JUDGMENT : (Goutam Bhaduri, J.) : 1. Challenge in this appeal is to the order dated 31-7-2023 passed by the Sixth Additional District Judge, Durg, in civil suit No.26-A/2023, wherein in exercise of power under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short ‘the CPC’) the suit is dismissed for want of cause of action. 2. (i) The facts of the case, as pleaded by the appellant/plaintiff, in brief, are that a suit for specific performance along with declaration and permanent injunction was filed by the plaintiff against the respondents/defendants. The plaintiff averred that in respect of the property held by the defendants i.e. 15 acres of land situated at village Kumhari, Tahsil Damdha, District Durg, the defendant No.3 namely; Navneet Gupta on behalf of his parents namely; Chandra Gupta & Neelam Gupta, who are arrayed as defendants No.1 & 2, entered into an agreement with the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff, the defendant No.3 made an offer before the plaintiff company that the defendants are owner of 15 acres of land and having heard about their goodwill they want to develop the said land by way of a joint venture agreement by carving plot, garden, parking, temple, etc. The plaintiff averred that they are in the business of such development of land and consequent thereto on 22-10-2022 an agreement was executed wherein 15.08 acres of land was agreed to be developed by further proceeding to joint venture agreement. (ii) As per the plaint averments, on 23-10-2022 possession of the land was handed over to the plaintiff company and thereafter the plaintiff started its work for development of the said land. The plaintiff further stated that an amount of 51.00 lacs was transferred to the account of defendant No.3. According to the plaintiff, the defendants were obliged to enter into joint venture agreement and were further obliged to transfer the land to create a partnership firm. As per the partnership the plaintiff company would hold the share of 45.5% and the defendants would hold the share of 54.5%. According to the plaintiff, to create joint venture agreement was the main intention whereby the defendants were ensured to develop the land through the plaintiff. As per the partnership the plaintiff company would hold the share of 45.5% and the defendants would hold the share of 54.5%. According to the plaintiff, to create joint venture agreement was the main intention whereby the defendants were ensured to develop the land through the plaintiff. The plaintiff further stated that after scrutiny of the land certain discrepancies were found in respect of the land, therefore, defendant No.3 was asked to rectify such defect in the title and the notices were served on 2-12-2022 and further reminder was sent in the month of December, 2022. (iii) Plaintiff also averred that the notice was published whereby the general public at large were apprised of the fact that people should not enter into further transaction in respect of the suit land. The plaintiff also averred that they had the money of Rs. 5.00 crores which was to be paid and they were capable to pay the amount and were ready and willing to execute their part of contract. The plaintiff contended that the defendants No.1 to 3 without replying to such notices served them a notice dated 9-2-2023 whereby the contract was rescinded. The plaintiff stated that it has paid an amount of Rs. 51.00 lacs to the defendants and thereby the defendants were obliged to enter into the partnership firm which would have been floated and consideration of Rs. 5.00 crores would have been paid at the time of agreement, but the same was not executed. The suit was, therefore, filed for specific performance of the contract valued at Rs. 5,51,00,000/-. 3. Written statement in this case was filed by the defendants, which was signed by the defendant No.3 alone. Apart from this, an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC was filed for dismissal of the suit on the ground that the defendants have returned the amount of Rs. 51.00 lacs wherein it was submitted that the agreement was to be executed within a period of 45 days and having not been done at the behest of the plaintiff, the defendants returned the amount of Rs. 55.00 lacs, therefore, no cause of action survives. Reply to that application was filed, but eventually the suit was dismissed as no cause of action survives. Thus, this appeal. 4. (a) Learned counsel appearing for the appellant/plaintiff would submit that an amount of Rs. 55.00 lacs, therefore, no cause of action survives. Reply to that application was filed, but eventually the suit was dismissed as no cause of action survives. Thus, this appeal. 4. (a) Learned counsel appearing for the appellant/plaintiff would submit that an amount of Rs. 51.00 lacs was paid to defendant No.3, who was acting on behalf of his parents i.e. defendants No.1 & 2. Referring to the agreement, learned counsel would submit that after execution of agreement within a period of 45 days the second party would get the title verified and if any such defect is found the second party i.e. the company may come out of the contract. He would submit that as per clauses 7 & 8 of the agreement, the payment of Rs. 5.00 crores was depending only on the condition if the land was found to be without any defect. He would also submit that the plaint averments would show that the plaintiff was having sufficient fund and was ready and willing to execute the contract. (b) Referring to plaint averments, learned counsel would submit that after the agreement was executed on 22-10-2022 the cause of action arose and when the paper publication was made on 24-10-2022 and having received the search