JUDGMENT : RAJESH RAI K., J. The appellant in this writ appeal has questioned the correctness and validity of the order dated 30.01.2023, passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.106754/2015 filed by the appellant, challenging the order of penalty of compulsory retirement dated 23.06.2015, passed by the Director (Admn. & HR), the Karnataka Power Transmission Limited i.e. the 2nd respondent, wherein the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition and confirmed the order passed by the 2nd respondent. The said order is challenged in this writ appeal. 2. The brief facts of the case which are necessary for disposal of this appeal are that, the appellant was appointed as a Mestri in the year 1998 in the Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited and subsequently promoted as a Lineman in the year 2000 and thereafter as Mestri Grade-II in the year 2004 and subsequently as Meter Reader in the year 2008. He was placed as Junior Engineer (In-charge) from the year 2010. Since then, the appellant was working as Junior Engineer (In-charge) in 33/11 K.V.Station, Chulaki, Hubballi Electricity Supply Co., Ltd., Saudatti taluk, Belagavi district. The appellant while working as Incharge Section Officer (Junior Engineer), Rural Division, HESCOM, Ramdurg, a complaint was lodged by one Bheemappa Gangappa Karadigudda to the Registrar of Karnataka Lokayukta, Bengaluru i.e. 5th respondent, alleging that, the appellant and another have demanded illegal gratification for installing new transformer. Based on the said complaint, a trap was laid by the 5th respondent Lokayukta through Lokayukta Police on 16.06.2011 and Criminal Proceedings were initiated against the appellant by registering FIR in Crime No.12/2011 for the offence punishable under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the Lokayukta Police after conducting the investigation filed chargesheet against the appellant before the IV Additional District and Sessions Judge and Special Judge (PCA), Belagavi and the said case is numbered as Special Case No.50/2012 and the Special Judge for the Lokayukta after conducting a detail trial, by examining witnesses and also by perusal of the materials available on record, acquitted the appellant and another for the offence under Section 7, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 34 of IPC by vide Judgment dated 22.06.2015. 3. 3. In the meantime, on the basis of the report submitted under Section 12(3) of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984, the 2nd respondent i.e. the Director of Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited, entrusted the enquiry to be held against the appellant under Regulation 14A of KEB (Classification, Disciplinary Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1987, by an order dated 03.11.2012. The Additional Registrar of Enquiries5 issued Articles of Charges against the appellant. However, the appellant having denied the charges, the enquiry was proceeded and a report was submitted on 20.09.2014. Thereafter, the 5th respondent Lokayukta by its order dated 21.10.2014 while enclosing the report of enquiry recommended for imposing a major penalty of compulsory retirement on the appellant. Based on the said report of Karnataka Lokayukta, the 2nd respondent issued a second show cause notice to the appellant on 20.02.2014 by enclosing a copy of the recommendation of the 5th respondent and the enquiry report. However, the appellant submitted a detailed explanation on 25.03.2015. But in spite of that, the 2nd respondent imposed a penalty of compulsory retirement as recommended by the 5th respondent. Being aggrieved by the said order passed by the 2nd respondent, the appellant approached the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.106754/2015 and the learned Single Judge after hearing both the parties, passed the impugned order dated 30.01.2023 by dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant and confirmed the order passed by the 2nd respondent as stated supra. Hence, the appellant is before this Court by challenging the order passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.106754/2015. 4. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant Sri. Vijay Kumar and Sri. B.S.Kamate, learned counsel for the respondent Nos.1 and 2 and Sri. Shivaraj P. Mudhol, learned counsel for respondent Nos.3 and 4 and Sri. Anil Kale, learned counsel for respondent No.5. 5. Sri. Vijay Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant would vehemently contend that, the order of the learned Single Judge suffers from infirmities and the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate the relevant facts that the findings of the enquiry officer in his report suffers from perversity and illegality and not based on any legally acceptable evidence. He would further contend that, by perusal of the order passed by the 5th respondent, the order of penalty imposed is subject to the decision of the trial Court in Special Case No.50/2012. He would further contend that, by perusal of the order passed by the 5th respondent, the order of penalty imposed is subject to the decision of the trial Court in Special Case No.50/2012. The said order of penalty was passed on 23.06.2015 by the 2nd respondent. Nevertheless, the Special Judge of the Lokayukta acquitted the appellant from the