JUDGMENT : SANJAY S. AGRAWAL, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred by the accused under Section 374 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(for short ‘the Cr.P.C.’) against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 31.01.2020, passed by the Special Judge [constituted under Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)] Act, 1989 (herein after referred to as ‘the Atrocities Act’) in Special Criminal Case No. 19/2019, whereby, the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under: CONVICTION SENTENCES U/s 363 of IPC R.I. for 3 years and fine of Rs. 5,000/- U/s 366 of IPC R.I. for 5 years and fine of Rs. 5,000/- U/s 376(2) ¼<½ of IPC R.I. for 10 years and fine of Rs. 10,000/- 376(3) of IPC R.I. for 20 years and fine of Rs.50,000/- In default of payment of fine R.I. for 1-1 year, in each offence. The sentences were directed to run concurrently. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that on 10.03.2018, a written report was lodged by the prosecutrix’s father before the Police Station, Antagrh, alleging inter-alia, that his minor daughter is missing from the house since 03.02.2018 and raised a doubt that someone else has abducted her. Based upon the said information, an offence punishable under Section 363 of IPC has been registered against an unknown person in connection with Crime No. 22/2018 and when the matter was being investigated, the prosecutrix returned home on 08.10.2018 and her statement was accordingly recorded, in which, it was stated that she came in contact with the appellant in the month of January 2018 and since then they used to talk with each other through mobile phones and on the fateful day, the appellant called her at Dallirajhara and she went there and thereafter, both went to Durg and later on, to Mumbai by Train and stayed in the Lodge for 7 months, and during this period, the appellant has committed sexual intercourse with her on several occasions. She states further that after 7 months, at her request, the appellant dropped her at Durg Station, from where she returned home by Bus. She states further that after 7 months, at her request, the appellant dropped her at Durg Station, from where she returned home by Bus. After recording her statement, an offence punishable under Sections 363, 366 and 376 of IPC and also under Sections 4 and 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012(for short the ‘POCSO Act’) read with Sections 3(1)(b) and 3(2)(v) of the Atrocities Act has been registered against the appellant, who was then arrested on 08.03.2019. The statement of the prosecutrix was recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C vide Ex.P-7 and was sent for her medical examination and Dr. Preeti Singh(PW-7), who examined her, recommended for obtaining the report from the Radiologist in order to ascertain her age. For collecting the information pertaining to her age, “Dakhil Kharij Register” was recovered from the Head Mistress of the concerned school and the birth Certificate was recovered from the prosecutrix’s parents. After collecting her vaginal slide and the semen of the appellant, it was sent for chemical examination and that by conducting the thorough investigation, a final report has been filed for the offence mentioned herein above and, after considering the same, the trial Court has framed the charges under Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(n) and 376(3) of IPC, under Section 6 of the POCSO Act read with Section 3(2)(v) of the Atrocities Act against the appellant, who denied the charges so framed and claimed to be tried. 3. In order to bring home the guilt of the accused/appellant, the prosecution has examined as many as 17 witnesses and exhibited 42 documents, while none was examined by the appellant in rebuttal. 4. After considering the evidence led by the prosecution, the appellant has been found to be guilty of the alleged offence and accordingly, he has been convicted and sentenced by the learned trial Court for the offence punishable under Sections 363, 366, 376 and 376(3) of IPC, while acquitted him under Section 3(2)(v) of the Atrocities Act. In consequence, he has been convicted and sentenced by the learned trial Court for the offence as mentioned herein above. Being aggrieved, the appellant has preferred this appeal. 5. In consequence, he has been convicted and sentenced by the learned trial Court for the offence as mentioned herein above. Being aggrieved, the appellant has preferred this appeal. 5. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the finding of the court below holding that the prosecutrix was a minor at the time of occurrence of the alleged incident, is apparently contrary to law as the prosecution has not adduced any evidence in order to show that on what basis the date of birth of the prosecutrix was recorded in her School record. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the State/respondent has supported the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence as passed by the trial Court. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire record carefully. 8. The prosecutrix was examined as PW-1 and according to her statement, she came in contact with the appellant in the year 2018 and they started talking with each other for about 1 year on their mobile phones. She deposed further that the appellant took her to Kolkata for solemnizing the marriage with her and she stayed along with him at his brother-in -law’s house for a period of 8 months and thereafter, she came back to her home and her father took her to Police Station, Antagarh and during enquiry, it was deposed by her that she has incorrectly informed that the appellant has taken her to the said place forcefully. It was stated further that after staying at home for 2-3 days, she again went to the house of the appellant at Kolkata, where she stayed with him for 3 months. In her cross-examination, it was stated that they lived for 8 months as husband and wife and it was deposed further that her relation with him was made voluntarily. 9. Prosecutrix’s father was examined as PW-2, who lodged the written report (Ex.P-8) on 10.03.2018 before the Police Station, Antagarh by saying that his daughter has gone with someone else since 03.02.2018 without intimating to anyone of his family member. 9. Prosecutrix’s father was examined as PW-2, who lodged the written report (Ex.P-8) on 10.03.2018 before the Police Station, Antagarh by saying that his daughter has gone with someone else since 03.02.2018 without intimating to anyone of his family member. It is stated further that the Mark-sheet (Ex.P-11) of class 8th standard of his daughter was provided by him to the concerned police, while the birth certificate (Ex.P-13) issued by the competent authority under the Registration of Birth and Death Act,1969 (herein after referred to as ‘the act of 1969’) was seized from him on 12.03.2018 vide seizure memo (Ex.P-14), wherein, the date of birth of his daughter has been shown to be as ‘01.03.2003’. 10. Heera Bai Sahu (PW-4) is the Head Mistress of the Primary School, Kondagaon, from whose possession, the “Dakhil Kharij Register” (entry register), Ex.P-22-C, was seized vide Ex.P-23, wherein, the date of birth of the prosecutrix has been shown to be as ‘01.03.2003’ as was mentioned in the said birth certificate. It was stated by her that the alleged entry was made as per the information provided by her parents. 11. Dr. Preeti Singh (PW-7), who examined the prosecutrix, has referred her to the Radiologist for determination of her age vide her report (Ex.P-3) and Dr.K.K.Shori (PW-11), who is the Radiologist, opined the age of the prosecutrix to be between 16 -18 years vide his report (Ex.P-30). 12. What is, therefore, reflected from the aforesaid evidence of the prosecution witnesses that the prosecutrix has left the house on 03.02.2018 without informing anyone of the family member and, the report (Ex.P-8) was thereafter, lodged by her father (PW-2) only on 10.03.2018, i.e. more than a month after her leaving the house. It appears further from the testimony of the prosecutrix that she had remained with the appellant for a considerable period of 8 months and came back to her home only on 08.10.2018 and, it appears further that after staying at home only for 2-3 days, she again went along with the appellant to his brother-in-law’s house at Kolkata, where she stayed for about 3 months. It was also revealed from her testimony that she lived with him voluntarily as husband and wife and her relation was made with him on her own wish. It was also revealed from her testimony that she lived with him voluntarily as husband and wife and her relation was made with him on her own wish. The conduct of the prosecutrix would, thus, show that she was neither abducted nor was taken by the appellant forcefully from the custody of her parents and instead, she was found to be with him on her own wish all the times. In view thereof, we do not find that the appellant has either abducted her or has committed sexual intercourse without her consent as alleged by the prosecution. 13. In view of above, the focal point for decision would now be the age of the prosecutrix in order to determine as to whether she was major as to give her consent on the date of occurrence of the alleged incident, which took place on 03.02.2018 up to 08.10.2018. 14. From perusal of the record, it appears that the prosecutrix was examined by Dr.Preeti Singh (PW-7), who after her examination referred to the Radiologist for determination of her age and according to the report (Ex.P-30) of the Radiologist-Dr. K.K. Shori (PW-11), her age was found to be between 16-18 years. The “Dakhil Kharij Register” marked as Ex.P-22-C, submitted by the Head Mistress of the Primary School, Kondagaon, would reveal her date of birth as 01.03.2003, which was recorded on the basis of the information furnished by her parents. 