report the defects came to the knowledge of the appellant. Further referring to search report, which was filed along with the plaint, he would submit that the same would disclose that certain discrepancies were found in respect of the land and by letter dated 2-12-2022, which was filed along with plaint, they were asked to cure the defect. Further the respondents by a notice dated 9-2-2023 terminated the contract and demanded damages and also stated that an amount of Rs. 51.00 lacs would be forfeited. He would submit that written statement was filed on 6-7-2023 wherein it was disclosed that on 2-5-2023 the amount of Rs. 51.00 lacs was returned, though the suit was filed on 27-3-2023, therefore, the entire act of the defendants was to frustrate the contract. He would submit that present issue is commercial in nature and hence the Commercial Court was having the jurisdiction. 51.00 lacs was returned, though the suit was filed on 27-3-2023, therefore, the entire act of the defendants was to frustrate the contract. He would submit that present issue is commercial in nature and hence the Commercial Court was having the jurisdiction. (c) By placing reliance upon the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Prem Kishore and Others v Brahm Prakash and Others : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 356, learned counsel would submit that while dealing with an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC the rejection of plaint cannot be done when it is a mixed question of facts and law and only plaint averments are required to be seen. He also placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the matter of H.S. Deekshit and Another v Metropoli Overseas Limited and Others : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2024 to submit that it is well settled that while considering an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC, the averments in the plaint alone are to be examined and no other extraneous factor can be taken into consideration, therefore, at this stage, the plaintiff could not have been non suited. (d) To buttress his contention, learned counsel placed his reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Dahiben v Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) Dead through Legal Representatives and others : (2020) 7 SCC 366 and contended that under Order 7 Rule 11, a duty is cast on the Court to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by scrutinizing the averments in the plaint, read in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any law and the plea taken by the defendant in the written statement and application for rejection of the plaint on the merits, would be irrelevant, and cannot be adverted to. (e) Further referring to the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Kuldeep Singh Pathania v Bikram Singh Jaryal, (2017) 5 SCC 345 learned counsel would submit that the court has to read the entire plaint as a whole to find out whether it discloses a cause of action and if it does, then the plaint cannot be rejected by the court exercising the powers under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code. Essentially, whether the plaint discloses a cause of action, is a question of fact which has to be gathered on the basis of the averments made in the plaint in its entirety taking those averments to be correct. A cause of action is a bundle of facts which are required to be proved for obtaining relief. (f) Learned counsel would also place reliance upon the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy v Syed Jalal : (2017) 13 SCC 174 , to submit that the plaint can be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC if conditions enumerated in the said provision are fulfilled. Learned counsel would further place reliance upon the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of R. Hemalatha v Kashthuri : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 381 to submit that even the agreement is unregistered, the same can be examined for the collateral purpose in evidence. 5. (I) Learned counsel appearing for the respondents/defendants, per contra, would submit that the order of the Court below is well merited. Referring to agreement, he would submit that in the said agreement three persons have been named, but bare perusal of the written statement would show that it has been signed only by defendant No.3, albeit interest of other defendants involved. He would submit that reading of the agreement would show that it was a contingent contract. Without prejudice to the aforesaid agreement, learned counsel would submit that the agreement was a contingent contract and 45 days time limit was fixed for the purpose of contract. He would also submit that the plaintiff alleges certain discrepancies, but those discrepancies were not on the title or ownership. According to him, the conduct of the plaintiff would show that it was tainted with malice and filing of the suit itself would show that they wanted to drag on to the litigation instead realiasation of the property. (II) By relying upon the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Dahiben (supra), learned counsel would submit that the Court was under obligation to see the document filed along with the plaint and the agreement herein though alleged to be creating a right, but it was not registered. (II) By relying upon the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Dahiben (supra), learned counsel would submit that the Court was under obligation to see the document filed along with the plaint and the agreement herein though alleged to be creating a right, but it was not registered. He would submit that the plaint averments would show that the plaintiff claimed that they were put into possession, therefore, the said averments if are read along with the document itself would not admissible in evidence. He would also submit that the agreement having not been signed by all the defendants they cannot be forced to a create a joint venture. Learned counsel would submit that without prejudice to the aforesaid facts the defendants No.1 & 2 were not party to the agreement nor the amount came into their account and after filing of the suit the defendant No.3 has returned the amount to the plaintiff, therefore, the rejection of the plaint was just and proper. The order of the Court below is well merited, which do not call for any interference. 6. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties at length and perused the record. 7. Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC speaks about rejection of plaint. The same is quoted below for ready reference : 11. Rejection of plaint.- The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:— (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action; (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so; (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to supply the requisite stamp paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law; (e) where it is not filed in duplicate; (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9. Provided that the time fixed by the court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp papers shall not be extended unless the court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature for correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp papers, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff. 8. The Supreme Court in the matter of Dahiben (supra) laid down that under Order 7 Rule 11, a duty is cast on the Court to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by scrutinizing the averments in the plaint, read in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any law. Order 7 Rule 14 (1) provides for production of documents, on which the plaintiff places reliance, which reads as under : 14. Production of document on which plaintiff sues or relies.—(1) Where a plaintiff sues upon a document or relies upon document in his possession or power in support of his claim, he shall enter such documents in a list, and shall produce it in Court when the plaint is presented by him and shall, at the same time deliver the document and a copy thereof, to be filed with the plaint. (2) Where any such document is not in the possession or power of the plaintiff, he shall, wherever possible, state in whose possession or power it is. (3) A document which ought to be produced in Court by the plaintiff when the plaint is presented, or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint but is not produced or entered accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit. (4) Nothing in this rule shall apply to document produced for the cross examination of the plaintiffs witnesses, or handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory. 9. Therefore, the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case has laid down that having regard to Order 7 Rule 14 CPC, the documents filed along with the plaint, are required to be taken into consideration for deciding the application under Order 7 Rule 11. 9. Therefore, the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case has laid down that having regard to Order 7 Rule 14 CPC, the documents filed along with the plaint, are required to be taken into consideration for deciding the application under Order 7 Rule 11. In Dahiben (supra) the Supreme Court has placed reliance upon its decision rendered in the matter of State of Punjab and others v Gurdev Singh : (1991) 4 SCC 1 and held that the Court must examine the plaint and determine when the right to sue first accrued to the plaintiff, and whether on the assumed facts, the plaint is within time. The Court further held that the words “right to sue” means the right to seek relief by means of legal proceedings and the right to sue accrues only when the cause of action arises, therefore, the Court at paras 23.8 to 23.15 and 24 held thus : 23.8 Having regard to Order VII Rule 14 CPC, the documents filed alongwith the plaint, are required to be taken into consideration for deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11(a). When a document referred to in the plaint, forms the basis of the plaint, it should be treated as a part of the plaint. 23.9 In exercise of power under this provision, the Court would determine if the assertions made in the plaint are contrary to statutory law, or judicial dicta, for deciding whether a case for rejecting the plaint at the threshold is made out. 23.10 At this stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement and application for rejection of the plaint on the merits, would be irrelevant, and cannot be adverted to, or taken into consideration. 23.11 The test for exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11 is that if the averments made in the plaint are taken in entirety, in conjunction with the documents relied upon, would the same result in a decree being passed. This test was laid down in Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V.Sea Success, which reads as : “139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially a question of fact. But whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose, the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. Ltd. v. M.V.Sea Success, which reads as : “139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially a question of fact. But whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose, the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is as to whether if the averments made in the plaint are taken to be correct in their entirety, a decree would be passed.” 