ORDER : 1. The Applicants/original Plaintiffs have preferred this application to rectify the typographical mistakes/clerical errors in the name of Defendant No.5 in the cause title and the description of the suit property in the schedule of drawn up Consent Decree dated 28 April 1982 in Suit No.2134 of 1981 in exercise of the powers under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘the Code’). 2. The Applicants had instituted suit against Defendant Nos.1 to 13 for a decree of specific performance of agreement for sale dated 27 November 1978, supplemental agreement dated 14 December 1979 and agreement dated 28 March 1980, of all the properties situated at CTS No.419, 419(1-20) and Survey No.474, Hissa No.2 of Malad, Mumbai (‘the suit property). 3. Defendant Nos.1 to 11 entered appearance through Shri Shelke, Advocate. Eventually, on 28 April, 1982 pursuant to the settlement arrived at between the Plaintiffs and Defendant Nos.1 to 13, Consent Terms were executed by the Counsel for the Plaintiffs, Defendant Nos.1 to 11, and Defendant Nos.12 and 13 for and on behalf of the Plaintiffs and Defendants. The Consent Terms, inter alia, provided for a decree in terms of prayer clause (a) of the plaint. Decree drawn pursuant to the Consent Terms was to operate as a conveyance of the property described in the Schedule appended thereto for the consideration of Rs.5,00,000/-. 4. The decree was drawn up in accordance with the Consent Terms. The Plaintiffs got the decree registered with the Registrar of Assurances. The Plaintiffs constructed buildings on part of the suit property. Eventually, the flat purchasers formed a co-operative housing society under the name and style of Nidhi Co-op. Hsg. Soc. Ltd. 5. Whilst the Consent decree was, thus, given effect to and acted upon, the Plaintiffs filed an application with the City Survey Officer to mutate their names in property card of the suit property. It was noticed that there were discrepancies in the area of the suit property in the property card and the consent decree. Firstly, in the property card, the total area of the suit property was shown 3423 sq. meters, whereas in the plaint and the decree, the area was shown as 3989 sq. yards i.e. 3300 sq. meters or thereabout. Secondly, in the decree, CTS No.419 was not distinctly indicated apart from the Survey No.419 (1 to 20). 6. Firstly, in the property card, the total area of the suit property was shown 3423 sq. meters, whereas in the plaint and the decree, the area was shown as 3989 sq. yards i.e. 3300 sq. meters or thereabout. Secondly, in the decree, CTS No.419 was not distinctly indicated apart from the Survey No.419 (1 to 20). 6. During the course of the enquiry by the City Survey Officer, Mr. Joseph Bernard Pereira raised objection on the ground that he was not Joseph Anthony Pereira, who was impleaded as Defendant No.5. He was never impleaded as a party Defendant to the Suit and, thus, no decree was passed against him. 7. In view of the aforesaid objection and noticing the discrepancies in the description of the suit property, the City Survey Officer declined to correct the area of the suit property and mutate names of the Plaintiffs to the property card. The Plaintiffs were advised to get the Consent Decree amended. Hence, this Application. 8. Mr. Joseph Bernard Pereira resisted the application by filing an Affidavit in Reply. It was contended that the instant application suffers from the vice of gross delay and laches. It is malafide as well. Mr. Pereira categorically asserted that he was neither a party to the Suit, nor to the Consent Terms. He had never executed the agreements of which specific performance was sought by the Plaintiffs. Nor he had received any benefit under the Consent Terms. The Consent Terms, thus, does not bind him. According to him, the Consent Terms were vitiated by fraud and misrepresentation. 9. Defendant Nos.6, 8, 10 and 11 also resisted the Application by filing an Affidavit in Reply. The Defendants contended that by the present Interim Application the Plaintiffs seek to enlarge the area of the suit property from 3300 sq. meters to 3423 sq. meters. However, in none of the agreements, of which specific performance was sought by the Plaintiffs, the said area finds mention. All the agreements uniformly record that the suit property admeasures 3300 sq. meters. Disguised as an application for amendment of the Consent decree, the Plaintiffs intend to usurp the property to which they are not entitled to. Hence, the Application be dismissed with exemplary costs. 