JUDGMENT : The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the order as contained in memo No. 8280 (S) dated 29.11.2012 issued by the Engineer-in-Chief, Road Construction Department, Jharkhand, Ranchi (respondent no.4) whereby while disposing of the departmental proceeding conducted against the petitioner, two major punishments have been imposed upon him, one of which is reduction of pay to his minimum basic pay scale and the other is recovery of 1/3rd of the amount paid in irregular manner. It has also been mentioned in the said order that payment of salary disbursed during the suspension period of the petitioner will be confined to subsistence allowance already paid, however period of suspension will not be considered as break of service for calculating his pension. Further prayer has been made for quashing the order as contained in memo no. 8644(S) dated 21.09.2013 issued under the signature of the Deputy Secretary to the Government, Road Construction Department, Jharkhand (respondent no.3) whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order dated 29.11.2012 passed by the disciplinary authority i.e., the respondent no. 4, has been rejected. 2. The factual background of the case as stated in the writ petition is that pursuant to order dated 30.06.2009 passed in W.P.(PIL) No. 803/2009, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) conducted investigation in the matter of alleged large scale irregularities and embezzlement committed by the private contractors as well as public servants of the Road Construction Department with respect to purported procurement of bitumen for construction of roads in the State of Jharkhand. After the preliminary inquiry being PE 03(A)/09-R, the C.B.I./ACB/ Ranchi lodged an F.I.R. being R.C. Case No. 18(A)/2009(R) under Sections 120B,420,467,468 and 471 IPC and Sections 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against Sri Sone Lal Das, the then Executive Engineer, Road Construction Department, Road Division, Hazaribag, M/S Gajo Prasad Mehta (contractor), village- Bangawan, Hazaribagh and other unknown alleging that during the period 2005-06, Sri Sone Lal Das entered into criminal conspiracy with Sri Gajo Prasad Mehta- Proprietor of M/S Gajo Prasad Mehta and other unknown and in furtherence thereof, the said contractor submitted false/bogus invoices showing procurement of bitumen for execution of the contractual work awarded in its favour vide agreement no. 09F2/05-06 concerning surface renewal of “Khorhar-Gouria-Karma Road” (Km 0 to 5) causing wrongful gain to it and corresponding wrongful loss to the Government of Jharkhand. 09F2/05-06 concerning surface renewal of “Khorhar-Gouria-Karma Road” (Km 0 to 5) causing wrongful gain to it and corresponding wrongful loss to the Government of Jharkhand. 3. At the relevant point of time, the petitioner was posted as Junior Engineer, Road Construction Department, Road Division, Hazaribag under Sri Sone Lal Das. The CBI submitted charge-sheet no. 05/2010 dated 27.10.2010 under sections 120B read with Sections 420, 468, 471 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against the accused persons including the petitioner, however did not choose to submit charge- sheet against Sri Sone Lal Das, the then Executive Engineer, Road Construction Department, Road Division, Hazaribag who was named in the F.I.R. being R.C.Case No. 18(A)/2009 (R) lodged by the C.B.I. in compliance of the order dated 30.06.2009 passed in W.P. (PIL) No. 803 of 2009. 4. After submission of the chargesheet in the said criminal case, the petitioner was put under suspension vide memo no. 7174 (S) dated 7.12.2010 and a departmental proceeding was initiated against him vide office order no. 307 dated 31.10.2011, copy of which was communicated to the petitioner vide memo No.7264 (S) dated 31.10.2011 issued under the signature of the respondent no.4 wherein Sri Satyendra Singh, Secretary, Department of Information and Technology, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi was appointed as the Conducting Officer and Section Officer, Section-4 of the Road Construction Department, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi was appointed as the Presenting Officer. The memo of charges against the petitioner along with details of evidence were also supplied alleging non-verification of the original bills produced by the concerned contractor regarding purchase of bitumen from oil company i.e., Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Bottling Plant, Public Sector, Bokaro. The petitioner submitted reply to the said memo of charges refuting all those, however the enquiry officer submitted the enquiry report mentioning that the charges against the petitioner were proved. Thereafter, the petitioner was issued second show cause notice vide letter no. 6116 (S) WE dated 28.8.2012 by the respondent no. 4. The petitioner submitted his reply to the show cause notice on 5.9.2012, however the respondent no. 4 being the disciplinary authority imposed major punishments upon him vide order as contained in letter no. 8280 (S) dated 29.11.2012 i.e., reduction of pay to his minimum basic pay scale and recovery of 1/3rd of the amount paid in irregular manner. 