JUDGMENT : Bhuwan Goyal, J. 1- vihykFkhZx.k&vfHkqDrx.k }kjk izLrqr vihysa] fo}ku fopkj.k U;k;ky; vij ls'ku U;k;k/kh'k ¼QkLV Vªsd½] Vksad ¼jktLFkku½ }kjk ls'ku izdj.k la[;k 33@2011] muokuh izdj.k jktLFkku jkT; cuke 'kkfdj oxSjg esa ikfjr fu.kZ; ,oa n.Mkns'k fnukad 26-06-2012 ds fo:) izLrqr dh xbZ gS] ftlds }kjk fo}ku fopkj.k U;k;ky; }kjk vihykFkhZx.k&vfHkqDrx.k dks nks"kfl) fd;k tkdj fuEukuqlkj nf.Mr fd;k x;k gS%& vihykFkhZ&vfHkqDRk 'kkfdj ¼vihy la[;k&729@2012½ /kkjk ltk vFkZn.M vne vnk;xh vFkZn.M 302 ,oa 120ch Hkk-na-la vkthou dkjkokl 1000@&#i, 02 ekg dk lk/kkj.k dkjkokl 342 Hkk-na-la 06 ekg dk lk/kkj.k dkjkokl 100@&#i,</td> <td valign="top" style="border-left: medium none; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0cm; padding-bottom: 0cm"> 15 fnol dk lk/kkj.k dkjkokl</td> </tr> <tr> <td valign="top" style="border-left: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0cm; padding-bottom: 0cm"> 377 Hkk-na-la</td> <td valign="top" style="border-left: medium none; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0cm; padding-bottom: 0cm"> 07 o"kZ dk lk/kkj.k dkjkokl</td> <td valign="top" style="border-left: medium none; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0cm; padding-bottom: 0cm"> 1000@&#i,</td> <td valign="top" style="border-left: medium none; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0cm; padding-bottom: 0cm"> 02 ekg dk lk/kkj.k dkjkokl</td> </tr> <tr> <td valign="top" style="border-left: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0cm; padding-bottom: 0cm"> 201 Hkk-na-la</td> <td valign="top" style="border-left: medium none; border-right: 1.0pt solid windowtext; border-top: medium none; border-bottom: 1.0pt solid windowtext; padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-top: 0cm; padding-bottom: 0cm"> <a href='00100010186'>AIR 1957 SC 637</a></a>, Sarwan Singh Vs. State of Punjab 2. <a href='00100021295'>AIR 1988 SC 599</a>, Chandan & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan 3. 1994 Supp (2) SCC 73, Rampal Pithwa Rahidas & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra 4. 2006 (13) SCC 210, Francis Stanley Alias Stalin Vs. Intelligence Officer Narcotics Control Bureau 5. <a href='00100064969'>2020 (7) SCC 722</a>, Somma Sundaram Alias Somu Vs. The State Rep. By The Deputy Commissioner of Police 6. 2008 Criminal Law Journal H.P. 1988, Santosh Kumar & Ors. Vs. H.P. 7. Criminal. A.S. No. 2460-SB of 2008 (O&M), High Court of Punjab & Harayana, Karambir Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Harayana 8. S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 1348/2015 Decided on 15.04.2015, Surendra Kumar Vs. State of Rajasthan</UL>16- blds foijhr fo}ku vfrfjDr egkf/koDrk us nkSjkus cgl dFku fd;k gS fd fo}ku fopkj.k U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr vkykSP; vkns'k] i=koyh ij miyC/k leLr lk{; dk lEiw.kZ :i ls foospu djrs gq, ikfjr fd;k x;k gS] ftlesa fdlh izdkj dh dksbZ fof/kd ,oa rkfRod =qfV ugha gS] vr% vihykFkhZx.k }kjk izLrqr vihysa vLohdkj dj vihykFkhZx.k&vfHk;qDrx.k dh nks"kflf) dks ;Fkkor~ j[kk tkosaA17- geus vihyh; i=kofy;ksa o fo}ku fopkj.k U;k;ky; dh i=koyh dk lEekuiwoZd voyksdu fd;kA ekuuh; loksZPp U;k;ky; ,oa mPp U;k;ky; }kjk viwzoj ¼lg&vijk/kh½ ,oa mldh lk{; ds lUnHkZ esa vius fuEukafdr U;kf;d n`"Vkarksa ds ek/;e ls ;g izfrikfnr fd;k x;k gS%&<UL>(i) Ram Narain Vs. State of Bihar (https://indiankanoon.org /doc/1020504) ".....an approver is participes criminis i.e. someone who was part of the crime but has now agreed to give evidence against the co-accomplice and has sought pardon for himself in return of giving such evidence. However, this also makes an approver’s testimony doubtful and thus cannot be considered a fair witness. There always exists a chance that the approver may provide false evidence in order to sought the pardon for himself as a reason of which, the courts must as a matter of prudence and caution anxiously look for some corroboration in order to ascertain the authenticity and reliability of such evidence. (ii) Sarwan Singh Vs. The State of Punjab (SC), Cri. Appeals Nos, 22 and 23 of 1957, Decided on: 10.04.1957. ds fcUnq la[;k&7 esa ;g vo/kkfjr fd;k gS fd%&"7. On behalf of Harbans Singh, it has been urged before us by Mr. (ii) Sarwan Singh Vs. The State of Punjab (SC), Cri. Appeals Nos, 22 and 23 of 1957, Decided on: 10.04.1957. ds fcUnq la[;k&7 esa ;g vo/kkfjr fd;k gS fd%&"7. On behalf of Harbans Singh, it has been urged before us by Mr. Kohli that the judgment of the High Court of Punjab suffers from a serious infirmity in that, in dealing with the evidence of the approver, the learned Judges do not appear to have addressed themselves to the preliminary question as to whether the approver is a reliable witness or not. The problem posed by the evidence given by an approver has been considered by the Privy Council and courts in India on several occasions. It is hardly necessary to deal at length with the true legal position in this matter. An accomplice is undoubtedly a competent witness under the Indian Evidence Act. There can be, however, no doubt that the very fact that he has participated in the commission of the offence introduces a serious stain in his evidence and courts are naturally reluctant to act on such tainted evidence unless it is corroborated in material particulars by other independent evidence. It would not be right to expect that such independent corroboration should cover the whole of the prosecution story or even all the material particulars. If such a view is adopted it would render the evidence of the accomplice wholly superfluous. On the other hand, it would not