ORDER : 1. Since the issue involved in both the petitions is almost one and the same, they are being disposed of by way of this common order. 2. Crl.P.Nos.2370 and 2371 of 2021 are filed under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure (for short ‘Cr.P.C’) by the petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 3 to quash proceedings in Crime Nos.218 and 222 of 2021 respectively on the file of Banjara Hills Police Station, Hyderabad. Crime No.218 of 2021 was registered for the offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 409, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 477-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1870 (for short ‘IPC’) and Crime No.222 of 2021 was registered for the offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 409, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 477-A of the IPC and Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C. 3. The petitioners in both the criminal petitions are accused Nos.1 to 3 in the said crimes and respondent No.2 in both the criminal petitions is the complainant. Facts in Crl.P.No.2370 of 2021: 4. The complainant filed an application under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. before the III Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad [for short ‘Court below’] seeking direction to the Station House Officer, Banjara Hills Police Station, Hyderabad, to register a case against the petitioners herein for the offences under Sections 120-B read with Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 477-A of IPC and to conduct investigation. Upon the directions given by the Court below, an FIR was registered in Crime No.218 of 2021 for the said offences. 5. The contents of the said FIR would show that accused No.1 is the Chairman [erstwhile Senior Vice Chairman], accused No.2 is the Managing Director and CEO, accused No.3 is the Vice Chairman [erstwhile Chairman] of the A.P.Mahesh Cooperative Urban Bank (for short ‘the Bank’). The complainant is the Secretary of A.P.Mahesh Cooperative Urban Bank Shareholders’ Welfare Association. On 31.10.2020, the Board of management of the Bank had convened a General Body Meeting for conducting elections to the Bank wherein it has been resolved to conduct elections to the bank on 20.12.2020. The complainant is the Secretary of A.P.Mahesh Cooperative Urban Bank Shareholders’ Welfare Association. On 31.10.2020, the Board of management of the Bank had convened a General Body Meeting for conducting elections to the Bank wherein it has been resolved to conduct elections to the bank on 20.12.2020. The accused, who were then board of directors, fearing that if they lost in the elections, a newly elected Board would go into the forensic audit, which would bring to light the grave irregularities done during their tenure, conspired with accused No.4 [Returning Officer] and inducted gold loanees as Ordinary/’A’ class members in the Bank from 02.11.2020 to 13.11.2020 without following due process of law. The accused admitted 920 gold loanees as ‘A’ class members in the Bank. The cut-off date of voters list was 17.11.2020. On 16.11.2020 another 243 gold loanees were made as ‘A’ class members and on the last date i.e., 17.11.2020 further 636 gold loanees were made as ‘A’ class members. In all, 1800 gold loanees were admitted as members from 02.11.2020 to 17.11.2020. The family members of bank employees were also admitted as ‘A’ class members by extending gold loans. This shows the complicity of the Board members with the employees of the bank. Such gold loans were extended to the members even without their physical presence before the bank and without furnishing any security and also without report from the gold appraiser. Further, they were all permitted to participate in the elections process, in collusion with accused No.4 contrary to the Master Circular issued by the Reserve Bank of India, which stipulates that newly inducted members are entitled to vote only after 12 months from the date of their membership. In the said circumstances, he filed the complaint. Facts in Crl.P.No.2371 of 2021: 6. The complainant filed another application under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. before the Court below seeking direction to the Station House Officer, Bangaja Hills Police Station, Hyderabad, to register a case against the petitioners herein for the offences under Sections 120-B read with Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 477-A of IPC and to conduct investigation. Upon the directions given by the Court below, an FIR was registered in Crime No.222 of 2021 for the said offences. 7. Upon the directions given by the Court below, an FIR was registered in Crime No.222 of 2021 for the said offences. 7. The contents of the FIR would show that the petitioners herein in conspiracy with unknown others have disbursed the loans to the family members of Board of Directors and major shareholders of the bank to a tune of Rs.20,73,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Crores Seventy Three Lakhs only). Such disbursements were concealed in the Books of Accounts and also suppressed such loans in the annual reports at the relevant column by referring ‘nil’ loans extended to the relatives/companies’ in which Board of Directors were having interest. Such acts amount to criminal breach of trust, forgery of documents, falsification of accounts and cheating the bank. 8. The contents of the FIR would further show that accused No.1 in conspiracy with accused Nos.2, 3 and others had disbursed loans worth of more than Rs.300,00,00,000/- (Rupees Three Hundred Crores Only) to various entities by securing illegal collaterals, such as lands belonging to Wakf Board and non-existing properties by charging commission of 2% to 10% for disbursement of such illegal loans. Such disbursement was not referred in the annual reports of the Bank. It is averred in the FIR that huge amounts were spent on construction of building for the bank with highly inflated rates, and without approval of the shareholders in the Annual General Meeting. On account of such acts, the bank incurred huge loss to a tune of Rs.18.30 crores. Further, for the financial years 2018-19 and 2019-20, the accused misappropriated Rs.3 crores and Rs.3.5 crores respectively by submitting false bills without reflecting the same in 44th annual report under the head ‘details of other expenses’. On account of such large scale fraud, the interest of the bank was put in jeopardy and such acts amount to criminal breach of trust, cheating, falsification of accounts and forgery of documents. 9. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners/accused is that the complainant was the defeated candidate in the election for Directorship, and he filed the present complaints with a malafide intention with all false allegations. Thus, the said proceedings are required to be quashed. It is his further contention that the FIRs do not disclose the commission of any offence against the petitioners. The contents of the FIR and the writ petition are one and the same. Thus, the said proceedings are required to be quashed. It is his further contention that the FIRs do not disclose the commission of any offence against the petitioners. The contents of the FIR and the writ petition are one and the same. The complainant while filing the present complaints did not mention about the pendency of writ petition. As such, there is concealment of facts by the complainant. Therefore, on that ground also, the FIRs are liable to be quashed. Learned counsel further contended that the allegations in FIRs are based on the surmises and conjectures and far from the truth. The complainant filed the complaints only to take vengeance against the petitioners, who won the election. 10. It is also his further contention that the Court below failed to see that while issuing direction under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C, the complainant did not file affidavit verifying the contents of complaints, as directed by the Apex Court in Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P., 2015 (6) SCC 287 . Non-compliance of such directions vitiates the proceedings and it is a ground to quash the proceedings as held by the Apex Court in Babu Venkatesh v. The State of Karnataka, MANU/SC/0214/2022. The same principle has been followed by this Court in T. Kamalakar v. State of Telangana, MANU/TL/0569/2022, D. Satish Kumar v. State of Telangana, MANU/TL/0646/2022 and Chandrasekhar Reddy v. Public Prosecutor, Hyderabad, 2023 SCC OnLine AP 995. He has lastly contended that if the allegations in the complaints are taken to be true, the offences alleged in the FIRs are not attracted against the petitioners. Therefore, the proceedings are liable to be quashed. 11. The learned counsel for the complainant submitted that the scope of interference of this Court at the initial stage of FIR is very narrow. At that stage, this Court cannot stall the investigation and cannot decide the merits and demerits of allegations and it must be left to the investigating agency. He has further contended that the contents of the FIRs clearly suggest that there are allegations of fraud, forgery, criminal breach of trust, falsification of accounts and concealment of facts, which clearly make offences alleged in the FIRs. Truth or otherwise of such allegations cannot be tested in the present proceedings. He has further contended that the contents of the FIRs clearly suggest that there are allegations of fraud, forgery, criminal breach of trust, falsification of accounts and concealment of facts, which clearly make offences alleged in the FIRs. Truth or otherwise of such allegations cannot be tested in the present proceedings. He has further submitted that even there is malice or act of vengeance on the part of the complainant in filing the complaints, if the allegations are substantially true, the malice and vengeance conduct of the complainant has no significance and such motive loses its relevancy. The investigating agency shall be allowed to proceed with the investigation to find out whether any offence has been committed or not. 12. It is his further contention that the directions given in Priyanka Srivastava’s case (supra) for filing an affidavit is directory in nature and it is part of procedure. A similar obligation is casted upon the Magistrate to insist for the affidavit before the complaint was referred under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. If such an obligation had been discharged by the Magistrate, the complainant could have rectified such a defect by complying direction. Though there is a direction to file an affidavit along with the complaint, such direction is only for the purpose of fixing the allegiance to the allegations made in the complaint on sworn affidavit. The warrant for giving a direction that an application under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., be supported by an affidavit so that the person making the application should be conscious and also endeavour to see that no false allegation is made. Once an affidavit is found to be false, he would be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. Therefore, the requirement is only a procedural one and non-compliance of the same does not vitiate the entire proceedings. It is a curable defect that can be rectified at any stage. 