JUDGMENT : 1. This Civil Writ Petition has been preferred claiming the following reliefs:- “A) By an appropriate writ order or direction, the order impugned dated 10.10.2014 (Annexure-7) passed by the Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue), Sri Karanpur, District Sri Ganganagar as well as the order dated 5.08.2019 (Annexure-10) passed by learned Board of Revenue may kindly be quashed and set aside. B) By an appropriate writ order or direction the revision petition filed by the petitioners may kindly be allowed as prayed for and the applications filed by the respondent No.2 & 3 under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC and order 1 Rule 10 (2) CPC may kindly be dismissed.” 2. The present writ petition assails the impugned order dated 10.10.2014 (Annex.7) passed by the SDO (Revenue) Sri Karanpur, District Sri Ganganagar in Case No.88/2012 (26/2001) Harmel Kaur & Ors. v. Jagraj Singh & Ors., whereby the application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC preferred by respondents No.2 & 3 for amending the suit and the application under Order 1 Rule 10 (2) CPC for impleading Babu Singh, the present petitioner as party respondent in the main suit were allowed. 3. Aggrieved by the said order, a revision petition, bearing case No.6086/2017, titled Kuldeep Kaur & Anr. v. Harmel Kaur & Ors. was preferred under Section 230 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 before the Board of Revenue, which was dismissed vide order dated 05.08.2019 (Annex.10). 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners assails the impugned orders on the following grounds:- 4.1 That the application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC has been allowed without assigning any reasons for the same. And that the matter ought to be remanded back to the concerned S.D.O. for a fresh decision. In this regard learned counsel placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Manipur High Court in the case of the State of Manipur v. Arambam Manju Singh (Criminal Petition No.1/2021) decided on 26.02.2021, and drawing attention of this Court to paragraph 11, submitted that a mere line in the impugned order stating that the record has been perused and the facts and circumstances of the case have been considered does not amount to a reasoned judicial order. Relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced hereunder:- “In its recent judgment in Mahipal case, the Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated that merely recording ”having perused the record” and “on the facts and circumstances of the case” does not subserve the purpose of a reasoned judicial order as the duty of judges to give reasoned decisions lies at the hear of this commitment. It was also stressed that the question of grant of bail concern both liberty of individuals undergoing criminal prosecution as well as the interest of the criminal justice system in ensuring that those who commit crimes are not afforded the opportunity to obstruct justice.” 4.2 That the application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC, sale deed pertaining the year 1996 was sought to be challenged/declared null and void. The suit was filed on 24.04.2001, whereas the application was filed on 24.12.2012 (Annex.3). And that, therefore, there is a gross and unexplained delay of 11 years in filing such application. And that the reply to the suit was already filed on 24.12.2002, and that the sale deed in question was well within the knowledge at the time of filing reply. 4.3 That the learned Courts below have erred in allowing the application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC as it is tantamount to changing the nature of the suit itself, from partition of land to that of suit of title and cancellation of sale deed. Furthermore that the respondents have also sought to get the adoption deed declared as null and void. Reliance in this regard was placed upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Revajeetu Builders v. Narayanswamy (Civil Appeal No. 6921/2009) decided on 09.10.2009 and Bharat Karsondas Thakkar v. Kiran Construction Co. (Civil Appeal No. 2573/2008) decided on 09.04.2008. For the sake of brevity, the relevant portion of the said judgments, as relied upon by the learned counsel, is reproduced hereunder:- In Revajeetu Builders (supra):- “67. On critically analyzing both the English and Indian cases, some basic principles emerge which ought to be taken into consideration while allowing or rejecting the application for amendment. (1)Whether the amendment sought is imperative for proper and effective adjudication of the case? (2)Whether the application for amendment is bona fide or mala fide? On critically analyzing both the English and Indian cases, some basic principles emerge which ought to be taken into consideration while allowing or rejecting the application for amendment. (1)Whether the amendment sought is imperative for proper and effective adjudication of the case? (2)Whether the application for amendment is bona fide or mala fide? (3)The amendment should not cause such prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated adequately in terms of money; (4)Refusing amendment would in fact lead to injustice or lead to multiple litigation; (5)Whether the proposed amendment constitutionally or fundamentally changes the nature and character of the case? and (6)As a general rule, the court should decline amendments if a fresh suit on the amended claims would be barred by limitation on the date of application” In Bharat Karsondas Thakkar (supra):- “21. Having carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, and the decisions cited on their behalf, we are of the view that the