be safe to act upon such evidence merely because it is corroborated in minor particulars or incidental details because, in such a case, corroboration does not afford the necessary assurance that the main story disclosed by the approver can be reasonably and safely accepted as true. But it must never be forgotten that before the court reaches the stage of considering the question of corroboration and its adequacy or otherwise, the first initial and essential question to consider is whether even as an accomplice the approver is a reliable witness. If the answer to this question is against the approver then there is an end of the matter, and no question as to whether his evidence is corroborated or not falls to be considered. In other words, the appreciation of an approver's evidence has to satisfy a double test. If the answer to this question is against the approver then there is an end of the matter, and no question as to whether his evidence is corroborated or not falls to be considered. In other words, the appreciation of an approver's evidence has to satisfy a double test. His evidence must show that he is a reliable witness and that is a test which is common to all witnesses. If this test is satisfied the second test which still remains to be applied is that the approver's evidence must receive sufficient corroboration. This test is special to the cases of weak or tainted evidence like that of the approver. Mr. Kohli's contention is that since the learned Judges of the High Court of Punjab have failed to address themselves to this initial question, their appreciation of the approver's evidence suffers from a serious infirmity. In our opinion, this contention is well-founded. We have carefully read the judgment delivered by the High Court but we find no indication in the whole of the judgment that the learned Judges considered the character of the approver's evidence and reached the conclusion that it was the evidence given by a reliable witness. The only statement which we find in the judgment dealing with this topic is that "since the main evidence in the case consists of the testimony of the approver it is necessary to consider the case of each appellant individually." With respect, this observation is open to the criticism which has been made against it by Mr. Kohli." (iii) Chandra Prakash Vs. State of Rajasthan (SC), Cri. Appeal No. 1155 of 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) 4419 of 2009), Decided on: 09.05.2014. "133. Accomplice.-An accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person; and a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Illustration (b) to Section 114 (b) The Court may presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated in material particulars. 36. "133. Accomplice.-An accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person; and a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Illustration (b) to Section 114 (b) The Court may presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated in material particulars. 36. The aforesaid two provisions came to be considered in Bhiva Doulu Patil v. State of Maharashtra, MANU/SC/0141/1962 : <a href='00100011574'>AIR 1963 SC 599</a> wherein the Court held as follows: The combined effect of Sections 133 and Illustration (b) to Section 114, may be stated as follows: According to the former, which is a Rule of law, an accomplice is competent to give evidence and according to the latter, which is a Rule of practice it is almost always unsafe to convict upon his testimony alone. Therefore, though the conviction of an accused on the testimony of an accomplice cannot be said to be illegal yet the courts will, as a matter of practice, not accept the evidence of such a witness without corroboration in material particulars. 37. In Mohd. Husain Umar Kochra etc. v. K.S. Dalipsinghji and Anr. etc. MANU/SC/0123/1969 : <a href='00100013789'>(1969) 3 SCC 429</a>, the Court observed thus: ...The combined effect of Sections 133 and 114, Illustration (b) is that though a conviction based upon accomplice evidence is legal, the Court will not accept such evidence unless it is corroborated in material particulars. The corroboration must connect the accused with the crime. It may be direct or circumstantial. It is not necessary that the corroboration should confirm all the circumstances of the crime. It is sufficient if the corroboration is in material particulars. The corroboration must be from an independent source. One accomplice cannot corroborate another. 38. Having stated the legal position with regard to the statutory provisions, presently we shall proceed to consider the requisite tests to be applied to accept the credibility of the testimony of the approver. At this juncture, we may sit in a time machine and quote a passage from Sarwan Singh S/o Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab, MANU/SC/0038/1957 : <a href='00100010186'><a href='00100010186'>AIR 1957 SC 637</a></a> wherein it has been held as follows: ...An accomplice is undoubtedly a competent witness under the Indian Evidence Act. At this juncture, we may sit in a time machine and quote a passage from Sarwan Singh S/o Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab, MANU/SC/0038/1957 : <a href='00100010186'><a href='00100010186'>AIR 1957 SC 637</a></a> wherein it has been held as follows: ...An accomplice is undoubtedly a competent witness under the Indian Evidence Act. There can be, however, no doubt that the very fact that he has participated in the commission of the offence introduces a serious stain in his evidence and Courts are naturally