside and the appellant may be acquitted of the charges. 9. On the other hand, Mr. Arun Kumar Jaiswani (PW-18) and his report Ex.P/31 is contrary to law and that motive has not been proved by the prosecution. Hence, the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside and the appellant may be acquitted of the charges. 9. On the other hand, Mr. Jitendra Pali, learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for the State/respondent would support the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence and submit that learned trial Court, in view of categorical statement made by the deceased in dying declaration (Ex.P/14) duly proved by the Executive Magistrate-cum-Naib Tahsildar Chandra Shila Jaiswal (PW/12) coupled with the medical statement of Dr. Arun Kumar Jaiswani (PW-18) and his report Ex.P/31, was absolutely justified in bringing home the guilt of the appellant for the aforesaid offences as the prosecution has proved the offence committed by the appellant beyond reasonable doubt by leading cogent and clinching evidence, therefore, the instant appeal deserves to be dismissed. 10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the original records of the trial Court with utmost circumspection and carefully as well. 11. In order to appreciate the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties, we have to examine the evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution. 12. The first question for consideration would be, whether the trial Court was justified in holding that death of deceased was homicidal in nature ? 13. The trial Court, relying upon the statement of Dr. Arun Kumar Jaiswani (PW-18), who has conducted postmortem on the body of deceased, vide Ex.P/31, has clearly come to the conclusion that death of deceased was due to burns and its complications with head injury. The said finding recorded by the trial Court is a finding of fact based on evidence available on record, which is neither perverse nor contrary to record. Even otherwise, it has not been seriously disputed by the learned counsel for the appellant. We hereby affirm the said finding. 14. The said finding recorded by the trial Court is a finding of fact based on evidence available on record, which is neither perverse nor contrary to record. Even otherwise, it has not been seriously disputed by the learned counsel for the appellant. We hereby affirm the said finding. 14. The next question for consideration would be, whether the trial Court has rightly held that the appellant is author of the crime by relying upon the following circumstances:- (i) As per the case of the prosecution, the fact of death of deceased was within the knowledge of the appellant, however, there was no any explanation given by the appellant in his statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. Thus, burden of proof was on the appellant to explain such circumstance, which he failed to explain. 15. Now, the question would be, whether Section 106 of the Evidence Act would be applicable or not? 16. Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, states as under: - “106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.—When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.” 17. This provision states that when any fact is specially within the knowledge of any person the burden of proving that fact is upon him. This is an exception to the general rule contained in Section 101, namely, that the burden is on the person who asserts a fact. The principle underlying Section 106 which is an exception to the general rule governing burden of proof applies only to such matters of defence which are supposed to be especially within the knowledge of the other side. To invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the main point to be established by prosecution is that the accused persons were in such a position that they could have special knowledge of the fact concerned. 18. In the matter of Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer, AIR 1956 SC 404 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 of the Evidence Act is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. 18. In the matter of Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer, AIR 1956 SC 404 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 of the Evidence Act is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution, to establish facts which are “especially” within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The Supreme Court while considering the word “especially” employed in Section 106 of the Evidence Act, speaking through Vivian Bose, J., observed as under: - “11. … The word "especially" stresses that it means facts that are preeminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than he whether he did or did not. It is evident that cannot be the intention and the Privy Council has twice refused to construe this section, as reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to mean that the burden lies on an accused person to show that he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. These cases are Attygalle v. The King, 1936 PC 169 (AIR V 23) (A) and Seneviratne v. R. 1936-3 ER 36 AT P.49 (B).” Their Lordships further held that Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be used to undermine the well established rule of law that save in a very exceptional class of case, the burden is on the prosecution and never shifts. 19. The decision of the Supreme Court in Shambhu Nath Mehra (supra) was followed with approval recently in the matter of Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar, (2021) 10 SCC 725 in which it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as under: - “22. 