JUDGEMENT Rajnesh Oswal, J. 1. The appellant has filed five intra court appeals against the judgment dated 31.03.2018 whereby the learned writ court disposed of three writ petitions i.e. SWP No. 1613/2013, SWP No. 1820/2013 and SWP No. D-1071/2014 filed by the private respondent and two writ petitions i.e. SWP No. 1216/2015 and SWP No. 1933/2016 filed by the appellant. 2. The Letters Patent Appeal bearing No. 56/2018 arises out of the writ petition bearing SWP No. 1820/2013 filed by the private respondent for quashing the order No. 367-HME of 2013, dated 26.06.2013, whereby the appellant was deemed to be appointed as Lecturer in the discipline of Medicine, Government Medical College (GMC), Jammu notionally with effect from 04.07.2007 (the date of notification by the Public Service Commission) and further he was placed below Dr. Anil Dhar, Lecturer, Medicine, GMC, Jammu and above Dr. Faiz Ahmed Wani, Lecturer Medicine, GMC, Jammu. 3. The Letters Patent Appeal bearing No. 52/2018 arises out of the writ petition bearing SWP No. 1613/2013 filed by the private respondent wherein he sought quashing of the order bearing No. 415-HME of 2013, dated 22.07.2013, whereby the appellant was placed as Assistant Professor in his own pay & grade and also prayed for directing the official respondents to consider the case of the private respondent for promotion as Assistant Professor (Medicine). 4. The Letters Patent Appeal bearing LPA No. 55/2018 arises out of the writ petition bearing SWP No. D-1071/2014 filed by the private respondent, wherein he sought quashing of the order bearing No. 22-HME of 2014, dated 23.04.2014, whereby the services of the appellant were segregated from his parent cadre i.e. Department of Medicine to Department of Gastroenterology and his lien was also transferred to Department of Gastroenterology. 5. The Letters Patent Appeal bearing No. 53/2018 arises out of the writ petition bearing SWP No. 1216/2015 filed by the appellant and in this writ petition, the appellant had prayed for quashing of the Government order No. 139-HME of 2015, dated 22.04.2015 and directing the official respondents to allow the appellant to perform his duties as the Head of Unit of Gastroenterology in the Super Speciality Hospital, GMC, Jammu and not to disturb the seniority of the appellant. 6. 6. The Letters Patent Appeal bearing No. 54/2018 arises out of the writ petition bearing SWP No. 1933/2016 filed by the appellant and in that writ petition, the appellant had sought quashing of the advertisement notification No. 03-PSC(DR-P) of 2016, dated 19.02.2016 so far as it pertained to the advertisement of one post of Lecturer in the Department of Gastroenterology for the selection in the open merit in the GMC Jammu on the ground that no such post existed on the said date in the department as the said post was held by the appellant and further direction was also sought to be issued to the official respondents to convene the meeting of Departmental Promotion Committee and consider the case of the appellant along with other eligible candidates for substantive promotion to the post of Assistant Professor with effect from the date, he was holding the post in his own pay & grade. 7. The outcome of LPASW No. 53/2018 would decide the fate of all the other connected intra-court appeals. Before we consider this appeal, we deem it proper to have the history of litigation commenced by the appellant in the year, 2007. 8. The Jammu and Kashmir Public Service Commission (J&K PSC) issued a notification No. 7-PSC of 2007, dated 04.07.2007, whereby one post of Lecturer in the discipline of Medicine in Government Medical College, Jammu was advertised for selection. The appellant challenged the said notification on the ground that the said post was required to be advertised for the Scheduled Tribe (ST) category as per the reservation rules because in the year 2000, one post of ST category was utilized in the selection under open merit. The learned writ court vide its interim order dated 13.08.2007 directed the Public Service Commission to accept the application form of the appellant for the post of Lecturer in the discipline of Medicine and the appellant be allowed to participate in the selection process but the result was not to be declared till the disposal of the main writ petition. The learned writ court vide its interim order dated 13.08.2007 directed the Public Service Commission to accept the application form of the appellant for the post of Lecturer in the discipline of Medicine and the appellant be allowed to participate in the selection process but the result was not to be declared till the disposal of the main writ petition. The appellant applied for the said post pursuant to the interim orders of the court but the learned writ court vide its judgment dated 12.12.2007 quashed the notification impugned and directed the official respondents to issue fresh notification treating the vacancy of Lecturer in Medicine reserved for ST category within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of copy of that order. 9. The J&K PSC issued a notification No. 13-PSC of 2008, dated 31.12.2008, whereby two posts, one for RBA and other for SC category, were advertised. The appellant filed the contempt petition, as the advertisement was not in consonance with the judgment dated 12.12.2007. Thereafter, the J&K PSC issued a notification No. 14-PSC of 2009, dated 17.07.2009 wherein three posts were advertised out of which two posts were advertised under open merit and one post was advertised for ST category. The selection process was conducted and the appellant and the private respondent were appointed as Lecturers in the Department of Medicine, GMC vide Government order No. 569-HME of 2009, dated 24.12.2009. The appellant was selected under ST category, whereas the private respondent was selected under Open Merit. As the appellant was pursuing his DM course in Gastroenterology at PGI, Chandigarh, therefore, sanction was granted to him for joining to the post of Lecturer in GMC Jammu after the expiry of the period prescribed for joining, as in the order dated 24.12.2009, it was mentioned that the appointees shall join the department within the period of 21 days from the date of issuance of the order, failing which, their appointments were deemed to be cancelled without any further notice. Accordingly, the appellant joined on 01.01.2011. 