Division Bench of the High Court erred in law in allowing the amendment of the plaint sought for by the respondent No.1 herein as the plaintiff in the suit. Even if the bar of limitation is not taken into account, the plaintiff, namely, the respondent No.1 herein, is faced with the ominous question as to whether the amendment of the pleadings could have at all been allowed by the High Court since it completely changed the nature and character of the suit from being a suit for specific performance of an agreement to one for declaration of title and possession followed by a prayer for specific performance of an agreement of sale entered into between its assignee and the vendors of the assignees. Along with that is the other question, which very often raises its head in suits for specific performance, that is, whether a stranger to an agreement for sale can be added as a party in a suit for specific performance of an agreement for sale in view of Section 15 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The relevant provision of Section 15 with which we are concerned is contained in clause (a) thereof and entitles any party to the contract to seek specific performance of such contract. Admittedly, the appellant herein is a third party to the agreement and does not, therefore, fall within the category of "parties to the agreement". The relevant provision of Section 15 with which we are concerned is contained in clause (a) thereof and entitles any party to the contract to seek specific performance of such contract. Admittedly, the appellant herein is a third party to the agreement and does not, therefore, fall within the category of "parties to the agreement". The appellant also does not come within the ambit of Section 19 of the said Act, which provides for relief against parties and persons claiming under them by subsequent title. This aspect of the matter has been dealt with in detail in Kasturi’s case (supra). While holding that the scope of a suit for specific performance could not be enlarged to convert the same into a suit for title and possession, Their Lordships observed that a third party or a stranger to the contract could not be added so as to convert a suit of one character into a suit of a different character. 22. … The proper course of action for the respondent No.1 would have been to challenge the consent decree not in its suit for specific performance, but in a separate suit for declaration that the consent decree ought not to have been passed and the same was not binding on the respondent. By seeking amendment of the plaint in its suit for specific performance, the respondent No.1 has created its own difficulties by substantially changing the nature and character of the original suit, which is not permissible in law. If, as was held in Durga Prasad’s case (supra), the impleadment of the appellant was only for the purpose of joining him in the conveyance if the respondent No.1’s suit ultimately succeeded, the ratio of the said decision would possibly have been applicable to the facts of this case. Unfortunately, that is not the case here, since the respondent No.1 has by amending the plaint prayed for a declaration that the consent decree obtained by the appellant was not binding on him and also for a declaration that the consent decree was null and void and was liable to be quashed.” 4.4 That the amendment to the suit, sought by way of the application under Order 6 Rule 17 is time barred. That the sale deed sought to be challenged is of the year 1996, and that the time period wherein a challenge could be laid to it expired in the year 1999, as the limitation prescribed under amendment 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is that of three years. And that the application in the present case was preferred in the year 2001,and that therefore there is a lapse of 16 years in laying laying challenge to the sale deed in question. 4.5 That the revenue Court does not have the jurisdiction to set aside the sale deed and adoption deed under challenge, as only a competent Civil Court has the jurisdiction for the same as the respondents have filed the suit under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, and that the revenue Courts only have the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon matters as specified in the Third Schedule. Reliance in this regard was placed up[on the judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Hasti Cement Pvt. Ltd. v. Sandip Charan (Civil Revision Petition No. 137/2015) decided on 07.03.2018. Relevant portion of the said judgment as relied upon by the learned counsel is reproduced hereunder:- “The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Suhrid Singh vs. Randhir Singh & Ors. : (2010) 12 SCC 112 , with regard to the issue pertaining to nature of the declaration required to be sought pertaining to the instruments, laid down as under: “Where the executant of a deed wants it to be annulled, he has to seek cancellation of the deed. But if a non-executant seeks annulment of a deed, he has to seek a declaration that the deed is invalid, or non est, or illegal or that it is not binding on him. The difference between a prayer for cancellation and declaration in regard to a deed of transfer/conveyance, can be brought out by the following illustration relating to A and B, two brothers. A executes a sale deed in favour of C. Subsequently A wants to avoid the sale. A has to sue for cancellation of the deed. On the other hand, if B, who is not the executant of the deed, wants to avoid it, he has to sue for a declaration that the deed executed by A is invalid/void and non est/ illegal and he is not bound by it. A has to sue for cancellation of the deed. On the other