10. I have heard Mr. Tripathi, learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs, Mr. Zishan Quazi, the learned Counsel for Defendant No.5 and Mr. meters. Disguised as an application for amendment of the Consent decree, the Plaintiffs intend to usurp the property to which they are not entitled to. Hence, the Application be dismissed with exemplary costs. 10. I have heard Mr. Tripathi, learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs, Mr. Zishan Quazi, the learned Counsel for Defendant No.5 and Mr. Vikramjeet Garewal, the learned Counsel for Defendant Nos.6, 8, 10 and 11, at some length. With the assistance of the learned Counsel for the parties, I have perused the material on record, including the plaint in Suit No.2134 of 1981, Consent Terms and Consent Decree drawn on the basis of the Consent Terms, (the agreements of which the Plaintiffs sought specific performance). 11. To start with, it would be apposite to appreciate the contours of the powers of the Court to correct a judgment, decree or order. Section 152 of the Code reads as under : “152. Amendment of judgments, decrees or orders:- Clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission may at any time be corrected by the Court either of its own motion or on the application of any of the parties. 12. The Court is empowered to correct the clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments or orders or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission. The stage of the proceeding does not matter. Such a correction can be made at any time. The Court is empowered to correct its record suo motu or on the application of any of the parties. 13. The power under section 152 of the Code, however, does not partake the character of review. The corrections which can be legitimately made by invoking section 152 are only accidental omissions or mistakes. Any correction which touches upon the merits of the case, falls beyond the purview of section 152 of the Code. The avowed purpose of the vesting of general power in a Court to amend its judgment, decree or orders, is to ensure that the act of the Court does not cause prejudice to the parties. 14. Any correction which touches upon the merits of the case, falls beyond the purview of section 152 of the Code. The avowed purpose of the vesting of general power in a Court to amend its judgment, decree or orders, is to ensure that the act of the Court does not cause prejudice to the parties. 14. A useful reference in this context can be made to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab vs. Darshan Singh, (2004) 1 SCC 328 wherein the Supreme Court expounded the nature and import of the power contained in section 152 of the Code. It reads as under:- “12. Section 152 provides for correction of clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission. The exercise of this power contemplates the correction of mistakes by the Court of its ministerial actions and does not contemplate of passing effective judicial orders after the judgment, decree or order. The settled position of law is that after the passing of the judgment, decree or order, the same becomes final subject to any further avenues of remedies provided in respect of the same and the very Court or the tribunal cannot, on mere change of view, is not entitled to vary the terms of the judgments, decrees and orders earlier passed except by means of review, if statutorily provided specifically therefor and subject to the conditions or limitations provided therein. The powers under Section 152 of the Code are neither to be equated with the power of review nor can be said to be akin to review or even said to clothe the Court concerned under the guise of invoking after the result of the judgment earlier rendered, in its entirety or any portion or part of it. The corrections contemplated are of correcting only accidental omissions or mistakes and not all omissions and mistakes which might have been committed by the Court while passing the judgment, decree or order. The corrections contemplated are of correcting only accidental omissions or mistakes and not all omissions and mistakes which might have been committed by the Court while passing the judgment, decree or order. The omission sought to be corrected which goes to the merits of the case is beyond the scope of Section 152 as if it is looking into it for the first time, for which the proper remedy for the aggrieved party if at all is to file appeal or revision before the higher forum or review application before the very forum, subject to the limitations in respect of such review.” (emphasis supplied) 15. In the case of Jayalakshmi Coelho V. Oswald Joseph Coelho, (2001) 2 SCC 181 the Supreme Court expounded the legal position as under : “13. So far as legal position is concerned, there would hardly be any doubt about the proposition that in terms of Section 152 C.P.C., any error occurred in the decree on account of arithmetical or clerical error or accidental slip may be rectified by the court. The principle behind the provision is that no party should suffer due to mistake of the court and whatever is intended by the court while passing the order or decree must be properly reflected therein, otherwise it would only be destructive to the principle of advancing the cause of justice….. 