JUDGMENT : This second appeal under Section 100 C.P.C. is preferred by the plaintiff in the suit. Sri K. Jagga Rao filed O.S.No.65 of 2002 before learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Vijayawada seeking for specific performance of an agreement for sale. On trial and after due contest, the suit was decreed by judgment dated 25.11.2005. The defendant Sri Ch. Lakshmi Narayana challenged it in his first appeal before learned VIII Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Vijayawada in A.S.No.215 of 2005. After due hearing, by judgment dated 08.08.2012 the appeal was allowed and the judgment of the trial Court was set aside as a consequence the suit for specific performance stood dismissed. It was during the pendency of the first appeal, the sole plaintiff/sole respondent therein died and his legal representatives i.e., respondent Nos.2 to 6 were brought on record in I.A.No.355 of 2008 by order dated 06.04.2010 and respondent No.7 was brought on record in I.A.No.455 of 2011 by order dated 19.10.2011. The present second appeal is preferred by those legal representatives of the deceased sole plaintiff. The sole respondent herein is the sole defendant before the Courts below. 2. On 24.01.2013 a learned Judge of this Court admitted this second appeal on the following substantial questions of law : (a) Whether the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court dated 08.08.2012 holding that the suit claim is barred by limitation without considering the clause stipulating payment of interest in case of failure to get the document registered within the time mentioned in the agreement of sale dated 31.03.1992 and setting aside the findings of the lower Court that time is not the essence of the contract and time for performance of the contract stood extended on payment of interest and by the endorsement of payment of Rs.30,000/- dated 30.11.1992 is perverse, wholly untenable and deserves to be set aside by this Hon’ble Court? (c) Whether the first appellate Court failed to appreciate the oral and documentary evidence on record in correct perspective and came to a perverse and erroneous conclusion by allowing the appeal A.S.No.215/2005 on grounds unsustainable and for reasons wholly invalid? 3. However, during the course of arguments in this second appeal on the question of possession of the property, elaborate arguments were made by the learned counsel for appellants as well as learned counsel for respondent. 3. However, during the course of arguments in this second appeal on the question of possession of the property, elaborate arguments were made by the learned counsel for appellants as well as learned counsel for respondent. Considering the nature of the facts available on record, it is found in the interest of justice to allow the question of possession being argued and considered. 4. It is with reference to that question of possession of the property the appellants preferred I.A.No.1 of 2022 under Order XLI Rule 27 C.P.C. urging this Court to permit the appellants to produce additional evidence in the form of three documents, which are : 1. C.C. of amended plaint in O.S.No.20 of 2005 in the Court of XIII Additional District Judge, Vijayawada along with schedule. 2. C.C. of the written statement in O.S.No.20 of 2005. 3. C.C. of the judgment in O.S.No.20 of 2005. 5. Protesting this prayer, respondent filed a counter affidavit and sought for dismissal of the application. 6. Learned counsel on both sides along with the second appeal submitted their fervent arguments on this application also. 7. The connection between the parties and the conflict between the parties is out of an agreement for sale, which was marked as Ex.A1. There is a part payment, which is found acknowledged on the reverse side of the first page of Ex.A.1, and the said part payment is shown as Ex.A.6. Since the dispute has come up to here and since the focus of arguments on both sides turned on Exs.A.1 and A.6, it is relevant to find out what this agreement contains and then advert to the litigation that unfurled before the Courts below and the findings that were recorded by the Courts below and then consider the substantial questions of law that have been available on record. 8. The property that is mentioned in Ex.A.1 is the property that is mentioned in plaint schedule. It is Ac.0.78 cents of dry land in RS.No.122/25 at Tadigadapa Village of Vijayawada, Patamata Sub-Registry with specific boundaries on all the four sides. The defendant is the owner and possessor of this property and the original plaintiff was the intending purchaser of it. Ex.A.1 is on three sheets of paper made on a non-judicial stamp of Rs.100/-. It is unregistered. By its recitals it is non-possessory in nature. The defendant is the owner and possessor of this property and the original plaintiff was the intending purchaser of it. Ex.A.1 is on three sheets of paper made on a non-judicial stamp of Rs.100/-. It is unregistered. By its recitals it is non-possessory in nature. This document was executed by the defendant on 31.03.1992 and it bears his signature and it also bears the signature of one witness and also the signature of the scribe, who got it prepared. It is in Telugu language and is type written. The opening recital in the document is that Ac.1.00 cents of land is worth Rs.2,50,000/- and the property transacted under this document is Ac.0.78 cents and therefore, the sale consideration agreed upon between parties is Rs.1,95,000/-. Nearing the end of the terms of the contract between the parties, the recital further shows that parties have agreed to have the property measured and then