23.12 In Hardesh Ores (P.) Ltd. v. Hede & Co. the Court further held that it is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage, and to read it in isolation. It is the substance, and not merely the form, which has to be looked into. The plaint has to be construed as it stands, without addition or subtraction of words. If the allegations in the plaint prima facie show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact. 23.13 If on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and without any merit, and does not disclose a right to sue, the court would be justified in exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. 23.14 The power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC may be exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit, either before registering the plaint, or after issuing summons to the defendant, or before conclusion of the trial, as held by this Court in the judgment of Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra. The plea that once issues are framed, the matter must necessarily go to trial was repelled by this Court in Azhar Hussain case. 23.15 The provision of Order VII Rule 11 is mandatory in nature. It states that the plaint “shall” be rejected if any of the grounds specified in clause (a) to (e) are made out. If the Court finds that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, or that the suit is barred by any law, the Court has no option, but to reject the plaint. 24. “Cause of action” means every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to judgment. If the Court finds that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, or that the suit is barred by any law, the Court has no option, but to reject the plaint. 24. “Cause of action” means every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to judgment. It consists of a bundle of material facts, which are necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to entitle him to the reliefs claimed in the suit. 10. The proposition cited by the plaintiff are settled proposition, which are not in dispute at all. The averments of the plaint would be necessary along with the document filed which are to be read in conjuncture and nothing can be seen in isolation. It is the trite law that Order 7 Rule 11 CPC may be exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit, even before conclusion of trial. 11. Now coming back to the facts of the case, according to the plaint averments, the cause of action arose on 22-10-2022 when the agreement was executed and when the public notice was made in paper and notices were accepted and after receipt of the search report. Para 6 of the agreement speaks that if any defect in respect of title or possession is pointed out then the plaintiff may come out from the agreement. The search report, which is also annexed with the plaint, do not, prima facie, discloses about any defect of title or possession. It only touches upon the fact that the lands were shown to be diverted lands, but it was shown to be agricultural lands. 12. The search report, which is also annexed with the plaint, do not, prima facie, discloses about any defect of title or possession. It only touches upon the fact that the lands were shown to be diverted lands, but it was shown to be agricultural lands. 12. In the plaint, the plaintiff would pray for the following relief(s) : 28- ;g fd oknh dEiuh ekuuh; U;k;ky; ls fuEu vuqrks"k dh izkFkZuk djrh gSA v½ ;g fd] oknh dEiuh ds i{k esa izfroknhx.k ds fo:) bl vk'k; dh fofufnZ"V ikyu dh fMØh o vkKkfIr ikfjr dh tk;s fd izfroknh Øekad 1 ls 3 oknh dEiuh ds lkFk fu"ikfnr lafonk fnukad 22-10-2022 dk ikyu djrs gq, oknh dEiuh ls 5]00]00]000@& ¼ikap djksM+ :i;s½ izkIr djrs gq, oknxzLr laifRr dks oknh dEiuh ds i{k esa TokbaV osUpj rFkk Hkkxhnkjh foys[k fu"ikfnr djrs gq, gLrkUrfjr djsa ,oa ftl ij fodflr 54-5 izfr'kr fgLlk izfroknh Øekad 1 ls 3 dks izkIr gksosxk ,oa 45-5 izfr'kr fgLlk oknh dEiuh dks izkIr gksosxkA c½ ;g fd] oknh dEiuh ds i{k esa izfroknhx.k ds fo:) bl vk'k; dh mn~?kks"k.kk dh fMØh o vkKkfIr ikfjr dh tkos fd izfroknh Øekad 1 ls 3 }kjk okn laifRr ds laca/k esa lafonk fnukad 22-10-2022 dks ,drjQk fujLr djus ckcr~ izsf"kr uksfVl fnukafdr 09-02-2023 vf/kdkfjrkjfgr] lafonk dh 'krksZa ds foifjr gksus ls voS/k ,oa 'kwU; gS rFkk oknh dEiuh ij ca/kudkjh ugha gSA l½ ;g fd] oknh dEiuh ds i{k esa izfroknhx.k ds fo:) bl vk'k; dh LFkk;h fu"ks/kkKk dh fMØh o vkKkfIr ikfjr dh tkos fd izfroknh Øekad 1 ls 3 }kjk Lo;a vFkok vius izfrfuf/k O;fDr ds ek/;e ls okn laifRr dks fdlh Hkh izdkj ls foØ;] varj.k vFkok gLr{ksi djus ls LFkk;h :i ls fojr jgsaA n½ ;g fd] oknh dEiuh ds i{k esa izfroknhx.k ds fo:) oknh dk okn O;;] vf/koDrk 'kqYd] U;k;'kqYd ,oa vU; O;; vnk fd;s tkus dk vkns'k ikfjr dh tkosA ¼b½ oknh ds i{k esa ,oa izfroknhx.k ds fo:) vU; dksbZ vkns'k tks ekuuh; U;k;ky; vfpr o ;qfDr;qDr le>s ikfjr djus dh d`ik djsaA 13. From the aforesaid prayer clause, it is manifest that a prayer was made that the defendants should accept Rs. 5.00 crores and be directed to execute further agreement to create joint venture and execute the partnership deed wherein 54.5% share would be of defendants No.1 to 3 and 45.5% share would be of the plaintiff company. From the aforesaid prayer clause, it is manifest that a prayer was made that the defendants should accept Rs. 5.00 crores and be directed to execute further agreement to create joint venture and execute the partnership deed wherein 54.5% share would be of defendants No.1 to 3 and 45.5% share would be of the plaintiff company. Further prayer was made that cancellation of the agreement be set aside. Prima facie reading of the agreement do not show that the defendants No.1 & 2 have signed such agreement. The written statement filed though it is captioned as ‘defendants’, but it is not signed by the defendants except defendant No.3 with whom the plaintiff alleged to have entered into a contract. 