charges leveled against him vide Judgment dated 22.06.2015 i.e. one day prior to the order passed by the 2nd respondent. As such, according to the learned counsel for the appellant since there is an observation in the order passed by the 2nd respondent, that the order of penalty imposed is subject to the decision of the trial Court, then the order passed by the 2nd respondent is not sustainable under law. 6. He would further contend that, the Lokayukta police approached this Court by filing a Criminal Appeal No.100145/2016 against the acquittal order passed in Special Case No.50/2012, however, this Court after hearing the parties, dismissed the said appeal and confirmed the order of acquittal passed by the Special Judge in Special C.C.No.50/2012. As such, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, the acquittal order passed by the Special Judge attained finality. Hence, when there is a clear observation in the order passed by the 2nd respondent that the penalty imposed is subject to the decision of the trial Court in Special Case No.50/2012, the subsequent order passed by the disciplinary authority cannot be sustained in view of the acquittal of the accused in Special Case No.50/2012 and also confirmation of the said order by this Hon’ble Court in Criminal Appeal No.100145/2016. 7. He would further contend that, even otherwise, by perusal of the evidence available on record before the Karnataka Lokayukta in Enquiry No.457/2012, the charges leveled against the appellant has not been proved, for the reason that, P.W.1Bhimappa Gangappa Karadigudda who lodged the complaint has totally turned hostile to the prosecution case and denied the contents of his complaint which is marked as Ex.P.1 and also his signature on Ex.P.2 i.e. Mahazar conducted by the police in the office of the appellant. The evidence of P.W.2 to 4 pancha witnesses relied by the Enquiry Officer and also the learned Single Judge, is unsustainable for the reason that, according to those witnesses, the bribe amount was recovered from the table drawer of the appellant in his absence and on washing of the hands of the appellant, the same has not turned into pink. Hence, there is no evidence in respect of acceptance of the illegal gratification by the petitioner. Nevertheless, the police have also failed to seize either the table or the drawer from which the bribe amount was seized. Learned counsel would further contend that, even for demand of the illegal gratification by the appellant is concerned, the evidence relied by the Enquiring Officer is totally misconstrued for the reason that, P.W.2 who is said to have recorded the conversation with the appellant in respect of the demand of bribe, has not supported the case of the prosecution. Under such circumstances, the conversation recorded in the Voice Recorder cannot be believed, unless the complainant supports the case of the prosecution. Admittedly, the complainant has failed to identify the voice of the accused No.1. The voice record is the only available evidence on record in respect of the alleged demand of bribe by the appellant and in the absence of the evidence of the complainant in that regard, certainly the evidentiary value of the conversation contained in the C.D. diminishes. Furthermore, the conversation recorded in the C.D. was not sent for expert opinion. Hence, the said C.D. loses its value in order to prove the said conversation relates to the complainant and appellant/accused in respect of the demand of bribe. Hence, before the enquiry authority, there is no prima-facie evidence placed by the prosecution to prove either the demand or acceptance of bribe/illegal gratification by the appellant from P.W.2. Hence, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned Single Judge totally failed to consider all these aspects. Accordingly, he prays to allow the writ appeal. Learned counsel for the appellant places reliance on the following Judgments: (i) (1999) 2 SCC 10 [Kuldeep Singh Vs. Commissioner of Police and others; (ii) (2013) 6 SCC 602 [S.R.Tewari Vs. Union of India and another; (iv) W.P.No.1226/2022 (SKSAT) Smt. Anjali Devi Vs. the State of Karnataka and others; (v) W.P.No.35043/2018 (SKSAT) Jameer Pasha Vs. The State of Karnataka. Learned counsel for the appellant places reliance on the following Judgments: (i) (1999) 2 SCC 10 [Kuldeep Singh Vs. Commissioner of Police and others; (ii) (2013) 6 SCC 602 [S.R.Tewari Vs. Union of India and another; (iv) W.P.No.1226/2022 (SKSAT) Smt. Anjali Devi Vs. the State of Karnataka and others; (v) W.P.No.35043/2018 (SKSAT) Jameer Pasha Vs. The State of Karnataka. (iii) (2011) 6 SCC 376 [Commissioner of police, Delhi and others Vs. Jai Bhagwan]; 8. Per contra, Sri. B.S.Kamate, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Corporation vehemently contended that, the order passed by the learned Single Judge does not suffers from any illegality or perversity and the same is based on the evidence on record and as per the settled position of law by the Hon’ble Apex Court. He would further contend that, learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the writ petition based on the well established principle of law that while exercising the jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, Courts should not interfere with the merits of the decision and scope of interference is only with regard to