reluctant to act on such tainted evidence unless it is corroborated in material particulars by other independent evidence. It would not be right to expect that such independent corroboration should cover the whole of the prosecution story or even all the material particulars. If such a view is adopted it would render the evidence of the accomplice wholly superfluous. On the other hand, it would not be safe to act upon such evidence merely because it is corroborated in minor particulars or incidental details because, in such a case, corroboration does not afford the necessary assurance that the main story disclosed by the approver can be reasonably and safely accepted as true. But it must never be forgotten that before the court reaches the stage of considering the question of corroboration and its adequacy or otherwise, the first initial and essential question to consider is whether even as an accomplice the approver is a reliable witness. If the answer to this question is against the approver then there is an end of the matter, and no question as to whether his evidence is corroborated or not falls to be considered. In other words, the appreciation of an approver's evidence has to satisfy a double test. His evidence must show that he is a reliable witness and that is a test which is common to all witnesses. If this test is satisfied the second test which still remains to be applied is that the approver's evidence must receive sufficient corroboration. This test is special to the cases of weak or tainted evidence like that of the approver. 8....Every person who is a competent witness is not a reliable witness and the test of reliability has to be satisfied by an approver all the more before the question of corroboration of his evidence is considered by criminal courts. 39. This test is special to the cases of weak or tainted evidence like that of the approver. 8....Every person who is a competent witness is not a reliable witness and the test of reliability has to be satisfied by an approver all the more before the question of corroboration of his evidence is considered by criminal courts. 39. In Ravinder Singh v. State of Haryana, MANU/SC/0199/1975 : <a href='00100016473'>(1975) 3 SCC 742</a>, this Court has observed that: An approver is a most unworthy friend, if at all, and he, having bargained for his immunity, must prove his worthiness for credibility in court. This test is fulfilled, firstly, if the story he relates involves him in the crime and appears intrinsically to be a natural and probable catalogue of events that had taken place. ... Secondly, once that hurdle is crossed, the story given by an approver so far as the accused on trial is concerned, must implicate him in such a manner as to give rise to a conclusion of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 42. In Chandan and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan, MANU/SC/0063/1988 : <a href='00100021295'>(1988) 1 SCC 696</a>, the Court held that so far as the question about the conviction based on the testimony of the accomplice is concerned, the law is settled and it is established as a rule of prudence that the conviction could only be based on the testimony of the accomplice if it is thought reliable as a whole and if it is corroborated by independent evidence either direct or circumstantial, connecting the accused with the crime. 43. In Haroon Haji Abdulla v. State of Maharashtra, MANU/SC/0060/1967 : <a href='00100013318'>AIR 1968 SC 832</a>, the view in this regard was expressed in the following terms: An accomplice is a competent witness and his evidence could be accepted and a conviction based on it if there is nothing significant to reject it as false. But the rule of prudence, ingrained in the consideration of accomplice evidence, requires independent corroborative evidence first of the offence and next connecting the accused, against whom the accomplice evidence is used, with the crime. 45. In Renuka Bai alias Rinku alias Ratan and Anr. But the rule of prudence, ingrained in the consideration of accomplice evidence, requires independent corroborative evidence first of the offence and next connecting the accused, against whom the accomplice evidence is used, with the crime. 45. In Renuka Bai alias Rinku alias Ratan and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, MANU/SC/8457/2006 : <a href='00100038744'>(2006) 7 SCC 442</a>, the Court held that the evidence of the approver is always to be viewed with suspicion especially when it is seriously suspected that he is suppressing some material facts. 46. In Ranjeet Singh and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan, MANU/SC/0410/1988 : (1988) 1 SCC 633, the Court observed that while looking for corroboration, one must first look at the broad spectrum of the approver's version and then find out whether there is other evidence to lend assurance to that version. The nature and extent of the corroboration may depend upon the facts of each case and the corroboration need not be of any direct evidence that the accused committed the crime. The corroboration even by circumstantial evidence may be sufficient. 53. In Anter Singh v. State of Rajasthan, MANU/SC/0096/2004 : <a href='00100008458'>(2004) 10 SCC 657</a>, after referring to the decisions in Madan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, MANU/SC/0126/1978 : <a href='00100017967'>(1978) 4 SCC 435</a>, Mohd. Aslam v. State of Maharashtra, MANU/SC/2255/2000 : <a href='00100005121'>(2001) 9 SCC 362</a>, Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor, MANU/PR/0049/1946 : <a href='00100055952'>AIR 1947 PC 67</a>, Prabhoo v. State of U.P., MANU/SC/0123/1962 : <a href='00100011641'>AIR 1963 SC 1113</a> and Mohd. Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra, MANU/SC/0166/1975 : <a href='00100016847'>(1976) 1 SCC 828</a>, this Court summed up the following principles: 16. The various requirements of the section can be summed up as follows: (1) The fact of which evidence is sought to be given must be relevant to the issue. It must be borne in mind that the provision has nothing to do with the question of relevancy. The relevancy of the fact discovered must be established according to the prescriptions relating to relevancy of other evidence connecting it with the crime in order to make the fact discovered admissible. (2) The fact must have been discovered. (3) The discovery must have been in consequence of some information received from the accused and not by the accused's own act. (4) The person giving the information must be accused of any offence. (2) The fact must have been discovered. (3) The discovery must have been in consequence of some information received from the accused and not by the accused's own act. (4) The person giving the information must be accused of any offence. (5) He must be in the custody of a police officer. (6) The discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from an accused in custody must be deposed to. (7) Thereupon only that portion of the information which relates distinctly or strictly to the fact discovered can be proved. The rest is inadmissible."(iv) State of Bihar Vs. Srilal Kejriwal and Ors. (HC Patna), Govt. Appeal No. 6 of 1957, Decided on: 26.04.1960. "29. Nathuram Sharma of Bhiyani, in the district of Hissar, (P. W. 38) who is the bhagina of the approver has deposed that in the middle of July 1953 Udami Maharaj came to his house in Bhiyani. The witness found his uncle to be depressed and upset. On his enquiry Udami Maharaj narrated the entire occurrence to him. The motive for the occurrence, the manner in which the godown was set fire to and the names of all the participant; in the crime formed the subject of this disclosure. This statement was made by Udami Maharaj as early as could reasonably be expected in the circumstances of the case and is undoubtedly admissible under Section 157 of the Evidence Act although the evidentiary value of the statement, emanating from the same tainted source, is not very high. The learned Judge was of the view that this witness must in law be deemed to have been an accomplice, and hence no reliance should be placed upon his testimony. In this connection he has referred to the case of Ismail v. Emperor AIR 1947 Lah 220. According to the learned judge since the witness had harboured the approver even after the disclosure he must be deemed to have been an accessory after the fact. The ruling relied upon by the learned Judge, however, does not support him. In this connection he has referred to the case of Ismail v. Emperor AIR 1947 Lah 220. According to the learned judge since the witness had harboured the approver even after the disclosure he must be deemed to have been an accessory after the fact. The ruling relied upon by the learned Judge, however, does not support him. as has been pointed out in this case, to constitute a crime the act must, except in the case of certain statutory crimes, be accompanied by a criminal intent or by such negligence or in difference to duty or to consequences as is regarded by the law as equivalent to criminal intent. The term accomplice" has been explained in this case as follows: 'The expression accomplice' has not been defined in the Evidence Act, but there can be little doubt that it means a person who knowingly or voluntarily co-operates with or aids, and assists another in the commission of a crime". Referring to the Privy Council decision in Mahadeo v. The King <a href='00100055861'>AIR 1936 P.C. 242</a>, Bhandari J., who delivered the judgment, points out that three conditions must unite to render one an accessory after the fact, viz., that the felony must be complete that the accessory must have knowledge that the principal committed the felony, and that the accessory must harbour Or assist the principal felon, He then observes: "Mere acts of charity which relieve or comfort a felon, but do not hinder his apprehension and conviction nor aid his escape, do not render one an accessory after the fact (4 Blackstone's commentaries p. 38). He must be proved to have done some act to assist the felon personally R. v. Chappie (1840) 9 C and P. 355. The mere fact, that one had knowledge that a crime had been committed, and that he concealed or failed to disclose such knowledge, does not render him an accomplice. If, for example, the concealment is due to the witness's anxiety for his own safety rather than to any desire to shield the criminal, he would not be an accomplice. Nor would be a person who remains passively silent after obtaining knowledge of the commission of the crime be an accessory or an accomplice within the rule as to the testimony of accomplices. To render a person an accomplice his participation in the crime must be criminally corrupt". Nor would be a person who remains passively silent after obtaining knowledge of the commission of the crime be an accessory or an accomplice within the rule as to the testimony of accomplices. To render a person an accomplice his participation in the crime must be criminally corrupt". Judged by these tests it is impossible to urge that Nathuram Sharma was an accomplice. The evidence shows that he is a student and a Junior member of the family. The approver's visit must have been taken by the witness to be a visit by a near relation suggest that he him with a criminal intent. I am unable, therefore, to hold that the witness is an accomplice. As, however, pointed out before, the evidence of this witness is not of much probative value since he has deposed only to the statement of the approver himself. I am unable, therefore, to hold that the witness is an accomplice. As, however, pointed out before, the evidence of this witness is not of much probative value since he has deposed only to the statement of the approver himself. There is, however, no bar to the statement of the approver being used as corroboration, whatever be the value of his evidence in court."