ORDER : 1. The instant writ petition has been preferred challenging the order dated 25.01.2021, passed by the respondent No. 3 cancelling petitioner’s candidature. 2. The facts in nutshell are that the petitioner vied for the post of Junior Assistant pursuant to recruitment notification dated 16.04.2018. The petitioner being meritorious, was issued an order of appointment dated 14.07.2020. 3. After issuance of appointment order, petitioner’s police verification was got conducted in which it had transpired that the petitioner being involved in a criminal case had been convicted. The Principal Seth Manohar Singh Mehta, Govt. Senior Secondary School, Sanganer, Bhilwara by his letter dated 15.07.2020 sought a clarification from the District Education Officer, as to whether the petitioner should be allowed to join. 4. It is noteworthy that regardless of the fact that the said letter dated 15.07.2020 made a clear reference of the order/judgment dated 10.01.2020, passed by the High Court and benefit of probation under section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1958”) having been given thereby, the respondent No. 2 vide communication dated 15.01.2021 recommended that the petitioner be not taken in services. 5. In furtherance of the recommendation so made, the District Education Officer (respondent No. 3) passed the impugned order (dated 25.01.2021) and cancelled/revoked petitioner’s appointment/selection. 6. The petitioner present in person submitted that by way of the order dated 10.01.2020, passed in an appeal filed by the petitioner being S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 455/2005 Amit Singh and Others vs. State of Rajasthan, the High Court has given benefit of probation to the petitioner under section 4 of the Act of 1958. While inviting Court’s attention towards Para No. 13 of the judgment aforesaid, he highlighted that the Court had acquitted the petitioner of the charges under sections 399 and 402 of the Indian Penal Code. In relation to his conviction for the offences under sections 3/25 and 4/25 of the Arms Act, he submitted that though the same has been maintained but the benefit of provision of section 4 of the act of 1958 has been given and hence, the disqualification (if any) on account of his conviction has gone. He argued that the respondents’ action of rejecting his candidature is illegal and liable to be quashed. 7. He argued that the respondents’ action of rejecting his candidature is illegal and liable to be quashed. 7. The Court’s attention was drawn towards the communication dated 15.07.2020 to flag that the school where the petitioner was appointed has forwarded not only the copy of the order dated 10.01.2020 but had also highlighted that the petitioner has been given the benefit of section 4 of the Act of 1958. 8. The petitioner argued that in spite of the relevant facts being available with the respondents, they have taken a view completely contrary to the mandate of section 4 of the Act of 1958. 9. Petitioner submitted that in identical circumstances, a Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Khyali Lal Regar vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5989/2022 vide order dated 28.04.2022, allowed the writ petition and quashed the rejection of petitioner’s candidature. 10. Mr. Sarwan Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State submitted that petitioner’s acquittal is not honourable, hence, the order passed by this Court on 10.01.2020 in petitioner’s appeal does not help the petitioner’s cause. He was, however, not in a position to distinguish the facts of the present case from the facts involved in the case of Khyali Lal Regar (supra). 11. Heard the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondent-State and perused the material available on record. 12. Before adverting to the rival contentions, this Court would like to observe that the respondents have cancelled/revoked petitioner’s appointment without following the basic canon of law,- opportunity of hearing being the first principle of natural justice. It is surprising to note that before snatching petitioner’s livelihood, they did not even deem it imparative to issue a notice to him. The order impugned is thus, violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 13. A perusal of the record makes it abundantly clear that the respondents were having all requisite details including the copy of the order dated 10.01.2020, passed in the appeal preferred by the petitioner. The judgment dated 10.01.2020, passed in the appeal preferred by the petitioner in unambiguous terms confers benefit of section 4 of the Act of 1958 upon the petitioner, so far as charges for the offences under sections 3/25 and 4/25 of the Arms Act are concerned. 14. The judgment dated 10.01.2020, passed in the appeal preferred by the petitioner in unambiguous terms confers benefit of section 4 of the Act of 1958 upon the petitioner, so far as charges for the offences under sections 3/25 and 4/25 of the Arms Act are concerned. 14. A further look at the order dated 10.01.2020 shows that the conviction of the petitioner for the offences under sections 399 and 402 of the Indian Penal Code has been set aside. 15. Such being the position, it was not open for the respondents to cancel petitioner’s selection/appointment by taking an absolutely erroneous and hyper-technical view of the matter. The State’s stand that petitioner’s acquittal is not honourable, though does not find mention in the order impugned, but even if examined on merit, is untenable. The petitioner has been acquitted of the charges under sections 399 and 402 of the Indian Penal Code. The so called ‘honourable acquittal’ is not required to be mentioned in the judgments of the Courts and it is required to be deciphered from the adjudication made. 16. A perusal of Para 13 of the judgment dated 10.01.2020 reveals that this Court has acquitted the appellants (including petitioner) of the charges for the offences under sections 399 and 402 of the Indian Penal Code. Given that the petitioner has been acquitted of the very charges, the respondents’ stand that the his acquittal was not honourable is absolutely uncalled for and unsustainable. 17. Adverting to petitioner’s conviction for the offences under sections 3/25 and 4/25 of the Arms Act, suffice it to observe that though petitioner’s conviction has been affirmed qua charges, but he has been given the benefits of section 4 of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. 18. Once the benefit of section 4 has been granted, it was not open for the respondents to cancel petitioner’s candidature, else the entire purpose of the Probation of Offenders Act, more particularly section 12 thereof would be defeated. Section 12 of the Act of 1958 Reads thus: “12. 18. Once the benefit of section 4 has been granted, it was not open for the respondents to cancel petitioner’s candidature, else the entire purpose of the Probation of Offenders Act, more particularly section 12 thereof would be defeated. Section 12 of the Act of 1958 Reads thus: “12. Removal of disqualification attaching to conviction - Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, a person found guilty of an offence and dealt with under the provisions of section 3 or section 4 shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to a person who, after his release under section 4 is subsequently sentenced for the original offence.” 19. Section 12 which contains a non-obstante clause obliterates or expunges the disqualification attached to or emanating from a conviction. 20. That apart, the respondents have relied upon the circular dated 04.12.2019 in order to cancel petitioner’s selection, whereas a simple look, particularly Para 2(iii) thereof (reproduced here-infra) reveals that the petitioner was entitled to be entered into the State services. The order/action of the State is clearly contrary to its own circular let alone the statutory provisions: ^^2- ,sls Ádj.k@fLFkfr;ka ftuesa vH;FkhZ dks fu;qfDr gsrq ik= ekuk tkuk pkfg,%& ¼1½------------------ ¼2½------------------ ¼3½ vH;fFkZ;ksa ds ,sls Ádj.k ftuesa U;k;ky; }kjk ifjoh{kk vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 12 dk ykHk fn;k tkdj ifjoh{kk ij NksM+k x;k gksA ¼nks"kflf} fdlh fujgZrk ls xzLr ugha@jktdh; lsok@Hkkoh thou ij fdlh Ádkj dk foijhr ÁHkko ugha½A** 21. As an upshot of the discussion forgoing, the writ petition succeeds. The order dated 25.01.2021, rejecting petitioner’s candidature and cancelling his appointment order dated 14.07.2020 is hereby quashed. 22. The respondents are hereby directed to allow the petitioner to join within a period of four weeks from today, if the petitioner is otherwise eligible and suitable. 23. The petitioner shall be entitled to notional benefits from the date of issuance of his appointment order. 24. It is hereby made clear that the respondents shall be free to examine petitioner’s suitability on all counts other than his conviction referred to in the order dated 25.01.2021. 25. Stay petition also stands disposed of accordingly.