10. The real controversy arose after the appellant joined as Lecturer in GMC, Jammu. Accordingly, the appellant joined on 01.01.2011. 10. The real controversy arose after the appellant joined as Lecturer in GMC, Jammu. The Public Service Commission issued the list of the Lecturers on the basis of their merit vide letter No. PSC/DR/HME/23/2010, dated 18.10.2010 and in the said list, the appellant was shown under the notification of 2009 and as per the appellant, he was required to be shown separately under the notification of2007 (Notification quashed by the writ court vide judgment dated 12.12.2007) and above the notification of2008. The appellant continued his long journey of litigation by filing the writ petition bearing SWP No. 1582/2011, thereby challenging the letter No. PSC/DR/HME/23/2010, dated 18.10.2010 and the learned writ court vide its interim order dated 15.10.2011 disposed of the application for grant of interim relief filed by the appellant thereby directing the official respondents therein to consider the case of the appellant in light of the averments contained in the CMP filed with the writ petition and make a decision within four weeks strictly in accordance with the rules. 11. The official respondents rejected the claim of the appellant for treating him as having been appointed under the notification of 2007 being devoid of any merit. The said writ petition was later on disposed of by the learned writ court vide order dated 10.05.2013, thereby directing the respondents to consider and decide the case of the appellant afresh. 12. The official respondents pursuant to the above judgment, examined the matter afresh and issued order No. 367-HME of 2013, dated 26.06.2013 whereby it was ordered that the appellant shall be deemed to have been appointed as Lecturer in the discipline of Medicine in the Government Medical College, Jammu notionally with effect from 04.07.2007 i.e. the date of initial notification issued by the J&K PSC without any monetary benefit, which was quashed by the writ court vide its judgment dated 12.12.2007. 13. The respondent No. 1 thereafter issued a communication dated 01.07.2013 and sought the work and conduct/integrity, services and status of complaint/enquiry of the Lecturers of the Medicine stream for their elevation to a higher post. As the private respondent No. 3 did not figure in the said communication, he filed a writ petition and challenged the said communication. 13. The respondent No. 1 thereafter issued a communication dated 01.07.2013 and sought the work and conduct/integrity, services and status of complaint/enquiry of the Lecturers of the Medicine stream for their elevation to a higher post. As the private respondent No. 3 did not figure in the said communication, he filed a writ petition and challenged the said communication. The said writ petition bearing SWP No. 1459/2013 was disposed of by the learned writ court with a direction to the respondent No. 1 to consider the claim of the private respondent strictly on the basis of merit and in terms of the Recruitment Rules. Thereafter, the Government issued the order bearing No. 415-HME of 2013 dated 22.07.2013, whereby the appellant was promoted on stop gap arrangement as Assistant Professor, Medicine in his own pay and grade and on the same date, the appellant claims to have joined as Assistant Professor in the department of Medicine, GMC, Jammu. The private respondent being aggrieved of the same, filed a writ petition challenging the same bearing SWP No. 1613/2013. 14. The private respondent thereafter filed another writ petition bearing SWP No. 1820/2013 thereby challenging the Government order No. 367-HME of 2013, dated 26.06.2013 whereby the appellant was ordered to have been appointed as Lecturer notionally with effect from 04.07.2007, after he came to know about the issuance of the said Government order when the appellant filed the response to SWP No. 1613/2013. In that writ petition, the writ court vide its interim order dated 02.09.2013 directed that the impugned order shall not be made basis for any promotion from that date onwards and subsequently, the said order was modified vide order dated 27.09.2013 and it was directed that the pendency of the writ petition and the orders passed therein shall not come in the way of the appellant for promotion. The private respondent assailed the said order in LPA (SWP) No. 173/2013 and the Division Bench vide its order dated 14.11.2013 directed the official respondents to consider the candidature of both the appellant as well as the private respondent for their promotions as Assistant Professor (Medicine) in GMC, Jammu but in accordance with the rules governing the field and the result thereof was ordered not to be declared till the matter was considered by the writ court. It appears that while the order dated 14.11.2013 in LPASW No. 173/2013 continued to be in operation during the pendency of these two writ petitions, the appellant approached the then Minister for Health and Medical Education, Jammu and Kashmir by way of a representation and the same was endorsed with the remarks "PMC Jammu, please issue orders as discussed" and after the communications between the PMC, Jammu and the Commissioner Secretary to Government, Health and Medical Education Department, order dated 23.04.2014 was issued for the segregation of the services of the appellant from his parent cadre i.e. Department of Medicine to Department of Gastroenterology, GMC and transfer of his lien from Department of Medicine to Department of Gastroenterology for seniority/promotion purpose. This order was assailed by the private respondent in SWP No. D-1071/2014. 