settle between themselves the exact money to be paid and received in terms of the rate that is already fixed in the agreement. The document has a further recital that the original title deed would be got back from the bank by the vendor and would be handed over to the purchaser at the time of registration of the regular sale deed. In this document it is mentioned that on the date of agreement, out of the agreed sale consideration of Rs.1,95,000/-, the purchaser paid Rs.25,000/- and the vendor received it. It is then stated that the remaining balance sale consideration is Rs.1,70,000/- and the purchaser has to pay it in full on or before 31.12.1992 and then it would be at the expenses of purchaser and as per the desired terms and conditions of the purchaser, the purchaser would have to get a regular sale deed drafted and get the title conveyed either in his name or in the name of someone as is desired by the purchaser and then the document would be registered. Then there is further recital showing that if the purchaser fails to have the registered sale deed within the time so prescribed and if he delays he would further be obliged to pay the balance sale consideration along with interest at the rate of 24% per annum. Then there is further recital showing that if the purchaser fails to have the registered sale deed within the time so prescribed and if he delays he would further be obliged to pay the balance sale consideration along with interest at the rate of 24% per annum. These are the recitals in this document and the existence of these recitals and the execution of this document have never been in dispute between the parties. 9. Ex.A.6 indicates that on 25.11.1992 the purchaser paid Rs.30,000/- towards part of the advance sale consideration out of the overdue sale consideration and the vendor received it. This is signed by the defendant and also two witnesses and a scribe. The said payment and the said written acknowledgment have not been in dispute between the parties at any stage. 10. Subsequent to these two documents/Exs.A.1 and A.6 and earlier to the filing of the suit, written notices were exchanged between the parties. Ex.A.3 is a registered notice dated 18.12.2001 got issued on behalf of the plaintiff by his learned counsel. This notice in its initial parts mentioned all the information concerning the above referred Exs.A.1 and A.6. After that what is mentioned there is extracted her : “….Thereafter my client several times personally approached you and requested to receive the balance sale consideration and execute a registered sale deed in my client’s favour as per the terms of the agreement of sale. But you have dragged on the matter on some pretext or other and delayed the matter. My client further instructs that my client is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract as per the terms mentioned in the agreement of sale dated 31.03.1992. Therefore finally my client is hereby demands you to execute a registered sale deed in my client’s favour within “TEN” days from the date of receipt of this notice and my client is ready to perform his part of contract by paying the remaining sale consideration of Rs.1,40,000/- together with reasonable interest. If you failed to execute registered sale deed as agreed by you, my client has no option except to initiate legal proceedings against you and in that event you will be held liable for all costs and consequences including the cost of this notice of Rs.500/-.” 11. If you failed to execute registered sale deed as agreed by you, my client has no option except to initiate legal proceedings against you and in that event you will be held liable for all costs and consequences including the cost of this notice of Rs.500/-.” 11. The said notice was received by the defendant and he sent a reply notice through his learned counsel as per Ex.A.5. The assertion of the defendant in this reply notice is apt to be recorded in his own words : “The allegations in your notice that our client dragged on the matter without receiving balance of consideration and that your client is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and that our client is liable to execute sale deed are not true. It is very clear that your client was never ready to pay the balance amount at any time and he has neither capacity nor intention to perform his part of the agreement. In spite of repeated demands made by our client, your client has been evading to pay the balance amount and to obtain sale deed. Thus your client abandoned the agreement of sale and the same is barred by time. Our client is not liable to execute sale deed as demanded in your notice. The advance amount has been forfeited.” 12. This reply notice is dated 10.01.2002. It is thereafter on 07.02.2022 the purchaser sued his vendor in O.S.No.65 of 2002. In the plaint averments are made concerning Ex.A.1-agreement for sale and Ex.A.6-part payment and the exchange of notices. In addition to these averments plaintiff averred about possession at para No.5 of the plaint, which is extracted below : “5. It is submitted that in fact the plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property since the date of agreement of sale itself by raising a thatched hut in the said site and by paying taxes to Gram Panchayat, Tadigadapa. At the time of purchasing the property some encroachers were in possession of the plaint schedule property and because of the efforts of the plaintiff herein, they were vacated and delivered the vacant possession of plaint schedule property to the plaintiff. The said factum is also known to everybody including the adjacent owners of the property as well as the defendant herein.” 