JUDGMENT : 1. The appellant/insurance company has challenged award dated 14.12.2009 passed by the Commissioner under Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (Assistant Labour Commissioner), Jammu (hereinafter to be referred as the Commissioner), whereby a sum of Rs. 4,30,560/- along with interest at the rate of 12 per cent has been awarded in favour of the claimants/respondent Nos. 1 to 4. The liability of paying the compensation has been fastened upon the appellant/insurance company. 2. It appears that on 20.05.2006, Balwan Singh, the predecessor in interest of the claimants, who was employed with respondent No. 5, owner of the Gas Tanker bearing No. HR-38-J-9707, while driving the said Gas Tanker suffered an accident on reaching Daha Khani, W. No. 5, Keri Bari, District Chitwan (Nepal). As a result of the accident, Balwan Singh died. The accident had arisen out of and in the course of employment of the deceased with respondent No. 5 and at the time of the accident, the offending vehicle was carrying Liquefied Petroleum Gas(LPG) from Baruni Oil Refinery. The deceased was 22 years old at the time of the accident. 3. The claim petition was contested by the owner (respondent No. 5) and the insurer, the appellant herein. Respondent No. 5, the owner of the offending Tanker admitted that the deceased was employed with it and it was pleaded that the vehicle in question was insured with the appellant/insurance company at the time of the accident. The appellant/insurance company raised a number of defences and one of the defences raised by the appellant/insurance company was that the deceased-Balwan Singh was not holding an effective and valid licence at the time of the accident inasmuch as he was not authorized to drive a vehicle carrying hazardous goods. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the Commissioner framed the following issues: 1. “Whether the deceased namely Balwan Singh falls under the definition of Workman as prescribed under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (OPP) 2. Whether he met with an accident during and in the course of his employment with Respondent No. 1(OPP) 3. What was age and wages of the deceased at the time of death (OPP) 4. Relief.” 4. After recording evidence of the parties, the Commissioner after taking the wages of the deceased as Rs. 4,000/- per month and his age as 26 years, assessed the compensation in favour of the claimants as Rs. 4,30,560/-. What was age and wages of the deceased at the time of death (OPP) 4. Relief.” 4. After recording evidence of the parties, the Commissioner after taking the wages of the deceased as Rs. 4,000/- per month and his age as 26 years, assessed the compensation in favour of the claimants as Rs. 4,30,560/-. Although no issue was framed by the Commissioner as regards the validity of the driving license of the deceased, yet evidence was led by the parties before the Commissioner on this aspect of the matter and the Commissioner also dealt with this aspect of the matter in the impugned award by holding that there was no requirement of possession of a valid driving license in a case where compensation is being sought under the provisions of the Employees Compensation Act, 1923. 5. The appellant/insurance company has challenged the impugned award passed by the Commissioner to the extent liability to satisfy the award has been fastened upon it. It has been claimed that the Commissioner was not correct in holding that plea regarding validity of the driving license cannot be raised in a proceeding under Employees Compensation Act. It has also been contended that without an endorsement on the driving license, authorising its holder to drive a vehicle carrying hazardous goods, it cannot be said that a person driving such a vehicle is holding an effective and valid driving license. 6. The first question of law that arises for determination in this appeal is as to whether an insurer is entitled to raise the plea of validity of driving license in a proceeding under Employees Compensation Act. The other question that arises for determination is as to whether a person driving a vehicle carrying hazardous goods is competent to drive such a vehicle in the absence of an endorsement on his driving license authorising him to drive such a vehicle. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents have contended that the aforesaid questions of law do not constitute substantial questions of law and in fact the Commissioner has not even framed an issue as regards the validity of the driving license. On this ground it is urged that the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents have contended that the aforesaid questions of law do not constitute substantial questions of law and in fact the Commissioner has not even framed an issue as regards the validity of the driving license. On this ground it is urged that the appeal deserves to be dismissed. In support of their contentions, learned counsel for the respondents have relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Fulmati Dhramdev Yadav and anothers v New India Assurance Company Limited and another, Civil Appeal No. 4713 of 2023 dated 04.09.2023. It has been contended that when no issue was framed by the Commissioner regarding the validity or invalidity of the driving licence of the deceased, in such a situation, appeal in terms of Section 30 of the Employees Compensation Act cannot be entertained as the scope of an appeal under the said Act is limited only to substantial questions of law. 9. As per proviso to Section 30 of the Employees Compensation Act, no appeal lies against an order passed by the Commissioner, unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal. First of all, it needs to be understood as to what amounts of substantial question of law within the meaning of proviso to section 30 of the Employees Compensation Act. The Supreme Court in the case of Hero Vinod (Minor) vs Seshammal (2006) 5 SCC 545 has explained the expression substantial question of law in the context of Section 100 of the CPC and summarized the principles in the following manner: “(i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law. (iii) The general rule is that High Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of the Courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well recognized exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to 'decision based on no evidence', it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.” 