19. The decision of the Supreme Court in Shambhu Nath Mehra (supra) was followed with approval recently in the matter of Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar, (2021) 10 SCC 725 in which it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as under: - “22. Thus, Section 106 of the Evidence Act will apply to those cases where the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts which are within the special knowledge of the accused. When the accused fails to offer proper explanation about the existence of said other facts, the court can always draw an appropriate inference. 23. When a case is resting on circumstantial evidence, if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of burden placed on him by virtue of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, such a failure may provide an additional link to the chain of circumstances. In a case governed by circumstantial evidence, if the chain of circumstances which is required to be established by the prosecution is not established, the failure of the accused to discharge the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not relevant at all. When the chain is not complete, falsity of the defence is no ground to convict the accused.” 20. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the matter of Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 460 , while considering the provisions contained in Sections 103 & 106 of the Evidence Act, held that the burden of proving a plea specially set up by an accused which may absolve him from criminal liability, certainly lies upon him, but neither the application of Section 103 nor that of 106 could, however, absolve the prosecution from the duty of discharging its general or primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. It was further held by their Lordships that it is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof may lie upon the accused. Their Lordships also held that the burden of proving a plea specifically set up by an accused, which may absolve him from criminal liability, certain lies upon him. 21. Their Lordships also held that the burden of proving a plea specifically set up by an accused, which may absolve him from criminal liability, certain lies upon him. 21. The principle of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gurcharan Singh (supra) has been followed with approval by their Lordships in the matter of Sawal Das v. State of Bihar, AIR 1974 SC 778 and it has been held that burden of proving the case against the accused was on the prosecution irrespective of whether or not the accused has made out a specific defence. 22. The entire issue in the present case centers around on the admissibility and evidentiary value of the dying declaration (Ex.P/14) made by the deceased, which was reduced in writing and recorded by Executive Magistrate-cum-Naib Tahsildar Chandra Shila Jaiswal (PW/12) in the Community Health Centre, Malkharoda without certifying by the Doctor posted in Burn Unit, Chandra Shila Jaiswal (PW/12) has recorded the same as per statement of deceased, where she has specifically deposed that she was set on fire after pouring petrol by her husband, i.e., the present appellant. 23. The Supreme Court in the matter of Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (Constitution Bench), (2002) 6 SCC 710 has clearly held that a certification by the Doctor is essentially a rule of caution, and therefore, the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be established otherwise and observed as under: “3. ... Where it is proved by the testimony of the Magistrate that the declarant was fit to make the statement even without examination by the doctor the declaration can be acted upon provided the court ultimately holds the same to be voluntary and truthful. A certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and therefore the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be established otherwise.” 24. Following the principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Laxman (supra), recently in the matter of Jagbir Singh v. State of NCT, (2019) 8 SCC 799, it has been held by the Supreme Court that even absence of the certificate by a Doctor is not fatal to act upon a dying declaration. However, the requirement remains that the person who records the dying declaration must ensure that the patient was in a fit condition, both mentally and physically, to give the declaration. 25. However, the requirement remains that the person who records the dying declaration must ensure that the patient was in a fit condition, both mentally and physically, to give the declaration. 25. In the matter of Atbir vs. Government of NCT of Delhi, (2010) 9 SCC 1 , the Supreme Court held that while recording dying declaration, factors such as mental condition of maker, alertness of his/her mind and memory, evidentiary value, etc. have to be taken into account, laid down principles. Paras 14 to 22 are relevant for the purpose, which read as under :- “(A) Dying declaration 14. It is true that in the case on hand, conviction under Section 302 was based solely on the dying declaration made by Sonu @ Savita and recorded by Investigating Officer in the presence of a Doctor. Since we have already narrated the case of prosecution which led to three deaths, eliminating the second wife and the children of one Jaswant Singh, there is no need to traverse the same once again. This Court in a series of decisions enumerated and analyzed that while recording the dying declaration, factors such as mental condition of the maker, alertness of mind and memory, evidentiary value etc. have to be taken into account. 15. In Munnu Raja and Another vs. The State of M.P, (1976) 3 SCC 104 , this Court held: (SCC pp. 106-07 para 6)" “6....It is well settled that though a dying declaration must be approached with caution for the reason that the maker of the statement cannot be subject to cross-examination, there is neither a rule of law nor a rule of prudence which has hardened into a rule of law that a dying declaration cannot be acted upon unless it is corroborated.