15. While these three writ petitions were pending, a Government order No. 139-HME of 2015, dated 22.04.2015 was issued by the respondent No. 1 whereby the following orders were revoked ab initio: I. Government order No. 367-HME of 2013, dated 26.06.2013 whereby it was ordered that the appellant shall be deemed to be appointed as Lecturer in discipline of Medicine, GMC, Jammu notionally with effect from 04.07.2007 i.e. the date of initial notification of the J&K PSC without any monetary benefit and the appellant was placed below Dr. Anil Dhar and above Dr. Faiz Ahmed Wani in the seniority list. II. Government order No. 415-HME of 2013, dated 22.07.2013 whereby the appellant was placed as Assistant Professor, Medicine, GMC, Jammu in his own pay and grade. III. Government order No. 22-HME of 2014, dated 23.04.2014 whereby the segregation of the services of the appellant from his parent cadre i.e. Department of Medicine to Department of Gastroenterology, Government Medical College, Jammu and transfer of his lien from Department of Medicine to Department of Gastroenterology for seniority/promotion purposes, were ordered. 16. The appellant challenged the order dated 22.04.2015 through the medium of SWP No. 1216/2015, whereby the learned writ court issued order of status quo, which was assailed in LPASW No. 40/2015 and the Division Bench directed the official respondents not to act upon and to implement the Government order No. 139-HME of 2015, dated 22.04.2015 till the matter comes up before the writ court. During the pendency of this writ petition, in the year, 2016, the J&K PSC issued notification No. 3-PSC-DR-P of 2016, dated 19.02.2016 wherein besides advertising other posts, one post of Lecturer in Gastroenterology Department was advertised for selection. The appellant challenged the said advertisement through SWP No. 1933/2016 and the learned writ court vide its interim order dated 16.09.2016 directed the official respondents not to change the status of the appellant as Assistant Professor in Gastroenterology Department till next date and the official respondents were further directed to consider the case of the appellant for regularization as Assistant Professor in Department of Gastroenterology. 17. After hearing the parties, the learned writ court vide its judgment dated 31.03.2018 dismissed both the writ petitions filed by the appellant and allowed the writ petitions filed by the private respondent. 18. Mr. Z.A. Shah, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant has vehemently argued that the learned writ court has not considered the fact that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of the judgment dated 22.12.2007 of the learned writ court passed in SWP No. 1372/2007 as the writ court had quashed the advertisement on the ground that the said post was meant for ST category and he simultaneously, laid stress that the order dated 22.04.2015 was passed in utter disregard of the principle of natural justice as the benefits granted to the appellant vide three earlier orders have been withdrawn at the back of the appellant. He also urged that the private respondent could not have filed the writ petitions as the decision in SWP No. 1459/2013 operated as res judicata. Mr. Z.A. Shah, learned senior counsel, relied heavily upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Dhar v. J&K Public Service Commission & Anr. 2000 AIR SC 3238. 19. Mr. Z.A. Shah, learned senior counsel, besides laying stress on the above grounds only, in fact devoted considerable time during the course of arguments that the official respondents are guilty of committing contempt of the Court as this Court had modified its interim order dated 07.04.2018 vide order dated 11.05.2018 and had directed that the appellant be allowed to function as Assistant Professor in the Department of Gastroenterology in Super Speciality Hospital, Jammu but till date the said order has not been complied with. 20. Per contra, Mr. 20. Per contra, Mr. Amit Gupta, learned Additional Advocate General, representing the official respondents, vehemently argued that the order dated 26.06.2013 whereby the appellant was given notional seniority prior to the date of his appointment was, in fact contrary to the rules in-vogue and as such, after realising the said mistake, the corrective measures were taken and order dated 22.04.2015 was passed. He further argued that the seniority is to be reckoned in terms of Rule-24 of the Jammu and Kashmir, Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1956 (for short the Rules) and as the private respondent had higher merit than the appellant, therefore, the appellant was placed lower than the private respondent in the seniority list. He also urged that no benefit was granted to the appellant by the writ court in terms of the judgment dated 22.12.2007 as the advertisement notice was quashed by the writ court and no further directions were issued by the writ court to grant any benefit to the appellant. Mr. Amit Gupta, learned AAG has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Apex Court in K Megha Chandra Singh v. Nigam Siro & Ors., (2020) 5 SCC 689 . 21. Mr. Ajay Abrol, learned counsel representing private respondent vehemently argued that the appellant had filed the writ petition bearing SWP No. 1582/2011 without impleading the private respondent as a party and the official respondents rightly rejected the claim of the appellant for grant of seniority prior to his appointment and the order dated 10.05.2013 which was relied upon by the official respondents to issue order dated 26.06.2013, never contained any positive directions. He supported the arguments of Mr. Amit Gupta, AAG so far as applicability of Rule 24 of the Rules in determining the seniority is concerned. Mr. Ajay Abrol further submitted that as only one course was available with the official respondents to recall the order dated 26.06.2013 in absence of there being any provision for granting notional seniority, so even if the appellant had been provided any opportunity of being heard, the result would have been the same. Mr. Ajay Abrol placed reliance upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 1999 AIR SC 2583 and in ICAR & Anr. v. T.K. Suryanarayan & Ors. 1997 AIR SC 3108. 22. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 23. Mr. Ajay Abrol placed reliance upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 1999 AIR SC 2583 and in ICAR & Anr. v. T.K. Suryanarayan & Ors. 1997 AIR SC 3108. 22. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 23. Following questions arise for determination by this Court: A. Whether the learned writ court has rightly arrived at the conclusion that the appointment cannot be antedated, notionally or otherwise, from a date prior to the date of appointment? B. Whether the learned writ court has rightly held that the principle of res judicata shall not apply to the writ petitions filed by the private respondent? C. Whether the order dated 22.04.2015 was required to be quashed being in violation of the principles of natural justice? Issue No. A Whether the learned writ court has rightly arrived at the conclusion that the appointment cannot be antedated, notionally or otherwise, from a date prior to the date of appointment? 24. This is an admitted fact that pursuant to the selection process conducted in terms of the notification No. 14-PSC of 2009, dated 17.07.2009, the appellant was appointed as Lecturer in the discipline of Medicine in GMC Jammu vide Government order No. 569-HME of 2009, dated 24.12.2009. It is also the admitted case of the appellant that he joined the department on 01.01.2011 after seeking permission from the official respondents to complete his DM course in Gastroenterology at PGI Chandigarh. 25. The contention of the appellant is that the appellant was entitled to seniority in terms of the judgment passed by the writ court in SWP No. 1372/2007 filed by the appellant and the judgment dated 10.05.2013 passed in SWP No. 1582/2011. A perusal of the judgment dated 12.12.2007 in SWP No. 1372/2007 reveals that the advertisement was quashed and the directions were issued for the issuance of fresh notification treating the vacancy as reserved for ST category. The claim of the appellant to get the benefit of seniority from the date of notification issued in the year 2007 is misconceived, particularly when the said notification was declared void-ab initio by the writ court. Appellant also cannot draw any benefit from the order dated 10.05.2013. The claim of the appellant to get the benefit of seniority from the date of notification issued in the year 2007 is misconceived, particularly when the said notification was declared void-ab initio by the writ court. Appellant also cannot draw any benefit from the order dated 10.05.2013. The operating portion of the order dated 10.05.2013 disposing of the SWP No. 1582/2011 is reproduced as under: "The respondents, in opposition to the writ petition, have come up with a stand that despite being eligible the petitioner's claim cannot be sustainable in the eyes of law because he was not borne on the lecturers' cadre at the time when he attained eligibility or when post became available. However, it is additionally pleaded that since the petitioner has competed for the post of lecturer and appointed also on the basis of court orders, therefore, respondent-PSC, can better answer the grievances projected by the petitioner. Taking into consideration the nature of the controversy coupled with the submissions made at the Bar by the counsel for the parties, this writ petition is disposed of with the direction to respondents to consider and decide the case of the petitioner afresh while taking into consideration the battle he has been fighting before the courts of law and the time taken by the respondents in redressing his grievances. The needful be done within a period of one month from the date copy of the judgment is acknowledged by them." 26. It is evident that there is no direction by the writ court in favour of the appellant directing the respondents to appoint him as a Lecturer, Medicine in GMC, Jammu from the date of earlier notification that was quashed by the writ court vide its judgment dated 12.12.2007. The official respondents in compliance to the interim directions issued in SWP No. 1582/2011, had rightly rejected the claim of the appellant for seniority from the date prior to his appointment due to absence of any rule/provision providing for the grant of seniority notional or otherwise, prior to the date of entry in to the service but the official respondents re-examined the claim of the appellant and issued order No. 367-HME of 2013 dated 26.06.2013 even in absence of any rule that there can be deemed appointment prior to the entry into the service. Mr. Mr. Shah, learned senior counsel has placed much reliance upon the judgment passed by the Apex Court in Sanjay Dhar v. J&K PSC (supra) wherein Sh. Sanjay Dhar was held entitled to notional seniority from the date of his earlier selection. In the said case, Sh. Sanjay Dhar had participated in the selection process pursuant to the directions of the court and secured 3rd position in the select list but he could not be appointed in the earlier selection process as all the available vacancies were exhausted by making appointments, bypassing the order passed by the Division Bench in LPA, wherein one vacancy was kept reserved. It was because of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the Hon'ble Apex Court issued the directions for grant of notional seniority to Sh. Sanjay Dhar from the date of his earlier selection. It would also be relevant to take note of the judgment of the Apex Court in K Megha Chandra Singh, (2020) 5 SCC 689 , wherein the Apex Court has held as under: 38. At this stage, we must also emphasise that the Court in N.R.\Parmar [Union of India v. N.R. Parmar, (2012) 13 SCC 340 ] need not have observed that the selected candidate cannot be blamed for administrative delay and the gap between initiation of process and appointment. Such observation is fallacious inasmuch as none can be identified as being a selected candidate on the date when the process of recruitment had commenced. On that day, a body of persons aspiring to be appointed to the vacancy intended for direct recruits was not in existence. The persons who might respond to an advertisement cannot have any service-related rights, not to talk of right to have their seniority counted from the date of the advertisement. In other words, only on completion of the process, the applicant morphs into a selected candidate and, therefore, unnecessary observation was made in N.R. Parmar [Union of India v. N.R. Parmar, (2012) 13 SCC 340 ] to the effect that the selected candidate cannot be blamed for the administrative delay. In the same context, we may usefully refer to the ratio in Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India [Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 47 ], where it was held that even upon empanelment, an appointee does not acquire any right. 