JUDGMENT : 1. By this acquittal appeal filed under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “Cr.P.C.”), appellant has challenged the legality and propriety of the judgment dated 31.01.2017 passed by the First Additional Judge to the Court of First Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur, Chhattisgarh (hereinafter referred to as “First Appellate Court”) in Criminal Appeal No.172 of 2015 allowing the appeal and setting aside the judgment dated 10.09.2015 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur, Chhattisgarh (hereinafter referred to as “Trial Court”) in Criminal Complaint Case No.38 of 2013, whereby the Trial Court has convicted the accused Ku. Reshu Kaur for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as “N.I. Act”) and sentenced her to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay compensation of Rs.3,00,000/- (Three Lac rupees), in default of payment of compensation, she would further undergo additional imprisonment for 6 months. 2. Brief facts for disposal of instant acquittal appeal, are that, accused Ku. Reshu Kaur had taken a loan of Rs.3,00,000/-(Three Lac rupees) from complainant Puran Lal Peshwani on 30.09.2011 and executed promissory note vide Ex.P/1. She had issued cheque bearing No.000004 dated 30.10.2012 (Ex.P/2) for payment of said amount, which the complainant deposited in his bank account. Thereafter, he was informed through Bank memo (Ex.P/3) dated 02.11.2012 that said cheque was not remunerated due to insufficient funds in accused's account. Upon said information, on 09.11.2012, complainant sent legal notice (Ex.P/4) to accused by registered post through his Advocate demanding cheque amount, postal receipt of which is annexed as Ex.P/5. But, neither mail returned nor any report was came, then information regarding said post was sought from Chief Post Master vide Ex.P/6, upon which, information of Ex.P/7 & Ex.P/8 was sent in envelope (Ex.P/9) by the Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Raipur Division, Raipur, in which, it was stated that notice was delivered to given address on 17.11.2012. When accused did not pay the amount within 15 days of service, complainant filed a complaint on 07.12.2012 under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. 3. After the accused denied the charge, complainant got himself examined and exhibited 9 documents (Ex.P/1 to Ex.P/9). When accused did not pay the amount within 15 days of service, complainant filed a complaint on 07.12.2012 under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. 3. After the accused denied the charge, complainant got himself examined and exhibited 9 documents (Ex.P/1 to Ex.P/9). The statement of accused was recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., in which, she denied the circumstances appearing against her and pleaded innocence and false implication in the case. She has only stated that she had given a cheque as security. No evidence has been presented in defence by the accused. 4. After considering the facts and circumstances of the case as well as after hearing both the parties, learned Trial Court vide judgment dated 10.09.2015, convicted and sentenced the accused as mentioned in the first paragraph of this judgment. 5. Being aggrieved with the judgment dated 10.09.2015, accused has preferred an appeal before the First Appellant Court, in which, she has stated that Trial Court has committed error in arriving at such finding. After evaluating all the facts and circumstances of the case, learned First Appellate Court allowed the appeal filed by the accused by the judgment dated 31.01.2017 and acquitted the accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act with a finding that cheque in question (Ex.P/2) issued by the accused was dishonored and on the basis of legal notice and demand for amount, accused was not paid the amount. However, First Appellate Court has found that on the date when complainant asked the accused to give a loan, complainant was not registered as per law for doing the business of money lending as he was not hold a license, whereas, complainant himself has accepted the fact that he does the business of money lending by giving loans. In the above situation, First Appellate Court while referring to the provisions of Sections 11-F and 11-H of the Chhattisgarh Money Lenders Act, 1934 (hereinafter referred to as “Act of 1934”) has found that business of money lending without registration as a moneylender is prohibited under the law. In such situation, any suit before Civil Court for recovery of debt without registration and license has been prohibited. In such situation, any suit before Civil Court for recovery of debt without registration and license has been prohibited. Therefore, the loan, which complainant has stated to give does not fall within the scope of "legally enforceable debt or other liability" as mentioned in explanation of Section 138 of the N.I. Act and as such, conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court was set aside and accused was acquitted of the charges levelled against her under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that