13. He has further contended that the Apex Court in Babu Venkatesh’s case (supra) had not quashed the proceedings on the ground of non-filing of affidavit. In fact, the Apex Court had found that the allegations made therein relate to civil transactions and such complaints were filed after 1½ year from the date of filing of written statement in the civil proceedings and such a complaint was filed with an ulterior motive to harass the accused therein. In fact, the Apex Court had found that the allegations made therein relate to civil transactions and such complaints were filed after 1½ year from the date of filing of written statement in the civil proceedings and such a complaint was filed with an ulterior motive to harass the accused therein. In that background, the Apex Court held that the case of the accused falls under category No.7 of decision of Apex Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 AIR 604. Having held so, the Apex Court also took note of failure of Magistrate in not complying directions in Priyanka Srivastava’s case (supra). There is no clear finding in the said decision to the effect that non-filing of affidavit alone is a ground to quash the proceedings. 14. Lastly, he has contended that the allegations made in the present complaints found substantially true and requires investigation in the background of the inquiry report submitted by the Reserve Bank of India into the affairs of the bank. Therefore, it is a fit case for thorough investigation to save the innocent shareholders of the bank by protecting the interest of the bank. 15. In the above background, this Court take up the issue of non-compliance of directions of the Apex Court in Priyanka Srivastava’s case (supra) relating to non-filing of affidavit along with the complaints filed under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., seeking direction to the concerned Police to register the case. 16. There is no dispute that the Magistrate, having jurisdiction, can act under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., to order investigation relating to a complaint submitted by the complainant. It is also not in dispute that there is no provision under the Criminal Procedure Code requiring to file an affidavit verifying the truthfulness of the allegations made in the complaint, in which a direction is sought from the Magistrate to order investigation by exercising power under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. In Priyanka Srivastava’s case (supra), the Apex Court held as follows : “27. Regard being had to the aforesaid enunciation of law, it needs to be reiterated that the learned Magistrate has to remain vigilant with regard to the allegations made and the nature of allegations and not to issue directions without proper application of mind. Regard being had to the aforesaid enunciation of law, it needs to be reiterated that the learned Magistrate has to remain vigilant with regard to the allegations made and the nature of allegations and not to issue directions without proper application of mind. He has also to bear in mind that sending the matter would be conducive to justice and then he may pass the requisite order. The present is a case where the accused persons are serving in high positions in the bank. We are absolutely conscious that the position does not matter, for nobody is above the law. But, the learned Magistrate should take note of the allegations in entirety, the date of incident and whether any cognizable case is remotely made out. It is also to be noted that when a borrower of the financial institution covered under the SARFAESI Act, invokes the jurisdiction under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and also there is a separate procedure under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, an attitude of more care, caution and circumspection has to be adhered to. 28. Issuing a direction stating "as per the application" to lodge an FIR creates a very unhealthy situation in the society and also reflects the erroneous approach of the learned Magistrate. It also encourages the unscrupulous and unprincipled litigants, like Respondent No.3, namely, Prakash Kumar Bajaj, to take adventurous steps with courts to bring the financial institutions on their knees. As the factual exposition would reveal, respondent No.3 had prosecuted the earlier authorities and after the matter is dealt with by the High Court in a writ petition recording a settlement, he does not withdraw the criminal case and waits for some kind of situation where he can take vengeance as if he is the emperor of all he surveys. It is interesting to note that during the tenure of appellant No.1, who is presently occupying the position of Vice-President, neither was the loan taken, nor was the default made, nor was any action under the SARFAESI Act was taken. However, the action under the SARFAESI Act was taken on the second time at the instance of the present appellant No.1. We are only stating about the devilish design of respondent No.3 to harass the appellants with the sole intent to avoid the payment of loan. However, the action under the SARFAESI Act was taken on the second time at the instance of the present appellant No.1. We are only stating about the devilish design of respondent No.3 to harass the appellants with the sole intent to avoid the payment of loan. When a citizen avails a loan from a financial institution, it is his obligation to pay back and not play truant or for that matter play possum. As we have noticed, he has been able to do such adventurous acts as he has the embedded conviction that he will not be taken to task because an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is a simple application to the court for issue of a direction to the investigating agency. We have been apprised that a carbon copy of a document is filed to show the compliance with Section 154(3), indicating it has been sent to the Superintendent of police concerned. 29. At this stage it is seemly to state that power under Section 156(3) warrants application of judicial mind. A court of law is involved. It is not the police taking steps at the stage of Section 154 of the code. A litigant at his own whim cannot invoke the authority of the Magistrate. A principled and really grieved citizen with clean hands must have free access to invoke the said power. It protects the citizens but when pervert litigations takes this route to harass their fellows citizens, efforts are to be made to scuttle and curb the same. 30. In our considered opinion, a stage has come in this country where Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. applications are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. That apart, in an appropriate case, the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the truth and also can verify the veracity of the allegations. This affidavit can make the applicant more responsible. We are compelled to say so as such kind of applications are being filed in a routine manner without taking any responsibility whatsoever only to harass certain persons. That apart, it becomes more disturbing and alarming when one tries to pick up people who are passing orders under a statutory provision which can be challenged under the framework of said Act or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. That apart, it becomes more disturbing and alarming when one tries to pick up people who are passing orders under a statutory provision which can be challenged under the framework of said Act or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But it cannot be done to take undue advantage in a criminal court as if somebody is determined to settle the scores. 31. We have already indicated that there has to be prior applications under Section 154(1) and 154(3) while filing a petition under Section 156(3). Both the aspects should be clearly spelt out in the application and necessary documents to that effect shall be filed. The warrant for giving a direction that an application under Section 156(3) be supported by an affidavit so that the person making the application should be conscious and also endeavour to see that no false affidavit is made. It is because once an affidavit is found to be false, he will be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. This will deter him to casually invoke the authority of the Magistrate under Section 156(3). That apart, we have already stated that the veracity of the same can also be verified by the learned Magistrate, regard being had to the nature of allegations of the case. We are compelled to say so as a number of cases pertaining to fiscal sphere, matrimonial dispute/family disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases and the cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, as are illustrated in Lalita Kumari are being filed. That apart, the learned Magistrate would also be aware of the delay in lodging of the FIR.” 17. A reading of the above judgment, it is clear that the facts therein disclose that the defaulter of the loan was trying to implicate higher officials of the bank to settle the scores in order to avoid proceedings under the SARFAESI Act. In the said context, the Apex Court has noted that while ordering such investigation, the Magistrate must be vigilant with regard to allegations made in the complaint and not to issue any directions without proper application of mind. However, the Magistrate shall take note of allegations in entirety, the date of incident and whether any cognizable case is remotely made out. However, the Magistrate shall take note of allegations in entirety, the date of incident and whether any cognizable case is remotely made out. It was found that issuing a direction stating "as per the application" to lodge an FIR creates a very unhealthy situation in the society and also reflects the erroneous approach of the learned Magistrate. It was also found that the affidavit is required for the reason that the person making the application should be conscious and also endeavour to see that no false affidavit is made. In the event, if the contents of such affidavit are found false, he would be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. This means, the purpose of filing affidavit is only to fix liability for prosecution in the event the allegations are found to be false. Further, in the same judgment, a direction was given to circulate the judgment to the concerned Magistrates, so that Magistrates would be more vigilant and diligent while exercising powers under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. This means, an obligation was also casted upon the Magistrates to insist for the affidavit. Unfortunately, in spite of clear law laid down by the Apex Court and such directions of the Apex Court are circulated to the concerned Magistrates, so that they can be vigilant and diligent while exercising powers under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., the Magistrates are not complying directions. Had this vigilance and diligence been exercised at the scrutiny stage, the complainant would have had the opportunity to rectify such defect, but this opportunity has been lost. 18. In Babu Venkatesh’s case (supra), the Apex Court has not specifically held that non-filing of affidavit alone vitiates the proceedings, and it is a ground for quashment of FIR. In this regard, it is relevant to refer paragraph Nos.22, 25 to 29 of the said judgment, which read as under : “22. We find that in the present case, though civil suits have been filed with regard to the same transactions and though they are contested by the respondent No. 2 by filing written statement, he has chosen to file complaint under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. after a period of one and half years from the date of filing of written statement with an ulterior motive of harassing the appellants. 