14. Bare perusal of the averments of the plaint would show that the plaintiff claimed that it was put into possession by virtue of agreement. Reading of the agreement would show that it is not registered. The terms of the agreement are crucial, which provides for transferring possession to the plaintiff. 15. When the plaintiff claimed that it was put to possession of entire land by agreement, whether such agreement was admissible in evidence. The question therefore arises that whether it would come under the definition of conveyance in terms of Section 2(10) of the Indian Stamp Act, which reads as under : “2. Definitions.- In this Act unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context - *** *** *** (10) Conveyance.-- 'Conveyance' includes a conveyance on sale and every instrument by which property, whether movable or immovable, is transferred inter-vivos and which is not otherwise specifically provided for by Schedule I;” 16. The then State of M.P., by Second Amendment Act 1990 (22 of 1990) has substituted Article 23 of Schedule 1(A) and Explanation has been added. The explanation appended to Article 23 of Schedule 1(a) of the Stamp Act as substituted by section 6 of the Act (22 of 1990) which reads as follows. The then State of M.P., by Second Amendment Act 1990 (22 of 1990) has substituted Article 23 of Schedule 1(A) and Explanation has been added. The explanation appended to Article 23 of Schedule 1(a) of the Stamp Act as substituted by section 6 of the Act (22 of 1990) which reads as follows. Explanation.- For the purpose of this article, where in the case of agreement to sell immovable property, the possession of any immovable property is transferred to the purchaser before execution or after execution of, such agreement without executing the conveyance in respect thereof then such agreement to sell shall be deemed to be a conveyance and stamp duty thereon shall be leviable accordingly: Provided that, the provisions of Section 47-A shall apply mutatis mutandis to such agreement which is deemed to be a conveyance as aforesaid, as they apply to a conveyance under that section : Provided further that where subsequently a conveyance is effected in pursuance of such agreement of sale the stamp duty, if any, already paid and recovered on the agreement of sale which is deemed to be a conveyance shall be adjusted towards the total duty leviable on the conveyance, subject to a minimum of Rs.10.” 17. The aforesaid Explanation has come into force with effect from 26.09.1990. The ratio laid down in the matter of Omprakash v Laxminarayan and Others : (2014) 1 SCC 618 emphasizes that the explanation creates a legal fiction. The agreement to sell shall be deemed to be a conveyance and stamp duty is leviable on an instrument whereby the possession has been transferred. Therefore a perusal of the agreement shows that it would amount to conveyance within the meaning of section 2(10) of the Stamp Act and necessarily should have been stamped according to Schedule 1-A of Rule 23 which requires 7 1/2% stamp duty would be payable on the market value. 18. Likewise Section 35 of the Stamp Act provides that instruments not duly stamped is inadmissible in evidence and cannot be acted upon. Section 35 of the Act would be relevant in the facts and circumstances of the case which is quoted hereunder: "35. Instruments not duly stamped inadmissible in evidence, etc. 18. Likewise Section 35 of the Stamp Act provides that instruments not duly stamped is inadmissible in evidence and cannot be acted upon. Section 35 of the Act would be relevant in the facts and circumstances of the case which is quoted hereunder: "35. Instruments not duly stamped inadmissible in evidence, etc. -- No instrument chargeable with duty shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose by any person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence, or shall be acted upon, registered or authenticated by any such person or by any public officer, unless such instrument is duly stamped : Provided that-- (a) any such instrument shall be admitted in evidence on payment of the duty with which the same is chargeable, or, in the case of an instrument insufficiently stamped, of the amount required to make up such duty, together with a penalty of five rupees, or, when ten times the amount of the proper duty or deficient portion thereof exceeds five rupees, of a sum equal to ten times such duty or portion; (b) where any person from whom a stamped receipt could have been demanded, has given an unstamped receipt and such receipt, if stamped, would be admissible in evidence against him, then such receipt shall be admitted in evidence against him, then such receipt shall be admitted in evidence against him on payment of a penalty of one rupee by the person tendering it; (c) Where a contract or agreement of any kind is effected by correspondence consisting of two or more letters and any one of the letters bears the proper stamp, the contract or agreement shall be deemed to be duly stamped; (d) nothing herein contained shall prevent the admission of any instrument in evidence in any proceeding in a Criminal Court, other than a proceeding under Chapter XII or Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of 1898); (e) nothing herein contained shall prevent the admission of any instrument in any Court when such instrument has been executed by or on behalf of the Government, or where it bears the certificate of the Collector as provided by section 32 or any other provision of this Act. 19. Likewise Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 and Section 49 of the Registration Act 1908 would also be relevant here and quoted below. 