39. In the same context, we may usefully refer to the ratio in Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India [Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 47 ], where it was held that even upon empanelment, an appointee does not acquire any right. 39. The judgment in N.R. Parmar [Union of India v. N.R. Parmar, (2012) 13 SCC 340 ] relating to the Central Government employees cannot in our opinion, automatically apply to the Manipur State Police Officers, governed by the MPS Rules, 1965. We also feel that N.R. Parmar [Union of India v. N.R. Parmar, (2012) 13 SCC 340 ] had incorrectly distinguished the long-standing seniority determination principles propounded in, inter alia, Jagdish Ch. Patnaik [Jagdish Ch. Patnaik v. State of Orissa, (1998) 4 SCC 456 ] , Suraj Parkash Gupta v. State of J&K [Suraj Parkash Gupta v. State of J&K, (2000) 7 SCC 561 ] and Pawan Pratap Singh v. Reevan Singh [Pawan Pratap Singh v. Reevan Singh, (2011) 3 SCC 267 ]. These three judgments and several others with like enunciation on the law for determination of seniority makes it abundantly clear that under service jurisprudence, seniority cannot be claimed from a date when the incumbent is yet to be borne in the cadre. In our considered opinion, the law on the issue is correctly declared in Jagdish Ch. Patnaik [Jagdish Ch. Patnaik v. State of Orissa, (1998) 4 SCC 456 ] and consequently we disapprove the norms on assessment of inter se seniority, suggested in N.R. Parmar [Union of India v. N.R. Parmar, (2012) 13 SCC 340 ]. Accordingly, the decision in N.R. Parmar [Union of India v. N.R. Parmar, (2012) 13 SCC 340 ] is overruled. However, it is made clear that this decision will not affect the inter se seniority already based on N.R. Parmar [Union of India v. N.R. Parmar, (2012) 13 SCC 340 ] and the same is protected. This decision will apply prospectively except where seniority is to be fixed under the relevant rules from the date of vacancy/the date of advertisement. (Emphasis Supplied) 27. This decision will apply prospectively except where seniority is to be fixed under the relevant rules from the date of vacancy/the date of advertisement. (Emphasis Supplied) 27. The Apex Court in B.S. Murthy v. A. Ravinder, 2022 SCC Online SC 317 also by placing reliance upon its earlier decisions including in P. Sudhakar Rao v. U. Govinda Rao (2013) 8 SCC 693 ruled that the seniority cannot be given to any appointee from a date anterior to his or her appointment, in the cadre. 28. It would also be advantageous to take note of the Rule 24 of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1956, which is reproduced as under: "24. Seniority.-(1) The seniority of a person who is subject to these rules has reference to the service, class, category or grade with reference to which the question has arisen. Such seniority shall be determined by the date of his first appointment to such service, class, category or grade as the case may be. Note 1.-The rule in this clause will not effect the seniority on the date on which these rules come into force of a member of any service, class, category or grade as fixed in accordance with the rules and orders in force before the date on which these rules come into force. Note 1.-The rule in this clause will not effect the seniority on the date on which these rules come into force of a member of any service, class, category or grade as fixed in accordance with the rules and orders in force before the date on which these rules come into force. Interpretation.-The words "date of first appointment" occurring in the above rule will mean the date of first substantive appointment, meaning thereby the date of permanent appointment or the date of first appointment on probation on a clear vacancy, confirmation in the latter case being subject to good work and conduct and/or passing of any examination or examinations and/or tests: Provided that the inter se seniority of two or more persons appointed to the same service, class, category or grade simultaneously will, notwithstanding the fact that they may assume the duties of their appointments on different dates by reason of being, posted to different stations, be determined- (a) in the case of those promoted by their relative seniority in the lower service, class, category or grade; (b) in the case of those recruited direct except those who do not join their duties when vacancies are offered to them according to the positions attained by and assigned to them in order of merit at the time of competitive examination or on the basis of merit, ability and physical fitness etc., in case no such examination is held for the purpose of making selections; (c) as between those promoted and recruited direct by the order in which appointments have to be allocated for promotion and direct recruitment as prescribed by the rules. Note 2.-Any substantive appointments or permanent promotions made in any department prior to 15th May, 1953, will not be disturbed if otherwise in order unless such appointments or promotions are already the subject of any appeal, review or revision or otherwise pending decision. (2) A member of a service, class, category or grade, unless he is reduced in seniority as a punishment shall retain seniority in such service or grade as determined by sub-rule (1) notwithstanding any delay in the completion of his probation or his appointment as a member of such service, class, category or grade. (2) A member of a service, class, category or grade, unless he is reduced in seniority as a punishment shall retain seniority in such service or grade as determined by sub-rule (1) notwithstanding any delay in the completion of his probation or his appointment as a member of such service, class, category or grade. (3) Where a member of any service, class, category or grade reduced to a lower service, class, category or grade he shall be placed at the top of the latter unless the authority ordering such reduction directs that he shall rank in such lower service, class, category or grade next below any specified member thereof." 