ORDER : 1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed for setting aside the order dated 13.1.2017 (Annexure P/1) passed by respondent No.2 terminating the services of the petitioner. 2. Brief facts of the case, as mentioned in the writ petition, are that after the death of petitioner’s father, the petitioner was appointed on compassionate ground on the post of Peon/Coolie vide order dated 19.4.2010 (Annexure P/3) under the office of respondents No. 2 & 3. However, on 20.5.2016 respondent No.2 issued a show cause notice (Annexure P/4) to the petitioner to explain as to why he furnished wrong information in his application for compassionate appointment and suppressed the material fact that his mother is also a government servant. The petitioner submitted a detailed reply to the said notice with relevant documents on 1.6.2016. Thereafter, respondent No.2 constituted a four-members enquiry committee to submit report whether the petitioner had given wrong information/declaration for getting compassionate appointment. The said enquiry committing without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, proceeded of its own and submitted a report before respondent No.2 which led to passing of the impugned order dated 13.1.2017 terminating the services of the petitioner from the regular post of Peon/Coolie. Thereafter, the petitioner made a detailed representation on 27.1.2017 which has not yet been decided. Hence this petition for the following reliefs: “10.1 That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to call record pertaining to passing of the impugned-termination-Order dated 03/01/2017 (Annexure P/1) passed by the respondent no.2, which is the violation of service-conditions. 10.2 That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow the writ petition, by issuing a writ of mandamus by quashing the impugned-termination-Order dated 13/01/2017 (Annexure P/1) passed by respondent no.2, and further respondents may kindly be directed to consider the appointment of petitioner in regular-post-Peon/Coolie by maintain his appointment-order dtd. 19/04/2010 as proper. 10.3 Any other relief which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in favour of the petitioners may kindly also be passed in view of appointment-order dtd. 19/04/2010.” 3. 19/04/2010 as proper. 10.3 Any other relief which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in favour of the petitioners may kindly also be passed in view of appointment-order dtd. 19/04/2010.” 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order dated 13.1.2017 passed by respondent No.2 terminating the services of the petitioner from the post of Peon/Coolie after a lapse of seven years of his appointment, is illegal, arbitrary and against the policy of the State Government, hence liable to be set aside. The petitioner had not suppressed the fact that his mother Smt. Pramila Bai Yadav was also working on the post of Peon/Coolie while his father Late Pardeshi Yadav was posted and working as Peon, who died on 19.6.2009. Much prior to this, on 30.3.1997 a written mutual divorce was executed by Yadav Samaj between Pardeshi Yadav and Smt. Pramila Bai Yadav whereby she was separated from them. The petitioner, who was 19 years of age at that time, started living with his father and therefore, he mentioned the facts in his application for compassionate appointment, which were within his knowledge as his mother was living separately. This apart, it is worthwhile to mention here that there are some employees appointed as Peon in Public Health Department on compassionate ground after the death of their father despite their mothers working in the same department. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order being bad in law is liable to be set aside. Reliance has been placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Bhupinder Pal Singh Vs. Director General of Civil Aviation, 2003 CJ (SC) 142 and the judgment dated 2nd May, 2022 of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 3574/2022 in the matter of Pawan Kumar Vs. UOI and another. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent No.1/State submits that the reliefs claimed by the petitioner are against respondent No.2/Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur, so State is a formal party in this writ petition. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.2 strongly opposes the prayer of the petitioner and submits that it is an admitted fact that Pardeshi Ram Yadav, ex-employee of the Municipal Corporation died on 19.6.2009 and his wife Smt. Pratima Bai Yadav was already in employment on regular post of Kuli as per Annexure P/2. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.2 strongly opposes the prayer of the petitioner and submits that it is an admitted fact that Pardeshi Ram Yadav, ex-employee of the Municipal Corporation died on 19.6.2009 and his wife Smt. Pratima Bai Yadav was already in employment on regular post of Kuli as per Annexure P/2. The show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 20.5.2016 (Annexure P/4) which was replied to by the petitioner along with divorce deed as also affidavit of his mother dated 20.1.2010 and himself dated 8.1.2010. The Commissioner has also issued letters to Ashok Sharma, Avinash Bapte, Leeladhar Mishra and Ramsunder Mishra, therefore, order of removal from service of the petitioner is neither illegal nor bad because there is suppression of fact in the application for getting employment on compassionate ground as admitted by the petitioner in his reply dated 1.6.2016. It is settled law that for death of an employee, employment cannot be given to two persons as was done in this case. Therefore, no wrong has been committed by the respondent-Municipal Corporation in terminating the services of the petitioner and as such, the present petition being without any substance is liable to be dismissed. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 7. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was appointed on 19.4.2010 on the post of Peon (Coolie) and was removed from service on 13.1.2017 (Annexure P/1). Before passing this order, only one show cause notice dated 20.5.2016 (Annexure P/4) was issued to the petitioner. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Bhupinder Pal Singh (supra) observed in para 3 of the judgment as under: “3. Looking to the assertion made by the appellant that no opportunity was given to him during the investigation or inquiry based on which the order was passed on 21.7.1999 adversely affecting his rights and status and in the absence of any counter affidavit denying the same either before the High Court or before this Court, there is no impediment or difficulty in holding that the order dated 21.7.1999 was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. Even a perusal of the impugned order indicates that no opportunity was given to the appellant. The High Court proceeded on wrong assumption that the second inquiry was not a de novo inquiry. Even a perusal of the impugned order indicates that no opportunity was given to the appellant. The High Court proceeded on wrong assumption that the second inquiry was not a de novo inquiry. It appears to us that no opportunity was given to the appellants either during the inquiry made for the first time or in the second inquiry. Since the order passed is in clear violating of principles of natural justice, it is unnecessary for us to go into the merits of the other contentions raised. In the normal course, we would have set aside the order giving liberty to the respondents to hold a fresh inquiry. Since the appellant was superannuated and at this length of time, we think it is neither appropriate nor desirable to direct a fresh inquiry. 08. In the matter of Pawan Kumar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed in para 16 of the judgment as under: “16. The judgment relied upon by the respondent Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Limited and another v. Anil Kanwariya, (2021) 10 SCC 136 may not be of any assistance for the reason that it was a case where the respondent employee before submitting application pursuant to the advertisement inviting applications was convicted by the competent Court of jurisdiction and this fact was not disclosed by him while filling his application form and that was the reason favoured upon the Court while upholding action of the authority in passing the order of termination which was impugned in the proceedings. We have already quoted paragraph 38 of the judgment by a three Judge Bench of this Court in Avtar Singh (supra) and in the context of the factual background of the present case applied the said principles. One distinguishing factor, as noticed above, is that the criminal complaint/FIR in the present case was registered post submission of the application form. We have also taken into account the nature of the allegations made in the criminal case and that the matter was of trivial nature not involving moral turpitude. Further, the proceedings had ended in a clean acquittal. As is clear from paragraph 38 in Avtar Singh (supra), all matters cannot be put in a straitjacket and a degree of flexibility and discretion vests with the authorities, must be exercised with care and caution taking all the facts and circumstances into consideration, including the nature and type of lapse.” 9. As is clear from paragraph 38 in Avtar Singh (supra), all matters cannot be put in a straitjacket and a degree of flexibility and discretion vests with the authorities, must be exercised with care and caution taking all the facts and circumstances into consideration, including the nature and type of lapse.” 9. In this case also, the petitioner has been in service for about 7 years and before termination of his services, he was given only a show cause notice dated 20.5.2016, to which he replied on 1.6.2016 along with supporting documents. However, without considering the petitioners’ reply, the documents annexed therewith and without affording him an effective personal hearing, the impugned order has been passed. 10. Thus, in the totality of facts and circumstances of the case, the manner in which the impugned order terminating the services of the petitioner has been passed without affording him a reasonable opportunity of hearing/defence and the aforesaid guidelines of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the impugned order dated 13.1.2017 (Annexure P/1) is hereby set aside and the respondent authorities are directed to reinstate the petitioner with 50% backwages. However, liberty is reserved with the respondents to initiate proper departmental enquiry against the petitioner, if so desire, and after affording him a reasonable opportunity of hearing/defence, pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. Thus writ petition stands allowed to the above extent.