ORDER : 1. The petitioner has filed this writ petition challenging the legality and sustainability of the order dated 19.05.2023 passed by respondent No.3 for forfeiting the amount of Rs.30,000/- deposited against the contract of transportation of group No.07, 08, group No.14, 17, group No.07, 09, group No. 07, 13, 16, 09 for non-performance of contract of transportation of woods, recovery of 33 ½ percent towards excess expenditure to be incurred with blacklisting and banning the petitioner for a period of 3 years from the date of order. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is working as Contractor and transporting timber and wood for last two decades. Petitioner was awarded contract for transportation of woods, by the Divisional Forest Officer, Gariyaband. Impugned order was issued on 22.12.2022, 24.01.2023, 30.01.2023 and 21.02.2023. Petitioner started work of transportation of woods from the specified area/work place, however, the sufficient quantity of timber and woods were not available for transportation and further due to untimely rain, road provided by the respondents became non-transportable. Petitioner, on several occasions, wrote letter bringing to the notice of respondents about the difficulties being faced in transporting the woods/timber at the required pace, but they have not given any heed to the request made by the petitioner. Respondents without giving any opportunity of hearing, in an arbitrary manner, have passed the impugned order. He also pointed out that the letter/notice which was issued to the petitioner on 12.05.2023 and 17.05.2023 clearly mentioned the cutoff date for completing the transportation work as 25.05.2023, however, prior to the said date, impugned order is passed on 19.05.2023 and therefore the order impugned is bad in law. 3. Learned counsel for the respondent- State vehemently opposes the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner and would submit that time and again petitioner was issued letter requesting to complete the work of transportation within the time as agreed in the contract between the parties. In the letter/notice, petitioner was brought to the notice that his work of transportation is slow. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that timber and wood for transportation was not available is not correct, in view of Annexure P-6 and Annexure P-7, which are letters written to the petitioner by the Divisional Forest Officer, Gariyaband on 12.05.2023 and 17.05.2023. There is no error on the part of respondents in passing the impugned order. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that timber and wood for transportation was not available is not correct, in view of Annexure P-6 and Annexure P-7, which are letters written to the petitioner by the Divisional Forest Officer, Gariyaband on 12.05.2023 and 17.05.2023. There is no error on the part of respondents in passing the impugned order. He also contended that writ petition itself is not maintainable in view of efficacious alternate remedy of arbitration as per Clause 20 of the Agreement for Haulage of Fuel Wood to Forest Depot. Prior to taking action against the petitioner, two detailed notices were issued on 12.05.2023 and 17.05.2023 mentioning the shortcomings and granting time to complete the quantity of transportation of woods/timber and the consequences of non-completion of contract is also mentioned therein. Therefore, impugned order does not call for any interference. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the documents annexed along with writ petition. 5. It is not in dispute that petitioner was awarded the work order on different dates for transportation of woods and timbers, of quantity mentioned therein. The documents further reflect that the petitioner also wrote letter showing difficulty being faced by him and further the letter written by an officer of respondent department that petitioner's work is not up to the mark and satisfactory. Order impugned is with respect to forfeiture of deposit made by the petitioner against the award of work, recovery of the excess expenditure to be incurred at the rate of 33 ½ per cent and the second limb is of blacklisting of the petitioner. 6. So far as the first limb with respect to forfeiture of deposit and recovery of 33 ½ percent of the sanctioned amount is concerned, petitioner is having the remedy of arbitration as provided under Clause 20 of the Agreement entered into by the petitioner with respondent. The submission of learned counsel for the respondents with respect to the alternate remedy of arbitration available to the petitioner as per agreement is not disputed and therefore, I am not considering the part of order of forfeiture of Rs.30,000/- and recovery at the rate of 33 ½ per cent of the sanctioned amount and accordingly, petition to above extent is dismissed reserving liberty with the petitioner to approach the appropriate authority by filing appropriate proceedings. 7. 7. So far as the second limb of the impugned order with respect to blacklisting and banning of the petitioner for a period of 3 years is concerned, perusal of the record does not show that separate show cause notice specifying the ground/reason for proposed action of blacklisting is ever issued to the petitioner prior to passing of order. Blacklisting and banning of the petitioner is having civil consequences and also reputation of the petitioner comes to at stake. If any adverse action is to be taken, there must be strict adherence to principles of natural justice. Prior show cause notice, granting reasonable opportunity of being heard is an essential element of all administrative decision making and particularly so in decisions pertaining to blacklisting which entail grave consequences for the entity, being blacklisted. In the like nature of case, furnishing of a valid show cause notice is crucial and failure to do so would be fatal to any order of blacklisting. 8. Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with an issue of blacklisting in case of Gorkha Security Services Vs. Government (NCT Delhi) & Ors. (2014) 9 SCC 105 has held thus:- “27. We are, therefore, of the opinion that it was incumbent on the part of the Department to state in the show cause notice that the competent authority intended to impose such a penalty of blacklisting, so as to provide adequate and meaningful opportunity to the appellant to show cause against the same. However, we may also add that even if it is not mentioned specifically but from the reading of the show cause notice, it can be clearly inferred that such an action was proposed, that would fulfill this requirement. In the present case, however, reading of the show cause notice does not suggest that noticee could find out that such an action could also be taken. We say so for the reasons that are recorded hereinafter. 28. In the instant case, no doubt show cause notice dated 6.2.2013 was served upon the appellant. Relevant portion thereof has already been extracted above. This show cause notice is conspicuously silent about the blacklisting action. On the contrary, after stating in detail the nature of alleged defaults and breaches of the agreement committed by the appellant the notice specifically mentions that because of the said defaults the appellant was “as such liable to be levied the cost accordingly”. This show cause notice is conspicuously silent about the blacklisting action. On the contrary, after stating in detail the nature of alleged defaults and breaches of the agreement committed by the appellant the notice specifically mentions that because of the said defaults the appellant was “as such liable to be levied the cost accordingly”. It further says “why the action as mentioned above may not be taken against the firm, besides other action as deemed fit by the competent authority”. It follows from the above that main action which the respondents wanted to take was to levy the cost. No doubt, notice further mentions that competent authority could take other actions as deemed fit. However, that may not fulfil the requirement of putting the defaulter to the notice that action of blacklisting was also in the mind of the competent authority. Mere existence of Clause 27 in the agreement entered into between the parties, would not suffice the aforesaid mandatory requirement by vaguely mentioning other “actions as deemed fit.” As already pointed out above in so far as penalty of black listing and forfeiture of earnest money/ security deposit is concerned it can be imposed only, “if so warranted”. Therefore, without any specific stipulation in this behalf, respondent could not have imposed the penalty of black listing. 29. No doubt, rules of natural justice are not embodied rules nor can they be lifted to the position of fundamental rights. However, their aim is to secure justice and to prevent miscarriage of justice. It is now well established proposition of law that unless a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of any rules of natural justice, in exercise of power pre-judicially affecting another must be in conformity with the rules of natural justice. 30. We are conscious of the following words of wisdom expressed by this Court through the pen of Krishna Iyer, J in Board of Mining Examination and Anr. v. Ramjee; 1977 (2) SCC 256 : “1. If the jurisprudence of remedies were understood and applied from the perspective of social efficaciousness, the problem raised in this appeal would not have ended the erroneous way it did in the High Court. Judges must never forget that every law has a social purpose and engineering process without appreciating which justice to the law cannot be done. If the jurisprudence of remedies were understood and applied from the perspective of social efficaciousness, the problem raised in this appeal would not have ended the erroneous way it did in the High Court. Judges must never forget that every law has a social purpose and engineering process without appreciating which justice to the law cannot be done. Here, the socio-legal situation we are faced with is a colliery, an explosive, an accident, luckily not lethal, caused by violation of a regulation and consequential cancellation of the certificate of the delinquent shot-firer, eventually quashed by the High Court, for processual solecisms, by a writ of certiorari. * * * 13.......Natural justice is no unruly horse, no lurking land mine, nor a judicial cure all. If fairness is shown by the decision maker to the man proceeded against, the form, features and the fundamentals of such essential processual propriety being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of. Unnatural expansion of natural justice, without reference to the administrative realities and other factors of a given case, can be exasperating. We can neither be finical nor fanatical but should be flexible yet firm in this jurisdiction. No man shall be hit below the belt – that is the conscience of the matter. 14... We cannot look at law in the abstract or natural justice as a mere artefact. Nor can we fit into a rigid mould the concept of reasonable opportunity.” 