29. In view of the above, we are of the considered view that the learned writ court has rightly come to the conclusion so far as issue No. 1 is concerned. Issue No. B Whether the learned writ court has rightly held that the principle of res judicata shall not apply to the writ petitions filed by the private respondent? 30. A perusal of order dated 09.07.2013 passed in SWP No. 1459/2013 filed by the private respondent for assailing the communication dated 01.07.2013, whereby Deputy Secretary to Government Health and Medical Education Department had called for the work, conduct/integrity etc of the Lecturers of Medicine stream, reveals that the writ court directed the respondents to consider the case of the private respondent for his promotion as Assistant Professor (Medicine) on the basis of his merit and seniority as reflected in the Government order dated 24.12.2009 in strict adherence to the Rules. The private respondent filed one writ petition bearing SWP No. 1613/2013 for quashing the order dated 22.07.2013 to the extent that it pertained to the promotion of the appellant as Assistant Professor and simultaneously prayer was also made for directing the official respondents to consider the case of the private respondent for his promotion as Assistant Professor (Medicine). The subsequent writ petitions were also filed by the private respondent details of which have already been mentioned above. The subsequent writ petitions were also filed by the private respondent details of which have already been mentioned above. The private respondent filed these writ petitions on the basis of different causes of action those accrued to him subsequently and that too when the official respondents acted contrary to the Rules, therefore, the learned writ court has rightly come to the conclusion that the subsequent events gave a fresh cause to the private respondent and this finding is upheld, being in consonance with law. Issue No. C Whether the order dated 22.04.2015 was required to be quashed being in violation of principles of natural justice? 31. Before we examine this issue, it would be appropriate to consider as to whether, in all the cases, the violation of principle of "audi alteram partem" would result in striking down the order passed in violation of above rule. It would be advantageous to take note of the judgment of the Apex Court in M.C. Mehta & Ors. v Union of India & Ors.,1999 AIR SC 2583 (supra). The relevant para Nos. 21, 22 and 23 are reproduced as under:- "21. It is, therefore, clear that if on the admitted or indisputable factual position, only one conclusion is possible and permissible, the Court need not issue a writ merely because there is violation of the principles of natural justice. 22. Before we go into the final aspects of this contention, we would like to state that cases relating to breach of natural justice do also occur where all facts are not admitted or are not all beyond dispute. In the context of those cases there is a considerable case-law and literature as to whether relief can be refused even if the court thinks that the case of the applicant is not one of "real substance" or that there is no substantial possibility of his success or that the result will not be different, even if natural justice is followed. See Malloch v. Aberdeen Corpn. [(1971) 1 WLR 1578] (per Lord Reid and Lord Wilberforce), Glynn v. Keele University [(1971) 1 WLR 487], Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority [ (1980) 1 WLR 582 ] and other cases where such a view has been held. The latest addition to this view is R. v. Ealing Magistrates' court, exp Fannaran [(1996) 8 Admn LR 351, 358] (see de Smith, Suppl. The latest addition to this view is R. v. Ealing Magistrates' court, exp Fannaran [(1996) 8 Admn LR 351, 358] (see de Smith, Suppl. p. 89) (1998) where Straughton, L.J. held that there must be- "demonstrable beyond doubt" that the result would have been different. Lord Woolf in Lloyd v. McMahon [ (1987) 2 WLR 821 , 862] has also not disfavoured refusal of discretion in certain cases of breach of\natural justice. The New Zealand Court in McCarthy v. Grant [1959 NZLR 1014] however goes halfway when it says that (as in the case of bias), it is sufficient for the applicant to show that there is "real likelihood-not certainty-of prejudice". On the other hand, Garner Administrative Law (8th Edn., 1996, pp. 271-72) says that slight proof that the result would have been different is sufficient. On the other side of the argument, we have apart from Ridge v. Baldwin [1964 AC 40] , Megarry, J. in John v. Rees [(1969) 2 WLR 1294] stating that there are always "open and shut cases" and no absolute rule of proof of prejudice can be laid down. Merits are not for the court but for the authority to consider. Ackner, J. has said that the "useless formality theory" is a dangerous one and, however inconvenient, natural justice must be followed. His Lordship observed that "convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms". More recently Lord Bingham has deprecated the "useless formality" theory in R v. Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police Forces, ex p Cotton [1990 IRLR 344] by giving six reasons. (See also his article "Should Public Law Remedies be Discretionary?" 