15. It appears further that the birth certificate (Ex.P-13) issued by the Registrar, appointed under Section 7 of the Act of 1969, under Section 12 and 17 of the said Act was seized from the father of the prosecutrix and according to it, her date of birth has been shown to be as ‘01.03.2003’. It is to be noted here that the alleged certificate (Ex.P-13) was issued on 08.09.2016 under the said statute much prior to the occurrence of the alleged incident. Therefore, it cannot be presumed that it was obtained with an ulterior motive in order to implicate the appellant for the commission of alleged offence. That apart, the authenticity of the said certificate (Ex.P-13) issued under the said statute has not been questioned by the appellant and the entries made therein pertaining to her date of birth is a relevant one as per the provisions prescribed under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. That apart, the authenticity of the said certificate (Ex.P-13) issued under the said statute has not been questioned by the appellant and the entries made therein pertaining to her date of birth is a relevant one as per the provisions prescribed under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The said provision is relevant for the purpose, which reads as under: “35. Relevancy of entry in public [record or an electronic record] made in performance of duty - An entry in any public or other official book, register or [record or an electronic record], stating a fact in issue or relevant fact, and made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which such book, register, or [record or an electronic record] is kept, is itself a relevant fact.” 16. According to the aforesaid provision, it is, thus, evident that a register maintained in the ordinary course of business by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoyed by the law, in which, such register is kept, would be a relevant fact. While interpreting the said provision, it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi vs. State of U.P. (2006) 5 SCC 584 at paragraph 23, which is relevant for the purpose reads as under: “23. Section 35 of the Evidence Act would be attracted both in civil and criminal proceedings. The Evidence Act does not make any distinction between a civil proceeding and a criminal proceeding. Unless specifically provided for, in terms of Section 35 of the Evidence Act, the register maintained in the ordinary course of business by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which, inter-alia, such register is kept would be a relevant fact. Section 35, thus, requires the following conditions to be fulfilled before a document is held to be admissible thereunder: (i) it should be in the nature of the entry in any public or official register; (ii) it must state a fact in issue or relevant fact; (iii) entry must be made either by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country and (iv) all persons concerned indisputably must have an access thereto.” 17. In view of the aforesaid principles, it is, thus, evident that an entry made by the concerned official in the discharge of his official duty, is admissible under the aforesaid provision and it is not necessary to examine the official, who has made the said entry. At this juncture, the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of Harpal Singh and Another vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1981) 1 SCC 560 is to be seen, wherein it has been held at Para-3 as under: “3...................There is yet another document, viz. Ex. PD, a certified copy of the relevant entry in the birth register which shows that Saroj Kumari, who according to her evidence was known as Ramesh during her childhood, was born to Lajwanti wife of Daulat Ram on November 11, 1957. Mr. Hardy submitted that in the absence of the examination of the officer/Chowkidar concerned who recorded the entry, it was inadmissible in evidence. We cannot agree with him for the simple reason that the entry was made by the concerned official in the discharge of his official duties, that it is therefore clearly admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act and that it is not necessary for the prosecution to examine its author.” 18. In view of the above, the certificate as to date of birth issued by the Registrar under Sections 12 and 17 of the Act of 1969, is therefore, admissible under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 19. In the light of the aforesaid principles and in view of the facts observed herein above, it is evident that the prosecutrix was 14 years and 11 months old at the relevant point of time and was, thus, a minor. Therefore, her consent would be of no use. 20. 19. In the light of the aforesaid principles and in view of the facts observed herein above, it is evident that the prosecutrix was 14 years and 11 months old at the relevant point of time and was, thus, a minor. Therefore, her consent would be of no use. 20. In view of the aforesaid background, the trial court has not committed any illegality in convicting the appellant for the offence punishable under Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(n) and 376(3) of IPC and, we accordingly affirm the same. The appeal being devoid of merits is accordingly dismissed.