</UL>18- izLrqr U;kf;d n`"Vkarksa ,oa mijksDr U;kf;d n`"Vkarksa esa izfrikfnr fl)karksa ds ifjizs{; esa geus i=koyh dk lEekuiwoZd ,oa xgurkiwoZd voyksdu fd;k rFkk mHk;i{kksa ds rdksZa ij euu fd;kA19- gLrxr ekeysa esa i=koyh ij miyC/k lk{; ls ,oa nkSjkus cgl fd, x, dFkuksa ls ;g Lohd`r rF; gS fd ?kVuk ds laca/k esa izdj.k esa dksbZ p'enhn lk{kh ugha gS rFkk mDr izdj.k vizwoj eqthc ds c;ku ,oa ifjfLFkfrtU; lk{; ij vk/kkfjr gS] bl lanHkZ esa vuqla/kku vf/kdkjh lk{kh ih-MCY;w 34 fd'kksj cqVksfy;k }kjk viuh izfrj{kk esa Hkh ;g Lohdkj fd;k x;k gS fd ?kVuk dk dksbZ p'enhn lk{kh ugha gS rFkk lkFk gh ;g Hkh Lohdkj fd;k x;k gS fd mlus izn'kZ ih&61 tks fd xokg }kjk eq[; U;kf;d eftLVsªV dks eqthc dks lqYrkuh xokg cukus gsrq izLrqr fd;k x;k gS] mlesa bl ckr dk vadu fd;k gS fd ?kVuk dk dksbZ p'enhn lk{kh ugha gS] bl lwjr esa eqdnek gktk esa lQyrk dh xqatkbZ'k de gS] ftlls vuqla/kku vf/kdkjh ds dFkukuqlkj Hkh gLrxr izdj.k esa ?kVuk ds lanHkZ esa dksbZ p'enhn lk{kh uk gksuk izdV gksrk gSA20- ekuuh; loksZPp U;k;ky; }kjk vius mijksDr U;kf;d n`"Vkarksa ds ek/;e ls ;g vfHkfu/kkZfjr fd;k x;k gS fd ;|fi vizwoj ¼lg&vijk/kh½ ,d l{ke lk{kh gksrk gS] fdarq pwafd mlds }kjk ?kVuk dks djus esa Hkkx ,oa lg;ksx fy;k tkrk gS] ,sls esa mlds }kjk nh xbZ lk{; dks lansg dh n`f"V ls ns[kk tkuk pkfg,] D;ksafd mlds dFkuksa esa iw.kZ fo'oluh;rk ugha gksrh gS rFkk fdlh ekeysa esa vizwoj ds dFku ds Øe esa vfHk;qDrx.k dks nks"kfl) djrs le; i=koyh ij vfHk;qDrx.k dh nks"kflf) gsrq vU; lEiqf"Vdkjd lk{; gksuh vko';d gS] muds }kjk ;g Hkh vo/kkfjr fd;k x;k gS fd izR;sd ekeysa esa U;k;ky; dks vizwoj dh lk{; ij fopkj djrs oDr loZizFke ;g ns[kuk pkfg, fd D;k mldh mDr lk{; Lora= ,oa fo'oluh; gS rFkk ;fn U;k;ky; ;g ikrk gS fd mDr lk{; Lora= ,oa fo'oluh; gS] rks fQj U;k;ky; dks mlesa vkxs ;g ns[kuk t:jh gS fd D;k mDr lk{; dh lEiqf"V djus gsrq vU; lk{; i=koyh ij fo|eku gS rFkk izdj.k esa vizwoj }kjk fd, x, dFku dh iqf"V i=koyh ij miyC/k vU; lk{; ls dM+h ls dM+h cukrs gq, gks jgh gS ;k ugha rFkk mDr nksuksa fcUnq izekf.kr gksus ij gh vizwoj dh lk{; ds vk/kkj ij fdlh ekeysa esa vfHk;qDrx.k dks nks"kfl) fd;k tk ldrk gSA21- gLrxr izdj.k esa ;fn vizwoj eqthc dh lk{; ij fopkj djs rks vizwoj eqthc }kjk gLrxr izdj.k esa vius U;k;ky; ds le{k c;kuksa esa ;g dFku fd;k x;k gS fd og 22 ekpZ dks cl LVS.M ls gksdj vdsyk ?kj tk jgk Fkk] jkLrs esa mls 'kkfdj] ijost] foDdh feys] tks rhuksa gkFkkikbZ dj jgs Fks] oks mudks igys ls tkurk Fkk mlus iwNk fd yM+kbZ D;ks dj jgs gks rks 'kkfdj us mls ogka ls tkus ds fy, dgk rFkk ;g Hkh crk;k fd foDdh ds mldh ?kjokyh ds lkFk uktk;t laca/k gS] fQj 'kkfdj us vius dkjhxj eksbZu dks Qksu fd;k vkSj mls dgk fd mlds HkkbZ [kkfyn dks ysdj ihyh Vadh ds ikl vk tk foDdh dks etk p[kkuk gS] 15&20 feuV ds ckn eksbZu o [kkfyn ogka vk, vkSj foDdh ds lkFk ekjihV 'kq: dj nh rFkk fQj pkjksa 'kkfdj] [kkfyn] ijost] eksbZu us foDdh ds lkFk ekjihV 'kq: dj nh] 'kkfdj us foDdh ds lkFk cqjk dke fd;k] pUnzizdk'k us foDdh ds lkFk cqjk dke fd;k rFkk 'kkfdj us foDdh ds eqag esa IykfLVd dh FkSfy;ka ?kqlk nh] [kkfyn us lhus ij ?kqVuk j[kdj xyk nck fn;k rFkk fQj bu ikapksa us mls ukys esa QSad fn;k] mlus ?kVuk 8&10 fQV dh nwjh ls ns[kh Fkh] og ?kVuk ds ckn ?kj Hkkx x;k Fkk rFkk ?kj tkdj lks x;kA bl izdkj vizwoj eqthc }kjk vius mDr c;kuksa esa mlds }kjk] ek= ?kVuk ns[kus rFkk rFkkdfFkr ?kVuk dks dkfjr djus esa mlds }kjk Hkkx ugha ysus dk dFku fd;k x;k gS] gekjh fouez jk; esa vizwoj ¼lg&vijk/kh½ dh ifjHkk"kk esa vkus ds fy, loZizFke ml O;fDr dks fdlh Hkh :i esa ml ?kVuk esa Hkkx ysuk vFkok ?kVuk dks dkfjr djus esa lg;ksx djuk vko';d gksrk gSA vuqla/kku vf/kdkjh ih-MCY;w 34 fd'kksj cqVksfy;k }kjk Hkh viuh izfrijh{kk esa vizwoj ds lanHkZ esa ;g dFku fd;k x;k gS fd ;g lgh gS fd ljdkjh xokg og O;fDr gksrk gS] ftlus fdlh vijk/k esa fdlh u fdlh :i esa Hkkx fy;k gks] ;g lgh gS fd ,-Mh-ih- lkgc Vksad us eqthc ds /kkjk 164 na-iz-la- ds c;kuksa ds voyksdu ds ckn viuh jk; esa mls ;g crk;k Fkk fd dkuwuu :i ls eqthc ljdkjh xokg dh ifjHkk"kk esa ugha vkrk gS] D;ksafd mlus Lo;a dks vkjksfir vijk/k ds laca/k esa funksZ"k o lfEefyr gksus dk dFku fdlh Hkh :i esa O;Dr ugha fd;k gS] ,slh lwjr esa og vfHk;qDr vizwoj ¼ljdkjh xokg½ dh ifjHkk"kk esa ugha vkrk gSA bl lanHkZ esa gLrxr izdj.k esa U;kf;d n`"Vkarksa State of Bihar Vs. Srilal Kejriwal and Ors. (Supra) ,oa Ram Narain Vs. Srilal Kejriwal and Ors. (Supra) ,oa Ram Narain Vs. State of Bihar (Supra) ds ifjizs{; esa eqthc dk ?kVuk dks dkfjr djus esa Hkkx ugha ysus ls ;|fi mldk vizwoj ¼lg&vijk/kh½ dh ifjHkk"kk esa vkuk izFken`"V~;k izdV ugha gksrk gS] fdUrq vc izLrqr ekeys esa gesa ;g ns[kuk gS fd D;k mlds }kjk U;k;ky; esa lk{kh ds :i esa fd, x, dFku Hkh Lora= ,oa fo'oluh; gSa ;k ugha ,oa mudh iqf"V i=koyh ij miyC/k vU; lk{; ls gks jgh gS ;k ugha\ bl lanHkZ esa ;fn i=koyh ij miyC/k lk{; dk voyksdu djsa rks xokg us ;|fi vius c;kuksa esa mldk ?kVuk esa Hkkx ugha ysus] dsoy mls ns[kus dk dFku fd;k gS] fdarq izFken`"V~;k gh mlds mDr dFku dh iqf"V i=koyh ij miyC/k