19. Likewise Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 and Section 49 of the Registration Act 1908 would also be relevant here and quoted below. Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 is reproduced hereunder :- 17. Documents of which registration is compulsory.— (l) The following documents shall be registered, if the property to which they relate is situate in a district in which, and if they have been executed on or after the date on which, Act No. XVI of 1864, or the Indian Registration Act, 1866, or the Indian Registration Act, 1871, or the Indian Registration Act, 1877, or this Act came or comes into force, namely:— (a) Instruments of gift of immovable property; (b) other non-testamentary instruments which purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable property; (c) non-testamentary instruments which acknowledge the receipt or payment of any consideration on account of the creation, declaration, assignment, limitation or extinction of any such right, title or interest; and (d) leases of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent; (e) non-testamentary instruments transferring or assigning any decree or order of a Court or any award when such decree or order or award purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable property: Provided that the State Government may, by order published in the Official Gazette, exempt from the operation of this sub-section any lease executed in any district, or part of a district, the terms granted by which do not exceed five years and the annual rents reserved by which do not exceed fifty rupees. (1A) The documents containing contracts to transfer for consideration, any immovable property for the purpose of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882) shall be registered if they have been executed on or after the commencement of the Registration and Other Related laws (Amendment) Act, 2001 and if such documents are not registered on or after such commencement, then, they shall have no effect for the purposes of the said section 53A. (2) Nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (l) applies to— (i) any composition deed; or (ii) any instrument relating to shares in a joint stock Company, notwithstanding that the assets of such Company consist in whole or in part of immovable property; or (iii) any debenture issued by any such Company and not creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing any right, title or interest, to or in immovable property except in so far as it entitles the holder to the security afforded by a registered instrument whereby the Company has mortgaged, conveyed or otherwise transferred the whole or part of its immovable property or any interest therein to trustees upon trust for the benefit of the holders of such debentures; or (iv) any endorsement upon or transfer of any debenture issued by any such Company; or (v) any document other than the documents specified in sub-section (1A) not itself creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing any right, title or interest of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards to or in immovable property, but merely creating a right to obtain another document which will, when executed, create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any such right, title or interest; or (vi) any decree or order of a Court except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immovable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding; or (vii) any grant of immovable property by Government; or (viii) any instrument of partition made by a Revenue Officer; or (ix) any order granting a loan or instrument of collateral security granted under the Land Improvement Act, 1871, or the Land Improvement Loans Act, 1883; or (x) any order granting a loan under the Agriculturists, Loans Act, 1884, or instrument for securing the repayment of a loan made under that Act; or (xa) any order made under the Charitable Endowments Act, 1890, (6 of 1890) vesting any property in a Treasurer of Charitable Endowments or divesting any such Treasurer of any property; or (xi) any endorsement on a mortgage-deed acknowledging the payment of the whole or any part of the mortgage-money, and any other receipt for payment of money due under a mortgage when the receipt does not purport to extinguish the mortgage; or (xii) any certificate of sale granted to the purchaser of any property sold by public auction by a Civil or Revenue Officer. Explanation.—A document purporting or operating to effect a contract for the sale of immovable property shall not be deemed to require or ever to have required registration by reason only of the fact that such document contains a recital of the payment of any earnest money or of the whole or any part of the purchase money. (3) Authorities to adopt a son, executed after the 1st day of January, 1872, and not conferred by a will, shall also be registered. Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 is quoted below for ready reference : 49) Effect of non-registration of documents required to be registered.