ORDER : 1. Rule. Mr. Hardik Mehta, learned APP waives service of Rule on behalf of the respondent – State and Mr. Krunal G. Patel, learned advocate waives service of Rule on behalf of the respondent no.2. 2. This application has been filed under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing and setting aside the FIR bearing CR No.I-9/2019 registered with Navrangpura Police Station, Ahmedabad City for offences punishable under Sections 406, 420 and 114 of the IPC. 3. The complainant – Parvez Ibrahimbhai Kazi was working as Conductor in the Company known as Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Applicant no.1 is a President of the Union, while the applicant no.2 is Secretary who had filed Reference IT no.3 of 2008 praying for increasing the wages of the labourers. The case came to be disposed of with an increment of Rs.1,500/- to the wagers. The amount which has been received by a Reference was given through cheque in the bank account of the complainant and 53 individuals. It is alleged by the complainant that out of the said amount, Rs.6 lacs per individual was collected by the Union towards legal expenses and the complainant, thus, states that the amount collected was by defrauding the complainant and others and therefore, Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC would be attracted in the matter. 4. Mr. Virat Popat, learned advocate for the applicants submits that the Union had filed several cases before this Court, Labour Court and Industrial Tribunal and in all about 199 litigations were preferred by the Union. The applicants, as Union leaders, had worked day in and day out to ensure that the workmen get benefit as claimants. They worked as labourers from the year 2008 to 2015, which thereafter resulted in compromise and each labourer was granted Rs.15 lacs towards full and final settlement. 4.1 Mr. Popat submits that some of the claimants had accepted the amount and had given the affidavits stating that they are not desirous to proceed with the litigations. Mr. Popat states that necessary MOU/affidavits were executed which show that the amount was accepted without any dispute while 5 of the the claimants had not come forward to receive the cheque and thus, the cheques were returned back to the Company. Mr. Mr. Popat states that necessary MOU/affidavits were executed which show that the amount was accepted without any dispute while 5 of the the claimants had not come forward to receive the cheque and thus, the cheques were returned back to the Company. Mr. Popat further submits that the amount received by the individuals had gone to their bank account, which could be verified through the bank statement of the Company. Mr. Popat submits that the terms of full and final settlement was to the effect that the dues were finally settled and the workmen were to submit their resignation in their own handwriting. Mr. Popat submits that the present complainant too had resigned and there should not be any dispute as the money has been accepted by each of them which becomes apparent from the communication of the Company made to the Labour Welfare Department and further those claimants who have not accepted the cheques were returned back to the Company which itself proves the bonafide of the Union Officers and thus, submits that the element of Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC would not be attracted. 4.2 Mr. Popat states that 50 affidavits have been filed on record of the settlement and for rest of the three, Mr. Popat submitted that one has expired after filing of the affidavit, one is in jail while the other one is present today. 4.3 Mr. Popat further submits that the parties have settled the dispute amicably outside the Court and that there remains no grievance between them. Therefore, in the larger interest of the society, the impugned FIR may be quashed and set aside. 5. The complainant has appeared yesterday and even today and has filed an affidavit stating that he and other 53 were serving with the Transport Division of Green Channel Travel Services and the applicants, as Presidents of the Union and Chairpersons of the Negotiating Committee with the Companies, have represented their case of the workers for the benefits, rights and other demands from time to time. The complainant joined as Bus Conductor in the year 1999 and in 2008, a General Wage Demand was raised by the Union before the Industrial Union, Ahmedabad and has affirmed that from time to time, the Union has attended additional about 200 litigations before various competent authorities and vide agreement-cum-declaration letter dated 1.1.2018, all the workers of Transport Division of Green Channel Travel Services had agreed for the deductions towards legal professional fees along with Union expenses for all the litigations that the Union have contested on behalf of the Union members and had arrived at final settlement with the Company in the matter of General Wage Demand pending before the Industrial Tribunal, Ahmedabad i.e. Reference IT no.03 of 2008. The complainant states in his affidavit that out of misunderstandings and bitter circumstances, the FIR was lodged. 6. The affidavits of 15 persons have been produced on record. Today, (1) Rasidkhan Maheboobkhan Pathan, (2) Anish Mahomad Hanifbhai Shaikh, (3) Sabirhusen Mohamadmiya Shaikh, (4) Rameshkumar Chanduram Kanthumariya, (5) Babubhai Rupabhai Nayak, (6) Rameshkumar Hiralal Nathbawa, (7) Sakaraji Ranchhodji Makwana, (8) Jagdishbhai Chhanabhai Kabira, (9) Pravin Ranchhodbhai Rathod, (10) Himatram Shankarlal Kalal, (11) Sureshbhai Jayantibhai Makwana, (12) Digvijay Rambhai Rathod, (13) Dilipsinh Zala, (14) Dineshkumar Navalsinh Padhiyar, and (15) Maheshbhai Pravinbhai Prajapati are present before this Court and have affirmed the contents of the affidavits. All the affidavits have been executed and affirmed before the notary. Hence, the very contents and the statements made in the affidavits would not raise any doubt. The Court has verified about affidavits of 15 persons who were present before this Court who all have confirmed the execution of affidavits by the rest. 7. Mr. Hardik Mehta, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent-State submitted that any FIR should be quashed in accordance with the guidelines of the Hon'ble Apex Court and the parameters laid down therein. 