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2023 DIGILAW 629 (AP)

National Insurance Company Ltd v. K. Latha Ramesh

2023-03-23

T.MALLIKARJUNA RAO

body2023
JUDGMENT : 1. Aggrieved by the order dated 19.12.2012 in M.V.O.P. No.627 of 2007 passed by the Chairman, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-IV Additional District Judge, Tirupati (for short 'the Tribunal'), the National Insurance Company Limited rep., by its Branch Manager, Tirupati, who is the 2nd Respondent in M.V.O.P. preferred this appeal questioning the Award passed by the Tribunal and the liability fastened on it. 2. For the sake of convenience, hereinafter, the parties will be referred to as per their rankings in the M.V.O.P. 3. The claimants filed a petition under Section 166 (1) (c) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, claiming compensation of Rs.18,00,000/- on account of the death of K. Ramesh Reddy ( hereinafter be referred to as ‘the deceased’) in a motor vehicle accident that occurred on 23.04.2007 at 11.15 AM on Renigunta-Tirupati main road at Patel Wood Works. 4. The claimant's case is that on 23.04.2007, the deceased, as a rider and his son Pradeep Kumar as a pillion rider, were proceeding on their Scooter bearing No.ATC 6262, when they reached Patel Woodworks at Tirupati at about 11.15 AM, the 1st Respondent's Tempo Vehicle got insured with the 2nd Respondent bearing No.AP 03-U-5612 (hereinafter will be referred to as 'the offending vehicle'); its driver drove it rashly and negligently without due care and caution and dashed the deceased's Scooter on its behind and after that dashed the motorcycle bearing No.AP03-S-7830 proceeded in the same direction. As a result, the deceased sustained severe injuries, and Pradeep Kumar died on the spot due to the severe injuries sustained. Immediately, the deceased got shifted to S.V.R.R.G.G. Hospital, Tirupati; he died on the same day at 1.00 PM while undergoing treatment. 5. The first Respondent, the owner of the offending vehicle, remained ex-parte. 6. The 2nd Respondent filed a counter, admitting the accident and denied the other averments and contended that, as per the version in the claim petition, three vehicles were involved in the accident. The claimants filed the case against the owner and insurance company of the offending vehicle and not impleaded the owner and insurer of the other two vehicles. 6. The 2nd Respondent filed a counter, admitting the accident and denied the other averments and contended that, as per the version in the claim petition, three vehicles were involved in the accident. The claimants filed the case against the owner and insurance company of the offending vehicle and not impleaded the owner and insurer of the other two vehicles. The 2nd Respondent reliably learnt that the deceased had driven the Scooter in a rash and negligent manner and dashed the offending vehicle and, after that, the motorcycle and caused the accident, who was not having a driving licence and insurance for the Scooter and that the 2nd Respondent denied all other allegations and the claimants should put to strict proof of the same including driving licence of the driver of the offending vehicle, insurance and 1st Respondent was not violated the terms and conditions of the policy. The amount claimed is excessive. 7. The 2nd Respondent filed additional counter alleging that the police filed a charge sheet under section 304-A of I.P.C. and section 3 r/w 177 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which is clear that the cleaner dove 1st Respondent's vehicle at the time of the alleged accident, who has no driving licence; as per the latest Supreme Court decision, for the violation of policy conditions, insurance companies are not liable to pay compensation and the owner of the vehicle alone liable to pay the same. 8. Based on the pleadings, the Tribunal framed relevant issues. During the trial, on behalf of the claimants, P.Ws.1 and 2 got examined and marked Exs.A.1 to A.7. On behalf of the respondents, RW.1 got examined and marked Ex.B.1 copy of the policy. 9. On appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, the Tribunal held that the accident in question arose due to the negligence of the offending vehicle’s driver and on account of which the deceased died and granted compensation of Rs.17,87,200/- with interest at 7.5 % p.a., against the Respondents, making them jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation. 10. I have heard the learned Counsel appearing for both parties. 11. 10. I have heard the learned Counsel appearing for both parties. 