JUDGMENT : Ramesh Sinha, J. 1. Heard Mr. Vinod Kumar Deshmukh, learned counsel for the appellants/South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. (for short, the SECL) and Mr. Kamaljeet Singh Saini, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order dated 01.09.2021 passed by the learned Single Judge in WP(S) No. 141 of 2012 whereby the learned Single Judge has referred the matter with regard to determination of the age of the respondent/writ petitioner to the Age Determination Committee under Implementation Instruction No. 76 with a direction to consider the same within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. 3. Mr. Deshmukh, learned counsel for the appellants/SECL submits that the respondent/writ petitioner had the aforesaid petition seeking setting aside of the order dated 31.08.2011 (Annexure P/1) which is a notice with regard to his superannuation on 31.01.2012 and the order dated 27.12.2011 (Annexure P/9) by which his representation dated 22.12.2011 for correction of his date of birth has been rejected. The writ petitioner had further prayed for a direction to the respondent authorities to correct his date of birth in the official records as 16.07.1956 in place of 16.07.1952 and to allow him to continue his services till attainment of the age of superannuation. He had also prayed for referring the matter to the Age Determination Committee/Medical Apex Board for assessment of the actual date of birth of the writ petitioner. 4. The learned Single Judge, after hearing the parties, disposed of the petition referring the dispute to the Age Determination Committee, as above. 5. It is submitted by Mr. Deshmukh that the writ petitioner was appointed to the post of Electrician on 24.01.1975. In the statutory Form-B, the age of the writ petitioner was recorded as 23 years as on 24.01.1975 which was on the basis of disclosure made by the writ petitioner himself and it was signed also for confirmation. The date of birth (16.07.1952) recorded in Form PS-3 and PS-4 which has also been accepted by the writ petitioner by putting his signature on the service register. In all the said statutory documents maintained by the SECL, wherein date of birth is recorded as 23 year as on 24.01.1975 and the date 16. The date of birth (16.07.1952) recorded in Form PS-3 and PS-4 which has also been accepted by the writ petitioner by putting his signature on the service register. In all the said statutory documents maintained by the SECL, wherein date of birth is recorded as 23 year as on 24.01.1975 and the date 16. 07.1952 has also been accepted by the writ petitioner at relevant point of time and at the time of signing of the said statutory document, the writ petitioner did not raise any objection in respect of entry of date of birth in the service record. While the writ petitioner was at the fag end of his service, he had submitted a representation (Annexure P/8) for correction of his date of birth as well as request for referring his case to the Age Determination Committee. The concerned authority had considered his representation and passed a speaking order on 27.12.2011 and rejected the claim of the writ petitioner relying upon the provisions of Implementation Instruction No. 76 as his case did not fell under the said provisions for correcting the date of birth on the basis of 5th standard certificate. The writ petitioner has retired on attaining the age of superannuation of 60 years w.e.f. 31.01.2012 and on his retirement, entire retiral dues has also been paid to him. 6. Mr. Deshmukh further submits that the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner is not sustainable for the reason that the petitioner was appointed on 21.01.1975 in SECL and after lapse of more than 36 years, he has approached this Hon'ble Court by filing writ petition at the fag end of his service career as can be seen that the petitioner was going to be retired on 31.01.2012 on the basis of the date of birth entered in his service record and the writ petition was filed on 09.01.2012 on the verge of his retirement and as such, the petition suffers from gross delay and laches as the petition has been filed at a much belated stage, therefore, the petition deserves to be rejected on the ground of delay and laches alone. Moreover, the writ petitioner has retired on attaining the age of superannuation of 60 years w.e.f. 31.01.2012 and on his retirement entire retiral dues has also been paid to him. Moreover, the writ petitioner has retired on attaining the age of superannuation of 60 years w.e.f. 31.01.2012 and on his retirement entire retiral dues has also been paid to him. Now, after more than 9 years from the date of retirement, the learned Single Judge has directed to refer the case to the Age Determination Committee without considering the provisions of Implementation Instruction No. 76 of the NCWA. In all the said statutory documents maintained by the SECL, i.e. form B (recorded as 23 year as 24-01-1975), PS 3 & PS 4 wherein date of birth is recorded as 16.07.1952 which has also been accepted by the petitioner at relevant point of time and at the time of signing of the said statutory document, the petitioner did not raise any objection in respect of entry of date of birth in the service record. So far as mark sheet of class 5th (Annexure P/5), is concerned, the writ petitioner did not submit the same at the time of his initial appointment as well as at the time of filling up and signing the statutory documents and the date of birth was recorded based on the disclosure made by the writ petitioner himself. Further, the mark sheet, (Annexure P/5) wherein his date of birth is recorded as 16.07.1956 is not an authentic document as per Para B (i) (a) NCWA Implementation Instruction No.76 for determining the date of birth of the petitioner. 