14] As a matter of fact such inherent powers would generally be available to all courts and authorities irrespective of the fact whether the provisions contained under Section 152 C.P.C. may or may not strictly apply to any particular proceeding. In a matter where it is clear that something which the Court intended to do but the same was accidentally slipped or any mistake creeps in due to clerical or arithmetical mistake it would only advance the ends of justice to enable the Court to rectify such mistake. But before exercise of such power the Court must be legally satisfied and arrive at a valid finding that the order or the decree contains or omits some thing which was intended to be otherwise that is to say while passing the decree the court must have in its mind that the order or the decree should be passed in a particular manner but that intention is not translated into the decree or order due to clerical, arithmetical error or accidental slip. The facts and circumstances may provide clue to the fact as to what was intended by the court but unintentionally the same does not find mention in the order or the judgment or something which was not intended to be there stands added to it. The power of rectification of clerical, arithmetical errors or accidental slip does not empower the court to have a second thought over the matter and to find that a better order or decree could or should be passed.. There should not be re-consideration of merits of the matter to come to a conclusion that it would have been better and in the fitness of things to have passed an order as sought to be passed on rectification. On a second thought court may find that it may have committed a mistake in passing an order in certain terms but every such mistake does not permit its rectification in exercise of Courts inherent powers as contained under Section 152 C.P.C. It is to be confined to something initially intended but left out or added against such intention.” (Emphasis supplied) 16. In Niyamat Ali Molla V/s. Sonargon Housing Cooperative Society Ltd. And Ors., (2007) 13 SCC 421 the nature of the power of the Court to correct the record of the Court was expounded by the Supreme Court as under : “19. Code of Civil Procedure recognizes the inherent power of the Court. It is not only confined to he amendment of the judgment or decree as envisaged under Section 152 of the code but also inherent power in general. The Courts also have duty to see that the records are true and present the correct state of affair. There cannot, however, be any doubt whatsoever that the court cannot exercise the said jurisdiction so as to review its judgment. It cannot also exercise its jurisdiction when no mistake or slip occurred in the decree or order. This provision, in our opinion, should, however, not be construed in a pedantic manner. A decree may, therefore, be corrected by the Court both in exercise of its power under Section 152 as also under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such power of the court is well recognized.” 17. In the light of aforesaid enunciation of law, the Application is required to be considered in two parts. First, the correction sought in the name of Defendant No.5. Such power of the court is well recognized.” 17. In the light of aforesaid enunciation of law, the Application is required to be considered in two parts. First, the correction sought in the name of Defendant No.5. Second, the corrections sought in the description of the suit property. 