11. Learned Counsel for the appellant /second Respondent contends that the Tribunal failed to see that the accident took place between three vehicles; the Tribunal was unable to see that the cleaner who drove the offending vehicle at the time of the accident, who had no driving licence; the Tribunal failed to see that the 1st Respondent who is the owner of the offending vehicle was deliberately and knowing fully well and handed over the vehicle to the unlicenced cleaner and this is a clear violation of terms and conditions of the policy. An owner of the vehicle is bound to make reasonable enquiries as to whether the person authorized to drive the vehicle holds a license or not and whether a breach of the policy condition was willful on the part of the insured. The claimants established the said fact by relying on the charge sheet. It is further contended that the Tribunal failed to see that the offending vehicle's driver is charge-sheeted under section 181 of M.V. Act, for not possessing any driving licence; the Tribunal erred in awarding a sum of Rs.25,000/- towards loss of consortium which is on the higher side, and the proper amount is only Rs.5,000/- ; the Tribunal erred in awarding @ 7.5% per annum, and the appropriate interest is only @ 6%. 12. Learned Counsel for the respondents/claimants supported the Tribunal's findings and observations of the Tribunal about rash and negligence. However, the Tribunal Judgment is assigned on the ground that the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is meagre and it has not followed the well-established principles and the enabling provision Order 41 Rule 33 of C.P.C. empowers the Appellate Court to pass or make such further order/decree as the case may be required. 13. Now the points for consideration are, I. Is the Tribunal not justified in fastening the liability on the insurance company? II. Is the compensation fixed by the Tribunal just and reasonable, and is it required to be enhanced as contended by the appellants despite the non-filing of an appeal of cross-objections against the Award passed by the Tribunal? 13. Now the points for consideration are, I. Is the Tribunal not justified in fastening the liability on the insurance company? II. Is the compensation fixed by the Tribunal just and reasonable, and is it required to be enhanced as contended by the appellants despite the non-filing of an appeal of cross-objections against the Award passed by the Tribunal? POINT No. I: A. The Tribunal, while answering issue No.1, held that the deceased K. Ramesh Reddy died due to injuries sustained in the accident that took place on 23.04.2007 at 11.15 AM in question, is not challenged by the insurance company in this appeal also. It is also evident by Ex.A.1 -Certified Copy of F.I.R., Ex.A2 -Certified copy of charge sheet and Ex.A3 -Certified copy of Post-mortem report and Ex.A4 -Certified copy of inquest report. The main grievance of the appellant is that at the time of the accident, the cleaner drove the offending vehicle and the owner of the vehicle deliberately and knowing fully well handed over the vehicle to the cleaner and thereby, there is a clear violation of terms and conditions of policy. B. The relationship among the claimants and the deceased is not in dispute. The 1st claimant is the wife, the 2nd claimant is the daughter, and the 3rd claimant is the mother, of the deceased. The 1st claimant is examined as PW.1. In the cross-examination held on behalf of the 2nd Respondent, PW.1 categorically stated that she did not witness the accident. Thus, much significance cannot be attached to the evidence of PW.1 regarding the manner of the accident. However, she testified that as per the F.I.R. and charge sheet, the cleaner of the 1st Respondent drove the vehicle at the time of the accident. She denied the suggestion that the accident occurred due to the negligent riding of her husband at the time of the accident. C. On behalf of the 2nd Respondent, R.W.1 -S.B. Somla Naik, Administrative Officer of the second respondent/insurance company, is examined. According to his evidence, the owner of the offending vehicle deliberately allowed the cleaner to drive the vehicle, and the cleaner did not hold a driving license at the time of the accident. Though he spoke about the manner of the accident, admittedly, like PW.1, he was not an eyewitness to the accident. According to his evidence, the owner of the offending vehicle deliberately allowed the cleaner to drive the vehicle, and the cleaner did not hold a driving license at the time of the accident. Though he spoke about the manner of the accident, admittedly, like PW.1, he was not an eyewitness to the accident. He stated in his cross-examination that they had not taken a plea in O.P. No.192 of 2008, saying that the cleaner drove the lorry at the time of the accident. The witness clarifies that they do not know about the