subject matter of “Chhattisgarh Money Lenders Act, 1934” comes under the State list, whereas subject matter of “Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881” comes under the Central list. Therefore, the law made by the Parliament under the Central list will be considered effectively. The provisions of the Act of 1934 determines the civil liability, whereas the provisions of Section 138 of the N.I. Act determines the criminal liability. In such a situation, the conclusion of First Appellate Court is not valid and justified. He would further submit that as per provisions of Section 2(vii)(e) of the Act of 1934, cheque has been excluded from the definition of “borrowing” or “loan”, hence, the provisions of the Act of 1934 does not create any hindrance on the action taken under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. Reliance has been placed on the judgment rendered by Delhi High Court in case of Virendra Singh v. Deepak Bhatia, Crl. L.P. No.491 of 2011 decided on 08.04.2011 as well the judgment rendered by Andhra Pradesh High Court in case of B. Mohan Krishna v. Union of India, 1996 CRI. L.J. 636 decided on 27.01.1995, to buttress his submissions. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent/accused would submit that First Appellate Court has properly deliberated and concluded as per the law. The decision of the Trial Court for convicting and sentencing the respondent was not fair in the eyes of law. Thus, there is no need for any interference with acquittal order passed by the First Appellate Court. He would further submit that arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant are not acceptable and as such, instant appeal against the acquittal deserves to be dismissed. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with utmost circumspection. 9. He would further submit that arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant are not acceptable and as such, instant appeal against the acquittal deserves to be dismissed. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with utmost circumspection. 9. The accused herself has admitted in her statement given under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. that she had issued the cheque to the complainant vide Ex.P/2. She further stated that the said cheque was issued as security. According to the provisions of Section 139 of the N.I. Act, presumption is made in favour of complainant stating that cheque has been obtained for full or partial redemption of any debt or other liability. The accused could not refute that said cheque was not meant for repayment of debt, but was meant as security. Fulfillment of other essential elements under Section 138 of the N.I. Act has not been challenged, hence, only question is to be considered for disposal of instant appeal is whether conclusion given by First Appellate Court is justified that the debt which was given by the complainant, was legally enforceable or not ? 10. The provisions contained in Section 138 of the N.I. Act, reads as follows for easy reference: 138. 10. The provisions contained in Section 138 of the N.I. Act, reads as follows for easy reference: 138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account- Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for (a term which may extend to two years), or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: Provided that nothing contained in the section shall apply unless- (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier; (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, (within thirty days) of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, “debt or other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.” 11. From bare reading of Section 138 of the N.I. Act, it is clear that said provision ensures criminal liability of a person issuing cheque, while civil remedy for recovery of any debt given is available and this provision has been designed to fix criminal liability. From bare reading of Section 138 of the N.I. Act, it is clear that said provision ensures criminal liability of a person issuing cheque, while civil remedy for recovery of any debt given is available and this provision has been designed to fix criminal liability. It is also clear that intention of Legislature was to determine criminal liability along with civil remedies. 12. The object of the provisions of Chhattisgarh Money Lenders Act, 1934 is evident to regularize and streamline the business of money lending, which is importantly related to determination of civil rights and liabilities. In such a situation, this Act will not have overriding effect on the provisions of the N.I. Act made by the Parliament in relation to the Central list. From this point of view, the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the appellant/complaint appears reasonable. 