hand, if B, who is not the executant of the deed, wants to avoid it, he has to sue for a declaration that the deed executed by A is invalid/void and non est/ illegal and he is not bound by it. In essence both may be suing to have the deed set aside or declared as non-binding. But the form is different and court fee is also different. If A, the executant of the deed, seeks cancellation of the deed, he has to pay ad-valorem court fee on the consideration stated in the sale deed. If B, who is a non-executant, is in possession and sues for a declaration that the deed is null or void and does not bind him or his share, he has to merely pay a fixed court fee of Rs. 19.50 under Article 17 (iii) of Second Schedule of the Act. But if B, a non-executant, is not in possession, and he seeks not only a declaration that the sale deed is invalid, but also the consequential relief of possession, he has to pay an ad-valorem court fee as provided under Section 7(iv) (c) of the Act.” In view of the above discussion, the present case needs to be examined wherein, as noticed hereinbefore, the declaration has been sought in the plaint seeking cancellation of sale deed to the extent of share of the plaintiff on account of the fact that the suit property being ancestral joint Hindu property the transfer was made without any reason, basis or necessity. On the said aspect, while the judgment in the case of Sangram Singh (supra) laid down that such a sale would be void and, therefore, the suit would be triable by revenue court only, in later judgment in the case of Bhopal Singh (supra) it was laid down that such a sale would be voidable and not void. On the said aspect, while the judgment in the case of Sangram Singh (supra) laid down that such a sale would be void and, therefore, the suit would be triable by revenue court only, in later judgment in the case of Bhopal Singh (supra) it was laid down that such a sale would be voidable and not void. For the said proposition, reliance was placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghubanchmani (supra) and a unreported judgment in the case of Longram vs. Jaipal Singh : Civil Revision Petition No.153/1971 decided on 29/7/1971, taking different view was held as not a good law in view of the Supreme Court judgment, for the same reasons the judgment in the case of Sangram Singh (supra) also cannot be said to be a good law though the judgment in the case of Sangram Singh was not cited in the case of Bhopal Singh (supra). Relevant portion of the judgment dealing with the said aspect reads as under: “13. In view of the decision in Raghubanchamani's case AIR 1971 SC 776 , the sale-deed made by the plaintiff's father, who is defendant No. 5, in favour of the defendants Nos. 1 and 4 (petitioners) is voidable as according to the plaintiff it was without legal necessity and under Section 31(1) of the Specific Relief Act, when the plaintiff has reasonable apprehension that the sale-deed if left outstanding, may cause him serious injury, it became necessary for him to have it adjudged, void or voidable. The cancellation of the sale-deed, being the main relief in the suit, can only be granted by a Civil Court. Learned counsel for the petitioners cannot, in my opinion, derive any benefit from the decision in Jagansingh's case 1973 Raj LW 674. In Longram's case Civil Revn. No. 153 of 1971, D/-29-7-1971 Raj) (supra) the learned Judge took the view that the sale by the father of undivided coparcenary property is void in the absence of the legal necessity and the prayer for cancellation of the sale-deed is not very material, and further that the suit was essentially for possession of agricultural land. The sale by the father of the plaintiff in the case before me is voidable according to the decision in Raghubanchamani's case AIR 1971 SC 776 . The sale by the father of the plaintiff in the case before me is voidable according to the decision in Raghubanchamani's case AIR 1971 SC 776 . I regret my inability to agree with the view taken in Longram's case and it is no more a good law after Raghubanchamani's case.” In view of the above, the law laid down in the case of Bhopal Singh (supra) holding the instrument of the present nature as voidable, suit apparently is maintainable before the civil court and in view thereof the order passed by the trial court cannot be faulted.” 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent opposed the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners and submitted that the learned Courts below have rightly passed the impugned orders after taking into due consideration the overall facts and circumstances of the present case and the evidences placed on record before them. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that that the dispute in the present case is purely between private parties, and that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Patil (Civil Appeal No. 5896/2010) decided on 23.07.2010, held that the High Courts ought not to interfere in orders of the Trial Courts while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. And that, in the instant case the State is not a party, and the dispute in question is a private dispute between the parties. Relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced hereunder:- “However, this Court unfortunately discerns that of late there is a growing trend amongst several High Courts to entertain writ petition in cases of pure property disputes. Disputes relating to partition suits, matters relating to execution of a decree, in cases of dispute between landlord and tenant and also in a case of money decree and in various other cases where disputed questions of property are involved, writ courts are entertaining such disputes. In some cases High Courts, in a routine manner, entertain petition under Article 227 over such disputes and such petitions are treated as writ petitions. 