25. 25. This Court has clearly held that, a stage has come where applications under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the complainant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. 26. This court further held that, in an appropriate case, the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the truth and also verify the veracity of the allegations. The court has noted that, applications under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. are filed in a routine manner without taking any responsibility only to harass certain persons. 27. This court has further held that, prior to the filing of a petition under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., there have to be applications under Section 154(1) and 154(3) of the Cr.P.C. This court emphasizes the necessity to file an affidavit so that the persons making the application should be conscious and not make false affidavit. With such a requirement, the persons would be deterred from causally invoking authority of the Magistrate, under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. In as much as if the affidavit is found to be false, the person would be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. We find that, the present case fits in the category of No. 7, as mentioned in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (supra). 28. In the present case, we find that the learned Magistrate while passing the order under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., has totally failed to consider the law laid down by this Court. 29. From the perusal of the complaint it can be seen that, the complainant/respondent No. 2 himself has made averments with regard to the filing of the Original Suit. In any case, when the complaint was not supported by an affidavit, the Magistrate ought not to have entertained the application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. The High Court has also failed to take into consideration the legal position as has been enunciated by this court in the case of Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P. (supra), and has dismissed the petitions by merely observing that serious allegations are made in the complaint.” 19. A reading of the above paragraphs, it is clear that initially, the Apex Court came to the conclusion on the basis of allegations that it is a fit case to quash the proceedings since it is falling under the principle laid down by the Apex Court in Ch. Bhajan Lal’s case (supra). In addition to that, the Apex Court also found that the magistrate had ignored the direction given by the Apex Court in Priyanka Srivastava’s case (supra) with regard to filing of affidavit and non-application of mind. Further, the judgment of the Apex Court in Babu Venkatesh’s case (supra) does not lay down any law to the effect that non-filing of the affidavit alone vitiates entire proceedings and invites quashing of FIR de hors existence of allegation which would make out a cognizable offence so as to order investigation. 20. It can also be seen in other way i.e., whether the directions given by the Apex Court in Priyanka Srivastava’s case (supra) with regard to filing of affidavit along with the complaint is ‘directory’ in nature or ‘mandatory’ in nature. 21. There is no doubt that Criminal Procedure Code or Criminal Rules of Practice govern the requirements to be followed when an application under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., is filed. In fact, there is no requirement under Cr.P.C and Criminal Rules of Practice to file such an affidavit verifying the allegations made in the complaint on oath. 22. The Apex Court in Priyanka Srivastava’s case (supra) has found that false complaints are being filed seeking directions from the Magistrates for registration of FIRs which resulted in unhealthy practice and troubling innocent persons. In the said context, the Apex Court insisted additional procedural requirement of filing of affidavit. These directions are in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, such directions are the law laid down by the Apex Court, and hence those directions must be taken as additional procedural requirement. 23. Now the question arises “whether the non-compliance of such directions vitiate the entire proceedings, and whether insistence for an affidavit is mandatory or directory in nature, and if it is directory in nature, whether such a lapse can be cured since it is only an irregularity.” 24. 23. Now the question arises “whether the non-compliance of such directions vitiate the entire proceedings, and whether insistence for an affidavit is mandatory or directory in nature, and if it is directory in nature, whether such a lapse can be cured since it is only an irregularity.” 24. The Apex Court in MRF Ltd. v. Manohar Parrikar, (2010) 11 SCC 374 while dealing with the interpretation of law with regard to mandatory or directory in nature has examined its various decisions and held as under : “45. In Haridwar Singh v. Bagun Sumburui { (1973) 3 SCC 889 }, it was noted as follows. ‘13. Several tests have been propounded in decided cases for determining the question whether a provision in a statute, or a rule is mandatory or directory. No universal rule can be laid down on this matter. In each case one must look to the subject-matter and consider the importance of the provision disregarded and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured. Prohibitive or negative words can rarely be directory and are indicative of the intent that the provision is to be mandatory... 14. Where a prescription relates to performance of a public duty and to invalidate acts done in neglect of them would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have to control over those entrusted with the duty, such prescription is generally understood as mere instruction for the guidance of those upon whom the duty is imposed.’ 46. In Montreal Street Rely Co. v. Normandin {1917 AC 170}, it is held: ‘...The statutes contain no enactment as to what is to be the consequence of non-observance of these provisions. It is contended for the appellants that the consequence is that the trial was coram non judice and must be treated as a nullity. It is necessary to consider the principles which have been adopted in construing statutes of this character, and the authorities so far as there are any on the particular question arising here. The question whether provisions in a statute are directory or imperative has very frequently arisen in this country, but it has been said that no general rule can be laid down, and that in every case the object of the statute must be looked at. The cases on the subject will be found collected in Maxwell on Statutes, 5th ed. The question whether provisions in a statute are directory or imperative has very frequently arisen in this country, but it has been said that no general rule can be laid down, and that in every case the object of the statute must be looked at. The cases on the subject will be found collected in Maxwell on Statutes, 5th ed. P. 596 and following pages. When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience, or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty, and at the same time would not promote the main object of the Legislature, it has been the practice to hold such provisions to be directory only, the neglect of them, though punishable not effecting the validity of the acts done.’ (emphasis supplied) 47. In R. v. Secy. of State for the Home Deptt., ex parte Jeyeanthan (2000) 1 WLR 354 , it is observed: ‘The issue is of general importance and has implications for the failure to observe procedural requirements outside the field of immigration. The conventional approach when there has been non-compliance with a procedural requirement laid down by a statute or regulation is to consider whether the requirement which was not complied with should be categorised as directory or mandatory. If it is categorised as directory it is usually assumed it can be safely ignored. If it is categorised as mandatory then it is usually assumed the defect cannot be remedied and has the effect of rendering subsequent events dependent on the requirement a nullity or void or as being made without jurisdiction and of no effect. The position is more complex than this and this approach distracts attention from the important question of what the legislator should be judged to have intended should be the consequence of the non-compliance. This has to be assessed on a consideration of the language of the legislation against the factual circumstances of the non-compliance. In the majority of cases it provides limited, if any, assistance to inquire whether the requirement is mandatory or directory. The requirement is never intended to be optional if a word such as 'shall' or 'must' is used. This has to be assessed on a consideration of the language of the legislation against the factual circumstances of the non-compliance. In the majority of cases it provides limited, if any, assistance to inquire whether the requirement is mandatory or directory. The requirement is never intended to be optional if a word such as 'shall' or 'must' is used. A requirement to use a form is more likely to be treated as a mandatory requirement where the form contains a notice designed to ensure that a member of the public is informed of his or her rights, such as a notice of a right to appeal. In the case of a right to appeal, if, notwithstanding the absence of the notice, the member of the public exercises his or her right of appeal, the failure to use the form usually ceases to be of any significance irrespective of the outcome of the appeal. This can confidently be said to accord with the intention of the author of the requirement. There are cases where it has been held that even if there has been no prejudice to the recipient because, for example, the recipient was aware of the right of appeal but did not do so, the non-compliance is still fatal. The explanation for these decisions