13. The said factum is also known to everybody including the adjacent owners of the property as well as the defendant herein.” 13. Then it is stated that plaintiff has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract but the defendant was not coming forward to perform his part of the contract and he is avoiding and evading to do it on some pretext or the other. The plaint made the following prayers : (a) pass a judgment and decree in favour of the plaintiff, directing the defendant to execute and register a sale deed on proper stamp paper at the expense of the plaintiff, conveying the plaint schedule property in favour of the plaintiff with proper terms and conditions, free from any claims and encumbrances, within the time fixed by this Hon’ble Court, on receiving the balance sale consideration of Rs.1,40,000/- from the plaintiff; If the defendant fail to execute and register the sale deed, as directed by this Hon’ble Court, plaintiff prays that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to execute and register the sale deed on behalf of the defendant, in favour of the plaintiff; (b) pass a decree for delivery of possession of plaint schedule property to the plaintiff; (c) award costs of the suit; (d) grant such other relief or reliefs as this Hon’ble Court deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. 14. In response to the above, defendant put in his written statement wherein he admitted the agreement and the further payment and denied the rest of the contentions raised in the plaint including the contention concerning possession saying that the property has been in possession and enjoyment of the defendant and that possession was never delivered under the agreement for sale to the plaintiff. It is also stated that while the plaint asserts about possession of the property by the plaintiff himself his prayer in the plaint seeks for delivery of possession. Thus, it has to be seen that plaintiff is not in possession of the property. However, it is stated that plaintiff miserably failed to perform his part of the contract and he is not entitled for any of the equitable reliefs and the reliefs prayed are time barred and sought for dismissal of the suit with costs. Thus, it has to be seen that plaintiff is not in possession of the property. However, it is stated that plaintiff miserably failed to perform his part of the contract and he is not entitled for any of the equitable reliefs and the reliefs prayed are time barred and sought for dismissal of the suit with costs. Learned trial Court framed the following two issues for trial : (1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for specific performance of agreement of sale dated 31.03.92 in respect of the plaint schedule property? (2) To what relief? 15. On 04.02.2005 the learned trial Court framed the following additional issue : Whether the suit is barred by limitation or not? However, while passing the judgment, the learned trial Court at para No.20 framed the following another issue : “Whether the plaintiff is entitled for possession of the suit schedule property or not”? 16. At the trial, both the parties were invited to sustain their claims by tendering evidence and accordingly, the plaintiff testified as PW.1 and the scribe of Exs.A.1 and A.6 testified as PW.2. As the plaintiff was asserting his possession over this property and he was paying tax, he got examined Tadigadapa Village Panchayat Secretary as PW.3. Exs.A.1 to A.6 were marked for plaintiff. Ex.A.2 is property tax receipt dated 05.02.2002. As against it, defendant did not adduce any documentary evidence and he himself testified as DW.1 and did not adduce any other oral evidence. 17. On considering the above evidence and on hearing the arguments on both sides, the learned trial Court recorded that all the important facts and documents are not in dispute. Ex.A.1-agreement for sale and its terms and Ex.A.6-part payment endorsement and then exchange of notices between parties are all found admitted and it was a fair deal between both the parties in entering into the contract and there were no assertions or facts indicating anything contrary to what is there in those documents. The trial Court, while addressing the additional issue concerning aspect of limitation as to whether the suit is barred by time or not, observed that Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 is the one that governs the dispute. The trial Court, while addressing the additional issue concerning aspect of limitation as to whether the suit is barred by time or not, observed that Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 is the one that governs the dispute. It mentioned that the agreement for sale between parties fixed outer date for completion of the task as 31.12.1992 and recorded that by that date contract was not completed between parties and the balance sale consideration as was available by then was not paid by the plaintiff to the defendant. It recognized that the suit was not filed within three years namely on or before 31.12.1995. However, it held that the suit was not barred by limitation since it found that time was found not the essence of the contract and under Ex.A.6 further part payment was paid and received. At page No.12 of its judgment the learned trial Court stated that the defendant never issued any notice earlier to the notice of the plaintiff and therefore, it cannot be said that plaintiff is not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and the defendant was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Saying so, it held that the suit was not barred by limitation. 