same by them. As seen from the evidence adduced on behalf of both sides, both parties have not examined eyewitnesses to establish the accident. D. It would also be essential to note the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Anita Sharma v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 2021 A.C.J. 17 (S.C.) wherein the Apex Court observed that "the standard of proof in such like matters is one of preponderance of probabilities, rather than beyond reasonable doubt. One needs to be mindful that the approach and role of courts while examining evidence in accident claims cases ought not to be to find fault with non-examination of some best eyewitnesses, as may happen in a criminal trial, but, instead should be only to analyze the material placed on record by the parties to ascertain whether the claimant's version is more likely than not true". E. Considering the law laid down by Apex Court, I appreciate the contention raised by both parties. Respondents placed no evidence to show that the contents of the charge sheet are incorrect. In K. Rajani and others Vs. M. Satyanarayana Goud and others, 2015 ACJ 797 , this High Court observed that : "when the insurance company came to know that the police investigation is false, they must also challenge the charge sheet in appropriate proceedings. If at all the findings of the police are found to be incorrect, it is for the insurance company to produce some evidence to show that the contents of the charge sheet are false". If at all the findings of the police are found to be incorrect, it is for the insurance company to produce some evidence to show that the contents of the charge sheet are false". F. In Bheemla Devi V. Himachal Road Transport Corporation, 2009 ACJ 1725 (S.C.), the Apex Court observed as follows : “It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants are merely to establish their case on the touch stone of preponderance of probabilities. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied”. G. Nothing on record suggests that the Investigating Officer filed a charge sheet against the offending bus driver without conducting a proper investigation. It is also difficult to hold that the Police Officer fabricated a case against the 1st Respondent. H. In a proceeding under the M.V. Act, where the procedure is a summary procedure, there is no need to go by strict rules of pleading or evidence. The document having some probative value, the genuineness of which is not in doubt, can be looked into by the Tribunal for getting preponderance of probable versions. As such, it is by now well settled that even F.I.R. or Police Papers, when made part of a claim petition, can be looked into for giving a finding in respect of the happening of the accident. The preponderance of probabilities is the touchstone for concluding rashness and negligence, as well as the mode and manner of happening. I. The claimants relied on Ex.A1 report, which shows that the accident that occurred on 23.04.2007 at 11.15 AM and the information received at Noon on the same day. As per Ex.A1 report, the driver of the Tempo bearing No.AP 03 U 5612 caused the accident because of his rash and negligent driving. I. The claimants relied on Ex.A1 report, which shows that the accident that occurred on 23.04.2007 at 11.15 AM and the information received at Noon on the same day. As per Ex.A1 report, the driver of the Tempo bearing No.AP 03 U 5612 caused the accident because of his rash and negligent driving. Ex.A.2 charge sheet shows that the accused, the lorry cleaner, has driven the lorry rashly and negligently dashed against the Scooter bearing No.ATC 6262 from its behind and then the lorry hit against motorcycle bearing No.AP 03 S 7830 proceeding in the same direction, resulting in K. Ramesh Reddy (D3), K. Pradeep Kumar (D1), the rider and pillion rider of the Scooter and K. Balakrishna Reddy (D2), the rider of Yamaha Motorcycle sustained severe injuries of them and K. Pradeep Kumar (D1) died on the spot, D2 and D3 got shifted to Tirupathi for treatment, D2 succumbed to the injuries on the same day at 12.45 AM, and K. Ramesh Reddy (D3) succumbed to injuries on the same day at 01.00 PM while undergoing treatment in S.V.R.R.G.G. Hospital, Tirupathi. J. Based on the observations and findings, the insurance company contends that the Tribunal should have exonerated the insurance company from liability as the cleaner of the offending vehicle caused the accident. The normal rule is for the petitioners to prove the negligence. But in accident cases, hardship is caused to the petitioner as the true cause of the accident is not known to them but is solely within the knowledge of the Respondent, who caused it. It will then be for the Respondent to