vuqla/kku dk;Zokgh ls ugha gksrh gS] D;ksafd i=koyh esa layXu lwpuk izn'kZ Mh&3 esa mlds }kjk vuqla/kku vf/kdkjh dks vuqla/kku dk;Zokgh ds nkSjku ;g lwpuk nh xbZ gS fd ftl LFkku ij mlus rFkk mlds lkFk okys yksxksa us yfyr mQZ foDdh dk dRy fd;k Fkk rFkk ftl LFkku ij yk'k dks fBdkus yxk;k og LFkku ikuh dh Vadh ds ikl LVsfM;e ds ihNs gS] ftldks og pydj crk ldrk gS rFkk izn'kZ Mh&4 esa mlds }kjk vuqla/kku vf/kdkjh dks ;g lwpuk nh xbZ gS fd oDr ?kVuk tks pIiy mlus igu j[kh Fkh og IykfLVd dh pIiy mlus vkt Hkh igu j[kh gS] ftudks Lo;a ds iSjksa ls mrkjdj is'k djus ij tfj, QnZ tCrh izn'kZ Mh&6 ds tCr fd;k x;k] ftlls mldk ;g dFku izekf.kr ugha gks ikrk gS fd mlus ?kVuk dkfjr djus esa Hkkx ugha fy;k Fkk] cfYd mlds }kjk ?kVuk djus esa Hkkx fy;k tkuk izdV gksrk gS] D;ksafd xokg us vius U;k;ky; ds le{k c;kuksa esa izn'kZ Mh&3 ,oa izn'kZ Mh&4 lwpuk mlus vuqla/kku vf/kdkjh dks ugha nh] ,slk dksbZ dFku ugha fd;k x;k gS] bl lanHkZ esa ;g Hkh mYys[kuh; gS fd gLrxr izdj.k esa vizwoj eqthc }kjk nh xbZ lwpuk izn'kZ Mh&3 ds vk/kkj ij vuqla/kku vf/kdkjh }kjk e`rd foDdh ds lkFk ftl LFkku ij ekjihV dh xbZ rFkk ftl LFkku ij mls Mkyk x;k Fkk] ml LFkku dk uD'kk ekSdk izn'kZ Mh&5 Hkh mldh fu'kknsgh ls cuk;k x;k gS rFkk mldh lwpuk ds vuqlkj izn'kZ Mh&6 ds tfj, ?kVuk ds oDr iguh mldh pIiy dks tCr fd;k x;k gS] ftlls gLrxr izdj.k esa mlds bl dFku fd] mlus ?kVuk dks dkfjr djus esa dksbZ Hkkx ugha fy;k Fkk] ek= mls ns[kk x;k Fkk dh fo'oluh;rk ;qfDr;qDr lansg ls ijs fl) ugha gks ikrh gS] cfYd mlds }kjk ckn esa U;k;ky; ds le{k fd;k x;k mDr dFku lksp&le>dj (Afterthought) fdlh nwjorhZ mÌs'; dh iwfrZ esa fd;k tkuk izdV gksrk gS] bl lanHkZ esa ;g mYys[kuh; gS fd lgvfHk;qDr 'kkfdj us vius c;ku eqyfTke esa vizwoj eqthc o mlds nksLr }kjk e`rd foDdh ls vizkd`frd eSFkwu djuk rFkk vizwoj eqthc }kjk gh e`rd foDdh ds eqag esa ekSds ij iM+h iUuh dh FkSfy;ksa dks ?kqlkus dk dFku fd;k gS rFkk lkFk gh ;g Hkh dFku fd;k gS fd vizwoj eqthc djksM+ifr gS] mlus mlds firk ds tfj, :i, nsdj] >wBk ljdkjh xokg cudj] >wBs c;ku dksVZ esa fn, gS rFkk iqjkuh Vksad lh-vkbZ- mlls tsy esa Hkh feyus vk, Fks] ftlls lgvfHk;qDr ds dFku ls Hkh mlds }kjk ?kVuk dkfjr djus dh ckr izdV gksrh gS rFkk ?kVuk esa dksbZ lg;ksx ugha djus ,oa ?kVuk ek= vka[kksa ls ns[kus ckcr~ dFku dh fo'oluh;rk ;qfDr;qDr lansg ls ijs fl) ugha gks ikrh gSA22- gLrxr izdj.k esa ;g Hkh mYys[kuh; gS fd gLrxr izdj.k esa vizwoj eqthc }kjk viuh izfrijh{kk ds nkSjku ;g Lohdkj fd;k x;k gS fd izn'kZ Mh&7 ¼tks fd mlds }kjk vij eq[; U;kf;d eftLVsªV] mfu;kjk Vksad ds le{k /kkjk 164 n-iz-la- esa ys[kc) djk;k x;k c;ku gS]½ mldk , ls ch] lh ls Mh] bZ ls ,Q] th ls ,p] vkbZ ls ts] ds ls ,y] ,e ls ,u Hkkxksa esa Hkh xyr fy[kk gS] lkFk gh vius U;k;ky; ds le{k c;kuksa esa vkxs ;g Hkh dFku fd;k gS fd mlus vius c;ku izn'kZ Mh&7 esa eftLVªsV egksn; dks ;g ckr crk nh Fkh] jkLrsa ds vUnj 'kkfdj] ijost] foDdh rhuksa vkil esa gkFkkikbZ dj jgs Fks] [TRUNCATED] State of U.P. (Jail appeal no. 6662/2011) Decided on 26-10-2018 "25. In the present case from the evidence adduced, there is nothing on record to suggest that the appellant was at or around his residence at the relevant time. None of the prosecution witnesses have supported the prosecution case that at the relevant time the appellant was present at his house and had assaulted the deceased. We are now left only with the material i.e. the statement of the accused-appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C. wherein he has stated that at the time of incident he was sleeping at his roof. Now we have examined two facts as to whether in the absence of any corroborating evidence only on the basis of the statement given by the accused-appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C. can the appellant be convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC ? 26. It is well settled principle of law that the statement of an accused made under Section 313 Cr.P.C. can be taken into consideration is not in dispute; not only in view of the what has been contained under Section 313 (4) of the Code but also because of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as this Hon'ble Court in several pronouncements. We may in this regard refer to the decision of this Court in the Sanatan Naskar v. State of West Bengal reported in 2010 (8) SCC 249, where this observed: (SCC page 258-59, paras 21-24) "21. The answers by an accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. are of relevance for finding out the truth and examining the veracity of the case of the prosecution. ... 22. As already noticed, the object of recording the statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. is to put all incriminating evidence to the accused so as to provide him an opportunity to explain such incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the evidence of the prosecution. At the same time, also permit him to put forward his own version or reasons, if he so chooses, in relation to his involvement or otherwise in the crime. ... Once such a statement is recorded, the next question that has to be considered by the Court is to what extent and consequences such statement can be used during the enquiry and the trial. ... Once such a statement is recorded, the next question that has to be considered by the Court is to what extent and consequences such statement can be used during the enquiry and the trial. Over the period of time, the Courts have explained this concept and now it has attained, more or less, certainty in the field of criminal jurisprudence. 