the decision making process and unlike the criminal prosecution, where the charge has to be established beyond reasonable doubt, in a disciplinary proceeding, a charge of misconduct has to be established on a preponderance of probabilities. According to the learned counsel, the rules of evidence which apply to a criminal trial are distinct from those which govern a disciplinary enquiry. The acquittal of the accused in a criminal case does not debar the employer from proceeding in the exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction. As such, learned Single Judge after considering the said aspect has rightly dismissed the writ petition. He would further contend that, even otherwise by perusal of the evidence available on record, in respect of the proceedings conducted before the Lokayukta, the evidence of P.W.2, P.W.3 and P.W.4 proved the case against the appellant/accused beyond reasonable doubt. P.W.2 being the Pancha witness, for having seized the currency notes from the table of the appellant as per the Mahazar at Ex.P.3 and also in respect of the recording of the statements of the appellant. He is also a witness in respect of recording of conversation with the appellant with regard to demand of bribe, though not fully supported the case of the prosecution, nevertheless, he deposed in respect of the alleged raid. He is also a witness in respect of recording of conversation with the appellant with regard to demand of bribe, though not fully supported the case of the prosecution, nevertheless, he deposed in respect of the alleged raid. P.W.3 and P.W.4 are the shadow witness, who clearly supported the case of the prosecution in respect of the alleged trap proceedings and recovery of the amount from the drawer of the appellant. As such, according to the learned counsel, there is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of P.W.2 to P.W.4. Hence, there are ample evidence and materials available on record to prove the charges against the appellant, as such, the enquiry authority has rightly conducted the departmental enquiry and passed order on 23.06.2015 by holding that charges against the appellant are proved and thereby recommended for imposing major penalty for compulsory retirement against the appellant and the 2nd respondent passed the order imposing major penalty of compulsory retirement against the appellant. Hence, the learned single Judge has rightly rejected the writ petition. As such, the counsel for the respondent prays for dismissal of the appeal. In support of his submission, he placed reliance on the following Judgments: (i) Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited Vs. C. Nagaraju & another reported in (2019) 10 SCC 367 ; (ii) Ajit Kumar Nag Vs. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corporation Limited, Haldia & others, reported in (2005) 7 SCC 764 ; (iii) Director General of Police Vs. Rajendra Kumar Dubey in SLP No.32580/2017, date f disposal 25.11.2020. (iv) The State of Karnataka and another Vs. N. Gangaraj, in C.A.No.8071/2014, date of disposal 14.02.2020. (v) D. Manjunath Vs. Karnataka Lokayuktha, in Writ Petition No.36761/2014 date of disposal 11.01.2017. (vi) Union of India Vs. P. Gunasekaran, reported in 2015 SCC 610 . (vii) State Bank of India Vs. K.S.Vishwanath, reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 667. (viii) State of Karnataka and others Vs. Umesh in Civil Appeal No.17631764/2022 date of disposal 22.03.2022. 9. We have bestowed our anxious consideration on the submissions made by the learned counsels from both sides and have carefully examined the documents available on record, including the evidence placed before the Lokayukta. 10. K.S.Vishwanath, reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 667. (viii) State of Karnataka and others Vs. Umesh in Civil Appeal No.17631764/2022 date of disposal 22.03.2022. 9. We have bestowed our anxious consideration on the submissions made by the learned counsels from both sides and have carefully examined the documents available on record, including the evidence placed before the Lokayukta. 10. Having heard the learned counsels for the parties and having perused the records available on record, the only point that would arise for our consideration is; “Whether the learned Single Judge has justified in dismissing the Writ Petition No.106754/2015 filed by the appellant by confirming the order of penalty of compulsory retirement dated 23.06.2015 passed by the 2nd respondent ? 11. At the outset, on a cursory glance of the order passed by the 2nd respondent dated 23.06.2015, it is observed that, “the order of penalty imposed is subject to the decision of the trial Court in Special case No.50/2012.” The portion of the said order is extracted hereunder: 12. Admittedly, the Judgment of the learned Special Judge was passed on 22.06.2015 by acquitting the appellant from the charges leveled against him i.e. one day prior to the order of the respondent No.2. By perusal of the records, it is not forthcoming that, whether the Judgment passed by the Special Court was within the knowledge of the respondent No.2 or not. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the Special Court has passed the Judgment on 22.06.2015 and acquitted the accused from the charges leveled against him. By careful reading of the order passed by the respondent No.2, it can be gathered that, the said order was passed by reserving right of taking action against the accused based on the Judgment of the Special Judge in S.C.No.50/2012. Admittedly, the Sessions Judge acquitted the accused from the charges. Though the prosecution filed an appeal before this Court by questioning the acquittal order passed by the Special Judge, in Criminal Appeal No.100145/2016, the said appeal also dismissed by this Court vide Judgment dated 18.01.2023, as such, the same has attained finality. By careful perusal of the order passed by the learned Single Judge, the said aspect was not discussed. Though the prosecution filed an appeal before this Court by questioning the acquittal order passed by the Special Judge, in Criminal Appeal No.100145/2016, the said appeal also dismissed by this Court vide Judgment dated 18.01.2023, as such, the same has attained finality. By careful perusal of the order passed by the learned Single Judge, the said aspect was not discussed. Hence, in our considered opinion, prima-facie the order of penalty passed by the respondent No.2 cannot be implemented against the appellant in view of the rider clause in the order that, the same is subject to the Judgment of the Special Judge in Special Case No.50/2012. 13. The next aspect of the matter is that, whether this Court while exercising jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can interfere with the merits of the decision passed by the enquiry authority in a disciplinary proceedings. The learned Single Judge while passing the order, much relied on the Judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. Umesh, reported in (2022) 6 SCC 563 in paragraph Nos.16 to 23. The Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph No.22 of the said Judgment has held that, “In the exercise of judicial review, the Court does not act as an appellate forum over the findings of the disciplinary authority. The court does not reappreciate the evidence on the basis of which the finding of misconduct has been arrived at in the course of a disciplinary enquiry. The Court in the exercise of judicial review must restrict its review to determine whether; (i) the rules of natural justice have been complied with; (ii) the finding of misconduct is based on some evidence; (iii) the statutory rules governing the conduct of the disciplinary enquiry have been observed; and (iv) whether the findings of the disciplinary authority suffer from perversity; and (v) the penalty is disproportionate to the proven misconduct.” 14. Hence, the dictum laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above case, clarifies that if the findings of the disciplinary authority suffers from perversity, then this Court can interfere in the said order. On careful perusal of the evidence adduced before the enquiry authority, we find that P.W.1 being the complainant has totally turned hostile to the prosecution case. P.W.2 is a Pancha witness, partially supported the case. On careful perusal of the evidence adduced before the enquiry authority, we find that P.W.1 being the complainant has totally turned hostile to the prosecution case. P.W.2 is a Pancha witness, partially supported the case. P.W.3 and P.W.4 are the shadow witnesses to the trap proceedings. However, they are not witnesses for either demand or acceptance of the illegal gratification by the appellant. The complainant who was examined as P.W.2 is said to have recorded the conversation with the appellant with regard to demand of bribe, he has not supported the case of the prosecution. Under such circumstances, the conversation recorded in the voice recorder cannot be believed unless the complainant supports the case of the prosecution. Moreover, P.W.2 has failed to identify the voice of the appellant. The evidence of complainant is most material to prove the voice of the accused which has been recorded prior to lodging of the complaint. Since none of the witnesses including the Panchas were present at the time when the conversation was recorded, their evidence in this regard cannot be accepted. In the absence of the evidence of the complainant, certainly the evidentiary value of the conversation contained over the C.D. is lost. Even otherwise, the said C.D was not sent for expert opinion by obtaining voice sample of the appellant. Hence, the C.D. cannot be relied as an electronic evidence under Section 65B of the Evidence Act. In such circumstances, there is absolutely no evidence available on record to come to a conclusion that the appellant demanded illegal gratification from the complainant. 