establish the accident due to some other cause than his negligence. The insurance company did not choose to examine the driver of the lorry; the driver of the lorry involved in the accident did not enter the box to explain the manner of the accident. K. Upon careful reading of the material on record, this Court views that the Tribunal has perfectly appreciated the evidence on record and findings of the Tribunal that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the driver. As already observed, the cleaner of the offending vehicle caused the accident by driving the offending vehicle at the time of the accident. As already observed, the cleaner of the offending vehicle caused the accident by driving the offending vehicle at the time of the accident. There is a clear recital in the charge sheet that the accused being the cleaner of lorry drove the vehicle without a valid driving license and exhibited rashness and negligence while driving the same vehicle, resulting in the death of three persons. L. Both parties have not placed any oral evidence regarding the manner of the accident, they relied on the charge sheet to support their case. As per the contents of the charge sheet, the cleaner drove the offending vehicle at the time of the accident without a valid driving license. Despite service of notice, the owner of the offending vehicle did not choose to contest the proceedings of M.V.O.P. and this appeal. It also stated in the charge sheet that after the sale of Tomatos at Srikalahasti, the driver of the lorry LW.13 drove the lorry up to Yerpedu. Then he stopped the lorry by the side of the road and slept in his lorry, and the accused, who was the cleaner of the lorry, drove the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner and caused the accident. M. In the case of Skandia Insurance Company Limited Vs. Kokilaben Chandravadan and others, 1987 ACJ 411 SC, the Apex Court held that “On a true interpretation of the relevant clause which in interpretation is at peace with the conscience of Section 96, the condition excluding driving by a person not duly licensed is not absolute and the promisor is absolved once it is shown that he has done everything in his power to keep, honour, and fulfil the promise and he himself is not guilty of a deliberate breach. It was further held that unless the insured is at fault and is guilty of a breach the insrer cannot escape from the obligation to indemnify the insured and successfully contend that he is exonerated having regard to the fact that the promisor (the insured) committed a breach of his promise.” N. In the case of Sohan Lal Passi Vs. P. Sesh Reddy and others, 1996 (5) SCC 21 = 1996 ACJ 1044 , the Apex Court had gone to the extent of laying down that technical objection should not be allowed to be raised by the Insurance Company. P. Sesh Reddy and others, 1996 (5) SCC 21 = 1996 ACJ 1044 , the Apex Court had gone to the extent of laying down that technical objection should not be allowed to be raised by the Insurance Company. In that case, the person driving the vehicle was not even a driver and was a cleaner, who was not holding any licence, but the actual driver, who had a valid driving licence, had authorized him to drive the vehicle. In the circumstances, the Supreme Court held that no breach of the terms and conditions of the policy had been established and observed that : “In a case where the person who has got insured the vehicle with the insurance company has appointed a duly licensed driver and if the accident takes place when the vehicle is being driven by a person not duly licensed based on the authority of the driver duly authorized to drive the vehicle whether the insurance company in that event shall be absolved from its liability? While interpreting the contract of insurance, the Tribunal and Courts have to be conscious that the right to claim compensation by heirs and legal representatives of the victims of the accident is not defeated on technical grounds. Unless it is established on the materials on record that it was the insured who had wilfully violated the condition of the policy by allowing a person not duly licensed to drive the vehicle when the accident took place, the insurer shall be deemed to be a judgment debtor in respect of the liability in view of sub-section (1) of section 96 of the Act." O. The Apex Court further observed : “The whole concept of getting the vehicle insured by an insurance company is to provide an easy mode of getting compensation by the claimants, otherwise in the normal course, they had to pursue their claim against the owner from one forum to the other and ultimately to execute the order of Accidents Claims Tribunal for the realization of such amount by the sale of properties