1991 PL, p. 64.) A detailed and emphatic criticism of the "useless formality theory" has been made much earlier in "Natural Justice, Substance or Shadow" by Prof. D.H. Clark of Canada (see 1975 PL, pp. 27-63) contending that Malloch [(1971) 1 WLR 1578] and Glynn [(1971) 1 WLR 487] were wrongly decided. Foulkes (Administrative Law, 8th Edn., 1996, p. 323), Craig (Administrative Law, 3rd Edn., p. 596) and others say that the court cannot prejudge what is to be decided by the decision-making authority de Smith (5th Edn., 1994, paras 10.031 to 10.036) says courts have not yet committed themselves to any one view though discretion is always with the court. Wade (Administrative Law, 5th Edn., 1994, pp. Wade (Administrative Law, 5th Edn., 1994, pp. 526-30) says that while futile writs may not be issued, a distinction has to be made according to the nature of the decision. Thus, in relation to cases other than those relating to admitted or indisputable facts, there is a considerable divergence of opinion whether the applicant can be compelled to prove that the outcome will be in his favour or he has to prove a case of substance or if he can prove a "real likelihood" of success or if he is entitled to relief even if there is some remote chance of success. We may, however, point out that even in cases where the facts are not all admitted or beyond dispute, there is a considerable unanimity that the courts can, in exercise of their "discretion", refuse certiorari, prohibition, mandamus or injunction even though natural justice is not followed. We may also state that there is yet another line of cases as in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma [ (1996) 3 SCC 364 ], Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. [ (1996) 5 SCC 460 ] that even in relation to statutory provisions requiring notice, a distinction is to be made between cases where the provision is intended for individual benefit and where a provision is intended to protect public interest. In the former case, it can be waived while in the case of the latter, it cannot be waived." 32. It would again be profitable to take note of the judgment of Apex Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sudhir Kumar Singh, wherein Apex Court considered the scope of audi alteram partem and has observed as under: 39. An analysis of the aforesaid judgments thus reveals: (1) Natural justice is a flexible tool in the hands of the judiciary to reach out in fit cases to remedy injustice. The breach of the audi alteram partem rule cannot by itself, without more, lead to the conclusion that prejudice is thereby caused. (2) Where procedural and/or substantive provisions of law embody the principles of natural justice, their infraction per se does not lead to invalidity of the orders passed. Here again, prejudice must be caused to the litigant, except in the case of a mandatory provision of law which is conceived not only in individual interest, but also in public interest. (2) Where procedural and/or substantive provisions of law embody the principles of natural justice, their infraction per se does not lead to invalidity of the orders passed. Here again, prejudice must be caused to the litigant, except in the case of a mandatory provision of law which is conceived not only in individual interest, but also in public interest. (3) No prejudice is caused to the person complaining of the breach of natural justice where such person does not dispute the case against him or it. This can happen by reason of estoppel, acquiescence, waiver and by way of non-challenge or non-denial or admission of facts, in cases in which the Court finds on facts that no real prejudice can therefore be said to have been caused to the person complaining of the breach of natural justice. (4) In cases where facts can be stated to be admitted or indisputable, and only one conclusion is possible, the Court does not pass futile orders of setting aside or remand when there is, in fact, no prejudice caused. This conclusion must be drawn by the Court on an appraisal of the facts of a case, and not by the authority who denies natural justice to a person. (5) The "prejudice" exception must be more than a mere apprehension or even a reasonable suspicion of a litigant. It should exist as a matter of fact, or be based upon a definite inference of likelihood of prejudice flowing from the non-observance of natural justice. 33. Now, so far as the present case is concerned, this Court has already upheld the findings of the learned writ court that the appellant could not have been granted the antedated appointment in absence of any rule providing for the same and as such, there is only one conclusion possible so far as present controversy is concerned that the appellant could not have been granted the benefit of antedated appointment and had the appellant been heard, the conclusion would have been the same, as such, there is no force in this contention also and the same is rejected. 34. Though Mr. Shah raised only the above issues but we have examined the judgment of the learned writ court in its entirety. Learned writ court has considered the contention raised by the appellant so far as Reservation Rules, 2005 are concerned. 34. Though Mr. Shah raised only the above issues but we have examined the judgment of the learned writ court in its entirety. Learned writ court has considered the contention raised by the appellant so far as Reservation Rules, 2005 are concerned. The learned writ court considered the said issue as learned counsel for the appellant made an attempt to import the rota-quota rule for determining the seniority on the basis of roster points prescribed by the Rule 5 of the Reservation Rules. Rule 31 clearly provides that the roster prescribed for direct recruitment/promotion shall only be an aid to determine the entitlement of different categories with regard to the quota of reservation for them and these are not for determination of the seniority and further proviso to the Rule 31 of the Reservation Rules provides that inter se seniority of the category candidates vis-a-vis general category candidates on their appointment by direct recruitment shall be determined strictly in accordance with the order of the merit in the select list prepared by the selection authority. The select list prepared by the selection authority and the seniority as on 31.12.2010 reflecting the appellant at serial No. 7 and private respondent at serial No. 5 was in consonance with the rules. 35. The learned writ court has rightly come to the conclusion that as all the subsequent orders were issued on the basis of order dated 26.06.2013, so the orders dated 22.07.2013 and 23.04.2014 have rightly been rescinded by the official respondents. 