15. As far as the acceptance of the bribe by the appellant is concerned, though the witnesses P.W.3 and 4 have deposed in the enquiry proceedings about the recovery of tainted money from the drawer of the appellant in his office, they categorically stated that C.W.1 instructed the police that DGO1 has demanded the bribe amount and informed to pay bribe amount to DGO2 and in turn DGO-2 informed to DGO-1 to keep the amount in the drawer. Accordingly C.W.1 kept the bribe amount in the table drawer of DGO-1. Then C.W.3 removed the said cover containing the bribe amount from the table drawer of DGO-1. Later, he compared the note numbers with the numbers earlier recorded and they tallied. Accordingly C.W.1 kept the bribe amount in the table drawer of DGO-1. Then C.W.3 removed the said cover containing the bribe amount from the table drawer of DGO-1. Later, he compared the note numbers with the numbers earlier recorded and they tallied. By perusal of the evidence of P.W.3, it is clear that, on the instruction of DGO-2, the cover containing the bribe amount was kept by C.W.1 in the drawer of DGO-1 i.e. the appellant. Then P.W.2 removed the said cover. Hence, it is clear that at no point of time the appellant received the bribe amount. The appellant neither demanded the bribe amount nor received the same at the alleged spot. It is the specific say of P.W.2 that, the police informed that DGO1 had demanded the bribe amount and informed to pay the same to DGO2. Further, on perusal of the evidence of P.W.4 i.e. the Investigating Officer, he categorically stated that, he got to know about the transaction that took place between DGOs and C.W.1, through C.W.1 and 2, and as per his instructions, the bribe amount was kept in the right side of the table drawer of the DGO1 and the same was got removed by him through C.W.1. Hence, according to the Investigating Officer also, the bribe amount was neither received by the appellant nor kept in his table drawer. The further process of washing the hands with the chemical solution, etc., has not been conducted in the case for the reason that, the said amount was not touched by the appellant. Though a trap mahazar was conducted as per Ex.P.3, there is no active role of the appellant in respect of receiving of the bribe amount. That being the factual matrix of the case, coupled with the evidence of witnesses examined before the Enquiry Officer, the order passed the 5th respondent dated 20.09.2014 and the order of penalty imposed by the 2nd respondent cannot be sustained under law since they suffer from perversity and illegality. As such, the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above Judgment i.e. the State of Karnataka Vs. Umesh, is applicable in this case, in favour of the appellant. 16. Learned Single Judge has also relied on the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of the State Bank of India and another Vs. K.S.Vishwanath, reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 667. Umesh, is applicable in this case, in favour of the appellant. 16. Learned Single Judge has also relied on the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of the State Bank of India and another Vs. K.S.Vishwanath, reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 667. In paragraph Nos.7.3 to 9 it was held that “Judicial review and power of the High Court in a departmental enquiry and interference with the findings recorded in the departmental enquiry; the High Court is not a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant.” However, in the said Judgment the Hon’ble Apex Court in referring the Judgment passed in the case of State Bank of Bikanare and Jaipur Vs. Nemichand Nalwaya reported in (2014) 4 SCC 584 held that, Courts will not interfere with the findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiry except where such findings are based on “no evidence” or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, based on the material available on record. The Courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, malafide or based on extraneous considerations. By perusal of the above dictum laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, it is clear that, the judicial review can be exercised when the findings of the disciplinary authority suffers from perversity. As discussed supra, in the case on hand, the findings of the disciplinary authority totally suffers from perversity since the enquiry authority failed to appreciate the evidence adduced by the witnesses to prove the charges against the appellant. Since, there is no evidence placed before the enquiry authority in respect of demand and acceptance of the illegal gratification by the appellant, the enquiry authority ought not to have passed such an order and could not have submitted a report to the 2nd respondent to pass an order of penalty. Even otherwise, in the Judgment relied by the appellant in the case of Praveenkumar Vs. Even otherwise, in the Judgment relied by the appellant in the case of Praveenkumar Vs. Union of India, reported in (2020) 9 SCC 471 , which was also relied by the learned Single Judge, it was held that the power of judicial review is meant to ensure that, the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of Court. When an enquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/tribunal is required to determine whether the enquiry was held by a competent Officer or whether Rules of natural justice are complied with. It is further held that, the findings of the disciplinary authority, must be based on some evidence. The Court/tribunal may interfere in the said findings where the authority holds the proceedings against the delinquent Officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or findings reached by the disciplinary authority is based on “No evidence”. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the findings and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. Hence, by perusal of the evidence and material available on record, the dictum laid down in the said Judgment is squarely applicable to the case on hand since the findings reached by the disciplinary authority is based on “No evidence”. 