13. In case of Virendra Singh (supra), Hon’ble Delhi High Court has held in paragraph-7 as follows : “7. The loan as defined in Section 2(8) of the Act of 1938 specifically excludes an advance made on the basis of a negotiable instrument as defined in the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, other than a promissory note. The instant cases relate to an advance made by the Petitioner to the Respondent on the basis of the cheque which admittedly is a negotiable instrument. Thus, the bar of Section 3 of the Act of 1938 is not attracted to a loan given on the basis of a negotiable instrument, like a cheque. I am supported in this view by a judgment of the Supreme Court in Gajanan & Ors. v. Seth Brindaban, 1971(1) SCR 657 . Thus, the learned MM fell into error in dismissing the complaints and acquitting the Respondent solely on the ground that the complaint was barred under the provisions of the Act of 1938.” 14. The provisions of Section 11 of the Act of 1934, which was cited by First Appellate Court in passing its verdict of acquittal, had similar provisions in Punjab Registration of Moneylenders Act, 1938. In such a situation, considering the provisions of Section 138 of the N.I. Act and concept expressed in the said precedent, it is found that in the case at hand, the prohibition of the Act of 1934 is not attracted. 15. In such a situation, considering the provisions of Section 138 of the N.I. Act and concept expressed in the said precedent, it is found that in the case at hand, the prohibition of the Act of 1934 is not attracted. 15. In case of B. Mohan Krishna (supra), Hon’ble Andhra Pradesh High Court has expressed the concept regarding offence of cheque dishonor and held in paragraph-20 as follows : “20. The nature of the offence created by Section 138 of the Act although, incidentally, affects the relations between a debtor and a creditor, in its true nature and character - pith and substance - it does not encompass money-lending and money-lenders envisaged by entry 30 of List-II. It does not concern, in general, with either the business of money-lending or persons who carry on the business of money-lending or persons who carry on the business of money-lending. A statutory offence is created by Section 138 of the Act when a person issues a cheque for the discharge of whole or in part of any debt or other liability and if it is returned by the bank unpaid either because the amount of money standing to the credit of the account of the drawer is insufficient or the amount covered by the cheque is in excess of the amount to be paid from the account of the drawer by an agreement with the bank. Thus the limited sphere within which Section 138 of the Act operates cannot, by any stretch of reasoning, be approximated to or equated with money-lending or activities concerned with money-lenders. The section concerns with dishonour of cheques in certain circumstances and the resultant consequences. Banking and cheques (entries 45 and 46 of List-I) are thus primarily the matters covered by Section 138. Although, incidentally, the impugned legislation trenches upon debtor and creditor relationship, which is but an aspect of money-lending and money-lenders, it cannot be said that in its true nature and character, the legislation concerns with money-lenders and money-lending.” 16. If I consider the facts of the instant case in the light of above legal provisions and judicial precedents, it becomes clear that the object of Chhattisgarh Moneylenders Act, 1934 and the object of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 are different. The Act of 1934 is under the State list, hence it does not have overriding effect on the N.I. Act, which is under the Central list. The Act of 1934 is under the State list, hence it does not have overriding effect on the N.I. Act, which is under the Central list. Promissory note has been kept apart from definition of loan. The provisions of N.I. Act determines criminal liability. The complainant has presented sufficient evidence to fulfill the essential elements of the crime under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. It is not an essential element for the offence of cheque dishonor that if the complainant has given a loan, he/she should be registered and licensed under the Act of 1934. In such a situation, the finding of First Appellate Court is not found justified and is not worthy of being sustained. 17. For the foregoing reasons, instant acquittal appeal is allowed. The judgment of acquittal passed by the First Appellate Court is hereby set aside. The conviction of accused under Section 138 of the N.I. Act passed by the Trial Court is hereby confirmed. Insofar as the question of sentence is concerned, instant case is of the year 2011; almost 12 years have been elapsed, hence, punishment of imprisonment is not found appropriate. In such a situation, the sentence given by the Trial Court is cancelled and compensation amount is increased from Rs.3,00,000/- to Rs.6,00,000/-, which shall be deposited within a period of 60 days, in default of payment of compensation amount within the stipulated period, the respondent shall undergo simple imprisonment for 6 months. If the amount of compensation has been deposited, the same shall be adjusted. 18. Record of the Trial Court be sent back along with a copy of this judgment forthwith for information and necessary compliance.