JUDGMENT Rajbir Sehrawat, J. (Oral) The petitioner has filed this civil revision under Article 227 of the Constitution of India praying for setting aside of order dated 01.05.2014 (Annexure P-3) passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Gurgaon, whereby the application filed by the petitioner for impounding the Lease Deed for affixation of improper Stamp Fee and the application for de-exhibiting the Leas Deed (Annexure P-2), have been dismissed; along with certain other prayers. 2. The brief facts of this case are that the respondent-plaintiff filed a suit for recovery against the petitioner; for an amount of Rs. 52,46,413/-. That amount was stated to be rent of leased premises, created through lease dated 16.04.2007. During the evidence the plaintiff tendered the said lease deed in evidence. The said lease deed was marked as Exhibit P-4. Although, the objection was raised qua documents, including the lease deed, however, the objection was kept open by the trial court. Thereafter the evidence of the plaintiff was closed on 04.04.2013. The evidence of the defendant was started. The defendant was granted as many as nine opportunities to lead its evidence. However, no evidence had been led by the defendant in the suit. At the fag end of the trial the defendant moved an application under Order 7, Rule 11 for rejection of the plaint. However, the same was dismissed vide order dated 11.02.2014. Thereafter, two separate applications were moved by the defendant, one for de-exhibiting the lease deed in question and another for impounding the document, as such. However, the trial Court has dismissed both the aforesaid applications. Hence, the present petition has been filed by the petitioner. 3. Arguing the case learned counsel for the petitioner submits that since the objection was raised qua admissibility of the documents, therefore, the document being insufficiently stamped, the court was under duty to impound the same under provisions of Section 33 read with section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (in short, the 'Stamp Act'). Since the document was liable to be impounded, therefore, the same could not have been admitted in evidence, nor could the same be read into evidence in terms of the provisions of law contained in the aforesaid Sections. The counsel has submitted that due objection was raised when the document was tendered. However, the same was kept open by the trial court. The counsel has submitted that due objection was raised when the document was tendered. However, the same was kept open by the trial court. The trial Court was under a duty to decide the objection immediately on being raised. Moreover, the trial court has even recorded the observation that even the insufficiently stamped document could be read into evidence for collateral purposes. However, if the document is not even admissible in evidence then the same cannot be at all considered by court for any purpose. The counsel has relied upon the judgments rendered by the Supreme Court in the cases of Ram Rattan (dead) by L.Rs. v. Bajrang Lal & Others, (1978) 3 SCC 236 and Avinash Kumar Chauhati v. Vijay Krishna Mishra, 2009(2) SCC 532 . Hence, it is submitted that the trial court has wrongly dismissed the application filed by the petitioner. 4. On the other hand, the counsel for the respondent has submitted that the objection taken by the petitioner qua exhibition of the documents, as recorded in the proceedings of the trial court, was general in nature. No specific objection was raised by the petitioner at the time of the execution of the above said lease deed, specifically on account of insufficiency of stamp duty paid for lease deed. In any case, the objection can be decided at the time of decision of the suit as well. Hence, the trial court has rightly dismissed the petition and the present petition is not maintainable as such. The counsel for the respondent has also relied upon above said judgment in the case of Ram Rattan (supra) to buttress his argument. Beside this the counsel for the respondent has also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Javer Chand & others v. Pukhraj Surana, 1961 AIR SC 1655, to submit that once the document has been admitted in evidence, rightly or wrongly, the matter regarding admissibility of the document stands closed and the same cannot be reopened by the defendant, in view of section 36 of the Stamp Act. The counsel for the respondent has also relied upon the judgment of Calcutta High Court in the case of Shyamal Kumar Roy v. Sushil Kumar Agarwal, 2006(19) RCR (Civil) 244. 5. The counsel for the respondent has also relied upon the judgment of Calcutta High Court in the case of Shyamal Kumar Roy v. Sushil Kumar Agarwal, 2006(19) RCR (Civil) 244. 5. Having heard the counsel for the parties, this court finds that the document in question was tendered by the plaintiff at the time of its testimony. The objection regarding admissibility of the documents, which were being produced by the plaintiff, including the above said lease deed, was duly raised before the trial court. The statement of the plaintiff, as recorded by the trial court, itself shows the fact that the objection was raised but it was kept open by the trial court. That objection, regarding admissibility of the document, was kept open by the trial court. The objection was never decided by the trial court till the present applications were filed. 6. Although, the defendant might have been responsible for delay of the suit, yet once the application is filed by it for adjudication upon its objection, the same should have been considered and decided by the trial court because the said document is of primal legal significance for the case of the plaintiff. However, the impugned order shows that even while considering the applications filed by the petitioner, the trial court has kept the issue open by observing that it can be decided at an appropriate stage. Although, the trial court has recorded that the issue of admissibility of the lease deed can be decided at appropriate stage, however the order gives an expression as if the court has already made-up an opinion that admissibility and evidentiary value of the document, are two different things and therefore, the document may be read in evidence for some purpose, though not admitted in evidence. Once the trial court was keeping the issue open to be decided at appropriate stage, then no more observations could have been made by the trial court. Even the practice of keeping pending the objection as to the admissibility of the document, particularly regarding the admissibility of insufficiently stamped document, has been repeatedly deprecated by the Supreme Court. 7. Once the trial court was keeping the issue open to be decided at appropriate stage, then no more observations could have been made by the trial court. Even the practice of keeping pending the objection as to the admissibility of the document, particularly regarding the admissibility of insufficiently stamped document, has been repeatedly deprecated by the Supreme Court. 