18. Mr. Tripathi strenuously urged that Mr. Joseph Bernard Pereira having executed an agreement for sale and received the benefit under the Consent decree, has unjustifiably resisted the mutation of the name of the Plaintiffs to the property card by taking an undue advantage of a typographical error in the name of Defendant No.5 in the cause title of the plaint. Mr. Tripathi submitted that the material on record indicates that Mr. Joseph Bernard Pereira had executed the instruments and addressed letter to the then tenants in the said property as Joseph Bernard Pereira. Even the signature of Mr. Joseph Bernard Pereira on those documents tallies with the signature on the Affidavit in Reply filed on behalf of Defendant No.5. The error in mentioning the middle name of the Defendant No.5 was purely inadvertent and accidental. Such a typographical error deserves to be corrected by exercising the power under Section 152 of the Code. 19. In opposition to this, Mr. Quazi appearing for Mr. Joseph Bernard Pereira would urge that the Application suffers from the vice of gross delay and laches. At no point of time, Mr. Joseph Bernard Pereira was impleaded as a party Defendant to the Suit. He was not served with the suit summons. Nor the consent terms were executed by him. In the circumstances, correction of the decree, at this length of time, would cause grave prejudice to the rights of Mr. Joseph Bernard Pereira. 20. It is stated that the facts rarely fail to provide a legitimate answer to a question raised in the lis. In the case at hand, the agreements of which the Plaintiffs had sought specific performance, throw light on the identity of the parties to the transactions. The principal agreement dated 27 November 1978 was executed by Bernard Anthony Pereira, Charley Anthony Pereira, Johnny Anthony Pereira and Hillary Anthony Pereira, Defendant Nos.1 to 4. The Supplementary Agreement dated 14 December 1979 was executed by the abovenamed Defendant Nos.1 to 4 and Mr. Joseph Bernard Pereira (who according to the Plaintiffs was inadvertently impleaded by name Joseph Anthony Pereira) and Defendant Nos.6 to 11. The Supplementary Agreement dated 14 December 1979 was executed by the abovenamed Defendant Nos.1 to 4 and Mr. Joseph Bernard Pereira (who according to the Plaintiffs was inadvertently impleaded by name Joseph Anthony Pereira) and Defendant Nos.6 to 11. It would be contextually relevant to note that the Power of Attorney was executed by Defendant Nos.1 to 11 including Mr. Joseph Bernard Pereira in favour of Mr. Anil Jamanadas Dattani. Defendant Nos.1 to 11 gave a letter of attornment of tenancy on 14 December 1979. The Plaintiffs claimed, the signature at Sr. No.5 to the said letter is of Mr. Joseph Bernard Pereira. 21. In the face of the aforesaid instruments, of which specific performance was sought by the Plaintiffs, and the connected documents, the identity of Mr. Joseph Bernard Pereira as one of the vendors becomes fairly established. 22. Mr. Quazi made an endeavour to wriggle out of the situation by forcefully canvassing a submission that the aforesaid instruments are forged. I am afraid to countenance such submission, at this length of time, especially when the consent decree has been executed and acted upon by one and all and for all intent and purpose. What primarily tilts the scale in favour of the Plaintiffs is the relationship between Defendant No.1 Bernard Anthony Pereira and Mr. Joseph Bernard Pereira. It could not be disputed that Mr. Joseph Bernard Pereira is the son of Defendant No.1 and claimed through Defendant No.1. 23. Though I am conscious that comparison of signatures is fraught with hazards yet one cannot loose sight of the fact that the signature of the executant at Sr. No.5 of the Supplemental Agreement dated 14 June, 1979 (of Joseph Bernard Pereira) is strikingly identical to the signature of the deponent who has filed an Affidavit in Reply on behalf of Defendant No.5 in the instant Application. Likewise, the signature of signatory No.5 on the letter of attornment dated 14 December 1979 has a striking resemblance to the signature of the deponent to the said Affidavit in Reply. 24. The aspect of the correction of the description of the suit property can be considered in two parts. First, the omission to include Survey No.419 in the Schedule appended to drawn up decree. In the Schedule of the drawn up Decree, the suit property is described with reference to City Survey No.419 (1-20) and Survey no.474, Hissa No.2. 24. The aspect of the correction of the description of the suit property can be considered in two parts. First, the omission to include Survey No.419 in the Schedule appended to drawn up decree. In the Schedule of the drawn up Decree, the suit property is described with reference to City Survey No.419 (1-20) and Survey no.474, Hissa No.2. CTS no.419 remained to be included in the Schedule of the drawn up decree. There does not seem to be much controversy over the inadvertent omission to include distinct CTS No.419, apart from Survey no.419 (1-20). The Schedule appended to the agreement dated 27 November 1978 and the Schedule appended to the Consent Terms include CTS No.419, as a distinct Survey number, apart from CTS no.419 (1 to 20). Thus, there does not seem any impediment in correcting the Schedule of the drawn up decree by inserting the figure “419,” before the figure “419 (1-20)”. 