7. Mr. Deshmukh also contends that in the Implementation Instruction No.76 (Annexure P/7) the procedure is divided in two parts. Para (A) provides for determination of the age at the time of appointment whereas Para (B) provides for review/ determination of date of birth in respect of existing employees. The relevant provision of para A(ii) of the Implementation Instruction No.76 read as under: "ii) Non-matriculates but educated. In the case of appointees who have pursued studies in a recognised educational institution, the date of birth recorded in the School Leaving Certificate, shall be treated as correct date of birth and the same will not be altered under any circumstances." Para (B) of Implementation Instruction No.76 provides for Review/determination of date of birth in respect of existing employees which we are concerned here. Para (B) (i) (a) of the said Instruction reads as follows:- “i(a) In the case of the existing employees Matriculation Certificate or Higher Secondary Certificate issued by the recognised Universities or Board or Middle Pass Certificate issued by the Board of Education and/or Department of Public Instruction and admit cards issued by the aforesaid Bodies should be treated as correct provided they were issued by the said Universities/Boards /Institutions prior to the date of employment." A careful and critical reading of Para (B) (i) (a) of Implementation Instruction No.76 would show that in case of existing employees, following documents issued prior to the date of employment shall be treated as correct: - 1. Matriculation certificate. 2. Higher Secondary Certificate issued by the recognized University or Board. 3. Middle Pass Certificate issued by the Board of Education and/or Department of Public Instruction. 4. Admit cards issued by the aforesaid Bodies. Thus, four kinds of documents are deemed to be correct if they are available and they must have been issued by the said University, Board or Institution prior to the date of employment. In the instant case the petitioner has failed to submit the said required documents for seeking correction of his date of birth in the service record. 8. The date of birth of a person at the time of entry in service is not based on a figment of imagination by the employer. It is always based on the information furnished by the employee. An illiterate rustic employee can be a different issue. The writ petitioner had the capacity to read, write and understand for protecting his interest in employment regarding tenure based on date of birth and he has signed the documents. The date of birth of a person is a question of fact. If there are conflicting dates of birth on basis of the materials placed at different times by the claimant himself, it becomes a disputed question of fact that cannot be examined in the writ jurisdiction. It is a fact best known to the person concerned. It is for the person to act in his own interest by ensuring that it is recorded correctly, more particularly when it relates to employment and has long term consequences for the concerned. It is a fact best known to the person concerned. It is for the person to act in his own interest by ensuring that it is recorded correctly, more particularly when it relates to employment and has long term consequences for the concerned. There are no allegations of any fraud or interpolation made by the writ petitioner in the instant writ petition for this reason also the writ petition deserves to be rejected. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Bharat Coking Coal Limited and others v. Shyam Kishore Singh (2020) 3 SCC 421 wherein reliance has been placed on the earlier judgment in the matter of State of Madhya Pradesh and others v. Premlal Shrivas (2011) 9 SCC 664 and the decision rendered in Karnataka Rural Infrastructure Development Limited v. T.P.Nataraja and others, (2021) 12 SCC 27 , submits that the appeal deserves to be allowed and the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner may be dismissed. 9. This appeal came to be filed before this Court on 18.10.2021 and on 02.12.2021, the order dated 01.09.2021 passed by the learned Single Judge was stayed by this Court. The matter came to be listed thereafter twice and today, with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the matter is being heard finally. 10. A query was put to the learned counsel for the respondent-writ petitioner as to whether he intends to file any reply, he submits that he does not wish to file any reply to the appeal and for disposal of this appeal, the averments made in the writ petition may kindly be taken into consideration. He, however, supports the order passed by the learned Single Judge and submits that no interference is warranted with the same being just and proper. 