JUDGMENT : [WP(C) Nos.30687/2021, 15782/2022, 27531/2021, 27490/2021, 28747/2021] The petitioners in these cases are working in the services of “Jawaharlal Nehru Tropical Botanical Garden & Research Institute” (hereinafter referred to as “Institute” for short) and they were proceeded disciplinarily against, on the allegation that, on 08.11.2018, an incident occurred, wherein, they were involved in a scuffle with a person named Sri.S. Muhammed Shereef. They assert that the allegations against them are wholly without basis and that they have been able to establish so in the disciplinary enquiry, with no evidence or testimony being recorded, to establish their culpability; but that, in spite of this, the Enquiry Officer found against them, leading to an order imposing the punishment in barring three increments with cumulative effect. They say that they, therefore, filed an Appeal before the Appellate Authority, which, however, affirmed the orders of the Disciplinary Authority; and therefore, that they have preferred a further permissible Appeal before the Council of the Kerala State Council for Science, Technology and Environment (“Council” for short hereinafter), leading to impugned order, reducing the punishment to barring of two increments with cumulative effect, but confirming all the findings against them. 2. The petitioners assert that the impugned orders is untenable and has been settled with a preconceived impression that they were involved in the scuffle, when they were not; and that this is clearly evident from the evidence on record and the testimony of the witnesses. They thus pray that the order impugned in these cases be set aside. 3. I have heard various counsel for the petitioners in these cases; Sri.C.K.Karunakaran – learned Standing Counsel for the “Institute” and Sri.P.C.Sasidharan – learned Standing Counsel for the “Council”. 4. I do not propose to go into the merits of any of the contentions of the parties at this stage because, when I examine the second appellate order -which is the final one issued by the Member Secretary of the “Council” -it merely says that the Executive Committee scrutinized and deliberated upon the case and was convinced that the “scuffle and man handling” occurred in the “Institute”. It further records that ‘it also turns out to be a fact that the alleged persons were involved in the incident’(sic); and hence ‘the moot question before the Committee was whether to entertain to violence and hoolinganism in the premises of a prestigious scientific institute’(sic). It further records that ‘it also turns out to be a fact that the alleged persons were involved in the incident’(sic); and hence ‘the moot question before the Committee was whether to entertain to violence and hoolinganism in the premises of a prestigious scientific institute’(sic). They then appear to have concluded that ‘it is unbecoming of the employees in a prestigious institute like JNTBGRI indulging in such unruly behaviour’(sic). 5. However, the afore said order does not reflect any specific advertence to the materials gathered in the enquiry, including the evidence and testimony of witnesses; and this is crucial because, it is the specific case of the petitioners that they were not involved in the scuffle at all and that they have been implicated without any cogent evidence. They also have a case that the complainant was not true in reporting the alleged incident and that the Security Officer had offered an embellished report, with a motivated mind. They also rely upon the testimony of the witnesses, to show that they had no role in the alleged scuffle and assert that there is no evidence on record to connect them to the alleged incident in any manner whatsoever. 6. In short, the argument of the petitioners, as made by their respective learned counsel, is that this is a case where there is no evidence at all to link them to the alleged incident; and therefore, deserving of being intervened by this Court, while it acts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 7. On the contrary, Sri.P.C.Sasidharan, appearing for the “Council”, argued that petitioners cannot call upon this Court to sit as an Appellate Authority over the proceedings in the disciplinary enquiry; and that all which is permissible is to verify whether there is some evidence on record, which would justify the conclusions and imposition of penalty, as has been done. He, vehemently, asserted that, unless discipline in the campus of the “Institute” is maintained – which will require strict disciplinary action against the perpetrators – it would cause a catastrophic effect and would encourage more such incidents in future. He, vehemently, asserted that, unless discipline in the campus of the “Institute” is maintained – which will require strict disciplinary action against the perpetrators – it would cause a catastrophic effect and would encourage more such incidents in future. He concluded saying that the Executive Committee of the “Institute” -which is the final Appellate Authority -had deliberated upon every aspect involved in this case, to hold that the scuffle did occur and that the petitioners were guilty, thus imposing upon them a lesser punishment, taking into account their plea for mitigation. The learned counsel, therefore, prayed that these writ petitions be dismissed. 8. Sri.C.K.Karunakaran – learned standing counsel for the “Institute”, adopted the afore submissions of Sri.P.C.Sasidharan, to argue that if incidents, as seen in these cases, are left without proper action, discipline would be lost and it would be a sad day. He also thus prayed that these writ petitions be dismissed. 9. I must say upfront that I do not propose to go into the merits of the enquiry proceedings at this stage because, this Court is only enjoined to verify whether the final appellate order, issued by the Executive Committee of the “Council” answers the requirements in law. 10. As already recorded above, the impugned order of the Executive Committee of the “Council” merely says that they had deliberated upon the case, thus being convinced that the scuffle did happen and that petitioners were involved in the same. No details are mentioned in the appellate order, particularly when the petitioners have a specific contention that such a scuffle never happened; and alternatively that, even if it had occurred, the depositions and evidence would bear testimony that they were not involved in it at all. As said above, in short, the case of the petitioners is that there is no evidence at all to link them with the alleged incident and that, therefore, the Authorities have erred in finding them guilty. 11. I further notice from the impugned second appellate order issued by the Executive Committee of the “Council” that it had decided to ‘amend the punishment to some extent’(sic), but that this was done ‘imbibing the spirit of the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court and the pleading of the delinquents that the punishment awarded is quite damaging’(sic). 11. I further notice from the impugned second appellate order issued by the Executive Committee of the “Council” that it had decided to ‘amend the punishment to some extent’(sic), but that this was done ‘imbibing the spirit of the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court and the pleading of the delinquents that the punishment awarded is quite damaging’(sic). This can only mean that the Executive Committee also found that some latitude and lenitude must be shown to the petitioners, but no reasons have been given for this, except as mentioned above. 12. I am, therefore, of the firm view that the appeals of the petitioners before the Executive Committee of the “Council” must be reconsidered, after affording them necessary opportunities of being heard, addressing their specific contention that this is a case where there is no evidence at all to link them to the alleged incident and further that said incident never did happen, as could be established by them from the evidence and testimony of the witnesses. The question whether the punishment imposed against them would require a further reduction on account of the various other mitigating factors as may be noticed or projected, should also cease the attention of the said Executive Committee. Resultantly, I order these writ petitions to the limited extent of setting aside the orders of the second Appellate Authority, namely the Executive Committee of the “Council”; with a consequential direction to them to reconsider the matter in the manner indicated above; thus culminating in fresh orders, as expeditiously as is possible, but not later than four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. I, however, clarify that this court has not entered into the merits of the contentions of the petitioners, except for the purpose of this judgment; and that all of them are left open to be, however, decided dispassionately by the “Council” through the afore exercise. In view of the afore directions, this Court is not entering into the merits of the additional contentions of the petitioners that the Executive Committee of the Council had earlier acted with bias because some of them were also members of the first Appellate Authority -and I leave them open, since this court is not informed of the constitution of the Executive Committee of the “Council” as of today.