10. Thus, a substantial question of law would include not only a question which involves a debatable legal issue, but it would also arise where inter alia binding precedents relating to a question of law have been either ignored or a contrary finding has been returned with regard to such legal principle. The aforesaid principles can be safely applied to the cases under the Employees Compensation Act, while considering the import of the expression “substantial question of law” appearing in proviso to section 30 of the said Act. 11. The aforesaid principles can be safely applied to the cases under the Employees Compensation Act, while considering the import of the expression “substantial question of law” appearing in proviso to section 30 of the said Act. 11. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant/insurance company that in the instant case, the learned Commissioner has rendered findings on legal issues which are contrary to the settled proposition of law relating to entitlement of an insurer to raise plea regarding validity of the license as also relating to competence of a driver to drive a vehicle carrying hazardous goods without endorsement authorising him to do so upon his driving license. 12. Before testing the merits of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant/insurance company, it would be apt to deal with the objection of the learned counsel for the respondents to the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that an issue regarding validity of the license was not framed by the Commissioner. It is true that the Commissioner has not framed the issue as regards the validity of the driving license of the deceased. Had it been a case where the question regarding validity of the driving license of the deceased was not at all discussed and considered by the Commissioner then certainly in view of the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Fulmati Dhramdev Yadav’s case (supra), no appeal under section 30 of the Act could have been entertained but in the instant case, not only have the parties led evidence as regards the question of validity of driving license of the deceased, but the learned Commissioner has elaborately discussed the said evidence and come to a conclusion that validity of the driving license is an issue, which cannot be raised in a proceeding under Employees Compensation Act by relying upon the judgment delivered by this Court in the case, titled, United India Insurance Company Ltd vs. Mst. Noora and others, 2005(3) 27(HC). Therefore, merely because the Commissioner did not frame an issue regarding validity of the driving license of the deceased does not mean that the said issue was not considered by the Commissioner when the impugned award clearly suggests otherwise. Thus the ratio laid down in Fulmati Dhramdev Yadav’s case (supra), does not apply to the facts of the instant case. 13. Thus the ratio laid down in Fulmati Dhramdev Yadav’s case (supra), does not apply to the facts of the instant case. 13. It is true that in a proceeding under Employees Compensation Act, the employer cannot raise the plea of validity of driving license or absence of a valid driving licence, while question relating to award of compensation in favour of his employee is to be determined, but it does not mean that even the insurer is estopped from raising the plea regarding validity of the driving license of the deceased/injured driver employed by the owner so as to wriggle out of its liability to indemnify the insured. This is so because the liability of the insurance company to pay compensation to the driver on account of his death or injury, does not arise out of provisions contained in Employees Compensation Act, but it arises out of the contract of insurance between the employer and the insurance company. If the said contract contains a covenant whereby the insurance company is entitled to be exonerated of its liability to indemnify the insured in case of non validity of the driving licence of the employee, the insurance company can very well raise this defence in the proceedings under Employees Compensation’s Act. 14. In the above context, I am supported by the judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Zoona and others vs Ghulam Hassan Khandey and others, 2010(1) JKJ 363 . In the said case, this Court, while dealing with the aforesaid aspect of the matter, has observed as under: “9.............There can be no denial of the fact that Workman’ Compensation Act was conceived and enacted with laudable aims and objects and that having regard to the purpose of the Act even stretched view may be taken in interpreting the Act. There can be also no dispute with the legal proposition that the dependents of the deceased Workman to hold the employer responsible for payment of compensation have only to prove that the deceased workman was under employment of the employer; that death occurred due to an injury/accident arising out of and in the course of employment. There can be also no dispute with the legal proposition that the dependents of the deceased Workman to hold the employer responsible for payment of compensation have only to prove that the deceased workman was under employment of the employer; that death occurred due to an injury/accident arising out of and in the course of employment. However, the said proposition cannot be extended to include that an individual/company having an independent contract with the employer whereunder the individual/company binds down himself/itself to indemnify the employer in the event of an accident resulting in death/injury, is to be governed by the legal proposition and not the terms and conditions of the contract governing the relationship between the indemnifier and indemnified. In other words, the dependents of a deceased workman on proving that the deceased was a workman and that his death was caused due to injury/accident arising out of and in the course of employment may prove their case against the employer but to fasten a third party like Insurance Company with responsibility to indemnify the employer and pay the compensation, the dependents have to further prove that the third party or the Insurance Company in terms of the agreement between such third party/Insurance Company and the employer is obligated to pay the compensation to the dependents. The second limb of the duty cast on the dependents does not fall within the realm of the Workman’s Compensation Act and the third party/Insurance Company can prove and establish that because of defence available to it, it was not under any real obligation to pay the compensation amount. 