of the owner of the vehicle. …… We affirm and reiterate the statement of law laid down in the above case. We may also state that without the knowledge of the insured, if by driver's acts or omission, others meddle with the vehicle and cause an accident, the insurer would be liable to indemnify the insured. …… We affirm and reiterate the statement of law laid down in the above case. We may also state that without the knowledge of the insured, if by driver's acts or omission, others meddle with the vehicle and cause an accident, the insurer would be liable to indemnify the insured. The insurer in such a case cannot take the defence of a breach of the condition in the certificate of insurance. We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed in the case of Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Kokilaben Chandravadan (supra). As in the facts of the present case, the appellant shall be deemed to be liable to pay compensation applying the principle of vicarious liability because the accident took place when the act authorized was being performed in a mode which may not be proper but was directly connected within the course of employment, sub-section (1) of section 96 of the Act shall come into play, and the insurance company shall be deemed to be the judgment debtor, so far claim made by the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased is concerned. are Accordingly, the appeals are allowed, and the orders of the Claims Tribunal and the High Court are modified where only the appellant has been held to be liable to pay the compensation and the respondent insurance company has been absolved of the liability. The respondent insurance company shall be jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation to the claimants.” P. By following the principle in the said decision, this Court views that the Tribunal is justified in fastening the liability on the insurance company. Accordingly, this point is answered. Point No. II : A. The Tribunal has found that the age of the deceased was 41' years by relying on Ex.X.2-Entry in the Service Register of the deceased. PW.2 – Sri. M. Suresh, an employee of South Central Railways, deposed that the deceased was Junior Engineer in Railway and earned a gross salary of Rs.12,978/- per month, Ex.P.7-pay slip. After deducting statutory deductions, the Tribunal has taken the deceased's earnings at Rs.12,000/- per month. PW.2 also deposed that the date of birth of the deceased was 12.02.1965 and by taking into consideration of Ex.X2 and the evidence of PW.2, the Tribunal held the age of the deceased was 41' years at the time of the accident. After deducting statutory deductions, the Tribunal has taken the deceased's earnings at Rs.12,000/- per month. PW.2 also deposed that the date of birth of the deceased was 12.02.1965 and by taking into consideration of Ex.X2 and the evidence of PW.2, the Tribunal held the age of the deceased was 41' years at the time of the accident. Insofar as the future prospects are concerned, the Apex Court, in National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 , at paragraph 61, held that, (iii) While determining the income, an addition of 50% of the actual salary to the deceased's income towards prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and was below 40, should be made. The addition should be 30% if the deceased is between 40 to 50 years. If the deceased was between 50 to 60 years, the addition should be 15%. Actual salary should be read as actual salary less tax. (iv) If the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed salary, an additional 40% of the established income should be the warrant where the deceased was below the age of 40 years. An addition of 25% where the deceased was between 40 to 50 years and 10% where the deceased was between 50 to 60 years should be regarded as the necessary computation method. The established income means the income minus the tax component. B. In this case, the deceased had a permanent job, and as such, this Court views an additional 30% of the established income should be warranted towards future prospects. The monthly earnings, including future prospects, arrive at Rs.15,600/- (12,000+ 3,600). Following the same, the annual earnings of the deceased, including a future prospectus, can be assessed at Rs.1,87,200/- (Rs.15,600 x 12). Out of which, where the deceased is a married person, and the dependants are 3 in number, 1/3rd of the personal and living expenses of the deceased should be made, i.e. Rs.62,400/- (1,87,000X1/3rd) and thereby, the contribution of the earnings of the deceased towards the family members would arrive at an amount of Rs.1,24,800/- (187000-62400). To arrive at the loss of earnings, the appropriate