18. The learned trial Court observed that the evidence of PW.1 was about holding possession of this property and he also examined PW.3 to show that he was paying tax to Panchayat and was holding possession of the property. However, on this evidence the observation of the trial Court is that all that evidence is not useful since the prayer in the suit seeks for recovery of possession. Thus, the trial Court did not conclude the disputed fact as to whether the plaintiff is in possession of property or not. It discussed the evidence but did not conclude it saying that there was no need to record a finding on possession. The additional issue that has framed for its consideration at para No.20 of its impugned judgment does not refer to any focus for recording a finding on possession, but it is only a legal issue that is framed to the effect as to whether plaintiff is entitled for possession or not. The additional issue that has framed for its consideration at para No.20 of its impugned judgment does not refer to any focus for recording a finding on possession, but it is only a legal issue that is framed to the effect as to whether plaintiff is entitled for possession or not. Answering that issue, the trial Court stated that it already found plaintiff is entitled for specific performance and therefore, it answered that issue in favour of the plaintiff stating that plaintiff is entitled for recovery of possession. All the issues were answered in favour of the plaintiff. The operative portion of the judgment of the learned trial Court is extracted here : “IN THE RESULT, Suit is decreed with costs for Specific performance of agreement of sale dated 31-03-1992 and the plaintiff is directed to deposit the balance of sale consideration of Rs.1,40,000/- within one month from the date of this Judgment and decree before this Court with interest at the rate of 24% P.A. on the above said amount from 31-03-1992 till the date of deposit and on such deposit the defendant is directed to execute and register the sale deed in favor of the plaintiff within one month and deliver the possession of the plaint schedule property failing which the plaintiff is at liberty to get the sale deed executed, registered and also for possession of the plaint schedule property through process of law.” 19. Then the defendant preferred the first appeal and the learned first appellate Court on considering the material on record and the impugned judgment before it and on considering the arguments raised before it framed three points for its consideration. They are extracted here : 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for specific performance of agreement of sale dated 31.03.1992 as prayed for? 2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 3. Whether the decree and Judgment dated 25.11.2005 passed by the trial Court in O.S.65/2002 warrants any interference in this appeal? 4. To what relief? 20. They are extracted here : 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for specific performance of agreement of sale dated 31.03.1992 as prayed for? 2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 3. Whether the decree and Judgment dated 25.11.2005 passed by the trial Court in O.S.65/2002 warrants any interference in this appeal? 4. To what relief? 20. Learned first appellate Court on the same evidence that is available before the trial Court went on to consider the facts and the terms of Ex.A.1-agreement for sale and stated that under Ex.A.1 outer date for performance of the contract was fixed and first limb of Article 54 of Schedule to the Limitation Act applies and the suit ought to have been filed on or before 31.12.1995 and Rs.30,000/- part payment was made earlier to that and even there otherwise there was no agreed term to extend the time for performance and since the suit was not filed within the three years from the date fixed in the agreement for sale, the suit was barred by limitation. It thus disagreed with the reasoning of the trial Court saying that it was flawed. Then at page No.13 of the impugned judgment the first appellate Court discussed the aspect of additional issue framed by the learned trial Court at the time of judgment and recorded its displeasure about the manner in which the learned trial Court dealt with that aspect. It also observed that the stand of the plaintiff indicates that there was no confidence in him about his own possession. It then discussed the readiness and willingness pleaded by the plaintiff and stated that by his own evidence plaintiff indicated that he left his service in APSRTC as a Conductor way back in the year 1990 and the sale consideration for property was Rs.1,95,000/- and he was able to pay Rs.25,000/- on the date of agreement and Rs.30,000/- while the time was nearing the outer date and failed to pay the agreed balance sale consideration within the time and as per the evidence of PW.1 himself it was on 27.12.1992 he received Rs.2,00,000/- from his erstwhile employer and he went and met the defendant on the last date/31.12.1992. When the plaintiff said that defendant was dodging, he should have issued notice immediately thereafter but he did not issue and he really issued a notice several years thereafter in the year 2001. When the plaintiff said that defendant was dodging, he should have issued notice immediately thereafter but he did not issue and he really issued a notice several years thereafter in the year 2001. It is for all these reasons first appellate Court found that plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. With these observations it allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. 