4. The petitioner submitted his reply to the show cause notice on 5.9.2012, however the respondent no. 4 being the disciplinary authority imposed major punishments upon him vide order as contained in letter no. 8280 (S) dated 29.11.2012 i.e., reduction of pay to his minimum basic pay scale and recovery of 1/3rd of the amount paid in irregular manner. It has also been mentioned in the said order that during the suspension period, no amount other than subsistence allowance already paid will be payable to the petitioner. The petitioner preferred appeal before the respondent no. 2 on 9.5.2013 which was also dismissed vide order dated 21.09.2013. Hence, the present writ petition. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that primary responsibility of the petitioner was to physically verify the construction materials such as bitumen which was brought to the site for surface renewal of Khorhar-Gauria-Karma Road from (0 to 5 Km) as per the agreement/specification/work order and after being satisfied with the said physical verification, he signed the invoices produced by the contractor mentioning therein "material verified at worksite and found correct." It has not been alleged either in the F.I.R. or in the charge-sheet that lesser quantity of bitumen than the quantity mentioned in the work agreement has been used by the contractor in the construction work. It is an admitted fact that even after about 3 years of construction of the said road, there was no complaint regarding its quality. 6. It is further submitted that in the letter as contained in memo no. 718(S) dated 21.03.2001 issued by the Secretary, Department of Public Construction (Road, Building and Transport), Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi to the Principal Accountant General, Jharkhand, Ranchi as well as in resolution as contained in memo no. 1680(S) dated 26.03.2002 issued by the Secretary, Department of Road Construction, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi, it has been mentioned that supply of bitumen/other articles to be used in different government projects (worth more than Rs.10 lakhs) will be made available by the concerned contractor, however there is no order/direction regarding verification of the invoices related to procurement of bitumen submitted by the contractor. 7. It is also submitted that as per letter no. 1604 (S) dated 25.3.2009 issued by the Secretary, Road Construction Department, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi (the Respondent no. 7. It is also submitted that as per letter no. 1604 (S) dated 25.3.2009 issued by the Secretary, Road Construction Department, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi (the Respondent no. 2), the contractors were directed to use bitumen only after submitting the invoice related to procurement of the same to the concerned Executive Engineer and quality of all the articles as well as the ‘Quality Certificate’ were to be examined by the Departmental Quality Control Unit before utilizing those. The concerned Executive Engineers were directed to send the quarterly report regarding the details of the invoices with respect to procurement of bitumen submitted by the contractor in the prescribed format attached with the letter dated 25.3.2009. It is thus evident that there was no order/direction till 25.3.2009 from the government level to verify the genuineness of the invoices submitted by the contractor regarding purchase of bitumen from the public sector oil companies. 8. It is further submitted that the copy of N.I.T. was never supplied to the Assistant Engineer and Junior Engineer (the petitioner herein) as it remained in the custody of concerned Executive Engineer and the other superior officers. As such, the concerned Assistant Engineer and Junior Engineer (the petitioner herein) did not have any idea about the terms and conditions of the NIT. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner also contends that office of the Principal Accountant General (Audit) Jharkhand, Ranchi, vide letter no. 585 dated 23.03.2010, had provided information under the Right to Information Act, 2005 to the General Secretary, Jharkhand Engineering Services Association mentioning that as per resolution no. 6191(S) dated 8.9.2001 issued by the Road Construction Department, Government of Bihar, the contractor was required to intimate arrival at site along with documentary evidence of purchase of bitumen (invoices) to the concerned Executive Engineer and it was the responsibility of the Executive Engineer to satisfy himself about the quality and quantity of bitumen brought to the site by the contractor as well as to prescribe a form, if any, in which account of bitumen brought to site would be maintained by the contractor. 10. It is further argued that taking into consideration the aforesaid fact, the C.B.I. lodged the said F.I.R. against the Executive Engineer namely Sone Lal Das, however he was not charge-sheeted, rather the petitioner was made one of the accused without any fault on his part. 10. It is further argued that taking into consideration the aforesaid fact, the C.B.I. lodged the said F.I.R. against the Executive Engineer namely Sone Lal Das, however he was not charge-sheeted, rather the petitioner was made one of the accused without any fault on his part. It was alleged in the chargesheet submitted by the C.B.I. as well as in the memo of charge issued by the Road Construction Department, Government of Jharkhand that the petitioner being the Junior Engineer, approved/countersigned all the fake invoices produced by the contractor without verifying the genuineness of the same in order to provide him undue advantage as well as failed to ensure return of empty drums of bitumen by the contractor. However, while levelling