…" It is true that in the same decision, it was held, since the Investigating Officers are naturally interested in the success of the investigation and the practice of the Investigating Officer himself recording a dying declaration during the course of an investigation ought not to have been encouraged. 16. In Paras Yadav and Ors. vs. State of Bihar, (1999) 2 SCC 126 , this Court held that lapse on the part of the Investigation Officer in not bringing the Magistrate to record the statement of the deceased should not be taken in favour of the accused. 16. In Paras Yadav and Ors. vs. State of Bihar, (1999) 2 SCC 126 , this Court held that lapse on the part of the Investigation Officer in not bringing the Magistrate to record the statement of the deceased should not be taken in favour of the accused. This Court further held that a statement of the deceased recorded by a police officer in a routine manner as a complaint and not as a dying declaration can also be treated as dying declaration after the death of the injured and relied upon if the evidence of the prosecution witnesses clearly establishes that the deceased was conscious and was in a fit state of health to make the statement. 17. The effect of dying declaration not recorded by the Magistrate was considered and reiterated in Balbir Singh & Anr. Vs. State of Punjab, (2006) 12 SCC 283 . Para 23 of the said judgment is relevant which reads as under: "23. However, in State of Karnataka v. Shariff, (2003) 2 SCC 473 , this Court categorically held that there was no requirement of law that a dying declaration must necessarily be made before a Magistrate. This Court therein noted its earlier decision in Ram Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1998) 4 SCC 517 , wherein it was also held that the dying declaration need not be in the form of questions and answers. (See also Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 6 SCC 710 )." It is clear that merely because the dying declaration was not recorded by the Magistrate, by itself cannot be a ground to reject the whole prosecution case. It also clarified that where the declaration is wholly inconsistent or contradictory statements are made or if it appears from the records that the dying declaration is not reliable, a question may arise as to why the Magistrate was not called for, but ordinarily the same may not be insisted upon. This Court further held that the statement of the injured, in event of her death may also be treated as FIR. 18. In State of Rajasthan vs. Wakteng, (2007) 14 SCC 550 , the view in Balbir Singh case has been reiterated. The following conclusions are relevant which read as under: (Wakteng case, SCC p. 554, paras 14-15) "14. This Court further held that the statement of the injured, in event of her death may also be treated as FIR. 18. In State of Rajasthan vs. Wakteng, (2007) 14 SCC 550 , the view in Balbir Singh case has been reiterated. The following conclusions are relevant which read as under: (Wakteng case, SCC p. 554, paras 14-15) "14. Though conviction can be based solely on the dying declaration, without any corroboration the same should not be suffering from any infirmity. 15. While great solemnity and sanctity is attached to the words of a dying man because a person on the verge of death is not likely to tell lie or to concoct a case so as to implicate an innocent person but the court has to be careful to ensure that the statement was not the result of either tutoring, prompting or a product of the imagination. It is, therefore, essential that the court must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the statement, had clear capacity to observe and identify the assailant and that he was making the statement without any influence or rancour. Once the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it is sufficient for the purpose of conviction." 19. In Bijoy Das vs. State of West Bengal, (2008) 4 SCC 511 , this Court after quoting various earlier decisions, reiterated the same position. 20. In Muthu Kutty & Anr. Vs. State By Inspector of Police, T.N., (2005) 9 SCC 113 , the following discussion and the ultimate conclusion are relevant which read as under: (SCC p. 120, paras 14-15) "14. This is a case where the basis of conviction of the accused is the dying declaration. The situation in which a person is on the deathbed is so solemn and serene when he is dying that the grave position in which he is placed, is the reason in law to accept veracity of his statement. It is for this reason that the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Besides, should the dying declaration be excluded it will result in miscarriage of justice because the victim being generally the only eyewitness in a serious crime, the exclusion of the statement would leave the court without a scrap of evidence. 15. It is for this reason that the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Besides, should the dying declaration be excluded it will result in miscarriage of justice because the victim being generally the only eyewitness in a serious crime, the exclusion of the statement would leave the court without a scrap of evidence. 15. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its correctness. The court has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, or prompting or a product of imagination. The court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence." 21. The same view has been reiterated by a three Judge Bench decision of this Court in Panneerselvam vs. State of T.N., (2008) 17 SCC 190 and also the principles governing the dying declaration as summed up in Paniben vs. State of Gujarat, (1992) 2 SCC 474 . 