10. Viewed thus, though the validity of driving license may not be a requirement under Workman’s Compensation Act but all the same, it may be a requirement under the agreement between the insurance company and the employer. The view that validity of driving license is not a requirement in such matter, therefore, is not a sound proposition of law. If in a case it is found that the deceased workman had not a valid driving license the Insurance Company may successfully wriggle-out of its obligation to pay compensation to the dependents of the deceased workman. In such a situation the employer nonetheless shall continue to be under legal obligation to pay compensation to the dependents of the deceased workman.” 15. In such a situation the employer nonetheless shall continue to be under legal obligation to pay compensation to the dependents of the deceased workman.” 15. Again the Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd vs Mastan and another, (2006) 2 SCC 64, has held that an insurer, subject to the terms and conditions of contract of insurance is bound to indemnify the insured under the 1923 Act, meaning thereby that if there is any violation of terms and conditions of contract of insurance, the insurer can avoid its liability to indemnify the insured. In a recent case, titled, Bali Ram vs Rajinder Kumar and another, 2020 SCC Online SC 769, the Supreme Court has, in a case relating to Employees Compensation Act, 1923 held that in case of a valid driving license, if the license has expired, the insured is absolved of its liability. 16. From the aforesaid analysis of law on the subject, it is clear that the validity of driving license may not be an issue to be gone into while considering the liability of employee under the provisions of the Employees Compensation Act but it would certainly be a consideration while determining the liability of an insurer under a contract of insurance. Therefore, the insurance company can certainly raise an issue with regard to the validity of driving licence in the proceedings under Employees Compensation Act. In Zoona and other’s case (supra), this Court has considered the ratio laid down in the earlier judgment in the case of Mst Noora (supra) on which, the learned Commissioner has placed reliance and held that the proposition of law laid down in the said case is not legally sound. I am in respectful agreement with the view taken by this Court in Zoona and other’s case, (supra) because the said view is in consonance with the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd vs Mastan (supra) and Beli Ram vs Rajinder Kumar and anr (supra). 17. The learned Commissioner has relied upon the view taken by this Court in Noora and others’ case (supra) which has been declared as not a sound law in the later judgment of Zoona and others, case (supra) and the said view is also contrary the settled position of law laid down by the Supreme Court. Thus, a substantial question of law has arisen for determination. Thus, a substantial question of law has arisen for determination. Therefore, the contention of the respondents that no substantial question of law arises in the instant case is without any merit. 18. Having held that ratio laid down by this Court in Noora and others’ case (supra) is not sound proposition of law and that later judgment in Zoona and others’ case(supra) lays down the correct position of law which is in consonance with position of law settled by the Supreme Court, the very basis of the finding of the Commissioner that validity of the driving license of the deceased cannot be gone into during proceedings under Employees Compensation Act gets knocked down. Accordingly, it is held that the contention of the appellant/insurance company as regards the validity of the driving license of the deceased was required to be dealt with and decided by the Commissioner as the appellant/insurance company was entitled to establish breach of policy conditions so as to seek its exoneration from the liability to indemnify the employer. 19. That takes us to the second question of law which relates to the validity of the driving license of the deceased. According to the appellant/insurance company without there being an endorsement on the driving license of the deceased authorising him to drive a vehicle carrying hazardous goods, he was not competent to drive the offending vehicle. It is not in dispute that the deceased was driving the offending vehicle that was carrying LPG which is a hazardous substance. 20. Section 3 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 deals with necessity for driving license and it further provides that a person cannot drive a motor vehicle in any public place unless he holds an effective driving license issued to him authorizing him to drive a vehicle. Section 10 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for forms and contents of the license to drive. Sub section (2) of Section 10 provides that the driving license shall also be expressed as entitling the holder to drive motor vehicle of one or more of the classes (a) to (j) mentioned in the said sub section. 21. Section 10 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for forms and contents of the license to drive. Sub section (2) of Section 10 provides that the driving license shall also be expressed as entitling the holder to drive motor vehicle of one or more of the classes (a) to (j) mentioned in the said sub section. 