79. In some cases High Courts, in a routine manner, entertain petition under Article 227 over such disputes and such petitions are treated as writ petitions. 79. We would like to make it clear that in view of the law referred to above in cases of property rights and in disputes between private individuals writ court should not interfere unless there is any infraction of statute or it can be shown, that a private individual is acting in collusion with a statutory authority. 80. We may also observe that in some High Courts there is tendency of entertaining petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution by terming them as writ petitions. This is sought to be justified on an erroneous appreciation of the ratio in Surya Dev (supra) and in view of the recent amendment to Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999. It is urged that as a result of the amendment, scope of Section 115 of CPC has been curtailed. In our view, even if the scope of Section 115 CPC is curtailed that has not resulted in expanding High Court’s power of superintendence. It is too well known to be reiterated that in exercising its jurisdiction, High Court must follow the regime of law. 81. As a result of frequent interference by Hon’ble High Court either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution with pending civil and at times criminal cases, the disposal of cases by the civil and criminal courts gets further impeded and thus causing serious problems in the administration of justice. 82. This Court hopes and trusts that in exercising its power either under Article 226 or 227, Hon’ble High Court will follow the time honoured principles discussed above. Those principles have been formulated by this Court for ends of justice and the High Courts as the highest Courts of justice within their jurisdiction will adhere to them strictly.” 7. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the application preferred under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC was rightly allowed and petitioner no.2-Babu Singh was arrayed as party- respondent in the suit before the learned Court below, as he is a necessary party to the suit since during the pendency of such suit late Angrez Singh executed a sale deed in favour of Babu Singh with respect to the lands in question. Reliance in this regard was placed upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dhanlaxmi & Ors. v. P. Mohan & Ors. (Special Leave Petition (Civil) 262/2007) decided on 17.01.2007. The attention of this Court was drawn to paragraph 22 of the said judgment. Relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced hereunder:- “Section 52 deals with a transfer of property pending suit. In the instant case, the appellants have admittedly purchased the undivided shares of the respondents nos.2,3,4 & 6. It is not in dispute that the first respondent P. Mohan has got an undivided share in the said suit property. Because of the purchase by the appellants of the undivided share in the suit property, the rights of the first respondent herein in the suit or proceeding will not affect his right in the suit property by enforcing a partition. Admittedly, the appellants, having purchased the property from the other co-sharers, in our opinion, are entitled to come on record in order to work out the equity in their favour in the final decree proceedings. In our opinion, the appellants are necessary and proper parties to the suit, which is now pending before the Trial Court. We also make it clear that we are not concerned with the other suit filed by the mortgagee in these proceedings.” 8. Learned counsel for the respondent also submitted that Kuldeep Kaur-petitioner no.1 was already party in the main suit, and was arrayed as respondent no. 69 in the title of the suit, which was filed back on 23.03.2001. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that the contention of the petitioner that the Revenue Court has no jurisdiction to cancel the sale deed as well as adoption deed is misplaced, as no prayer to such extent has been made. And a perusal of the amended suit, placed on the record by the petitioners at Annexure-P/1 would reveal that prayer clauses (A) to (D) are same as the main suit, with the only change being made in prayer clause (E). Reliance was further placed upon the judgments rendered by this Court in the cases of Smt. Geeta Devi & Ors. v. Pushpap Chand & Ors. (S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 190/2016) decided on 23.08.2018 and Sukhpal Singh v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. 1998 (1) WLN 118 decided on 02.02.1998. Reliance was further placed upon the judgments rendered by this Court in the cases of Smt. Geeta Devi & Ors. v. Pushpap Chand & Ors. (S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 190/2016) decided on 23.08.2018 and Sukhpal Singh v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. 