the said charge against the petitioner, the C.B.I. did not consider that it was the duty of the Divisional Office of the Executive Engineer either to ensure return of empty drums of bitumen by the contractor or in the case of failure to deposit the same, to deduct the cost of empty drums of bitumen from the bill of the contractor. Nonetheless, the said step was already taken on 28.12.2006 by the Divisional Office of the Executive Engineer, Road Construction Department, Hazaribagh, from the security deposit of the contractor by deducting the total cost of 281 empty drums of bitumen @ Rs. 110/- per drum as per the agreement dated 30.12.2005 jointly signed by the concerned contractor and the then Executive Engineer namely Sri Sone Lal Das. As such, the said allegation made against the petitioner either by the C.B.I. or by the department is baseless. 11. It is also submitted that the office of the Executive Engineer used to have the Divisional Accounts Officer who was primarily responsible for checking the bills submitted by the contractors and only after necessary checking by the Divisional Accounts Officer, the payment orders used to be issued by the concerned Executive Engineer, but without considering the aforesaid aspect, the C.B.I. did not even bother to touch the concerned Divisional Accounts Officer during investigation of the case. 12. 12. It is further submitted that initiation of departmental proceeding against the petitioner is nothing but an example of misuse of power by the concerned respondent authorities only with a view to save the skin of the higher departmental authorities from any future action to be taken by the government or by any Court of Law as the entire matter is the outcome of system failure and negligence/latches on the part of the higher authorities by not issuing any government guidelines/circulars/instructions to the lower ranking officers such as the petitioner with respect to physical verification of original bills produced by the concerned contractor regarding procurement of bitumen from concerned public sector oil companies. It is also submitted that restricting the payment of salary of the suspension period to the extent of subsistence allowance could not have been passed without following the procedure laid down in the Rule 97 of the Jharkhand Service Code, 2001 as well as the settled principles of law laid down by this Court in several judicial pronouncements. As such, the said punishment inflicted upon the petitioner is contrary to law. 13. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the petitioner was suspended vide order as contained in memo no. 7174 (S) dated 07.12.2010 for his involvement in irregularities as reported by C.B.I., Anti-Corruption Branch, Ranchi in an F.I.R. being R.C. Case No. 18A/2009(R) and thereafter a departmental proceeding was initiated against him. The conducting officer submitted the inquiry report stating that the charges levelled against the petitioner was proved. After reviewing the inquiry report of the Conducting Officer, a second show cause notice was issued to the petitioner vide memo no. 6116(S) dated 28.08.2012 asking him to submit reply with evidence on the issue of imposition of major punishment. Since the petitioner reiterated the same facts in his reply as was stated in the first show cause notice, his reply to the second show cause notice was not considered satisfactory. 14. It is further submitted that the disciplinary authority, vide order as contained in memo no.8280 (S) dated 29.11.2012, decided to impose punishments upon the petitioner on the basis of proved charges against him. The petitioner failed to bring any new fact in appeal preferred by him before the respondent no. 2 and as such, the same was also dismissed. 14. It is further submitted that the disciplinary authority, vide order as contained in memo no.8280 (S) dated 29.11.2012, decided to impose punishments upon the petitioner on the basis of proved charges against him. The petitioner failed to bring any new fact in appeal preferred by him before the respondent no. 2 and as such, the same was also dismissed. It is also submitted that there is no restriction in conducting departmental proceeding simultaneously in a matter in which criminal proceeding is also in progress. 15. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. The petitioner has challenged the order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority as well as the order in appeal issued under the signature of the respondent no.3. 16. The main contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the departmental proceeding was initiated against him on the same set of facts and with the same charges for which a criminal proceeding was pending against him in R.C. Case No. 18(A)/2009 (R) and as such the same was required to be stayed till conclusion of the criminal proceeding. However, the disciplinary authority proceeded with the departmental proceeding and passed the impugned order of punishment against the petitioner which is in the teeth of the settled proposition of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 17. In support of the said contention, learned counsel for the petitioner puts reliance on a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony Vrs. Bharat Gold Mines reported in (1999) 3 SCC 679 wherein it has been held that if the departmental proceeding as well as criminal proceeding have been initiated on same set of facts and circumstances, the departmental proceeding should be stayed till conclusion of the criminal proceeding. 