21. The facts on record and the findings of the Courts below are all not in dispute. It is in the context of the above, now the two substantial questions of law that are raised are to be decided along with the questions concerning possession raised by the appellants. 22. The foremost submission of the learned counsel for appellants is that Ex.A.1 contains facts indicative of mutual obligation on both parties and both the Courts below failed to bestow attention on that and it was because of that the first appellate Court fell into an error and this Court shall rectify it. It is in this context the learned counsel submits that the outer limit for discharge of mutual obligation was fixed between the parties as 31.12.1992. Learned counsel admits that it is Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 that governs the questions of limitation. According to the first limb of Article 54 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act within three years from the date fixed the suit should be filed. Learned counsel admits that the suit was not filed within that time. The second limb of Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act is that if no time is fixed in the contract, then the suit has to be filed within three years from the date of refusal noticed by the plaintiff. It is here the effort of the learned counsel for appellants is to see that the contention concerning mutual obligation asserted by him should enable this Court to see that as long as the respondent/defendant did not perform his part of the contract, the question of limitation does not arise and therefore, the approach of the first appellate Court in holding that the suit was barred by limitation is incorrect. On the aspect of mutual obligation, the learned counsel submits that the obligation on the plaintiff is to pay the balance sale consideration and the obligation on part of the defendant is to have the land measured so as to arrive at accurate consideration that was to be paid and it is only after doing that the plaintiff was obliged to pay only that much of money and since the defendant did not measure the land there was no occasion for the plaintiff to find out what was the balance sale consideration and in that view of the matter, it is argued that the suit is not barred by limitation. As against it, the contention of the learned counsel for defendant/respondent is that a simple reading of Ex.A.1 itself would indicate that first the plaintiff had to come up with balance sale consideration and it is only then the obligation of the vendor to have the land measured arises and the contention of the appellants is against the terms of the contract. 23. In continuation of the above theme, the learned counsel for appellants also submits that Ex.A.1-agreement for sale has a recital that the vendor/defendant has to get back his original title deed and give it to the plaintiff and the vendor did not do it. It is another factor, according to the learned counsel that vindicates the correctness of purchaser’s contention. As against this, the submission of the learned counsel for defendant/ respondent is that as long as the plaintiff did not pay the balance sale consideration and did not have the draft sale deed prepared, the question of registration does not arise and the obligation of the vendor under Ex.A.1 was only to handover the original title deed at the time of registration and since the plaintiff has never been ready and willing, the stage of registration did not reach and therefore the question of defendant not giving the original title deed does not arise. 24. Having considered these rival submissions and having already engrafted all the recitals that are available in Ex.A.1-agreement for sale in the earlier paragraphs of the judgment, it is to be stated that the agreed sale consideration was Rs.1,95,000/- and the time for completion of payment is nine months from 31.03.1992 and outer date was fixed in the agreement itself as 31.12.1992. Thus, there was nine months time for the plaintiff to pay the sale consideration. At the time of agreement he paid Rs.25,000/- and then his next part payment came under Ex.A.6 on 25.11.1992. This part payment for Rs.30,000/- was paid within the stipulated date but not after the expiry of the date. Thus, he paid Rs.55,000/-. Thus, balance sale consideration was Rs.1,40,000/-. That remained unpaid by 31.12.1992. Article 54 of Schedule to the Limitation Act allows no choice in computing the period of limitation in a case where agreement for sale prescribes a fixed date for performance. Once the date is fixed the law is that it has to be obliged by the parties since it is the date that is agreed upon by the parties themselves. Every term in the contract is a law created by the parties for themselves between themselves. Once they have agreed upon a fact then the law shall operate based on that fact. Existing mutual obligations shall be completed within that agreed time. That someone could not perform it within that date does not fall for consideration since period of limitation operates on its own. It is not the case of appellant/plaintiff that his case falls under any of the principles contained in other provision of the Limitation Act, 1963, entitling him filing the suit beyond three years from the time fixed in the agreement for sale. He having not paid the balance sale consideration now urges this Court that his failure to pay is not out of his own omission but he was constrained not to pay because the defendant did not procure the original title deed and did not measure the land. A perusal of Ex.A.1 shows that the obligation of measuring