1998 (1) WLN 118 decided on 02.02.1998. Relevant portion of the said judgments is reproduced hereunder:- In Smt. Geeta Devi (supra):- “As per the plaint allegations, which have to be taken as correct for the purpose of deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the property stood transferred in favour of plaintiff on 14/11/2007 by registered sale deed by the power of attorney holder of defendants and, therefore, defendants no. 1 to 4 were divested of the ownership/right in the suit property and nothing remained thereafter with them to transfer on 17/11/2007 when they executed another sale deed in favour of defendants no. 5 and 6, which transfer, in case the transfer dated 14/11/2007 is a valid transfer, is wholly void and ineffective. As laid down in the case of Hasti Cement (supra) once the allegations made in the plaint seek to make out a case that the transaction resulting in sale deed pertaining to agriculture land, which is sought to be questioned, is void, the jurisdiction lies with the revenue court only and the jurisdiction of the civil court would be barred under Section 207 of the Act.” In Sukhpal Singh (supra):- “23. He has further placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Amir Mohammed v. Gafoor Mohammed Khan, 1988 RRD (Raj) 170, wherein the Court has observed that the relief of cancellation of the sale deed cannot be granted by a Revenue Court and the suit was maintainable only before the Civil Court. In the present case, the petitioner is not claiming cancellation of the Will and his case has been that it is a void being a forged and fabricated document and, thus, the cases referred to by Mr. Sidhu are distinguishable. 24. It should, also, be made clear that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not concurrent with that of the Revenue Court in a matter of this nature and the facts and circumstances of each case have to be considered of its own. 25. Sidhu are distinguishable. 24. It should, also, be made clear that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not concurrent with that of the Revenue Court in a matter of this nature and the facts and circumstances of each case have to be considered of its own. 25. If in the light of the above, the instant case is examined, it is abundantly clear that if the facts stated, the grounds and allegations and the averments made therein are taken into consideration in totality, it is abundantly clear in sum and substance that the respondent No. 3-plaintiff has made a grievance that the Will, on the basis of which the present petitioner-defendant has got the mutation, is void being a forged and fabricated document as it had never been executed by their father Ishar Singh. If the Revenue Court comes to the conclusion that it was never executed by late (Shri) Ishwar Singh, it is not necessary for the Revenue Court to declare it a nullity as it can be simply ignored and in that situation, by ignoring the said Will, the other reliefs claimed by the respondent No. 3-plaintift can be granted by the Revenue Court as according to the averments in the plaint, neither the body nor mind of Shri Ishar, Singh accompanied the alleged Will and the said instrument, being non est, is just to ,be ignored. Moreover, this petition has arisen only against an order passed on the application filed by the: petitioner-defendant under Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C. and it is settled law that such an application cannot be entertained and allowed where the validity of a particular document is under challenge.” 10. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that there is a difference in seeking relief for a sale deed to be declared void as opposed to seeking it to be cancelled. Reliance in this regard was placed upon the judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Suhrid Singh @ Sardool Singh v. Randhir Singh & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 2811-2813/2010) decided on 29.03.2010. Relevant portion of the said judgment as relied upon by the learned counsel is reproduced hereunder:- “6. Where the executant of a deed wants it to be annulled, he has to seek cancellation of the deed. (Civil Appeal No. 2811-2813/2010) decided on 29.03.2010. Relevant portion of the said judgment as relied upon by the learned counsel is reproduced hereunder:- “6. Where the executant of a deed wants it to be annulled, he has to seek cancellation of the deed. But if a non-executant seeks annulment of a deed, he has to seek a declaration that the deed is invalid, or non-est, or illegal or that it is not binding on him. The difference between a prayer for cancellation and declaration in regard to a deed of transfer/conveyance, can be brought out by the following illustration relating to ‘A’ and ‘B’ --two brothers. ‘A’ executes a sale deed in favour of ‘C’. Subsequently ‘A’ wants to avoid the sale. ‘A’ has to sue for cancellation of the deed. On the other hand, if ‘B’, who is not the executant of the deed, wants to avoid it, he has to sue for a declaration that the deed executed by ‘A’ is invalid/void and nonest/ illegal and he is not bound by it. In essence both may be suing to have the deed set aside or declared as non-binding. But the form is different and court fee is also different. If ‘A’, the executant of the deed, seeks cancellation of the deed, he has to pay ad-valorem court fee on the consideration stated in the sale deed. If ‘B’, who is a non-executant, is in possession and sues for a declaration that the deed is null or void and does not bind him or his share, he has to merely pay a fixed court fee of Rs. 19.50 under Article 17(iii) of Second Schedule of the Act. But if ‘B’, a non executant, is not in possession, and he seeks not only a declaration that the sale deed is invalid, but also the consequential relief of possession, he has to pay an ad-valorem court fee as provided under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Act. Section 7(iv)(c) provides that in suits for a declaratory decree with consequential relief, the court fee shall be computed according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint. Section 7(iv)(c) provides that in suits for a declaratory decree with consequential relief, the court fee shall be computed according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint. The proviso thereto makes it clear that where the suit for declaratory decree with consequential relief is with reference to any property, such valuation shall not be less than the value of the property calculated in the manner provided for by clause (v) of Section 7. 7. In this case, there is no prayer for cancellation of the sale deeds. The prayer is for a declaration that the deeds do not bind the “co-parcenery” and for joint possession. The plaintiff in the suit was not the executant of the sale deeds. Therefore, the court fee was computable under section 7(iv)(c) of the Act. The trial court and the High Court were therefore not justified in holding that the effect of the prayer was to seek cancellation of the sale deeds or that therefore court fee had to be paid on the sale consideration mentioned in the sale deeds.” 11. Learned counsel for the respondents also submitted that the application preferred under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC was rightly allowed as the Late Angrez Singh, husband of Kuldeep Kaur-Petitioner no.1 and father of Babu Singh-Petitioner no.2 transferred the land in question, during the pendency of the suit before the learned Court, in which the respondents have a share and therefore the amendment was necessary to get the sale deed declared as void, as the sale deed was executed after the suit was filed. 12. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the Revenue Court is thus well within its jurisdiction to allow the aforementioned applications, in exercise of the power under Sections 53, 88 and 183 of the Act of 1955. 13. Arguendo, learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that Harmel Kaur, mother of respondent no. 2/1-Buta Singh and 3-Jaspal Kaur is the first wife of the late Angrez Singh, and that petitioner no. 1-Kuldeep Kaur is the second wife, from the second bigamous marriage, and therefore the adoption deed, whereby Babu Singh who is being treated as the adopted son of the late Angrez Singh cannot be said to be the legal representative of the late Angrez Singh and Kuldeep Kaur, and therefore the application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC was rightly allowed. 14. 14. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length. Perused the record of the case as well as the catena of judgments cited at the Bar. 15. At the outset, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce the relevant provisions of law contained in Order VI Rule 17 CPC and Order I Rule 10 CPC. The same reads as follows :- “17. Amendment of pleadings.—The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties : Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial. 10. Suit in name of wrong plaintiff. (2) Court may strike out or add parties.—The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joinded, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.” 16. This Court observes that under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC, as clarified by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Revajeetu Builders (supra) has held that an amendment ought to be allowed if it is required for the proper and effective adjudication of the case, that it should not cause prejudice to the opposite parties, it should not fundamentally change the nature and character of the case, it should not lead to multiple litigation and courts should decline amendments if fresh suit on amended claims would be barred by limitation on the date of application. 17. 17. This Court further observes that under Order 1 Rule 10 sub-clause (2) CPC, the concerned court may add or strike out parties to the suit before it at any stage for the purpose of just and effective adjudication of the suit before it. 18. This Court also observes that the ratio decidendi laid down in the case of Shailini Shyam Shetty (supra) is that High Courts in their extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India ought not to interfere in cases where State instrumentalities are not party, and the dispute is purely of a private nature between the parties. 19. Now adverting to the facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court finds that the relief sought in the suit before the learned court below is not that of cancellation of the sale-deed and adoption-deed, but alleging that it is null and void. Therefore, the contention made on behalf of the petitioners that the revenue court would not have the jurisdiction but only a civil court would does not hold water. 20. This Court further observes that in the impugned order, dated 10.10.2014 (Annex.7) passed by the SDO (Revenue), Sri Karanpur, District Sri Ganganagar and the impugned order dated 05.08.2019 (Annex.10) passed by the learned Board of Revenue, Ajmer have clearly recorded the finding that the petitioners are necessary party to the suit, as the late Angrez Singh being the father of petitioner no.2-Babu Singh and the first husband of petitioner no.1-Kuldeep Kaur executed a sale-deed with respect to the land in-question. Furthermore, on a perusal of the cause-title of the main suit the petitioner no.1 Kuldeep Kaur and petitioner no.2-Babu Singh were arrayed as respondent no.69 and respondent no.70 respectively way back on 23.03.2001. 21. This Court upon going through the catena of judgments cited at Bar and looking into the overall facts and circumstances of the present case, specifically, the prayer in the main case No.88/2012 (26/2001) is of the firm opinion the impugned orders have been rightly passed, after finding that the petitioners are necessary parties to the suit before the learned trial court. 22. The present petition is thus without merit, and does not warrant the interference of this Court and is therefore, dismissed. Accordingly, the stay application also stands dismissed.