— No document required by section 17 or by any provision of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 ( 4 of 1882), to be registered shall— (a) affect any immovable property comprised therein, or (b) confer any power to adopt, or (c) be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such power, unless it has been registered: Provided that an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required by this Act or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), to be registered may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance under Chapter-II of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (3 of 1877) or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument”. 20. Thus, Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act mandates that any document which has the effect of creating and taking away the rights in respect of an immovable property must be registered and Section 49 of the Act imposes bar on the admissibility of an unregistered document and deals with the documents which are required to be registered u/s 17 of the Act. The said proposition is laid down in Yellapu Uma Maheshwari and Another v. Buddha Jagadheeswara Rao and others : (2015) 16 SCC 787 . 21. The said proposition is laid down in Yellapu Uma Maheshwari and Another v. Buddha Jagadheeswara Rao and others : (2015) 16 SCC 787 . 21. In the matter of R. Hemalatha (supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that as per proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act, an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required by the Registration Act or the Transfer of Property Act to be registered, may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance under Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument, however, subject to Section 17(1A) of the Registration Act. 22. The Supreme Court in the matter of R. Hemalatha (supra) held that as per proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 an unregistered agreement is admissible for suit of specific performance, however, in para 26 of the said decision it was held that exception to the proviso of Section 49 is provided under Section 17(1A) of the Registration Act. Section 17(1A) provides that the document containing contract for consideration of any immovable property for purpose of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 shall be registered. Section 53A provides that transfer of possession by transferee by way of contract. In the instant case as per the pleading of plaint the possession was transferred after and according to the agreement which makes Section 53A of the TP Act read with Section 17(1A) of the Registration Act applicable in the case. Thus, the case in hand falls within the exception of proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act, therefore, registration in the instant case was necessary and agreement cannot be held admissible. 23. Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for short ‘the Act, 1963’) provides that contracts not specifically enforceable, which is quoted below : 14. Thus, the case in hand falls within the exception of proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act, therefore, registration in the instant case was necessary and agreement cannot be held admissible. 23. Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for short ‘the Act, 1963’) provides that contracts not specifically enforceable, which is quoted below : 14. Contracts not specifically enforceable.—The following contracts cannot be specifically enforced, namely:— (a) where a party to the contract has obtained substituted performance of contract in accordance with the provisions of section 20; (b) a contract, the performance of which involves the performance of a continuous duty which the court cannot supervise; (c) a contract which is so dependent on the personal qualifications of the parties that the court cannot enforce specific performance of its material terms; and (d) a contract which is in its nature determinable. 24. From clause (d) of Section 14 of the Act, 1963 it is manifest that the contract was determinable in its nature after the specified period. Apart from the fact the prayer would show the contract obligations postulates that agreement to enter into an agreement was primarily executed. 25. The Supreme Court in the matter of Speech and Software Technologies (India) Private Limited v Neos Interactive Limited, (2009) 1 SCC 475 has held that agreement to enter into an agreement is neither enforceable nor does it confer any right upon the parties. Para 22 of the said decision is quoted below : 22. The said Letter of Intent on a bare reading is nothing but an agreement to enter into another agreement because it is provided in the said letter that "both parties agree to have set a deadline to sign this agreement by 15-9-2006". It is well settled legal position that an agreement to enter into an agreement is not enforceable nor does it confer any right upon the parties. The agreement in terms of the said Letter of Intent was to be signed on or before 15-9-2006. 26. From the above decision, it is evident that such prayer could not have been entertained, as it would not be specifically enforceable. 27. Applying the well settled principles of law and for the reasons stated hereinabove, we do not find any substance in the appeal. The order impugned is just and proper warranting no interference of this Court. 28. 26. From the above decision, it is evident that such prayer could not have been entertained, as it would not be specifically enforceable. 27. Applying the well settled principles of law and for the reasons stated hereinabove, we do not find any substance in the appeal. The order impugned is just and proper warranting no interference of this Court. 28. In the result, the appeal, sans merit, is liable to be and is hereby dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own cost(s).