the land and tendering the original document arises only when the purchaser making the payment or by tendering of balance sale consideration. The first appellate Court recorded an observation that even according to plaintiff he was able to procure Rs.2,00,000/- from his department on 27.12.1992 and he physically met the defendant only on the last date which was on 31.12.1992 and asked him to receive money and execute the registered sale deed, but the defendant refused. Thus, if one accepts that evidence as correct, the plaintiff was ready by 31.12.1992 with cash that was required to be paid and he even approached the defendant to receive it. Thus, if one accepts that evidence as correct, the plaintiff was ready by 31.12.1992 with cash that was required to be paid and he even approached the defendant to receive it. When the defendant failed to receive it, the next step that was expected from the purchaser is to serve a notice on him calling upon him to perform his part of the contract and execute the agreed registered sale deed in his favour. He did not do it. He did not do it for the next three years. He did not do it even soon after that three years. He waited till the year 2001 and then sent a notice to vendor. Thus, for about nine years he waited to serve a notice. Why did he not file the suit within first three years provided by law is sought to be explained by one statement in the plaint and the evidence of PW.1 which is that the plaintiff has been demanding the defendant to receive the balance sale consideration and execute the registered sale deed, but the defendant has been dodging the matter under one pretext or the other. The various dates on which the alleged payment was sought to be made and at the various times what were the words used by the defendant in dodging the matter are matters of fact that are to be pleaded and proved. They are completely absent in this case. Neither notice served by plaintiff nor the plaint filed by the plaintiff nor the evidence of PW.1 disclose any of these details. Thus, a bald and vague assertion is the one on which the appellant/plaintiff hinged his contention. Vagueness reaps no result and when facts are in dispute specifics matter. 25. In his notice under Ex.A.3 served nine years after the outer limit prescribed, he did not call upon the defendant to measure the land and procure the original title deed. That indicates that they were not the factors that were hindering the plaintiff from tendering his balance sale consideration. PW.1 in his evidence in chief did not utter a single word that though he was asking the defendant to measure the land and procure the original title deed he was not doing it. Thus, it has never been the cause of concern for the plaintiff himself about what the defendant was perceived to be obligated to do. PW.1 in his evidence in chief did not utter a single word that though he was asking the defendant to measure the land and procure the original title deed he was not doing it. Thus, it has never been the cause of concern for the plaintiff himself about what the defendant was perceived to be obligated to do. Thus, without any factual basis the appellants now raise a contention saying that about title deed and measurements of the land both the Courts below did not bestow their attention. There is no merit in this contention. If it were to be considered as a case of dispute on the construction of the terms in Ex.A.1, then it shall stated that the terms are crystal clear that as long as the plaintiff/purchaser/appellant does not pay money the obligation for measuring the land or tendering the title deed does not arise. It is never the case of the appellant that there were possible changes in the extent of land if it was measured. Though he claims that he has been in possession, he never said to the Courts that the agreed Ac.0.78 cents was not available on ground. He did not tell the Courts that the land on ground is more than Ac.0.78 cents. Thus, he never disclosed to the Court any possible differences in the extent of the land. It was perhaps for this reason there was no positive move for all the years about measurements of the land. The obligation on part of vendor arises, by the very terms of Ex.A.1, only on purchaser paying the sale consideration but not otherwise. It is worthwhile to notice what the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India was pleased to hold on questions of limitation. In U.N. Krishnamurthy v. A.M. Krishnamurtrhy, 2022 SCC Online SC 840 at para No.43 their Lordships have stated that the Courts would frown upon suits which are not filed immediately after the breach or refusal. The fact that limitation is three years does not mean that a purchaser can wait for one or two years to file a suit and obtain specific performance. The three years period is intended to assist the purchaser in special cases, as for example where the major part of the consideration has been paid to the vendor and possession has been delivered in part performance, where equity shifts in favour of the purchaser. The three years period is intended to assist the purchaser in special cases, as for example where the major part of the consideration has been paid to the vendor and possession has been delivered in part performance, where equity shifts in favour of the purchaser. In the case at hand, the undisputed findings of Courts below are that plaintiff did not pay major part of the sale consideration and he paid only a meagre part of the sale consideration and that Ex.A.1 is a non-possessory agreement and plaintiff was not given possession under Ex.A.1. In Katta Sujatha Reddy v. Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd., 2022 SCC Online SC 1079, their Lordships have said that in terms of Article 54 of Schedule to the Limitation Act once time for performance is fixed that has to be applied and a notice that was issued subsequent to that agreed period does not serve the purpose. A more important judgment to be seen is Gunwantbhai Mulchand Shah v. Anton Elis Farel, (2006) 3 SCC 634 . In the said judgment, their Lordships were pleased to lay down the ratio that in terms of Article 54 of Schedule to the Limitation Act, if time for performance was fixed a suit has to be decided as one that is barred by limitation unless any case of extension was pleaded and established by the purchaser. In the case at hand extension of time is neither pleaded in the plaint nor proved by the plaintiff through any evidence. In the same judgment their Lordships have said that if the agreement has not fixed any time for completion of performance then the material on record should indicate to the Court the date on which the plaintiff had notice that the performance was refused by the vendor. In the case at hand Ex.A.3 notice and the averments in the plaint are totally silent about the date on which plaintiff realized that the defendant was refusing to perform the contract. By evidence PW.1 stated that on 31.12.1992 defendant refused to receive balance sale consideration. That makes the matter very clear that even if one ignores the time fixed in Ex.A.1, the plaintiff was obliged to sue the defendant within three years from that date of refusal. Even that was not done. 26. By evidence PW.1 stated that on 31.12.1992 defendant refused to receive balance sale consideration. That makes the matter very clear that even if one ignores the time fixed in Ex.A.1, the plaintiff was obliged to sue the defendant within three years from that date of refusal. Even that was not done. 26. Appellant’s only contention is that he could sue at any time because he could issue notice at any time and whenever he issues a notice the law should mend itself and give him way to sue. This is totally against law. Trial Court’s observation was that the vendor was obliged to issue a notice calling upon the vendee to come forward and since that was not done, it should be understood as plaintiff being always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. That erroneous approach was rightly set aside by the first appellate Court. It is as against that well considered finding there is endeavour of the purchaser in this second appeal and it must be stated that his contention is meritless. In the context of readiness and willingness of purchaser/appellant it is to be noticed that as per Ex.A1 he agreed to pay 24% interest per annum over the balance sale consideration if he failed to pay the entire sale consideration on or before 31.12.1992. It is not his pleadings and evidence that he ever offered interest over the balance due. On the other hand, in his Ex.A.3 notice while in the first part of the notice he mentioned about 24% interest per annum he did not disclose his willingness to pay interest at that rate and that is clear in the last paragraph of the first page of this notice wherein he mentioned that he is ready to perform his part of the contract by paying the remaining sale consideration of Rs.1,40,000/- together with reasonable interest. Thus, there is a clear disclosure of unwillingness on part of the appellant himself in not paying the balance sale consideration at the agreed rate. Then in the prayer made in the suit he desired to pay the balance sale consideration alone and omitted to mention about the component of interest totally. This by itself should dispel every confusion to hold that even by the time of suing, the plaintiff purchaser was not ready and willing to pay the money as agreed in Ex.A1. 27. Then in the prayer made in the suit he desired to pay the balance sale consideration alone and omitted to mention about the component of interest totally. This by itself should dispel every confusion to hold that even by the time of suing, the plaintiff purchaser was not ready and willing to pay the money as agreed in Ex.A1. 27. Coming to the aspect of possession that is argued here a few facts require mention here. Ex.A.1 does not indicate vendor delivering possession of property to the purchaser. Nine years after it plaintiff got issued Ex.A.3 notice. A perusal of this notice does not indicate any possession being obtained by the plaintiff from the defendant either under Ex.A.1 or otherwise. Thus, all these years plaintiff has never disclosed to anyone in the world that he is in possession of this property which he never purchased. It is for the first time in the plaint there is a mention that on the date of agreement for sale itself he obtained possession. According to him, he put effort and got the encroachers evicted. Who are those encroachers to what extent there was encroachment and how this retired APSRTC employee was able to remove those encroachments is never part of the pleadings or evidence. Plaint schedule does not contain the existence of a hut or its door number. But the case of the plaintiff is that he raised a hut and he has been paying tax and he produced Ex.A.2 tax receipt and examined PW.3-Panchayat Secretary. Defendant as DW.1 in his cross-examination stated that he never raised any objection for the possession of the plaintiff since he did not know plaintiff was holding possession. He stated that he did not make payments of tax and did not object the plaintiff from making payment of taxes. He stated that he did not know plaintiff obtained possession of