31. When it comes to the action of blacklisting which is termed as 'Civil Death' it would be difficult to accept the proposition that without even putting the noticee to such a contemplated action and giving him a chance to show cause as to why such an action be not taken, final order can be passed blacklisting such a person only on the premise that this is one of the actions so stated in the provisions of NIT.” 9. Recently, Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of UMC Technologies Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Food Corporation of India & Anr. (2021) 2 SCC 551 reiterating the law enunciated in case of Gorkhka Security Services (supra) observed thus:- “24. Recently, Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of UMC Technologies Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Food Corporation of India & Anr. (2021) 2 SCC 551 reiterating the law enunciated in case of Gorkhka Security Services (supra) observed thus:- “24. A plain reading of the notice makes it clear that the action of blacklisting was neither expressly proposed nor could it have been inferred from the language employed by the Corporation in its show cause notice. After listing 12 clauses of the “Instruction to Bidders”, which were part of the Corporation’s Bid Document dated 25.11.2016, the notice merely contains a vague statement that in light of the alleged leakage of question papers by the appellant, an appropriate decision will be taken by the Corporation. In fact, Clause 10 of the same Instruction to Bidders section of the Bid Document, which the Corporation has argued to be the source of its power to blacklist the appellant, is not even mentioned in the show cause notice. While the notice clarified that the 12 clauses specified in the notice were only indicative and not exhaustive, there was nothing in the notice which could have given the appellant the impression that the action of blacklisting was being proposed. This is especially true since the appellant was under the belief that the Corporation was not even empowered to take such an action against it and since the only clause which mentioned blacklisting was not referred to by the Corporation in its show cause notice. While the following paragraphs deal with whether or not the appellant’s said belief was well-founded, there can be no question that it was incumbent on the part of the Corporation to clarify in the show cause notice that it intended to blacklist the appellant, so as to provide adequate and meaningful opportunity to the appellant to show cause against the same. 25. The mere existence of a clause in the Bid Document, which mentions blacklisting as a bar against eligibility, cannot satisfy the mandatory requirement of a clear mention of the proposed action in the show cause notice. The Corporation’s notice is completely silent about blacklisting and as such, it could not have led the appellant to infer that such an action could be taken by the Corporation in pursuance of this notice. The Corporation’s notice is completely silent about blacklisting and as such, it could not have led the appellant to infer that such an action could be taken by the Corporation in pursuance of this notice. Had the Corporation expressed its mind in the show cause notice to black list, the appellant could have filed a suitable reply for the same. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the show cause notice dated 10.04.2018 does not fulfill the requirements of a valid show cause notice for blacklisting. In our view, the order of blacklisting the appellant clearly traversed beyond the bounds of the show cause notice which is impermissible in law. As a result, the consequent blacklisting order dated 09.01.2019 cannot be sustained. 26. In view of our conclusion that the blacklisting order dated 09.01.2019 passed by the Corporation is contrary to the principles of natural justice, it is unnecessary for us to consider the other contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant. Having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, we deem it appropriate not to remit the matter to the Corporation for fresh consideration.” 10. In the case at hand, respondents have not issued show cause notice specifying the proposed action of blacklisting to be taken and the ground thereof. Letter dated 12.05.2023 and 17.05.2023 are only letter written to the petitioner to complete the work under the contract awarded to him failing which the consequences is mentioned. Those letters are only letters of caution and cannot be treated to be a show cause notice for taking any proposed action. In the aforementioned facts of the case and the law enunciated by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforementioned cases, I am of the considered view that order of blacklisting and banning of petitioner for a period of 3 years is passed without issuing show cause notice, providing opportunity of hearing and therefore the order (Annexure P-1) to the extent of blacklisting and banning the petitioner for a period of 3 years is in violation of principles of natural justice. 11. For the above discussions, impugned order to the extent of blacklisting is not sustainable. Accordingly, order Annexure P-1 dated 19.05.2023 to the extent of blacklisting of petitioner for a period of 3 years is quashed. 12. 11. For the above discussions, impugned order to the extent of blacklisting is not sustainable. Accordingly, order Annexure P-1 dated 19.05.2023 to the extent of blacklisting of petitioner for a period of 3 years is quashed. 12. Respondents will be at liberty to initiate fresh proceedings if they desire to take any action of blacklisting against the petitioner following the procedure as observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforementioned decisions. 13. The writ petition is accordingly allowed in part.