is that the draconian consequence is imposed as a deterrent against not observing the requirement. However even where this is the situation the consequences may differ if this would not be in the interests of the person who was to be informed of his rights. Because of what can be the very undesirable consequences of a procedural requirement which is made so fundamental that any departure from the requirement makes everything that happens thereafter irreversibly a nullity it is to be hoped that provisions intended to have this effect will be few and far between. In the majority of cases, whether the requirement is categorised as directory or mandatory, the tribunal before whom the defect is properly raised has the task of determining what are to be the consequences of failing to comply with the requirement in the context of all the facts and circumstances of the case in which the issue arises. In the majority of cases, whether the requirement is categorised as directory or mandatory, the tribunal before whom the defect is properly raised has the task of determining what are to be the consequences of failing to comply with the requirement in the context of all the facts and circumstances of the case in which the issue arises. In such a situation that tribunal's task will be to seek to do what is just in all the circumstances (see Brayhead (Ascot) Ltd v. Berkshire CC [1964] 1 All ER 149 : [1964] 2 QB 303 applied by the House of Lords in London and a Clydeside Estates Ltd. v. Aberdeen DC [1979] 3 All ER 876 : 1980] 1 WLR 182. By contrast, a requirement may be clearly directory because it lays down a time limit but a tribunal is given an express power to extend the time for compliance. If the tribunal grants or refuses an extension of time the position is clear. If the time limit is extended the requirement is of no Significance. If an extension is refused the requirement becomes critical. It may, for example, deprive a member of the public of a right to appeal which if exercised in time would have been bound to succeed. In the latter situation a directory requirement has consequences which are as significant as any mandatory requirement. A far from straightforward situation is where there is a need for permission to appeal to a tribunal but this is not appreciated at the time. The requirement is mandatory in the sense that the tribunal or the party against whom the appeal was being brought would have been entitled to object to the appeal proceeding without the permission and if they had done so the appeal would not have been accepted. However, what is the position if because they were unaware of the existence of the requirement no objection is made and the appeal is heard and allowed? Is the appellant, when the mistake is learnt of, to be deprived of the benefits of the appeal? If the answer is Yes the result could be very unjust. This would be especially so, if in fact the tribunal in error had told the appellant that permission is not needed and he would have been in time to make the application if he had not been misinformed. If the answer is Yes the result could be very unjust. This would be especially so, if in fact the tribunal in error had told the appellant that permission is not needed and he would have been in time to make the application if he had not been misinformed. Could it have been the intention of the author of the requirement that the requirement should have the effect of depriving the appellant of the benefit of his appeal? Clearly not. In such a situation the non-compliance would almost inevitably be regarded as being without significance. It must be remembered that procedural requirements are designed to further the interests of justice and any consequence which would achieve a result contrary to those interests should be treated with considerable reservation.’ 48. In Attorney General's Reference (No 3 of 1999) {(2001)2 AC 91, it is held: ‘My Lords, I acknowledge at once that reasonable minds may differ as to the correct interpretation of a Sub-section which has no parallel in the 1984 Act or any other statute. Nevertheless, there do seem to be secure footholds which may lead to a tolerably clear answer. It is not along the route adopted by the prosecution of asking whether the relevant provision is mandatory or directory. In London and Clydeside Estates Ltd. v. Aberdeen DC [1979] 3 All ER 876 at 882-884 : [1980] 1 WLR 182 at 188-190, Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone L.C. considered this dichotomy and warned against the approach 'of fitting a particular case into one or other of mutually exclusive and starkly contrasted compartments'. In R v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex p Jeycanthan [1999] 3 All ER 231 at 237 : [2000] 1 WLR 354 at 360, Lord Woolf MR, now Lord Chief Justice, echoed this warning and held that it is 'Much more important ... to focus on the consequences of non-compliance'. This is how I will approach the matter.’ 49. In R. v. Sekhon {2002 EWCA Crim 2954}, it is observed: ‘25. There is no doubt that difficulties for courts exist in applying the distinction between mandatory requirements on the one hand, and directory requirements on the other. Even if the terms 'directory' and 'mandatory' are not used the problem remains of answering the question : what is the effect of non-compliance with procedural requirements? There is no doubt that difficulties for courts exist in applying the distinction between mandatory requirements on the one hand, and directory requirements on the other. Even if the terms 'directory' and 'mandatory' are not used the problem remains of answering the question : what is the effect of non-compliance with procedural requirements? What is necessary as indicated by Lord Campbell LC in Liverpool Borough Bank v. Turner (1861) 30 LJ Ch 379 at 381, 45 ER 715 at 718, is 'to try to get at the real intention of the legislature, by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be construed.’ 50. Reference can be made to certain passages from HALSBURY'S Laws of England, 4th Edition Re issue Vol. 44(1) at para 1237 and 1238: ‘1237. Substantive and procedural enactments. A distinction is drawn between enactments that have substantive effect and those that are merely procedural. Here 'substantive' means having to do with the substance of the law, in particular the nature and existence of legal rights, powers or duties, whereas procedure is concerned with formalities and technicalities, rather than substance. A procedural change is expected to improve matters for everyone concerned (or at least to improve matters for some, without inflicting detriment on anyone else who uses ordinary care, vigilance and promptness). The distinction governs such questions as whether a statutory requirement is mandatory or merely directory", whether the effect of an enactment is retrospective' and when a limitation period begins to run. The question may be whether, on the facts of the instant case, the enactment is substantive or merely procedural, bearing in mind that an enactment may be substantive in the light of some facts but merely procedural on others. Another use of the term 'substantive' is to indicate a 'permanent' provision of an Act, in contrast to merely temporary or transitional provisions. 1238. Mandatory and directory enactments. The distinction between mandatory and directory enactments concerns statutory requirements and may have to be drawn where the consequence off ailing to implement the requirement is not spelt out in the legislation. The requirement may arise in one of two ways. 1238. Mandatory and directory enactments. The distinction between mandatory and directory enactments concerns statutory requirements and may have to be drawn where the consequence off ailing to implement the requirement is not spelt out in the legislation. The requirement may arise in one of two ways. A duty to implement it may be imposed directly on a person; or legislation may govern the doing of an act or the carrying on of an activity, and compel the person doing the act or carrying on the activity to implement the requirement as part of a specified procedure. The requirement may be imposed merely by implication. To remedy the deficiency of the legislature in failing to specify the intended legal consequence of non-compliance with such a requirement, it has been necessary for the courts to devise rules. These lay down that it must be decided from the wording of the relevant enactment whether the requirement is intended to be mandatory or merely directory. The same requirement may be mandatory as to some aspects and directory as to the rest. The court will be more willing to hold that a statutory requirement is merely directory if any breach of the requirement is necessarily followed by an opportunity to exercise some judicial or official discretion in a way which can adequately compensate for that breach. Provisions relating to the steps to be taken by the parties to legal proceedings (using the term in the widest sense) are often construed as mandatory. Where, however, a requirement, even if in mandatory terms, is purely procedural and is imposed for the benefit of one party alone, that party can waive the requirement. Provisions requiring a public authority to comply with formalities in order to render a private individual liable to a levy have generally been held to be mandatory. Requirements are construed as directory if they relate to the performance of a public duty, and the case is such that to hold void acts done in neglect of them would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty, without at the same time promoting the main object of the legislature. This is illustrated by many decisions relating to the performance of public functions out of time, and by many relating to the failure of public officers to comply with formal requirements. This is illustrated by many decisions relating to the performance of public functions out of time, and by many relating to the failure of public officers to comply with formal requirements. On the other hand, the view that provisions conferring private rights have been generally treated as mandatory is less easy to support; the decisions on provisions of this type appear, in fact, to show no really marked leaning either way. If the requirement is found to be mandatory, then in a case where a duty to implement it is imposed directly on a person, non-compliance will normally constitute the tort of breach of statutory duty, while in a case where it is to be implemented as a part of a specified procedure, non-compliance will normally render the act done invalid. If the requirement is found to be directory only then in either case the non-compliance will be without direct legal effect, though there might be indirect consequences such as an award of costs against the offender. It has been said that mandatory provisions must be fulfilled exactly, whereas it is sufficient if directory provisions are substantially fulfilled. Where the requirement is complied with at the relevant time, the act done is not vitiated by later developments which, had they occurred before that time, would have meant that the duty should have been performed in a different way.’ 25. It is also relevant to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in Kailash v. Nanhku, AIR 2005 SC 2441 , whereunder it has been held as follows : ‘33. Justice G.P. Singh notes in his celebrated work "Principles of Statutory Interpretation" (Ninth Edition, 2004) while dealing with mandatory and directory provisions - "The Study of numerous cases on this topic does not lead to formulation of any universal rule except this that language alone most often is not decisive, and regard must be had to the context, subject-matter and object of the statutory provision in question, in determining whether the same is mandatory or directory. In an oft-quoted passage LORD CAMPBELL said: 'No universal rule can be laid down as to whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification for disobedience. In an oft-quoted passage LORD CAMPBELL said: 'No universal rule can be laid down as to whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification for disobedience. It is the duty of Courts of justice to try to get at the real intention of the Legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be considered'." (p. 338) "For ascertaining the real intention of the Legislature", points out SUBBARAO, J. "the court may consider inter alia, the nature and design of the statute, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other; the impact of other provisions whereby the necessity of complying with the provisions in question is avoided; the circumstances, namely, that the statute provides for a contingency of the non-compliance with the provisions; the fact that the non-compliance with the provisions is or is not visited by some penalty; the serious or the trivial consequences, that flow therefrom; and above all, whether the object of the legislation will be defeated or furthered". If object of the enactment will be defeated by holding the same directory, it will be construed as mandatory, whereas if by holding it mandatory serious general inconvenience will be created to innocent persons without very much furthering the object of enactment, the same will be construed as directory." (pp. 339-340) 34. Two decisions, having a direct bearing on the issue arising for decision before us, have been brought to our notice, one each by the learned counsel for either party. The learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that in Topline Shoes Ltd. v. Corporation Bank MANU/SC/0558/2002 : [2002] 3 SCR 1167, pari materia provision contained in Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 came up for the consideration of the Court. The provision requires the opposite party to a complaint to give his version of the case within a period of 30 days or such extended period not exceeding 15 days as may be granted by the District Forum. The provision requires the opposite party to a complaint to give his version of the case within a period of 30 days or such extended period not exceeding 15 days as may be granted by the District Forum. The Court took into consideration the Statement of Objects and Reasons and the legislative intent behind providing a time frame to file reply and held : (i) that the provision as framed was not mandatory in nature as no penal consequences are prescribed if the extended time exceeds 15 days and; (ii) that the provision was directory in nature and could not be interpreted to mean that in no event whatsoever the reply of the respondent could be taken on record beyond the period of 45 days.” 26. It is also relevant to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in Patil Automation Private Limited v. Rakheja Engineers Private Limited, (2022) 10 SCC 1 , whereunder it has been held as under : “44. In Sharif-ud-Din v. Abdul Gani Lone { (1980) 1 SCC 403 }, relied upon by Shri Saket Sikri, the matter arose under the Jammu and Kashmir Representation of Peoples Act, 1957, the question arose whether the provision providing that copies of the election petition are to be attested by the Petitioner as true copies under his own signature, was mandatory. We may notice the following paragraph (SCC PP. 406-07, PARA 9) : 9. The difference between a mandatory Rule and a directory Rule is that while the former must be strictly observed, in the case of the latter substantial compliance may be sufficient to achieve the object regarding which the Rule is enacted. Certain broad propositions which can be deduced from several decisions of courts regarding the Rules of construction that should be followed in determining whether a provision of law is directory or mandatory may be summarised thus: The fact that the statute uses the word "shall" while laying down a duty is not conclusive on the question whether it is a mandatory or directory provision. In order to find out the true character of the legislation, the court has to ascertain the object which the provision of law in question has to sub-serve and its design and the context in which it is enacted. If the object of a law is to be defeated by non-compliance with it, it has to be regarded as mandatory. In order to find out the true character of the legislation, the court has to ascertain the object which the provision of law in question has to sub-serve and its design and the context in which it is enacted. If the object of a law is to be defeated by non-compliance with it, it has to be regarded as mandatory. But when a provision of law relates to the performance of any public duty and the invalidation of any act done in disregard of that provision causes serious prejudice to those for whose benefit it is enacted and at the same time who have no control over the performance of the duty, such provision should be treated as a directory one. Where, however, a provision of law prescribes that a certain act has to be done in a particular manner by a person in order to acquire a right and it is coupled with another provision which confers an immunity on another when such act is not done in that manner, the former has to be regarded as a mandatory one. A procedural Rule ordinarily should not be construed as mandatory if the defect in the act done in pursuance of it can be cured by permitting appropriate rectification to be carried out at a subsequent stage unless by according such permission to rectify the error later on, another Rule would be contravened. Whenever a statute prescribes that a particular act is to be done in a particular manner and also lays down that failure to comply with the said requirement leads to a specific consequence, it would be difficult to hold that the requirement is not mandatory and the specified consequence should not follow. 45. In Kailash v. Nanhku and Ors. { (2005) 4 SCC 480 }, relied upon by Shri Saket Sikri, this Court was dealing with an election matter and one of the questions was whether the time limit of ninety days, as prescribed by the proviso to Order VIII Rule I of the Code of Civil Procedure, is mandatory or not. The said provision dealt with the power of the Court to extend time for filing the written statement. The proviso fixes a period of ninety days from the date of service of summons as the maximum period for filing the written statement. The said provision dealt with the power of the Court to extend time for filing the written statement. The proviso fixes a period of ninety days from the date of service of summons as the maximum period for filing the written statement. This Court took the view that the provision is to be construed as directory and not mandatory. 46. In this context, we may notice paragraphs - 28 and 30 of Kailash (supra): 28. All the Rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. The language employed by the draftsman of processual law may be liberal or stringent, but the fact remains that the object of prescribing procedure is to advance the cause of justice. In an adversarial system, no party should ordinarily be denied the opportunity of participating in the process of justice dispensation. Unless compelled by express and specific language of the statute, the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure or any other procedural enactment ought not to be construed in a manner which would leave the court helpless to meet extraordinary situations in the ends of justice. The observations made by Krishna Iyer, J. in Sushil Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar { (1975) 1 SCC 774 } are pertinent: (SCC p. 777, paras 5-6) ‘5...The mortality of justice at the hands of law troubles a judge's conscience and points an angry interrogation at the law reformer. 6. The processual law so dominates in certain systems as to overpower substantive rights and substantial justice. The humanist Rule that procedure should be the handmaid, not the mistress, of legal justice compels consideration of vesting a residuary power in judges to act ex debito justitiae where the tragic sequel otherwise would be wholly inequitable. ... Justice is the goal of jurisprudence -- processual, as much as substantive.’ 29. xxx 30. It is also to be noted that though the power of the court under the proviso appended to Rule 1 Order 8 is circumscribed by the words "shall not be later than ninety days" but the consequences flowing from non-extension of time are not specifically provided for though they may be read in by necessary implication. Merely because a provision of law is couched in a negative language implying mandatory character, the same is not without exceptions. Merely because a provision of law is couched in a negative language implying mandatory character, the same is not without exceptions. The courts, when called upon to interpret the nature of the provision, may, keeping in view the entire context in which the provision came to be enacted, hold the same to be directory though worded in the negative form.” 27. A reading of the above judgments, it is manifest that while considering the question whether a particular provision of law is mandatory or directory in nature, the Court has to examine the character of legislation, the object of provision of law in question which has to sub-serve and its design, and the context in which it is enacted. Further, a procedural Rule ordinarily should not be construed as mandatory if the defect in the act done in pursuance of it can be cured by permitting appropriate rectification to be carried out at a subsequent stage unless by according such permission to rectify the error later on, another Rule would be contravened. 28. In the present case, there is no requirement under the procedure for filing the affidavit. The object of the affidavit was to remind the complainant about his duty to speak truth and the consequences of speaking untruth, which in fact results in prosecution. The intended object is to make him liable for prosecution for perjury in the event the allegations therein are found to be false. Except this purpose, no purpose is sought to be served. Further, insistence for an affidavit is a part of procedural requirement. The procedural requirement is presumed to be directory in nature and not mandatory. Such non-compliance can be cured with the permission of the Court at a later stage unless such a permission to rectify results in infraction of other rules. In this case, granting of permission to rectify the defect at a later stage does not violate any other specific rule. 29. It is also relevant to refer consequences of irregular proceedings as is referred under Sections 460(e) and 461(k) of Cr.P.C., which read as under : “460. Irregularities which do not vitiate proceedings.—If any Magistrate not empowered by law to do any of the following things, namely:— (a) to (d) x x x (e) to take cognizance of an offence under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 190; 461. Irregularities which do not vitiate proceedings.—If any Magistrate not empowered by law to do any of the following things, namely:— (a) to (d) x x x (e) to take cognizance of an offence under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 190; 461. Irregularities which vitiate proceedings.—If any Magistrate, not being empowered by law in this behalf, does any of the following things, namely:— (a) to (j) x x x (k) takes cognizance of an offence under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 190.” 30. A comparative reading of above provisions, it is clear that if any Magistrate is not empowered by law to do any of the acts pertaining to taking of cognizance under clause (a) or (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 190 of Cr.P.C., and erroneously does such a thing in good faith, his proceedings shall not be liable to be set aside merely on the ground of his not being empowered to do so. Whereas, as per Section 461 of Cr.P.C., if any Magistrate, not being empowered by law in this behalf, takes cognizance of an offence under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 190, such proceedings would be treated as void proceedings. 31. Section 190 (1) (a) of Cr.P.C., deals with written complaint filed for taking cognizance and Section 190(1)(c) deals with taking cognizance by the Magistrate upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed. Such information may be oral also. For taking cognizance under Section 190(1)(c), only jurisdictional magistrate alone has power and any other magistrate takes cognizance, such proceedings vitiates. 32. In the present case, invoking the jurisdiction under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., is based on the written complaint of the complainant and the Magistrate is empowered to act under Section 190 of Cr.P.C. When the Magistrate, while acting under Section 190(1)(a), commits any irregularity without being empowered, when such an act is done in good faith, the same is not vitiated. 33. Upon reading of the provisions on irregular proceedings which can be cured and which cannot be cured, it can be safely held that in the instant case, non-filing of affidavit does not vitiate the proceedings so as to quash the entire complaints. 34. 33. Upon reading of the provisions on irregular proceedings which can be cured and which cannot be cured, it can be safely held that in the instant case, non-filing of affidavit does not vitiate the proceedings so as to quash the entire complaints. 34. In the judgments which are relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner i.e., Babu Venkatesh’s case (supra), T. Kamalakar’s case (supra), D. Satish Kumar’s (supra) and Chandrasekhar Reddy’s case (supra), no issue was raised as to whether non-compliance of direction to file the affidavit is a curable defect or incurable defect or mandatory or directory in nature. Therefore, those judgments have no bearing on the issue in the present cases. This Court finds that non-filing of affidavit is a curable defect and it does not vitiate the proceedings and such an error can be allowed to be rectified at a later stage since such a rectification does not result in any infraction of any other Rules. This Court also finds that requirement of law laid down by the Apex Court can be said to be complied if the complainant is directed to file an affidavit swearing the allegations in the complaints. 35. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon various judgments of the Apex Court and this High Court in State, through CBI v. Hemendhra Reddy, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 515, Ramachandra Barathi @ Sathish Sharma V.K. v. State of Telangana, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 986, Mahender Kumar Gandhi v. Bindesh Kamdar, (2017) 1 ALT 79 , Director of Settlements, A.P. v. M.R. Apparao, (2002) 4 SCC 638 and Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 2 SCC 673 to contend that since the Apex Court has laid down law in Priyanka Srivastava’s case (supra), which is being followed by this Court in various judgments, this Court cannot take contrary view as such decisions are binding on this Court. If this Court wants to differ with the said decisions, it shall refer the matter to the larger Bench. I do not find any merit in this contention for the reason that in all the aforesaid judgments, there was no issue with regard to effect of non-filing of affidavit i.e., whether filing of affidavit is mandatory or directory in nature or whether non-compliance of the same can be cured at later point of time. I do not find any merit in this contention for the reason that in all the aforesaid judgments, there was no issue with regard to effect of non-filing of affidavit i.e., whether filing of affidavit is mandatory or directory in nature or whether non-compliance of the same can be cured at later point of time. If such an issue was there, definitely this Court is bound to follow the said law as a judicial propriety, dignity, and decorum, demand to follow the law laid down by highest Court in the country even if it is obiter dictum or decision of coordinate bench, if it is not differed and referred to larger bench. When the issue is not adverted to, there is no need to refer the matter to the larger Bench. Therefore, the said contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is devoid of merits. This Court hold that non-filing of affidavit does not entail quashment of entire proceedings. Such non-compliance, at the most, can be allowed to be rectified by permitting the complainant to file an affidavit so as to bind the allegations in the complaint for the purpose of his prosecution, if the contents of the affidavit are found to be untrue. 36. The learned counsel for the petitioners further contended that the orders of the Magistrate directing the Police to register the case and investigate the same are one line orders and there is non-application of mind which itself constitutes violation of decided principles of the Apex Court and such orders are devoid of reasoning. Thus, FIRs are liable to be quashed on this ground. 37. The learned counsel for respondent No.2/complainant has submitted that the order of the Magistrate directing the Police to register the case and investigate the same was not assailed in the present petitions. If the petitioners are aggrieved by the same, they could have filed a revision petition against such order and the same cannot be a ground to quash FIRs. 38. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the order directing investigation requires application of mind. The application of mind supposes some reasons should be indicated to show application of mind to the facts on record. The order directing the investigation is not assailed in the present petitions. The order directing the investigation is a revisable order by exercising revisional jurisdiction. The application of mind supposes some reasons should be indicated to show application of mind to the facts on record. The order directing the investigation is not assailed in the present petitions. The order directing the investigation is a revisable order by exercising revisional jurisdiction. If the revisional Court finds that the orders suffer from reasonless, it can set aside such orders and direct the Magistrate to reconsider the complaints and pass appropriate orders. However, in the present cases, the relief sought is quashment of FIRs. If the FIRs are quashed on the ground of absence of reasons in ordering investigation, the complainant would suffer great loss for no fault of him. If such orders are challenged before the revisional Court, there would be occasion for the revisional Court to remand the matter back in which case the complainant would not suffer any disadvantage. If the FIRs are quashed based for absence of reasons for taking cognizance, it results in termination of entire criminal proceedings which would cause a great prejudice to the complainant without fault of him. Therefore, such an issue cannot be a foundation for quashing of FIRs. 39. The allegations in FIR No.218 of 2021 would show that the accused, being the Board of Directors of the Bank, in conspiracy with each other and with others, allegedly made enmass admissions of A-class members into the bank, after the General Body decided to conduct elections on 20.12.2020. Such a decision was taken on 31.10.2020. From 02.11.2020 to 17.11.2020, which is the cut-off date for voters list, nearly 1800 members were admitted. Prior to that, there were only 3000 members in the bank. According to the complainant, the new members admitted were only gold loanees and the loans were granted as if they really required the loans. The loans were sanctioned without there being any actual pledge of the gold or gold appraisal report. The purpose of admitting new members in a short span of time was that if the new Board is elected, they would go into the mismanagement done by the previous Board. Hence, the accused, even though there was no eligibility, admitted new members and allowed them to vote in the elections contrary to the Master Circular issued by the RBI. The purpose of admitting new members in a short span of time was that if the new Board is elected, they would go into the mismanagement done by the previous Board. Hence, the accused, even though there was no eligibility, admitted new members and allowed them to vote in the elections contrary to the Master Circular issued by the RBI. As per the master circular, there must be a cooling period of 12 months from the date of obtaining membership, but the same is ignored in the present case. On the said allegations, FIR No.218 of 2021 was registered for the offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 409, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 477-A of IPC. 40. The allegations in FIR No.222 of 2021 would show that the accused, in conspiracy with each other and others, allegedly disbursed loans to a tune of Rs.20.74 crores to the family members of Directors and also to shareholders of the bank who had major shares. Such disbursement was not referred in 44th Annual Report of the bank and the same amounts to criminal breach of trust, cheating and forgery of annual reports. It is the further allegation that the accused had allegedly extended loans worth of Rs.300 crores by taking commission of 2% to 10% from the loanees as against illegal collaterals like properties belonging to Wakf Board and non-existing properties. Those disbursements were not even reflected in the Annual Reports of the bank. In addition to that, it is the further allegation that the accused allegedly misappropriated an amount of Rs.18.30 crores for construction of head office building of the bank. Such construction is made without approval of budget. The accused have spent Rs.37.30 crores by showing Rs.3,690/- per sft., for construction value. In fact, the actual constructed value might not be more than Rs.19 crores. Such action would amount to cheating, criminal breach of trust and forgery. Further, for the financial years 2018-19 and 2019-20, the accused misappropriated Rs.3 crores and Rs.3.5 crores respectively on the basis of false bills without reflecting the same in 44th annual report under the head – “Details of other expenses”. 41. Such action would amount to cheating, criminal breach of trust and forgery. Further, for the financial years 2018-19 and 2019-20, the accused misappropriated Rs.3 crores and Rs.3.5 crores respectively on the basis of false bills without reflecting the same in 44th annual report under the head – “Details of other expenses”. 41. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the allegations in the complaints if taken on the face of it, do not attract any of the offences mentioned in the FIRs, whereas, the contention of the learned counsel for the complainant is that the allegations levelled in the complaints clearly make out the offences mentioned in the FIRs. 42. The first offence alleged against the accused is criminal breach of trust. According to the learned counsel for the accused, there is no entrustment of property to the accused, as such, the question of criminal breach of trust by the accused does not arise. This contention has no merit. Section 405 of IPC deals with criminal breach of trust. One of the requirements to attract criminal breach of trust is whoever being in any manner entrusted with property or with any dominion over property dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged or of any legal contract which he had made touching the discharge of such trust. If such a thing is done by the banker, it is aggravated offence under Section 409 of IPC. The facts on hand show that all accused were entrusted with dominion over assets of bank. The allegation reveals that accused allegedly disbursed loans in violation of the direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged or the legal contract made touching the discharge of such trust. 43. In the present case, the allegations in both the complaints are that loan amounts were sanctioned in the first complaint to the gold loanees without obtaining security, without real requirement and without pledging the gold. For lending such loans which are temporary in nature, the bank officials require to lend such money by obtaining gold as pledge, after getting appraisal report. For lending such loans which are temporary in nature, the bank officials require to lend such money by obtaining gold as pledge, after getting appraisal report. The allegation in the first complaint prima facie show that from the date of creation of Society, there were only 3000 members, but in a short span of time, the accused admitted 1800 gold loanees as A-class members. Just two days before cut-off date, nearly more than 800 members were admitted as members. These are all factors which show that there is prima facie allegation attracting Section 409 of IPC. Apart from that, the allegations in the other complaint would show that loans were extended without there being any valid security and also spent amount for construction of building without approval of such budget in the Annual General Body meeting. These are the allegations clearly attracts the offence under Section 409 of IPC which are required to be investigated. 44. The allegation touching Section 420 of IPC is not found in the first complaint i.e., FIR No.218 of 2021. Though there is disbursement of loans contrary to the procedure in a short span of time, there is no inducement to the shareholders since they have not participated in the process of disbursement of gold loans and membership drive. If such loans were put in Annual General Meeting and obtained shareholders’ consent, it would have been a clear case of inducement of shareholders. However, in this case, such stage was not reached when complaint was filed. Therefore, invoking Section 420 of IPC in the first complaint i.e., FIR No.218 of 2021, is not sustainable. 45. Dealing with the offence of Section 420 of IPC in the second complaint i.e., FIR No.222 of 2021, there is a clear allegation that disbursement of loans to the family members of the Board of Directors was not reflected in 44th Annual General Meeting; at the relevant column in the Annual Report, ‘Nil’ is shown. According to the complainant, the loans worth of more than Rs.20 crores were extended to the family members of the Board of Directors or the major shareholders contrary to the mandate of financial administration of the bank. This clearly constitutes the offence under Section 420 of IPC. There is another allegation that various documents in the loan process were forged and false expenditure was also shown for construction of building. This clearly constitutes the offence under Section 420 of IPC. There is another allegation that various documents in the loan process were forged and false expenditure was also shown for construction of building. These are all aspects which would clearly prima facie make out offence of cheating as well as other offences under Sections 467, 468 and 471 of IPC. 46. With regard to Section 477-A of IPC, which deals with falsification of accounts, the allegations attracting Section 477-A of IPC are not present in the first complaint. However, in the second complaint, there are specific allegations of false bills and showing of high expenditure than what was actually incurred. There is allegation of falsification of annual reports by the officials of the Bank, who were under the helm of affairs. Therefore, in the second complaint, the allegations would attract Section 477-A of IPC. 47. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the allegations are vague and not specific and hence, the FIRs are liable to be quashed. To answer such contentions, it is apt to refer para 72 of the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, MANU/SC/0115/1992 which reads as under : “72. It is true that some of the allegations do suffer from misty vagueness and lack of particulars. Further as urged by Mr. Parasaran, there are no specific averments that either Ch. Bhajan Lal or his relations and friends had no source of income to accumulate the properties now standing in their names and that Ch. Bhajan Lal showed any favour to them by misusing his official power. In our considered view, these are all matters which would be examined only during the course of investigation and thereafter by the court on the materials collected and placed before it by the investigating agencies. The question whether the relations and friends of Ch. Bhajan Lal have independently purchased the properties out of their own funds or not also cannot be decided by the Court at this stage on the denial statement of Bhajan Lal alone.” 48. A similar contention was raised in the above said case that allegations do suffer from misty vagueness and lack of particulars. Bhajan Lal have independently purchased the properties out of their own funds or not also cannot be decided by the Court at this stage on the denial statement of Bhajan Lal alone.” 48. A similar contention was raised in the above said case that allegations do suffer from misty vagueness and lack of particulars. Adverting to the said contention, the apex court held that those allegations cannot be decided in the proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. These are all matters which will be examined only during the course of investigation. Therefore, such contention has no merit. 49. The Apex Court, in case of Indian Oil Corporation V. NEPC India Ltd., MANU/SC/3152/2006, having considered its various judgments, laid down the following principles for quashing criminal proceedings, which read as under : "12. The principles relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash complaints and criminal proceedings have been stated and reiterated by this Court in several decisions. To mention a few - Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia vs. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [MANU/SC/0261/1988 : (1988) 1 SCC 692 ], State of Haryana vs. Bhajanlal [MANU/SC/0115/1992 : 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335], Rupan Deol Bajaj vs. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [MANU/SC/0080/1996 : (1995) 6 SCC 194 ], Central Bureau of Investigation vs. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd., [MANU/SC/0622/1996 : (1996) 5 SCC 591 ], State of Bihar vs. Rajendra Agrawalla [MANU/SC/1429/1996 : (1996) 8 SCC 164 ], Rajesh Bajaj vs. State NCT of Delhi, [MANU/SC/0155/1999 : (1999) 3 SCC 259 ], Medchal Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd. vs. Biological E. Ltd. [MANU/SC/0128/2000 : (2000) 3 SCC 269 ], Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma vs. State of Bihar [MANU/SC/0223/2000 : (2000) 4 SCC 168 ], M. Krishnan vs. Vijay Singh [MANU/SC/0630/2001 : (2001) 8 SCC 645 ], and Zandu Phamaceutical Works Ltd. vs. Mohd. Sharaful Haque [MANU/SC/0932/2004 : (2005) 1 SCC 122 ]. The principles, relevant to our purpose are: (i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint. (ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with malafides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable. (iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution. (iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. (v) A given set of facts may make out : (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceedings are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not. 13. While on this issue, it is necessary to take notice of a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. This is obviously on account of a prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. Such a tendency is seen in several family disputes also, leading to irretrievable break down of marriages/families. This is obviously on account of a prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. Such a tendency is seen in several family disputes also, leading to irretrievable break down of marriages/families. There is also an impression that if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent settlement. Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged. In G. Sagar Suri vs. State of U.P. [MANU/SC/0045/2000 : (2000) 2 SCC 636 ], this Court observed: "It is to be seen if a matter, which is essentially of a civil nature, has been given a cloak of criminal offence. Criminal proceedings are not a short cut of other remedies available in law. Before issuing process, a criminal court has to exercise a great deal of caution. For the accused it is a serious matter. This Court has laid certain principles on the basis of which the High Court is to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. Jurisdiction under this Section has to be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." 14. While no one with a legitimate cause or grievance should be prevented from seeking remedies available in criminal law, a complainant who initiates or persists with a prosecution, being fully aware that the criminal proceedings are unwarranted and his remedy lies only in civil law, should himself be made accountable, at the end of such misconceived criminal proceedings, in accordance with law. One positive step that can be taken by the courts, to curb unnecessary prosecutions and harassment of innocent parties, is to exercise their power under section 250 Cr.P.C. more frequently, where they discern malice or frivolousness or ulterior motives on the part of the complainant. Be that as it may." 50. It is also apt to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in Mahendra K.C. v. State of Karnataka, MANU/SC/1012/2021, whereunder it has been held as follows : “23. ... Be that as it may." 50. It is also apt to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in Mahendra K.C. v. State of Karnataka, MANU/SC/1012/2021, whereunder it has been held as follows : “23. ... the High Court while exercising its power Under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash the FIR instituted against the second Respondent-Accused should have applied the following two tests: i) whether the allegations made in the complaint, prima facie constitute an offence; and ii) whether the allegations are so improbable that a prudent man would not arrive at the conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed with the complaint.” 51. In view of the above, this Court has to see whether the case of the accused falls under any of the above parameters. 52. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the complainant is a defeated candidate in the election and his litigation is motivated with malice and vengeance. Therefore, allowing such a person to prosecute the present litigation would tantamount to abuse of process of law and the same would cause great amount of harm. 53. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the complainant submitted that when the complaint makes out case for investigation, malice or vengeance has no significance. In support of his contention, he relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Umesh Kumar v. State of A.P., (2013) 10 SCC 591 , wherein it has been held at para 23 as follows : “23. The issue of The issue of mala fides loses its significance if there is a substance in the allegation made in complaint moved with malice. In Sheo Nandan Paswan v. State of Bihar & Ors., ( AIR 1987 SC 877 ), this Court held as under: “It is a well-established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justifiable and based upon adequate evidence does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or complainant.” 54. The learned counsel for the complainant has also relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. The learned counsel for the complainant has also relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque, (2005) 1 SCC 122 and State of A.P. v. Golkonda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522 and contended that when a complaint is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the proceedings. 55. He has also relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Bhajan Lal’s case (supra), wherein it has been held as under : “111. No doubt, there was no love lost between Ch. Bhajan Lal and Dharam Pal. Based on this strained relationship, it has been then emphatically urged by Mr. K. Parasaran that the entire allegations made in the complaint due to political vendetta are not only scurrilous and scandalous but also tainted with mala fides, vitiating the entire proceedings. As it has been repeatedly pointed out earlier the entire matter is only at a premature stage and the investigation is not yet proceeded with except some preliminary effort taken on the date of the registration of the case, that is on 21.11.1987. The evidence has to be gathered after a thorough investigation and placed before the Court on the basis of which alone the Court can come to a conclusion one way or the other on the plea of mala fides. If the allegations are bereft of truth and made maliciously, we are sure, the investigation will say so. At this stage, when there are only allegations and recriminations but no evidence, this Court cannot anticipate the result of the investigation and render a finding on the question of mala fides on the materials at present available. therefore, we are unable to see any force in the contention that the complaint should be thrown overboard on the mere unsubstantiated plea of mala fides. Even assuming that Dharam Pal has laid the complaint only on account of his personal animosity, that, by itself, will not be a ground to discard the complaint containing serious allegations which have to be tested and weighed after the evidence is collected. Even assuming that Dharam Pal has laid the complaint only on account of his personal animosity, that, by itself, will not be a ground to discard the complaint containing serious allegations which have to be tested and weighed after the evidence is collected. In this connection, the following view expressed by Bhagwati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar and Ors. {1987 CriLJ 793}. It is a well established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise, justifiable and based upon adequate evidence does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or the complainant.” 56. In the present case, though the complainant might be the defeated candidate, the litigation is taken up to protect the interest of the community, but not the individual. If the complaint was lodged with malice and ulterior motive for his interest, the same could be one of the relevant factors. But, in the present case, though the complainant might be the defeated candidate, the allegations made by him touch the rightful election of the body and rightful administration of financial institution in which every shareholder is having interest. Therefore, even if there is malice or vengeance in giving the complaints, they are not given for individual benefit, but to protect the interest of the shareholders of the Bank. Collapse of co-operative movement in the country is on account of mismanagement. Therefore, the plea of malice has no significance, in the light of prima facie allegations which require investigation. 57. The learned counsel for the petitioners also contended that the writ proceedings are invoked on the same allegations and hence, the present criminal proceedings cannot be sustained. The learned counsel for the complainant submitted that civil and criminal proceedings are different; that same facts may give remedy of civil law as well as criminal law and that merely because civil remedy has been availed, criminal proceedings are not barred. In support of his contention, he relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Mohd. Allauddin Khan v. State of Bihar, (2019) 6 SCC 107 , whereunder it has been held as under : “9. In support of his contention, he relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Mohd. Allauddin Khan v. State of Bihar, (2019) 6 SCC 107 , whereunder it has been held as under : “9. First error is that the High Court did not examine the case with a view to find out as to whether the allegations made in the complaint prima facie make out the offences falling under Sections 323, 379 read with Section 34 IPC or not. Instead the High Court in Para 6 gave importance to the fact that since there was a dispute pending between the parties in the Civil Court in relation to a shop as being landlord and tenant, it is essentially a civil dispute between the parties. It is on this ground, the High Court proceeded to quash the complaint. This approach of the High Court, in our view, is faulty. 11. The High Court failed to see that mere pendency of a civil suit is not an answer to the question as to whether a case under Sections 323, 379 read with Section 34 IPC is made out against respondent Nos. 2 and 3 or not. 12. The High Court should have seen that when a specific grievance of the appellant in his complaint was that respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have committed the offences punishable under Sections 323, 379 read with Section 34 IPC, then the question to be examined is as to whether there are allegations of commission of these two offences in the complaint or not. In other words, in order to see whether any prima facie case against the accused for taking its cognizable is made out or not, the Court is only required to see the allegations made in the complaint. In the absence of any finding recorded by the High Court on this material question, the impugned order is legally unsustainable.” 58. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the complainant, invocation of civil jurisdiction does not bar the remedy under criminal law, if same facts give rise to different cause of action under different laws. Therefore, in the present case, though the facts in writ proceedings may be overlapping with the criminal proceedings that will not debar the complainant from invoking criminal proceedings. 59. Therefore, in the present case, though the facts in writ proceedings may be overlapping with the criminal proceedings that will not debar the complainant from invoking criminal proceedings. 59. There is report from the Reserve Bank of India which shows that there is mismanagement in the financial administration of the Bank. 60. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that such a report cannot be sacrosanct and same cannot be foundation and same is only recommendation, but not binding. 61. The Apex Court has also declined to interfere with the interim order of this Court dated 24.06.2022 in I.A.No.3 of 2021 in W.P.No.30917 of 2021 on account of pendency of forensic audit. However, at this time, the forensic audit has been done by the Reserve Bank of India and a report is given, which prima facie shows that there is mismanagement in the financial administration of the Bank. Therefore, the allegations in the report have some basis. Though such a report may not be sacrosanct and not binding, it gives some credibility to the allegations which require to be investigated. Therefore, this Court finds prima facie case for investigation. 62. In the result, Crl.P.No.2370 of 2021 is partly allowed quashing the offence under Section 420 of IPC in FIR No.218 of 2022 on the file of Banjara Hills Police Station, Hyderabad and FIR for remaining offences is sustainable. Criminal Petition No.2371 of 2021 is dismissed. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall stand closed.