the property. It is here the trial Court though invited to record a finding about possession failed to record a finding concerning possession. In a suit for specific performance, normally, the question of possession has no bearing at all. Whether the purchaser is put in possession under the agreement for sale or obtained possession from the vendor otherwise than under Ex.A.1 are all not matters for consideration in deciding whether plaintiff is entitled for specific performance of agreement for sale or not. In a suit for specific performance, normally, the question of possession has no bearing at all. Whether the purchaser is put in possession under the agreement for sale or obtained possession from the vendor otherwise than under Ex.A.1 are all not matters for consideration in deciding whether plaintiff is entitled for specific performance of agreement for sale or not. However, this Court not being a Court to record a finding of fact need not record any finding on possession. The need for speaking on possession arises only because the appellants sought for additional evidence. The three documents that are filed indicate that the defendant in the suit had sued this plaintiff in the year 2005 making a mention about the existing suit for specific performance stating that purchaser obtained possession unlawfully and therefore, he made a prayer for recovery of possession and for damages etc. After the purchaser put in his written statement denying those facts and while the matter was coming up for trial it was in the year 2005 the plaintiff withdrew his suit with liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action. The plaint, written statement and the order of the said Court in that other litigation in O.S.No.20 of 2005 are sought to be produced as additional evidence by the appellants. 28. The law concerning additional evidence before the second appellate Court is argued before this Court by learned counsel on both sides by citing the same precedent. It is in Sanjay Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2022) 7 SCC 247 . Expounding Order XLI Rule 27 C.P.C. the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India stated that the main consideration for an appellate Court to decide an application about additional evidence shall depend upon one and the only fact, namely, whether the additional evidence has a direct bearing on pronouncement of the judgment. Their Lordships made it clear that whether the additional evidence is relevant to fact in issue on hand and whether there was opportunity to produce additional evidence earlier or not, need not necessarily be the determining factors. 29. Applying the above said ruling, this Court has to now see whether this proposed additional evidence has any direct bearing on pronouncement of the judgment. 29. Applying the above said ruling, this Court has to now see whether this proposed additional evidence has any direct bearing on pronouncement of the judgment. When the matter is viewed in that perspective it emerges very clear that the performance of obligation to vendor and vendee and the questions of limitation which have been the points that are relevant for consideration in a suit for specific performance can be appropriately decided without determining the questions of possession held by a purchaser. Therefore, even if the proposed evidence is considered, it has no bearing in deciding the essence of the dispute that emanated out of Ex.A.1-agreement for sale. Though the contention of the learned counsel for appellants is certainly right that the proposed documents would indicate admission of the vendor himself about loss of possession by the vendor and though definite findings are not available from the judgments of the Courts below about possession of the purchaser, the fact remains that the possession claimed by the plaintiff and stated to be supported through additional evidence being factors that are unnecessary for consideration and being facts that do not have any direct bearing the additional evidence application moved in this second appeal by the appellants cannot be granted. 30. On a total consideration of the material on record, it has to be stated that the evidence of the first appellate Court that the suit is barred by limitation is correct. The contention that time is not the essence of the contract does not pass the muster of law. Since the time is fixed by the agreement itself, since parties are bound by the agreement, since it is that date which the parties themselves fixed and since there is absolutely no pleadings and no evidence and no argument about the purchaser and the vendor mutually agreed for extension of time, the findings of the first appellate Court are right on facts and are in accordance with law and the impugned judgment does not require any interference. Therefore, both the points are answered against the appellants. 31. Learned counsel for appellants submit that in pursuance of the decree of learned trial Court, balance sale consideration was deposited into Court. In view of the present judgment, the appellants are entitled for refund of it along with interest accrued, if any. 32. Therefore, both the points are answered against the appellants. 31. Learned counsel for appellants submit that in pursuance of the decree of learned trial Court, balance sale consideration was deposited into Court. In view of the present judgment, the appellants are entitled for refund of it along with interest accrued, if any. 32. In the result, this Second Appeal is dismissed confirming the judgment of the first appellate Court. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.