11. It is an admitted fact that the writ petitioner made representation to the appellant-SECL at the fag end of his career for change of his date of birth only on 22.11.2011. The writ petitioner has retired on attaining the age of superannuation of 60 years w.e.f. 31.01.2012 and on his retirement, entire retiral dues has also been paid to him. Much later after his retirement, the writ petition came to be disposed of on 01.09.2021 when the learned Single Judge referred the matter to the Age Determination Committee. The writ petitioner has retired on attaining the age of superannuation of 60 years w.e.f. 31.01.2012 and on his retirement, entire retiral dues has also been paid to him. Much later after his retirement, the writ petition came to be disposed of on 01.09.2021 when the learned Single Judge referred the matter to the Age Determination Committee. No explanation has been offered by the writ petitioner as to when the date of birth was wrongly recorded by the appellant-SECL, then why he waited for such a long period to make a representation for correction of his date of birth. The learned Single Judge has erred in law by referring the matter to the Age Determination Committee after 9 years of superannuation of the writ petitioner, way back on 31.01.2012. 12. The Supreme Court, in Shyam Kishore Singh (supra) observed as under: "10. This Court in fact has also held that even if there is good evidence to establish that the recorded date of birth is erroneous, the correction cannot be claimed as a matter of right. In that regard, in State of M.P. v. Premlal Shrivas, it is held as hereunder: (SCC pp. 667 & 669, paras 8 & 12) "8. It needs to be emphasised that in matters involving correction of date of birth of a government servant, particularly on the eve of his superannuation or at the fag end of his career, the court or the tribunal has to be circumspect, cautious and careful while issuing direction for correction of date of birth, recorded in the service book at the time of entry into any government service. Unless the court or the tribunal is fully satisfied on the basis of the irrefutable proof relating to his date of birth and that such a claim is made in accordance with the procedure prescribed or as per the consistent procedure adopted by the department concerned, as the case may be, and a real injustice has been caused to the person concerned, the court or the tribunal should be loath to issue a direction for correction of the service book. Time and again this Court has expressed the view that if a government servant makes a request for correction of the recorded date of birth after lapse of a long time of his induction into the service, particularly beyond the time fixed by his employer, he cannot claim, as a matter of right, the correction of his date of birth, even if he has good evidence to establish that the recorded date of birth is clearly erroneous. No court or the tribunal can come to the aid of those who sleepover their rights (see Union of India v. HarnamSingh). * * * 12. Be that as it may, in our opinion, the delay of over two decades in applying for the correction of date of birth is ex facie fatal to the case of the respondent, notwithstanding the fact that there was no specific rule or order, framed or made, prescribing the period within which such application could be filed. It is trite that even in such a situation such an application should be filed which can be held to be reasonable. The application filed by the respondent 25 years after his induction into service, by no standards, can be held to be reasonable, more so when not a feeble attempt was made to explain the said delay. There is also no substance in the plea of the respondent that since Rule 84 of the M.P. Financial Code does not prescribe the time-limit within which an application is to be filed, the appellants were duty bound to correct the clerical error in recording of his date of birth in the service book." 13. Further, in Karnataka Rural Infrastructure Development Limited (supra), the Supreme Court observed as under: "11. Considering the aforesaid decisions of this Court the law on change of date of birth can be summarized as under: (i) application for change of date of birth can only be as per the relevant provisions/regulations applicable; (ii) even if there is cogent evidence, the same cannot be claimed as a matter of right; (iii) application can be rejected on the ground of delay and latches also more particularly when it is made at the fag end of service and/or when the employee is about to retire on attaining the age of superannuation.” 14. Therefore, applying the law laid down by the Supreme court in the aforesaid decisions, the representation made by the writ petitioner seeking change of his date of birth or to refer his case to the Age Determination Committee was liable to be rejected on the ground of delay and laches also and as such the respondent/writ petitioner was not entitled for any relief. The order passed by the learned Single Judge deserves to be and is accordingly set aside. 15. Accordingly, the appeal stands allowed.