22. The analysis of the above decisions clearly shows that, (i) Dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction if it inspires the full confidence of the Court. (ii) The Court should be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement and that it was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. (iii) Where the Court is satisfied that the declaration is true and voluntary, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. (iv) It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. (iii) Where the Court is satisfied that the declaration is true and voluntary, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. (iv) It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. (v) Where dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity such as the deceased was unconscious and could never make any statement cannot form the basis of conviction. (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain all the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (viii) Even if it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. (ix) When the eye-witness affirms that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, medical opinion cannot prevail. (x) If after careful scrutiny, the Court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration.” 26. Dying declaration is the last statement that is made by a person as to the cause of his/her imminent death or the circumstances that had resulted in that situation, at a stage when the declarant is conscious of the fact that there are virtually nil chances of his/her survival. On an assumption that at such a critical stage, a person would be expected to speak the truth, Courts have attached great value to the veracity of such a statement. Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 states that when a statement is made by a person as to the cause of death, or as to any of the circumstances which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person’s death comes into question, such a statement, oral or in writing made by the deceased victim to the witness, is a relevant fact and is admissible in evidence. It is noteworthy that the said provision is an exception to the general rule contained in Section 60 of the Evidence Act that ‘hearsay evidence is inadmissible’ and only when such an evidence is direct and is validated through cross-examination, it is considered to be trustworthy. 27. Smt. Jamuna Bai (PW-1), who is the mother of the deceased and mother-in-law of the accused/appellant, in para-1 of her evidence, stated that her daughter Ramshila was married to the accused/appellant 24-25 years ago. On the date of incident i.e. 04.02.2019, the accused started abusing her daughter Ramshila on account of cooking bad vegetable, thereafter, her daughter Ramshila along with her another daughter Sheela Bai came to her house and told that her husband was sleeping at home after drinking alcohol. In para-2, she has stated that while she was sitting near pond, the accused came and told her that Ramshila was burning then she along with the accused came to accused home on motorcycle and the accused leaving her near the door of house ran away from there. She went to the appellant’s house and saw that her daughter Ramshila was in burnt condition. When she asked, her daughter told her that the accused abused her and beaten her by holding her hair, she was coming out to save herself then the accused closed the door of the house, poured petrol on her and lit a matchstick from a distance and ran away. Her daughter had given the above statement in Malkharoda Hospital also. In her cross-examination, she has denied the suggestion that when she asked her daughter told her that she felt like dying and hence she set herself on fire. She also denied that her daughter told her that she had sprinkled petrol on herself and lit the fire with a matchstick and she was not even aware that as soon as she lit the matchstick, it would suddenly catch fire. 28. Birbal (PW-2), who is the father of the deceased and father-in-law of the appellant, in his evidence, stated that he had gone to work in the village itself. His wife called him at around 3 o'clock and told him that our daughter has been burnt. By the time he reached the spot, preparations had been made to take his daughter to the hospital in 112 vehicle, the Police had reached the spot. His wife called him at around 3 o'clock and told him that our daughter has been burnt. By the time he reached the spot, preparations had been made to take his daughter to the hospital in 112 vehicle, the Police had reached the spot. He too sat in vehicle 112 and brought his daughter to Malkharoda Community Health Centre. When he asked his daughter how this incident happened, his daughter told him that the accused had beaten her and sprinkled petrol on her and set her on fire with a matchstick. When the Policeman asked him in Malkharoda hospital itself, he told the Policeman that he cannot tell anything about this, ask his daughter only. The Police interrogated his daughter. Seeing the serious condition of his daughter, she was referred to Raigarh Hospital. While on the way to Raigarh Hospital, his daughter Ramshila died. 29. Sheela Bai (PW-3), who is the sister of the deceased and sister-in-law of the appellant, in her evidence, stated that she had come to the appellant’s house to have dinner on the date of the incident. The accused was in drunken condition at that time. After having dinner, she came back and reached Sakti by bus along with her family. Her father told her over phone that Ramshila had been burnt by the appellant. Thereafter, she went to Malkharoda Hospital to see her sister Ramshila, there Ramshila told her that the accused abused her, beat her and poured petrol on her