25. Mr. Garewal vehemently submitted that the correction sought in the area of the suit property does not deserve to be considered as it has the potentality to cause irretrievable prejudice to the Defendants. Amplifying the submission Mr. Garewal would urge that by the proposed correction in the area of the suit property from 3300 sq. meters to 3423 sq.meters, the Plaintiffs seek to deprive the Defendants of the ownership over the said (additional) area of the land. It was urged that the Defendants had not conveyed the said (additional) area to the Plaintiffs. Mr. Garewal strenuously submitted that the area of 3423 sq. meter does not find mention in any of the suit agreements, nor in the plaint and the Consent Terms. Therefore, according to Mr. Garewal, correction of the area, at this stage, would amount to passing a decree in favour of the Plaintiffs in respect of an area which was never agreed to be sold to the Plaintiffs and the subject matter of the Suit. 26. Mr. Tripathi, on the other hand, submitted that the entire area covered by the abovenumbered CTS and Survey Nos. was conveyed to the Plaintiffs. Moreover the suit property was described with reference to the boundaries. At no point of time, the Defendants claimed that a portion out of any Survey numbers was retained by the Defendants. 26. Mr. Tripathi, on the other hand, submitted that the entire area covered by the abovenumbered CTS and Survey Nos. was conveyed to the Plaintiffs. Moreover the suit property was described with reference to the boundaries. At no point of time, the Defendants claimed that a portion out of any Survey numbers was retained by the Defendants. Since the suit property has already been developed and the flats in the buildings erected thereon have also been sold, the Defendants cannot now take undue advantage of misdescription of the area of the suit property. 27. Order VII Rule 3 of the Code prescribes the manner in which the property should be described where the subject matter of the suit is immovable property. It reads as under : “3. Where the subject-matter of the suit is immovable property : - Where the subject-matter of the suit is immovable property, the plaint shall contain a description of the property sufficient to identify it, and, in case such property can be identified by boundaries or numbers in a record of settlement or survey, the plaint shall specify such boundaries or numbers.” 28. Evidently, Rule 3 ordains that where the subject matter of the suit is immovable property, the plaint shall contain the description of the property to make it clearly identifiable. It further provides that where the property can be identified by boundaries or numbers in record of settlement or survey, the plaint shall specify the boundaries or numbers. It implies that the suit property can be described either with reference to the number in record of survey or by furnishing particulars of the boundaries. If such particulars are furnished, the suit property can be said to have been described in a manner which is sufficient to fix the identity of the property. 29. In the case of Zarif Ahmad (dead) through legal representatives and Anr. V/s. Mohd. Farooq, (2015) 13 SCC 673 the Supreme Court enunciated that the object of the aforesaid provision is that the description of the property must be sufficient to identify it. The property can be identifiable by boundaries or by number in a public record of settlement or survey. 30. V/s. Mohd. Farooq, (2015) 13 SCC 673 the Supreme Court enunciated that the object of the aforesaid provision is that the description of the property must be sufficient to identify it. The property can be identifiable by boundaries or by number in a public record of settlement or survey. 30. It is pertinent to not that, in the case at hand, the Schedule of the property appended to the Agreement dated 27 November 1978 describes the property professed to be conveyed thereunder with reference to the Survey numbers as well as the boundaries. It reads as under : THE SCHEDULE HEREIN ABOVE REFERRED TO : ALL THAT piece or parcel of land or ground with the buildings standing thereon situate lying and being at Village Malad in the Registration District of Bombay City and Bombay Suburban and containing by admeasurement 3989 sq. yeards i.e. 3300 square metres or thereabouts bearing C.T.S.Nos.419, 419 (1 to 20) and S. No.474, Hissa No.2 of Malad and bounded as follows : that is to say : on or towards the East by the Scheme Road, on or towards the South by the property bearing S.No.474/6, on o rtowards the North by the property bearing S.No.477/1, 3 and 6 and on or towards the West by the property bearing S.No.444/1, 3 to 5 and assessed by the Greater Bombay Municipal Corporation under P. Ward Nos.3239 to 41 Street Nos.69, 69/1 and 69/2.” 31. The description of the property in the Schedule appended to the Consent Terms corresponds with the description of the property in the said Agreement of 1978, as the property is again described with reference to the Survey number and the boundaries. 32. Undoubtedly, the area mentioned in the Schedule appended to the suit agreements and the area mentioned in the Schedule appended to the Consent Terms is identical i.e. 3398 sq. yards i.e. 3300 sq meters or thereabout. However, it is well recognized that where the suit property is described with reference to boundaries and area, in the event of the discrepancy the description by boundaries prevails. 33. A learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of State of Maharashtra through the Secretary, Revenue and Forest Department and Ors. yards i.e. 3300 sq meters or thereabout. However, it is well recognized that where the suit property is described with reference to boundaries and area, in the event of the discrepancy the description by boundaries prevails. 33. A learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of State of Maharashtra through the Secretary, Revenue and Forest Department and Ors. V/s. Nathuji s/o Lotan Dhakate, 2003 SCC Online Bom 1156 in the context of such discrepancies in the description of the property held that “it is well settled position in law that whenever property is described on the basis boundaries of the property and if any discrepancy is between the two, the description as given by the boundaries shall prevail”. 34. In the case at hand, the description by boundaries which consists of a distinct and entire survey numbers seals the issue. Had it been a case that a portion of the property bearing Survey No.419, 419 (1 to 20) and Survey No.474, Hissa No.2, was retained by the vendors, the said fact must have been reflected in describing the suit property with reference to the boundaries. In contrast, the suit property was shown to have been bound by distinct survey numbers. 35. Mis-description of the suit property can be corrected by the Court in exercise of the power under Section 152 and 151 of the Code, even post decree. A useful reference, in this context, can be made to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case Pratibha Singh and Anr. V/s. Shanti Devi Prasad and Anr., AIR 2003 SC 643 wherein with reference to the power to correct the description of the suit property post passing of the decree, the Supreme Court enunciated as under : “17. When the suit as to immovable property has been decreed and the property is not definitely identified, the defect in the court record caused by overlooking of provisions contained in Order 7 Rule 3 and Order 20 Rule 3 of the CPC is capable of being cured. After all a successful plaintiff should not be deprived of the fruits of decree. Resort can be had to Section 152 or Section 47 of the CPC depending on the facts and circumstances of each case -- which of the two provisions would be more appropriate, just and convenient to invoke. After all a successful plaintiff should not be deprived of the fruits of decree. Resort can be had to Section 152 or Section 47 of the CPC depending on the facts and circumstances of each case -- which of the two provisions would be more appropriate, just and convenient to invoke. Being an inadvertent error, not affecting the merits of the case, it may be corrected under Section 152 of the CPC by the Court which passed the decree by supplying the omission. Alternatively, the exact description of decretal property may be ascertained by the Executing Court as a question relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of decree within the meaning of Section 47 CPC. A decree of a competent Court should not, as far as practicable, be allowed to be defeated on account of an accidental slip or omission. In the facts and circumstances of the present case we think it would be more appropriate to invoke Section 47 of the CPC.” (emphasis supplied) 36. In the light of the aforesaid exposition of law, in my view, the prayers in the application deserve to be granted as the Consent decree has been executed and acted upon to the fullest. Nay, it would be the duty of the Court to correct the consent decree so that the decree holders are not deprived of the benefit of the decree to the fullest. Thus, I am inclined to allow the application. 37. Hence, the following order : ORDER : (i) The Application stands allowed in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b). (ii) No costs.