multiplier 14' for the age groups of 41 to 45 as specified by the Apex Court in Sarala Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation, 2009 ACJ 1298 is applied and arrived at the loss of dependency at Rs.17,47,200/- (1,24,800x14). To arrive at the loss of earnings, the appropriate multiplier 14' for the age groups of 41 to 45 as specified by the Apex Court in Sarala Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation, 2009 ACJ 1298 is applied and arrived at the loss of dependency at Rs.17,47,200/- (1,24,800x14). C. Insofar as the conventional heads are concerned, in Pranay Sethi’s case referred to supra, the Apex Court awarded a total sum of Rs.70,000/- under conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium, and funeral expenses. It was further held that the sum should be enhanced at 10% every three years. It was held thus in Paragraph 61 : "(viii) Reasonable figures under conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs.15,000/-, Rs.40,000/- and Res.15,000/- respectively. The aforesaid amounts should be enhanced at the rate of 10% in every three years." D. In Magma General Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Nanu Ram, 2018 ACJ 2782 , at paragraph 8, the Apex Court held that : "(8.6)…the Motor Vehicles Act is beneficial and welfare legislation. The Court is duty-bound and entitled to award 'just compensation, irrespective of whether any plea on that behalf was raised by the claimant. (8.7) A Constitution Bench of this Court in Pranay Sethi, 2017 ACJ 2700 (S.C.), dealt with the various heads under which compensation is to be awarded in a death case. One of these heads is the loss of consortium. In legal parlance, 'consortium' is a compendious term which encompasses 'spousal consortium', parental consortium', and filial consortium. The right to consortium would include the company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family. With respect to a spouse, it would include sexual relations with the deceased spouse (Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh 2013 ACJ 1403 (S.C.). The parental consortium is granted to the child upon the premature death of a parent, for loss of 'parental aid, protection, affection, society, discipline, guidance and training. The filial consortium is the right of the parents to compensate in the case of the accidental death of a child. An accident leading to the death of a child causes great shock and agony to the parents and family of the deceased. The greatest agony for a parent is to lose their child during their lifetime. The filial consortium is the right of the parents to compensate in the case of the accidental death of a child. An accident leading to the death of a child causes great shock and agony to the parents and family of the deceased. The greatest agony for a parent is to lose their child during their lifetime. Children are valued for their love, affection, companionship and their role in the family unit." E. The Judgment in Pranay Sethi’s case was rendered in the year 2017. Therefore, the claimants are entitled to a 10% enhancement of conventional heads. In all, the claimants, wife and children, and the mother of the deceased are entitled to the compensation as detailed below : Towards loss of dependency Rs.17,47,200/- Towards funeral expenses Rs.16,500/- Towards loss of estate Rs.16,500/- Towards spousal consortium Rs.44,000/- Towards parental consortium Rs.44,000/- Towards filial consortium Rs.20,000/- Total Rs.18,88,200/- F. After considering the material on record, this Court holds that the claimants are entitled to Rs.18,88,200/- with interest as awarded by the Tribunal. G. Learned Counsel for the claimants contends that the quantum of compensation Awarded by the Tribunal was on the lower side; the Court has the power to enhance the compensation, even though the claimant had not filed any cross objection against the Award seeking higher compensation. In support of the said contention he relied on Universal Sompo General Insurance Co. Ltd., Uma and others, 2016 ACJ 2238 , he also relied on Surekha Vs. Santhosh, (S.C.) [Civil Appeal No.476 of 2020 = (SC) 276 : 2021(1) ACC 653 ], it was held by the Apex Court that, “This appeal takes exception to the Judgment and order dated 04.01.2019 passed by the High court of judicature at Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad in First Appeal No.2564 of 2016, whereby the High Court, even though agreed with the stand of the appellants that just compensation amount ought to be Rs.49,85,376/- (Forty-Nine Lakh eighty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Seventy-Six Only), however, declined to grant enhancement merely on the ground that the appellants had failed to file cross-appeal”. H. In a decision reported in Jitendra Khimshankar Trivedi and others V. Kasam Daud Kumbhar and others, [(5) 2015 (1) An.WR 755 (S.C.)