and burnt her. In the hospital, she had asked her sister why she did not try to run away, then her sister Ramshila told that the accused had closed the door of the house from outside after pouring petrol on her and burning her. 30. Investigating Officer Mohd. Tariq Harish (PW-15) has stated that he was posted as Station-in-Charge of Malkharoda Police Station from September 2018 to August 2019. On 04.02.2019, receiving the hospital memo of Community Health Center, Malkharoda at 3.00 p.m., the First Information Report (Ex.P/19) was filed. Thereafter, he issued memo Ex.P/20 to the Executive Magistrate, Malkharoda for taking the dying declaration statement of the deceased and memo Ex.P/6 for the Spot map. On 04.02.2019, receiving the hospital memo of Community Health Center, Malkharoda at 3.00 p.m., the First Information Report (Ex.P/19) was filed. Thereafter, he issued memo Ex.P/20 to the Executive Magistrate, Malkharoda for taking the dying declaration statement of the deceased and memo Ex.P/6 for the Spot map. He inspected the incident site and prepared Crime Details Form (Ex.P/2), on 04.02.2019, he had seized 100 ml petrol in a plastic box, matchsticks, burnt clothes of the deceased and burnt body of the deceased as per Property Seizure Memo (Ex.P/12) from the house of the deceased. He had sent the seized property to Raipur for FSL vide Ex.P/24 and Ex.P/25 and FSL reports are received vide Ex.P/26 and Ex.P/28 respectively. He had recorded the statements of witnesses Jamuna Bai, Sheela Bai, Hulasram and Birbal Sahu as per their instructions. On 04.02.2019, the accused Narayan Sahu was arrested in the presence of witnesses and the arrest/Court surrender memo (Ex.P/27) was prepared. 31. Chandra Shila Jaiswal (PW-12) Executive Magistrate-cum-Naib Tahsildar, who has taken the dying declaration of the deceased, in his evidence has stated that on 04.02.2019, when the application for recording the dying declaration of the deceased Ramshila was received by the Police Station-in-Charge, Malkhauda, at 3.40 p.m., the dying declaration of the deceased was taken. He has also described that the deceased was able to talk while taking her statement, wherein the deceased has disclosed about the incident, which is marked as Ex.P/14. He was also subjected to cross-examination, but nothing has been elicited by the defence to disbelieve the same. 32. It is the case of no direct evidence, rather conviction is based on circumstantial evidence. Five golden principles which constitute Panchseel of proof of case based on circumstantial evidence have been laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 , which state as under :- “(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. Five golden principles which constitute Panchseel of proof of case based on circumstantial evidence have been laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 , which state as under :- “(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned “must” or “should” and not “may be” established; (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 33. As regards question of motive, in case of direct evidence, motive loses its importance. Even otherwise, it only aids in criminality and can be inferred from the kind of weapon used, part of body hit, nature of injury and other circumstances. In the present case, as per case of the prosecution, burning of the deceased by pouring petrol by the accused/appellant shows that he intended to cause such injury as was sufficient to cause death to the deceased in the ordinary course of nature. 34. Therefore, from the statements of aforesaid prosecution witnesses coupled with the dying declaration of the deceased (Ex.P/14) proved by Chandra Shila Jaiswal (PW-12), Executive Magistrate-cum-Naib Tahsildar and also medical evidence showing the death of deceased was not a natural death, but was caused by burning and its complications with head injury, otherwise than under normal circumstances, it would be proved beyond reasonable doubt that it was the appellant, who had intentionally caused the death of his wife/deceased by pouring petrol on her, which was homicidal in nature and thereby committed the offence. 35. 35. The prosecution has also been able to prove the circumstances of the case in the light of five golden principles to constitute the 'panchsheel' of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence, as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra). In that view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the appellant is not entitled to be acquitted of the charges. 36. A careful perusal of the aforesaid findings recorded by the trial Court would show that the prosecution has established that, 1. death of deceased Ramshila was homicidal in nature; 2. on the date of offence, the appellant & the deceased were staying in the same room; and 3. it is the appellant who has murdered his wife by pouring petrol on her and burnt her. 37. In the light of aforesaid discussion, we are inclined to endorse the conclusion arrived at by the learned trial Court convicting the appellant on the basis of evidence adduced by the prosecution witnesses and dying declaration of the deceased (Ex.P/14). Therefore, conviction of the appellant for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC as well as the sentence imposed upon him by the learned trial Court is well merited and does not call for any interference by this Court. 38. For the foregoing reasons, the criminal appeal being devoid of merit and is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. 39. It is stated at the Bar that the appellant is in jail, he shall serve out the sentence as ordered by the learned trial Court. 40. Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted to the learned trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance.