JUDGMENT : 1. Present Second Appeal has been preferred by the appellant – original defendant against the concurrent findings of the learned Courts below arising out of the suit declaration and permanent injunction. 2. The facts as could be culled-out from the memo of the appeal are as under: 2.1 That the respondent – plaintiff filed the suit for declaration and grant of permanent injunction stating that the appellant no.1 residing with his son-in-law – opponent no.2. The respondent – plaintiff purchased the suit property from one Rashidabibi Mohamad Azam Valjiwala by a registered sale deed dated 9th September, 1998 for a sale consideration of Rs.32,000/-. As per the case of the respondent – plaintiff, the suit property was given by her mother’s father – Latifbhai Rahimbhai Rajebhai in the year 1961 and her mother sold the said property to Rasidabibi Mo. Aajam Valjiwala by registered Sale Deed dated 27th December, 1993 for consideration amount of Rs.30,000/- because her maternal uncles were not maintained her mother and thereafter Rasidabibi resided there with her family and her mother lives in rental house. 2.2 Thereafter, on 9th September, 1998 the property was purchased by respondent – plaintiff from Rashidabibi and thereafter, the husband of the respondent – plaintiff died on 19th September, 2009. The suit property was given to the appellant no.1 for residence purpose as a permissive user because the respondent and the appellant no.1 are sister-in-laws. 2.3 As the appellant no.1 – original defendant no.1 started demolishing the suit property and constructions of new building at the instigation of appellant no.2 – original defendant no.2 without the prior permission of the Nagarpalika, the respondent – plaintiff and her son objected and requested the appellant no.1 to stop the construction. Applications were also to the Commissioner of HUDA, Collector, Himmatnagar and Chief Officer Nagarpalika, Himmatnagar to stop the illegal and unauthorised construction and the Nagarpalika, Himmatnagar has visited the said place and given notice on 10th July, 2013 to stop the illegal and unauthorized construction on suit property and as being an owner of the suit property the notice was served upon the respondent – plaintiff. As the respondent – plaintiff had purchased the suit property and her name continued in the record of City Survey and she paid the tax of the suit property, the appellant no.1 – defendant no.1 tried to snatch away the possession of the suit property from the respondent – plaintiff. Therefore, the respondent – plaintiff has field the suit being Regular Civil Suit no.61 of 2013 for declaration and injunction. 2.4 The summons were issued to the appellant no.1 – defendant no.1. The written statement of the appellant no.1 – defendant no.1 has been filed at Exh.22 denying the entire facts averred by the respondent – plaintiff. The issues were framed accordingly by the trial Court in Regular Civil Suit no.61 of 2013 and after appreciating the pleadings and evidence both oral, as well as, documentary, the suit was decreed in favour of the respondent – plaintiff on 30th June, 2018. 2.5 Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the appellants – defendants have preferred an appeal being Regular Civil Appeal no.24 of 2018, wherein the Principal District Judge, Himmatnagar vide order dated 30th August, 2019 has dismissed the said appeal confirming the judgment and decree rendered by the trial Court which has given rise to the present appeal. 3. Heard Mr. Kharadi, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants – defendants and Ms. Meena Vyas, learned advocate on caveat for the respondents – plaintiffs. 4. I have examined the findings of both the Courts below on the issue raised in the suit. 5. It is contended by Mr. Kharadi, learned advocate for the appellants that the appellant no.1 was residing in the suit property since last 40 years with family, who died on 1st February, 2005. The original owner of the suit property was the mother-in-law of the appellant no.1 - daughter of one Jivanbhai Latifbhai and in they handed over the possession to the appellant no.1 before the family members and the society members and the appellant no.1 was having possession from then onwards. The original owner of the suit property was the mother-in-law of the appellant no.1 - daughter of one Jivanbhai Latifbhai and in they handed over the possession to the appellant no.1 before the family members and the society members and the appellant no.1 was having possession from then onwards. It is also submitted that the suit property was sold to the Rasihdabibi by the brother in law of the appellant no.1, but the husband of the appellant no.1 has raised the objection in the City Survey office and the City Survey office has passed the order on 31st March, 1999 and rejected the sale Entry no.95 and the suit property again retain in the name of Rashidabibi. Thereafter, Rashidabibi executed the sale deed in favour of the respondent – plaintiff, but the possession of the suit property was and is with the appellant no.1 and the trial Court has not considered the entire evidence to that effect. 5.1 It is also submitted that the question of adverse possession of the appellant no.1 since long has not been considered by the Court. The First Appellate Court has also not discussed anything regarding the entry of the City Survey Superintendent and the inquiry made by the City Survey and has only reproduced evidence of the trial Court and not appreciated the judgments to that effect. As such he has prayed to admit the appeal and judgments of both the Courts to be set aside. 6. On behalf of the respondent – plaintiff Ms. Vyas, learned advocate appeared and has submitted that the case of the gift deed by the appellant in the written statement has not been proved by any evidence and no contentions were raised regarding the gift deed. The sale deeds are legally executed in favour of the respondent – plaintiff and the predecessor of the respondent – plaintiff though the sale deeds were never challenged by the appellants – defendants in any Court, nor the appellants – defendants have every filed any proceedings regarding protection of their possession, if any. The sale deeds are legally executed in favour of the respondent – plaintiff and the predecessor of the respondent – plaintiff though the sale deeds were never challenged by the appellants – defendants in any Court, nor the appellants – defendants have every filed any proceedings regarding protection of their possession, if any. It is also submitted that undisputedly the title of the property is in the name of the respondent – plaintiff and the appellants – defendants were in permissive possession and permissive possession cannot give any kind of protection and permissive possession cannot be protected and both the Courts have rightly appreciated the evidence of that effect and have decided the case by their concurrent findings in both the proceedings. 7. Upon examination of the judgment and order of both the learned Courts below, and hearing the submissions of both the learned advocates, this Court finds that Mr. Kharadi, learned advocate for the appellants – defendants has not been able to point-out any infirmity, perversity or impropriety in concurrent findings of the fact rendered by the learned Court below. 8. The oral evidence by both the parties and documentary evidence are rightly and elaborately appreciated by both the Courts. It has come on record that the appellants – defendants were permissive user and the respondent – plaintiff have purchased the property. The City Survey record also contains the name of the respondent – plaintiff. The documentary evidence in way of sale deed, moreover a letter addressed to the GUDA, Himmatnagar regarding restraining the appellants – defendants from carrying-out construction are not rebutted by the appellants – defendants and as it has come on record, the appellants – defendants were restrained from carrying-out the construction activity. As such though the appellants – defendants were in premises, but they were not legal owners or in legal possession, they were only permissive caretaker of the property. As regards the adverse possession plea, the appellants – defendants though must have lived for maximum years, but they were not in a hostile possession which is un-obstructed by the respondent – plaintiff. They were restrained from carrying-out any construction activities. The appellants – defendants have not initiated any proceedings for being owner of the property by way of adverse possession. They were restrained from carrying-out any construction activities. The appellants – defendants have not initiated any proceedings for being owner of the property by way of adverse possession. It is to be proved by the respondent - plaintiff that their possession was more than 30 years in the property and it was not obstructed or interrupted by the true owner of the property, which is not on record. 9. Hence, this Court does not find any error of law to interfere with the concurrent findings of the learned Courts below in exercise of the powers under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure as the jurisdiction is confined to substantial question of law only. Here in this case, no substantial question of law has been raised so as to enable this Court to admit the present appeal. 10. The scope of Second Appeal under Section 100 is limited. Second Appeal is competent only if it involves, at the stage of admission, substantial question of law. The High Court can interfere with the concurrent findings of fact, if the findings are perverse but the perversity should be apparent on the face of record. 11. Here in this appeal, the question of law raised cannot be said to be substantial question of law and there are question of law but not the substantial question of law. 12. In the case of Easwari Versus Parvathi and others,. reported in (2014) 15 SCC 255 , it is held that the High Court can entertain a Second Appeal on a substantial question of law and it has absolutely no jurisdiction to entertain the Second Appeal on the ground of erroneous findings of fact, however, gross error seems to be looked into. The High Court can interfere in the concurrent findings of facts in the Second Appeal if the appellate Court has not properly appreciated the evidence on record. 13. In the case of Samina Khatun, AIR 1995 Gauhati 104, also it is held that the High Court can only entertain Second Appeal only on substantial question of law. The High Court has absolutely no jurisdiction to entertain Second Appeal on the ground of erroneous findings of fact. 14. 13. In the case of Samina Khatun, AIR 1995 Gauhati 104, also it is held that the High Court can only entertain Second Appeal only on substantial question of law. The High Court has absolutely no jurisdiction to entertain Second Appeal on the ground of erroneous findings of fact. 14. As laid down in the case of State of Haryana Versus Khalsa Motors Limited, reported in (1990) 4 SCC 659 , on the basis of evidence on record it is held that the trial court and first appellate court has given concurrent findings of facts and the High Court cannot reverse the said findings under ordinary circumstances. 15. In the case of C.Doddanarayana Reddy & Ors. Vs. C. Jayarama Reddy & Ors., reported in (2020) 4 SCC 659 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed and held as under :- “25. The question as to whether a substantial question of law arises, has been a subject matter of interpretation by this Court. In the judgment reported as Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Anjuman-E-Ismail Madris-Un-Niswan (1999) 6 SCC 343 , it was held that findings of the fact could not have been interfered within the second appeal. This Court held as under: “12. This Court had repeatedly held that the power of the High Court to interfere in second appeal under Section 100 CPC is limited solely to decide a substantial question of law, if at all the same arises in the case. It has deprecated the practice of the High Court routinely interfering in pure findings of fact reached by the courts below without coming to the conclusion that the said finding of fact is either perverse or not based on material on record. 13. In Ramanuja Naidu v. V. Kanniah Naidu ( 1996 3 SCC 392 ), this Court held: "It is now well settled that concurrent findings of fact of trial court and first appellate court cannot be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code. The Single Judge of the High Court totally misconceived his jurisdiction in deciding the second appeal under Section 100 of the Code in the way he did." 14. The Single Judge of the High Court totally misconceived his jurisdiction in deciding the second appeal under Section 100 of the Code in the way he did." 14. In Navaneethammal v. Arjuna Chetty ( 1996 6 SCC 166 ), this Court held : "Interference with the concurrent findings of the courts below by the High Court under Section 100 CPC must be avoided unless warranted by compelling reasons. In any case, the High Court is not expected to reappreciate the evidence just to replace the findings of the lower courts. … Even assuming that another view is possible on a reappreciation of the same evidence, that should not have been done by the High Court as it cannot be said that the view taken by the first appellate court was based on no material." 15. And again in Secy., Taliparamba Education Society v. Moothedath Mallisseri Illath M.N. ( 1997 4 SCC 484 ), this Court held: (SCC p. 486, para 5) "The High Court was grossly in error in trenching upon the appreciation of evidence under Section 100 CPC and recording reverse finding of fact which is impermissible." 26. In a judgment reported as Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitkibai Sopan Gujar & Ors., (1999) 3 SCC 722 , this Court held that from a given set of circumstances if two inferences are possible then the one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the High Court. In the said case, the First Appellate Court set aside the judgment of the trial court. It was held that the High Court can interfere if the conclusion drawn by the lower court was erroneous being contrary to mandatory provisions of law applicable or if it is a settled position on the basis of a pronouncement made by the court or based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence. This Court held as under: “5. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. This Court held as under: “5. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. It is true that the lower appellate court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate court had given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the first appellate court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the tower appellate court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable of its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the apex Court, or was based upon in inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence.” 27. In another judgment reported as Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3SCC 179, this Court held as under: “14. A point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be substantial, a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, in so far as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law involving in the case there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis.” 28. Recently in another judgment reported as State of Rajasthan v. Shiv Dayal, (2019) 8 SCC 637 , it was held that a concurrent finding of the fact is binding, unless it is pointed out that it was recorded de hors the pleadings or it was based on no evidence or based on misreading of the material on records and documents. The Court held as under: “When any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or it was based on no evidence or it was based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. (see observation made by learned Judge Vivian Bose, J. as His Lordship then was a Judge of the Nagpur High Court in Rajeshwar Vishwanath Mamidwar & Ors. vs. Dashrath Narayan Chilwelkar & Ors., AIR 1943 Nagpur 117 Para 43).” 29. The learned High Court has not satisfied the tests laid down in the aforesaid judgments. Both the courts, the trial court and the learned First Appellate Court, have examined the School Leaving Certificate and returned a finding that the date of birth does not stand proved from such certificate. May be the High Court could have taken a different view acting as a trial court but once, two courts have returned a finding which is not based upon any misreading of material documents, nor is recorded against any provision of law, and neither can it be said that any judge acting judicially and reasonably could not have reached such a finding, then, the High Court cannot be said to have erred. Resultantly, no substantial question of law arose for consideration before the High Court. 16. In the recent decision in the Case of Kapil Kumar Vs. Raj Kumar reported in (2022) 10 SCC 281 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed and held as under :- “10. At the outset, it is required to be noted that as such there were concurrent findings of facts recorded by the learned trial court as well as the learned first appellate court on execution of pronote by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff. The said findings were on appreciation of entire evidence on record. Therefore, unless the findings recorded by the courts below were found to be perverse, the same were not required to be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of powers under section 100 CPC. 11. Even the substantial question of law framed by the High Court cannot be said to be as such a question of law much less substantial question of law. From the impugned judgement and order passed by the High Court, it appears that as such no specific substantial question of law seems to have been framed by the High Court. However, it appears that what was considered by the High Court was whether the plaintiff proves the execution of pronote and the receipt by leading cogent evidence.” 17. Under the circumstances, nothing is available on record which can be favourable to the appellants – defendants and thus, this Court does not find any substance in the present appeal and the same is devoid of any merits, both on facts and in law, and hence the same is dismissed at admission stage. 18. In view of the dismissal of the main Second Appeal, the connected Civil Application No.1 of 2019 stands rejected.