= (2015) 4 SCC 237 ], the Hon’ble Apex Court held that “the Tribunal has awarded Rs.2,24,000/- as against the same, claimants have not filed any appeal. H. In a decision reported in Jitendra Khimshankar Trivedi and others V. Kasam Daud Kumbhar and others, [(5) 2015 (1) An.WR 755 (S.C.)= (2015) 4 SCC 237 ], the Hon’ble Apex Court held that “the Tribunal has awarded Rs.2,24,000/- as against the same, claimants have not filed any appeal. As against the Award passed by the Tribunal when the claimants have not filed any appeal, the question arises whether the income of the deceased could be increased and compensation could be enhanced. In terms of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the courts/tribunals are to pass awards determining the amount of compensation as to be fair and reasonable and accepted by the legal standards. The power of the courts in awarding reasonable compensation was emphasized by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Nagappa Vs. Gurudayal Singh and others, Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Mohd. Nasir and another and Ningamma and another Vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd., As against the Award passed by the Tribunal even though the claimants have not filed any appeal, as it is obligatory on the part of courts/tribunals to award just and reasonable compensation, it is appropriate to increase the compensation”. I. In the light of the settled legal position this court finds force in the submission of the counsel for the claimants. In view of the same this court views that even though the claimants had not filed any cross objection against the award seeking higher compensation, they are entitled to the compensation as arrived at by this court. J. As seen from the record, claimants filed petition for compensation of Rs.18,00,000/-. In Laxman @ Laxman Mourya v. Divisional Manager, Oriental Insurance Company Limited and another, (2011) 10 SCC 756 the Apex Court while referring to Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh, (2003) 12 A.C.J. 274 (SC) held as under : “It is true that in the petition filed by him under Section 166 of the Act, the appellant had claimed compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- only, but as held in Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh (2003) 2 SCC 274 , in the absence of any bar in the Act, the Tribunal and for that any competent Court is entitled to award higher compensation to the victim of an accident.” K. In Ramla Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd., CIVIL APPEAL No.11495 OF 2018 the Apex Court held no restriction to award compensation exceeding the amount claimed. National Insurance Co. Ltd., CIVIL APPEAL No.11495 OF 2018 the Apex Court held no restriction to award compensation exceeding the amount claimed. Given the principle laid down by the Apex Court, the claimants are entitled to Rs.18,88,200/- exceeding the claimed amount. However, the claimants shall pay the requisite court fee over and above the compensation awarded. L. Following the principles laid down by the Apex Court in a catena of judgments, this Court can safely conclude that the claimants are entitled to get more than what has been claimed. Further, the Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial piece of legislation where the interest of the claimants is a paramount consideration. The Courts should always endeavour to extend the benefit to the claimants to a just and reasonable extent. Accordingly, the compensation shall be awarded to respondents 1 to 3. Thus, the point is answered. 14. As a result, (i) the appeal is dismissed, without costs. However, the respondents 1 to 3/petitioners are awarded compensation of Rs.18,88,200/- with interest as awarded by the Tribunal from the date of petition till realization. (ii) the appellant/2nd respondent/ insurer and the 4th Respondent in appeal are jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation, and they are directed to deposit the awarded amount with interest and costs within one month from the date of receipt of the Judgment; (iii) On deposit of enhanced amount with interest, the 1st claimant is entitled to enhanced compensation with interest. (iv) The apportionment made by the tribunal regarding compensation awarded by it holds good; (v) The claimants shall pay the requisite court fee over and above the compensation awarded; (vi) the amount paid by the appellant/2nd respondent/insurer earlier towards the awarded amounts shall be given in credit; 15. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, pending if any, shall stand closed.