23. The statement of the accused can be used to test the veracity of the exculpatory nature of the admission, if any, made by the accused. It can be taken into consideration in any enquiry or trial but still it is not strictly evidence in the case. The provisions of Section 313(4) of Cr.P.C. explicitly provides that the answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such enquiry or trial and put in evidence for or against the accused in any other enquiry into or trial for, any other offence for which such answers may tend to show he has committed. In other words, the use is permissible as per the provisions of the Code but has its own limitations. The Courts may rely on a portion of the statement of the accused and find him guilty in consideration of the other evidence against him led by the prosecution, however, such statements made under this Section should not be considered in isolation but in conjunction with evidence adduced by the prosecution. 24. Another important caution that Courts have declared in the pronouncements is that conviction of the accused cannot be based merely on the statement made under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. as it cannot be regarded as a substantive piece of evidence....." (ii) Brajendra Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh <a href='00100051039'>(2012) 4 SCC 289</a> "15. It is a settled principle of law that the statement of an accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. can be used as evidence against the accused, insofar as it supports the case of the prosecution. Equally true is that the statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. simplicitor normally cannot be made the basis for conviction of the accused. But where the statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is in line with the case of the prosecution, then certainly the heavy onus of proof on the prosecution is, to some extent, reduced." (iii) Ashok Kumar VS. State of Haryana (Cri. Appeal no. But where the statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is in line with the case of the prosecution, then certainly the heavy onus of proof on the prosecution is, to some extent, reduced." (iii) Ashok Kumar VS. State of Haryana (Cri. Appeal no. 1489 of 2004) Decided on 08 July, 2010 "22. Now we may proceed to discuss the evidence led by the prosecution in the present case. In order to bring the issues raised within a narrow compass we may refer to the statement of the accused made under Section 313, Cr.PC. It is a settled principle of law that dual purpose is sought to be achieved when the Courts comply with the mandatory requirement of recording the statement of an accused under this provision. Firstly, every material piece of evidence which the prosecution proposes to use against the accused should be put to him in clear terms and secondly, the accused should have a fair chance to give his explanation in relation to that evidence as well as his own versions with regard to alleged involvement in the crime. This dual purpose has to be achieved in the interest of the proper administration of criminal justice and in accordance with the provisions of the Cr.P.C. Furthermore, the statement under Section 313 of the Cr.PC can be used by the Court in so far as it corroborates the case of the prosecution. Of course, conviction per se cannot be based upon the statement under Section 313 of the Cr.PC. 23. Let us examine the essential features of this section and the principles of law as enunciated by judgments of this Court, which are the guiding factor for proper application and consequences which shall flow from the provisions of Section 313 of the Cr.PC. As already noticed, the object of recording the statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.PC is to put all incriminating evidence to the accused so as to provide him an opportunity to explain such incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the evidence of the prosecution. At the same time, also permit him to put forward his own version or reasons, if he so chooses, in relation to his involvement or otherwise in the crime. The Court has been empowered to examine the accused but only after the prosecution evidence has been concluded. At the same time, also permit him to put forward his own version or reasons, if he so chooses, in relation to his involvement or otherwise in the crime. The Court has been empowered to examine the accused but only after the prosecution evidence has been concluded. It is a mandatory obligation upon the Court and besides ensuring the compliance thereof, the Court has to keep in mind that the accused gets a fair chance to explain his conduct. The option lies with the accused to maintain silence coupled with simplicitor denial or, in the alternative, to explain his version and reasons, for his alleged involvement in the commission of crime. This is the statement which the accused makes without fear or right of the other party to cross-examine him. However, if the statements made are false, the Court is entitled to draw adverse inferences and pass consequential orders, as may be called for, in accordance with law. The primary purpose is to establish a direct dialogue between the Court and the accused and to put every important incriminating piece of evidence to the accused and grant him an opportunity to answer and explain. Once such a statement is recorded, the next question that has to be considered by the Court is to what extent and consequences such statement can be used during the enquiry and the trial. Over the period of time, the Courts have explained this concept and now it has attained, more or less, certainty in the field of criminal jurisprudence. The statement of the accused