7. Although, the judgment rendered in the case of Shyamal Kumar Roy (supra) has emphasized that such an objection qua admissibility on account of insufficient stamp duty paid should be taken at the earlier stage and once document is admitted then no objection could be raised however, the judgment rendered in the case of Ram Rattan (supra) leaves the scope for the trial court to decide the issue even subsequently, by observing that the document would not be deemed to have been admitted unless the objection raised by the opposite party, is judicially decided even at a subsequent stage before decision of the suit. The relevant paragraph of the judgment is reproduced herein below: 6. When the document was tendered in evidence by the plaintiff while in witness box, objection having been raised by the defendants that the document was inadmissible in evidence as it was not duly stamped and for want of registration, it was obligatory upon the learned trial judge to apply his mind to the objection raised and decide the objection in accordance with law. Tendency sometimes is to postpone the decision to avoid interruption in the process of recording evidence and, therefore, a very convenient device is resorted to, of marking the document in evidence subject to objection. This, however, would not mean that the objection as to admissibility on the ground that the instrument is not duly stamped is judicially decided; it is merely postponed. In such a situation at a later stage before the suit is finally disposed of it would none-the-less be obligatory upon the court to decide the objection. If after applying mind to the rival contentions the trial court admits a document in evidence, section 36 of the Stamp Act would come into play and such admission cannot be called in question at any stage of the same suit or proceeding on the ground that the instrument has not been duly stamped. If after applying mind to the rival contentions the trial court admits a document in evidence, section 36 of the Stamp Act would come into play and such admission cannot be called in question at any stage of the same suit or proceeding on the ground that the instrument has not been duly stamped. The Court and of necessity it would be trial Court before which the objection is taken about admissibility of document on the ground that it is not duly stamped, has to judicially determine the matter as soon as the document is tendered in evidence and before it is marked as an exhibit in the case and where a document has been inadvertently admitted without the Court applying its mind as to the question of admissibility, the instrument could not be said to have been admitted in evidence with a view to attracting Section 36 (see Javar Chand v. Pukhraj Surana, AIR 1961 SC 1655 ) The, endorsement made by the learned trial judge that "objected, allowed subject to objections clearly indicates that when the objection was raised it was not judicially determined and the document was merely tentatively marked and in such a situation Section 36 would not be attracted. Reading of the above said para of the judgment of Supreme Court makes it clear that unless the objection raised by a party qua admissibility of the document, is judicially decided, the same cannot be deemed to have been admitted in the evidence as such. Moreover, even if such a document is marked as Exhibit into evidence, the same shall be taken as merely having been tentatively marked; and in such situation section 36 of the Stamp Act would not be attracted. 8. Although the learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Shyamal Kumar (supra) to say that once the documents have been admitted in evidence wrongly or rightly, then the issue regarding the admissibility cannot be raised by the other side, however, it is obvious that the said judgment is based on a presuming that the document had been admitted by the court after deciding the objection, if any, raised by the other side or without any such objection having been raised by the party at all. In case an objection has been raised by a party and the same has not been decided judicially then the document is not even "admitted" in evidence, therefore mere marking of the document as Exhibit would not lead to the deemed admission of the document in the evidence. This has been so held by the Supreme Court in the case of Ram. Rattan (supra). Hence, the document in the present case, though marked as exhibit, would not be taken as having been admitted in the evidence for the further purpose of the trial of the suit. The other aspect is that the trial court has observed in the impugned order that under law the said lease document could be used for collateral purposes even if the same is not sufficiently stamped. However, even these observations of the trial court are not in tune with the judgment rendered in the case of Avinash Kumar Chauhan (supra), which, in fact, is dealing with precisely the same issue. 9. Accordingly, though the trial court should have decided the objection qua the admissibility of the lease deed in question immediately on the same having been raised, however, since even now the trial court has observed that the same can be decided at the appropriate stage, therefore, it is obvious that the said objection is still kept open by the trial court. 10. In view of the above discussion, the order passed by the trial court is partially set aside qua dismissal of the applications filed by the petitioner, though this setting aside of the order of trial Court would not have effect of ipso facto accepting the objection raised by the petitioner qua admissibility of the documents. The same shall be required to be decided specifically. The other observations made by the trial court are ordered not to have any effect on the merits of the case at the time of final adjudication upon the suit or at the time of final adjudication upon the issue of admissibility of the lease deed mentioned above. 11. Accordingly, the present petition is disposed of. The trial court is directed to decide the issue of admissibility of the document before consideration of the case on merits, but in accordance with law. 12. However, it is clarified that the petitioner-defendant has no liberty to delay the suit; on any ground whatsoever, or to block its decision any further. 11. Accordingly, the present petition is disposed of. The trial court is directed to decide the issue of admissibility of the document before consideration of the case on merits, but in accordance with law. 12. However, it is clarified that the petitioner-defendant has no liberty to delay the suit; on any ground whatsoever, or to block its decision any further. It would be purely for the trial court to proceed with due promptitude; in the facts and circumstances of the case.