17. In this case, the P.W.1 turned hostile to the prosecution case and the P.W.2 has also partially turned hostile and by perusal of the evidence of P.W.3 and P.W.4, there is no iota of evidence to prove the aspect that, the appellant either demanded or accepted the illegal gratification as alleged by the complainant. In such circumstances, we have no other option, but to say that the disciplinary authority reached the conclusion in the absence of “No evidence”. 18. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of B.Jayaraj Vs. In such circumstances, we have no other option, but to say that the disciplinary authority reached the conclusion in the absence of “No evidence”. 18. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of B.Jayaraj Vs. State of A.P., has held that “Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is concerned, it is a settled position in law that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute the said offence and mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute the offence under Section 7 unless it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe.” Hence, though in a disciplinary proceedings, the charges against the accused need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt and a decision can be taken on preponderance and probabilities, but there must be basic/prima-facie evidence against the accused to take action against him. But in the case on hand, there is no such prima-facie evidence available on record. 19. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kuldeep Singh Vs. Commissioner of Police and others, reported in 1992 (2) SCC 10 has held that, “It is no doubt true that the High Court under Article 226 or this Court under Article 32 would not interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry by the disciplinary authority or the enquiry officer as a matter of course. The Court cannot sit in appeal over those findings and assume the role of the appellate authority. But this does not mean that, in no circumstance can the Court interfere. The power of judicial review available to the High Court as also to this Court under the Constitution takes in its stride the domestic enquiry as well and it can interfere with the conclusions reached therein if there was “no evidence” to support the findings or the findings recorded were such as could not have been reached by an ordinary prudent man or the findings were perverse or made at the dictates of the superior authority.” 20. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of S.R.Tewari Vs. Union of India and another, reported in (2013) 6 SCC 602 has held that, “The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material”. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of S.R.Tewari Vs. Union of India and another, reported in (2013) 6 SCC 602 has held that, “The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material”. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is “against the weight of evidence”, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence of thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse.” 21. Even otherwise, in the absence of clear proof based on the evidence of witnesses in the enquiry, an adverse presumption cannot be drawn on the guilt of the accused. It is cardinal principle of criminal law that, suspicion cannot take the place of proof without there being direct and reliable evidence against the appellant. The enquiry authority having held the charge against the appellant solely on the deposition of the pancha witnesses and in the absence of any evidence of witnesses to show that, the appellant had instructed the complainant to keep illegal gratification in his drawer and also without there being any evidence in respect of the demand of the bribe by the appellant as contended by the complainant, the enquiry authority would not have held the charges as proved. As discussed supra, the enquiry authority without appreciating the evidence deposed by the witnesses, mechanically held that the charges are proved against the appellant which is not sustainable in law as per the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in catena of Judgments including the Judgments discussed supra. 22. In the circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that, the impugned order passed by the 2nd respondent suffers from perversity and the same is not sustainable under law. 22. In the circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that, the impugned order passed by the 2nd respondent suffers from perversity and the same is not sustainable under law. Accordingly, we proceed to pass the following: ORDER (i) Writ Appeal filed by the appellant is hereby allowed; (ii) The order passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.106754/2015 dated 30.01.2023 is hereby set aside; (iii) Consequently, the order passed by the 2nd respondent dated 23.06.2015 in No.KAA.PRA.NI.NI/B21/32326/201213 imposing the penalty of compulsory retirement as recommended by the 5th respondent is set aside; (iv) The respondent No.2 shall reinstate the appellant on duty within a period of three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order; (v) The period when the appellant has compulsory retired and taken back on duty shall be treated as on duty for the purpose of pension and all other benefits;