can be used to test the veracity of the exculpatory of the admission, if any, made by the accused. It can be taken into consideration in any, enquiry or trial but still it is not strictly an evidence in the case. The provisions of Section 313 (4) of the Cr.PC explicitly provides that the answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such enquiry or trial and put in as evidence for or against the accused in any other enquiry or trial for any other offence for which, such answers may tend to show he has committed. In other words, the use of a statement under Section 313 of Cr.PC as an evidence is permissible as per the provisions of the Code but has its own limitations. In other words, the use of a statement under Section 313 of Cr.PC as an evidence is permissible as per the provisions of the Code but has its own limitations. The Courts may rely on a portion of the statement of the accused and find him guilty in consideration of the other evidence against him led by the prosecution, however, such statements made under this Section should not be considered in isolation but in conjunction with evidence adduced by the prosecution. The Courts may rely on a portion of the statement of the accused and find him guilty in consideration of the other evidence against him led by the prosecution, however, such statements made under this Section should not be considered in isolation but in conjunction with evidence adduced by the prosecution. Another important caution that Courts have declared in the pronouncements is that conviction of the accused cannot be based merely on the statement made under Section 313 of the Cr.PC as it cannot be regarded as a substantive piece of evidence."</UL>31- ekuuh; loksZPp U;k;ky; }kjk bl izdkj vius U;kf;d n`"Vkarksa ds ek/;e ls ;g vo/kkfjr fd;k x;k gS fd ek= vfHk;qDr ds /kkjk 313 na-iz-la ds rgr fd;s x;s dFku ds vk/kkj ij mls nks"kfl) ugha fd;k tk ldrk gS] mlds dFku dh lEiqf"V i=koyh ij miyC/k vU; lk{; ls gksuk vko';d gS] D;ksafd /kkjk 313 na-iz-la- ds rgr fd;k x;k dFku lkjoku lk{; dh Js.kh esa ugha vkrk gSA gLrxr izdj.k esa vihykFkhZ&vfHk;qDr 'kkfdj }kjk /kkjk 313 n-iz-la- eas fd, x, dFkuksa dk mDr U;kf;d n`"Vkarksa ds ifjizs{; esa fopkj djsa rks mlus vius] c;ku eqyfte esa mldk ekSds ij mifLFkr gksuk] eqthc }kjk Qksu djds vkfcn o mlds nksLr dks cqykuk] eqthc o mlds nksLr }kjk foDdh ds lkFk cqjk dke djuk ,oa eqthc }kjk foDdh ds eqag esa ogka iM+h FkSfy;ka ?kqlsM+ nsuk rFkk fQj mu pkjksa }kjk foDdh dks csgks'kh dh gkyr esa mBkdj ukyh esa j[k nsus dk dFku fd;k gS] fdUrq izFker% rks gLrxr izdj.k esa vihykFkhZx.k&vfHk;qDrx.k dh ekSds ij] ?kVuk ds le; mifLFkfr] dkWy fMVsYl ,oa QqV fizUV dh fjiksVZ izLrqr ugha gksus ls ;qfDr;qDr lansg ls ijs fl) ugha gqbZ gS] lkFk gh esfMdy fjiksVZ ls Hkh foDdh ds lkFk vizkd`frd eSFkwu gksus dh ,oa mldh xyk nckdj gR;k gksus dh iqf"V ugha gqbZ gS rFkk i=koyh ij miyC/k vU; lk{; ls Hkh mlds /kkjk 313 na-iz-la- esa fd, x, dFkuksa dh iqf"V ugha gqbZ gS] ftlls mlds /kkjk 313 na-iz-la- ds rgr fd;s x;s dFkuksa dh fo'oluh;rk Hkh izekf.kr ugha gks ikbZ gSA32- vr% i=koyh ij miyC/k lk{; ,oa mHk;i{kksa ds rdksZa ij xEHkhjrkiwoZd euu ds i'pkr~ ge bl fu"d"kZ ij igqaprs gSa fd izLrqr ekeys esa vizwoj eqthc ds dFku fo'oluh; ugha gksus] mlds iwoZorhZ ,oa orZeku dFkuksa esa fojks/kkHkkl gksus] vihykFkhZx.k&vfHk;qDrx.k dh ekSds ij mifLFkfr ;qfDr;qDr lansg ls ijs fl) ugha gksus] e`rd foDdh ds lkFk ?kVuk ds le; vizkd`frd eSFkwu gksdj mldh xyk nckdj gR;k gksus dh iqf"V esfMdy fjiksVZ ls uk gksus rFkk vizkd`frd eSFkwu ds lanHkZ esa ,Q-,l-,y- fjiksVZ izLrqr uk gksus ls ?kVukLFky ls mBk;s x;s QqV fizUV dh fjiksVZ U;k;ky; esa izLrqr uk gksus] QnZ tCrh ds lk{khx.k ds i{knzksgh gksus] ?kVuk ds dksbZ p'enhn lk{kh uk gksus] e`rd o vfHk;qDrx.k dh CyM xqzfiax fjiksVZ izLrqr ugha gksus ls vfHk;kstu i{k] vihykFkhZx.k&vfHk;qDrx.k ds fo:) fopkj.kh; fcUnw ;qfDr;qDr lansg ls ijs fl) ugha dj ik;k gSA ,sls esa izdj.k ds rF;ksa ,oa ifjfLFkfr;ksa dks n`f"Vxr j[krs gq,] mDr fo'ys"k.k ds vk/kkj ij fopkj.kh; U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr vkns'k fnukad 26-06-2012 fof/k lEer Ukgha gksus ls vikLr fd, tkus ;ksX; gSA33- mijksDr foospukuqlkj] gekjs fouez er esa vihykFkhZx.k&vfHk;qDrx.k 'kkfdj] eksbZuqn~nhu] [kkfyn gqlSu ,oa ijost ds }kjk izLrqr vihysa Lohdkj dh tkdj fo}ku fopkj.k U;k;ky; vij ls'ku U;k;k/kh'k ¼QkLV Vªsd½] Vksad ¼jktLFkku½ }kjk ls'ku izdj.k la[;k 33@2011] muokuh izdj.k jktLFkku jkT; cuke 'kkfdj oxSjg esa ikfjr fu.kZ; ,oa n.Mkns'k fnukad 26-06-2012 dks vikLr fd;k tkrk gSA vihykFkhZx.k&vfHk;qDrx.k dks vkjksfir vijk/kksa ls nks"keqDr fd;k tkrk gSA vihykFkhZx.k&vfHk;qDrx.k [kkfyn gqlSu] ekbZuqn~nhu ,oa ijost ds fo:) ikfjr ltk LFkfxr gksdj os tekur ij vktkn gSa] muds tekur eqpyds fujLr fd, tkrs gSA vihykFkhZ&vfHk;qDr 'kkfdj tsy esa gS] ;fn og fdlh vU; izdj.k esa okafNr uk gks rks mls gLrxr izdj.k esa vfoyEc fjgk fd;k tkosaA34- vihykFkhZx.k&vfHk;qDrx.k 'kkfdj] eksbZuqn~nhu] [kkfyn gqlSu ,oa ijost dks funsZf'kr fd;k tkrk gS fd izR;sd vihykFkhZ&vfHk;qDr ipkl gtkj :i;s dk Lo;a dk cU/k&i= rFkk blh jkf'k dh ,d lqn`ढ izfrHkwfr] /kkjk 437&d n-iza-la- ds vuqlkj] nks"keqDr gksus ds vkns'k fnukad ls nks lIrkg ds Hkhrj jftLVªkj ¼U;kf;d½ jktLFkku mPp U;k;ky; ihB t;iqj ds le{k bl vk'k; dh is'k djsa fd bl fu.kZ; ds fo:) fo'ks"k vuqefr ;kfpdk nk;j djus dh fLFkfr esa ;k vuqefr iznku fd;s tkus dh fLFkfr esa] vihykFkhZx.k&vfHk;qDrx.k 'kkfdj] eksbZuqn~nhu] [kkfyn gqlSu ,oa ijost dks uksfVl dh rkfey gksus ds i'pkr~ os ekuuh; mPpre U;k;ky; ds le{k mifLFkr gksaxsA mijksDr ca/k i= N% ekg ds fy, izHkkoh jgsaxsA<hr color=rgb(84,0,168)></body></html>

Shakir S/o. Shri Sadik Mohammad Hussain v. State of Rajasthan