8. Mr. Krunal G. Patel, learned advocate for respondent no.2 - original complainant has concurred with the factum of settlement of the dispute, as advanced by learned advocate Mr. Virat Popat, learned advocate appearing for the applicants. The Court verified the contents of the compromise with the original complainant–respondent no.2, who is present before the Court. The respondent no.2- original complainant affirmed about execution of the affidavit dated 17.10.2022, wherein terms of settlement have been recorded. Virat Popat, learned advocate appearing for the applicants. The Court verified the contents of the compromise with the original complainant–respondent no.2, who is present before the Court. The respondent no.2- original complainant affirmed about execution of the affidavit dated 17.10.2022, wherein terms of settlement have been recorded. The respondent no.2-original complainant, categorically stated that he has no grievance against the applicants and that he has no objection to the quashment of the impugned FIR filed by him. 9. In the case Mohammed Ibrahim & Ors. Vs State of Bihar & another reported in (2009) 8 SCC 751 , this Court has observed as under:- “18. Let us now examine whether the ingredients of an offence of cheating are made out. The essential ingredients of the offence of "cheating" are as follows: (i) deception of a person either by making a false or misleading representation or by dishonest concealment or by any other act or omission; (ii) fraudulent or dishonest inducement of that person to either deliver any property or to consent to the retention thereof by any person or to intentionally induce that person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and (iii) such act or omission causing or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property. 19. To constitute an offence under section 420, there should not only be cheating, but as a consequence of such cheating, the accused should have dishonestly induced the person deceived (i) to deliver any property to any person, or (ii) to make, alter or destroy wholly or in part a valuable security (or anything signed or sealed and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security). 20. When a sale deed is executed conveying a property claiming ownership thereto, it may be possible for the purchaser under such sale deed, to allege that the vendor has cheated him by making a false representation of ownership and fraudulently induced him to part with the sale consideration. But in this case the complaint is not by the purchaser. On the other hand, the purchaser is made a co-accused. 21. But in this case the complaint is not by the purchaser. On the other hand, the purchaser is made a co-accused. 21. It is not the case of the complainant that any of the accused tried to deceive him either by making a false or misleading representation or by any other action or omission, nor is it his case that they offered him any fraudulent or dishonest inducement to deliver any property or to consent to the retention thereof by any person or to intentionally induce him to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived. Nor did the complainant allege that the first appellant pretended to be the complainant while executing the sale deeds. Therefore, it cannot be said that the first accused by the act of executing sale deeds in favour of the second accused or the second accused by reason of being the purchaser, or the third, fourth and fifth accused, by reason of being the witness, scribe and stamp vendor in regard to the sale deeds, deceived the complainant in any manner. 22. As the ingredients of cheating as stated in section 415 are not found, it cannot be said that there was an offence punishable under sections 417, 418, 419 or 420 of the Code.” 10. It is true that the offences alleged against the applicants under Sections 406, 420 of the Indian Penal Code are compoundable by the persons cheated and by the owner of property in respect of which breach of trust has committed, but with the permission of the Court. Here the complainant has invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this Court to quash the FIR. Considering the principle laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303 , the present matter would fall under the criteria laid down therein. In paragraph-61 of the said judgment, it has been observed thus:- “61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victims family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.” 11. In view of the settlement arrived at between the parties, there exists no scope for any further proceeding in the matter. The continuance of proceedings would lead to wastage of precious judicial time as there would remain no possibility of any conviction in the case. Hence, the Court is of the opinion that this is a fit case where the inherent powers of the Court under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. could be exercised for securing the ends of justice. 12. In the result, the application is allowed. The impugned FIR bearing CR No.I-9/2019 registered with Navrangpura Police Station, Ahmedabad City and the proceedings initiated in pursuance thereof are quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute. Direct service is permitted.