21. Thus, provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act provide for the requirement of a driving license for driving a specific class of vehicle and unless a person has a driving license authorising him to drive a particular class of vehicle, he is not legally competent to drive such type of vehicle. In the instant case, admittedly the deceased was driving a vehicle that was carrying hazardous goods at the relevant time. Admittedly, there was no endorsement authorising the deceased to drive such type vehicle. However, the claimants had placed on record a copy of the training certificate, according to which, the deceased had undergone training programme on safe transportation of hazardous goods (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) and passed the same. The question arises whether mere holding of such a certificate without there being any endorsement to this effect on the driving license of the deceased would entitle him to drive such type of vehicle. 22. The answer to aforesaid question can be found in provisions contained in Rule 9 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules. Sub Rule (1) of Rule 9 provides that any person driving a goods carriage carrying goods of dangerous or hazardous nature to human life, should in addition to being a holder of a driving license to drive a transport vehicle, also possess a certificate of having successfully passed a course consisting of syllabus prescribed in the said Sub Rule. Sub Rule (2) provides that holder of a driving license possessing the certificate mentioned in Sub Rule (1) has to apply to the licensing authority for making necessary entries in his driving license. Sub Rule (3) provides that on receipt of application, the licensing authority would make an endorsement in the driving license to the effect that the license holder is authorized to drive a goods carriage carrying goods of dangerous or hazardous nature to human life. 23. Sub Rule (3) provides that on receipt of application, the licensing authority would make an endorsement in the driving license to the effect that the license holder is authorized to drive a goods carriage carrying goods of dangerous or hazardous nature to human life. 23. From the above, it is clear that undergoing the requisite course in terms of Sub Rule (1) of Rule 9 of the Rules is only one of the steps in the direction of acquiring a driving license authorising a person to drive a vehicle carrying hazardous goods. Unless the final step in this regard i.e. endorsement is made in the driving license of the holder in terms of Sub Rule (3) of Rule 9, such person cannot claim to be legally competent to drive a vehicle carrying hazardous goods. 24. The aforesaid issue has also been considered by this Court in the case of United India Insurance Company Limited vs Pawan Sumbly and others, CIMA No. 42/2012 decided on 19.07.2016. In the said case, this Court, while dealing with the question whether mere passing of driving test by the driver relating to the training course for carrying hazardous substances without any endorsement to this effect on the driving license of the driver would be enough to hold such driver competent to drive such type of vehicle, has observed that mere possession of certificate having undergone driving test to drive a vehicle meant for carrying hazardous substances cannot be taken as a substitute for fulfilment of the requirement of endorsement on the driving license authorizing the driver to drive such type of vehicle. The Court further observed that bringing out vehicle carrying dangerous and hazardous goods on public places involves a great element of risk to life and property of public at large. Therefore, owners of such vehicles must exercise special care to ensure that such vehicles are entrusted for driving and given incharge of persons who are duly trained and specifically authorised to take charge of such vehicles. The Court further observed that no lenient view is justified if breach in this regard is proved by the insurer. A similar view has been taken by this Court in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Subash Singh and others, 2017 (4) JKJ 570 . 25. The Court further observed that no lenient view is justified if breach in this regard is proved by the insurer. A similar view has been taken by this Court in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Subash Singh and others, 2017 (4) JKJ 570 . 25. In view of the aforesaid analysis of the legal position, it is clear that without endorsement authorising the deceased to drive the offending vehicle that was carrying hazardous goods in the shape of Liquefied Petroleum Gas, it cannot be stated that he was holding a valid and effective driving license. Therefore, the appellant/insurance company has been able to establish that there has been a breach of the policy conditions on the part of the owner, respondent No. 5, which entitles the appellant/insurance company to avoid its liability to indemnify respondent No. 5. The learned Commissioner has fallen into a grave error by not considering the binding precedents on this aspect of the matter and in holding that the appellant/insurance company is liable to pay the awarded sum. 26. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed and the appellant/insurance company is exonerated from its liability to indemnify the insured. However, having regard to the fact that the appellant/insurance company has already deposited the awarded sum with the Commissioner, and a portion thereof stands released in favour of the claimants, it is directed that the Commissioner shall release the balance amount of compensation in favour of the claimants and thereafter, recover the whole of the sum released in favour of the claimants from the owner/respondent No. 5. Upon receipt of the released compensation from the owner/employer, the same shall be refunded to the appellant/insurance company, who shall be at liberty to move an appropriate application before the Commissioner in this regard.