36. We are at pains to observe the mode and manner in which the official respondents have in fact assisted the appellant not only to get the antedated appointment though they made the amends subsequently but also while segregating the service of the appellant from his parent cadre i.e. Department of Medicine to Department of Gastroenterology. A perusal of the communication bearing No. GMC-J/P&S/106/2013-14/1739, dated 25.03.2014 reveals that the representation filed by the appellant with the then Minister of Health and Medical Education, Jammu and Kashmir was forwarded to the Principal, GMC, Jammu with an endorsement that 'PMC Jammu please issue orders as discussed'. A perusal of the communication bearing No. GMC-J/P&S/106/2013-14/1739, dated 25.03.2014 reveals that the representation filed by the appellant with the then Minister of Health and Medical Education, Jammu and Kashmir was forwarded to the Principal, GMC, Jammu with an endorsement that 'PMC Jammu please issue orders as discussed'. On first blush, it appears that the appellant was instrumental in getting the Department of Gastroenterology functional in view of the patient rush but the communication dated 01.04.2014 directing the Principal, GMC Jammu to intimate the qualification of the appellant reveals that the official respondents were inclined to appoint appellant only and perhaps because of the reason that in the LPASW No. 137/2013, the Division Bench had ordered that both the appellant and the private respondent be considered for the promotion to the post of Assistant Professor Medicine, GMC, Jammu but their results be not declared. In order to wriggle out of the said directions, the appellant managed the segregation of his cadre from his parent Department of Medicine. The private respondent is right in crying foul that he was not considered because of the ulterior motive as the official respondents wanted to accommodate the appellant only. We do not agree with the averments made by the appellant in his writ petition that with the change of dispensation, the order dated 22.05.2014 was issued but in fact the official respondents rectified the wrong committed by them for whatsoever reasons may be. 37. Since we have not acceded to the claim of the appellant with regard to the grant of antedated appointment so the appellant has even no right to challenge the advertisement notification that was impugned by the appellant in SWP No. 1933/2016. 38. For all what has been discussed above, there is no merit in all these appeals and as such, they are dismissed and the appellant is left free to avail the appropriate remedy as available under the law for release of his salary, in view of the order No. GMC-244 of 2022, dated 30.09.2022. 39. We have already observed that Mr. Z.A Shah, learned senior counsel devoted considerable time for pressing the contempt proceedings filed against the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in contempt LPA No. 26/2018 for violation of the order dated 07.04.2018 and as modified by the order dated 11.05.2018 and also for violation of order dated 24.05.2022. 40. 39. We have already observed that Mr. Z.A Shah, learned senior counsel devoted considerable time for pressing the contempt proceedings filed against the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in contempt LPA No. 26/2018 for violation of the order dated 07.04.2018 and as modified by the order dated 11.05.2018 and also for violation of order dated 24.05.2022. 40. A perusal of orders dated 07.04.2018 and 11.05.2018 reveal that when the LPA bearing No. 52/2018 was considered on the first date, the caveat was discharged and the appellant was permitted to continue as Assistant Professor in the Department of Gastroenterology in the Super Speciality Hospital, Jammu, if the same was functional. The said order was modified by order dated 11.05.2018. 41. The appellant filed another contempt petition for violation of the order dated 24.05.2022 passed by this Court whereby the official respondents were directed to consider the claim of the appellant for release of his salary. The compliance report stands filed, wherein it is stated that the claim of the appellant for release of the salary has been rejected. 42. Mr. Amit Gupta, learned AAG produced a communication dated 19.04.2016, wherein it was ordered that patients admitted in Medical ICU (Super Speciality Block) GMC shall immediately be shifted to the GMC for their suitable treatment and also vide order dated 20.04.2016, all the gazetted staff (Doctors) deployed in Medical ICU Super Speciality Block, GMC were directed to report to the HOD Medicine GMC, Jammu with immediate effect. A perusal of the communication dated 18.04.2018 also reveals that the appellant submitted his joining report on 06.04.2018 with the Principal, GMC, Jammu and he was directed vide communication dated 09.04.2018 to report to the HOD, Department of Medicine as In-charge Professor for further discharge of duties as per the Government order but the appellant did not join. It was also mentioned in the said communication that the Department of Gastroenterology is not functional and the services of Gastroenterology are being rendered by the concerned Specialities in the Department of General Medicine, GMC, Jammu. 43. As we have already dismissed the appeals and have upheld the order dated 22.04.2015 whereby even the order by virtue of which, the services of the appellant were segregated from Department of Medicine to Department of Gastroenterology was revoked, we do not find any reason to continue with these contempt proceedings, as such, the same are closed. 43. As we have already dismissed the appeals and have upheld the order dated 22.04.2015 whereby even the order by virtue of which, the services of the appellant were segregated from Department of Medicine to Department of Gastroenterology was revoked, we do not find any reason to continue with these contempt proceedings, as such, the same are closed. Otherwise also, we do not find any wilful dis-obedience upon the part of respondents. 44. In view of above, the contempt proceedings are dropped.