18. In a judgment rendered in the case of State Bank of India & Others Vs. Neelam Nag & Another reported in (2016) 9 SCC 491 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that there is no legal bar in conducting the disciplinary proceeding and criminal trial simultaneously. However, no straitjacket formula can be spelt out and the Court has to keep in mind the broad approach to be adopted in such matters on case-to-case basis. 19. Further, in the case of Stanzen Toyotetsu India Private Limited Vs. However, no straitjacket formula can be spelt out and the Court has to keep in mind the broad approach to be adopted in such matters on case-to-case basis. 19. Further, in the case of Stanzen Toyotetsu India Private Limited Vs. Girish V. & Others reported in (2014) 3 SCC 636 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “8. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length. The only question that falls for determination in the above backdrop is whether the courts below were justified in staying the ongoing disciplinary proceedings pending conclusion of the trial in the criminal case registered and filed against the respondents. The answer to that question would primarily depend upon whether there is any legal bar to the continuance of the disciplinary proceedings against the employees based on an incident which is also the subject-matter of criminal case against such employees. It would also depend upon the nature of the charges in the criminal case filed against the employees and whether the case involves complicated questions of law and fact. The possibility of prejudice to the employees accused in the criminal case on account of the parallel disciplinary enquiry going ahead is another dimension which will have to be addressed while permitting or staying such disciplinary enquiry proceedings. The law on the subject is fairly well settled for similar issues and has often engaged the attention of this Court in varied fact situations. Although the pronouncements of this Court have stopped short of prescribing any straitjacket formula for application to all cases, the decisions of this Court have identified the broad approach to be adopted in such matters leaving it for the courts concerned to take an appropriate view in the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case that comes up before them. Suffice it to say that there is no short-cut solution to the problem. What is, however, fairly well settled and was not disputed even before us is that there is no legal bar to the conduct of the disciplinary proceedings and a criminal trial simultaneously.” 20. Thus, it is well settled that there is no legal bar in conducting disciplinary proceeding and a criminal trial simultaneously. Each case has to be dealt with looking to the fact and circumstance of that particular case. Thus, it is well settled that there is no legal bar in conducting disciplinary proceeding and a criminal trial simultaneously. Each case has to be dealt with looking to the fact and circumstance of that particular case. The departmental proceeding may be stayed during the pendency of criminal proceeding where the case involves complicated questions of law and fact. The possibility of prejudice to the accused employee in the criminal case on account of ongoing parallel disciplinary enquiry is another dimension which is required to be addressed while permitting or staying such departmental proceeding. There is no straitjacket formula to be applied in all cases, rather it is upon the concerned courts to take an appropriate view in the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case that comes up before them. 21. The petitioner has questioned the continuance of departmental proceeding during pendency of criminal proceeding on mere ground of same set of facts being involved in each proceeding which is not at all sufficient for staying the departmental proceeding. He has also failed to show as to what prejudice has been caused to him by continuance of the departmental proceeding. 22. It further appears that charge-sheet was served to the petitioner containing two allegations, one of those was that the petitioner authenticated/countersigned six invoices produced by the contractor with respect to procurement of bitumen from Indian Oil Corporation Limited bottling plant, Bokaro without verifying the genuineness of the same and thus, he authenticated forged invoices of the contractor to provide undue benefit to it. The second allegation levelled against the petitioner was that the contractor did not return any empty drum of bitumen, but the petitioner did not verify the actual consumption of bitumen as claimed by the contractor before authenticating the invoices which was suspicious. In reply, the petitioner refuted the said allegation and claimed that there was no departmental order for verification of the invoices. Moreover, as per Clause 11 of the agreement, the responsibility for verifying the invoices was on the concerned Assistant Engineer/Executive Engineer. The enquiry officer did not accept the reply of the petitioner by observing that the petitioner was in knowledge of such provision in the agreement. It was also found that all the departmental officers were alleging each other to evade their responsibilities of compliance of the said provision mentioned in clause-11 of the agreement. The enquiry officer did not accept the reply of the petitioner by observing that the petitioner was in knowledge of such provision in the agreement. It was also found that all the departmental officers were alleging each other to evade their responsibilities of compliance of the said provision mentioned in clause-11 of the agreement. It was further observed that the petitioner being Junior Engineer, had to verify the executed work as well as all the bills, vouchers and invoices related to the work. Thus, the recommendation for payment of invoices presented by the contractor was to be made by the petitioner as well as the senior officials after verification of its actual executed work and as such it was necessary to ensure the genuineness of the invoices before making recommendation for payment in compliance of the provision of clause-11 of the agreement and due to the said inaction on the part of the petitioner, payment was made to the contractor on the basis of the fake invoices. 23. So far as the second charge is concerned, the petitioner replied that though it was necessary to return the empty drums of bitumen by the contractor, however due to not depositing any drum by it, the total cost of 281 empty drums as claimed by the petitioner, was recovered from the bill of the contractor @ Rs.110/- per drum (pre-determined panel rate). It has been observed in the enquiry report that when no empty drum was returned by the contractor, the concerned officials of the Road Construction Department were required to verify the actual use as well as source of bitumen which they failed to do. 24. The conducting officer found both the charges levelled against the petitioner to be proved and recommended for imposition of major penalty against him. On being issued second show cause notice, the petitioner replied that being the Junior Engineer, he had the responsibility to verify the execution of work and he also physically verified the same. The respondent no.4 however observed in the impugned order dated 29.11.2012 that the petitioner raised the same points in the reply to the second show cause notice as were earlier raised before the inquiry officer and as such his reply was not satisfactory. Finally, the impugned order was passed against him. 25. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Others Vs. Finally, the impugned order was passed against him. 25. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Others Vs. P. Gunasekaran reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 has held as under:- “13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 26. In the case of Chairman and Managing Director, V.S.P. & Others Vs. Goparaju Sri Prabhakara Hari Babu reported in (2008) 5 SCC 569 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “20. The jurisdiction of the High Court in this regard is rather limited. Its power to interfere with disciplinary matters is circumscribed by well-known factors. It cannot set aside a well-reasoned order only on sympathy or sentiments. (See Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Ram Lal [ (2005) 2 SCC 638 ]; State of Bihar v. Amrendra Kumar Mishra [ (2006) 12 SCC 561 ]; SBI v. Mahatma Mishra [(2006) 13 SCC 727]; State of Karnataka v. Ameerbi [ (2007) 11 SCC 681 ]; State of M.P. v. Sanjay Kumar Pathak [ (2008) 1 SCC 456 ] and Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Surji Devi [ (2008) 2 SCC 310 ].) 21. Once it is found that all the procedural requirements have been complied with, the courts would not ordinarily interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed upon a delinquent employee. The superior courts only in some cases may invoke the doctrine of proportionality. If the decision of an employer is found to be within the legal parameters, the jurisdiction would ordinarily not be invoked when the misconduct stands proved. (See Sangfroid Remedies Ltd. v. Union of India [ (1999) 1 SCC 259 ].) 22. The High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India also cannot, on the basis of sympathy or sentiment, overturn a legal order.” 27. (See Sangfroid Remedies Ltd. v. Union of India [ (1999) 1 SCC 259 ].) 22. The High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India also cannot, on the basis of sympathy or sentiment, overturn a legal order.” 27. Thus, the High Court while exercising the power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has to see whether the disciplinary proceeding has been conducted by following due procedure of law and if the same is found to be proper, it should not normally interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed upon the delinquent employee on the basis of sympathy or sentiment unless it is found that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate to the charges proved against the employee. 28. In the case in hand, due procedure has been followed by the disciplinary authority before passing the impugned order of punishment. The reply of the petitioner was also duly considered by the said authority. The petitioner has failed to show any lacuna in the procedure adopted by the disciplinary authority. So far as the quantum of punishment for the alleged misconduct committed by the petitioner is concerned, he has been imposed punishment of reduction of pay to his minimum basic pay scale and recovery of 1/3rd of the amount paid in irregular manner which cannot be said to be shockingly disproportionate so as to interfere with the same in exercise of power of judicial review by this Court. 29. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.