JUDGMENT : SANJAY K. AGRAWAL, J. 1. Since these two criminal appeals have arisen out of the common impugned judgment dated 18.12.2015 passed by the Sessions Judge, Session at Jashpur, Chhattisgarh in Sessions Trial No. 21/2014, they have been clubbed together, heard together and are being decided by this common judgment. 2. The sole appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 543 of 2016 namely Imtiyaj Ansari @ Kalu (A-1) and the sole appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 71 of 2016 namely Ravitosh Toppo (A-2); both have preferred these two appeals under Section 374(2) of the CrPC, calling in question the validity, legality and correctness of the impugned judgment, whereby both have been convicted and sentenced as under: Conviction (both the appellants) Sentence (both the appellants) Under Section 364 (A) of the IPC Imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs. 50,000/- in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for 2 years Under Section 507 of the IPC Rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay fine amount of Rs. 10,000/- in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for 5 months Under Section 201 of the IPC Rigorous imprisonment for 7 years and to pay fine of Rs. 15,000/- in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for 8 months All sentences were directed to run concurrently. 3. Case of the prosecution, in nutshell, is that on the date of offence i.e. 18.12.2013 between 5:00 pm to 9:00 pm, near Jashpur Nagar Palika, Police Station Jashpur, District Jashpur, Chhattisgarh, appellants herein abducted Yash Kumar Singh @ Raj (now deceased), and asked for ransom from his mother Anita Singh (PW-1) and thereafter, they killed Yash Kumar Singh @ Raj and to screen themselves from the aforesaid offences hide the dead body of the deceased under the bricks in Vishwanath Bhagat’s old bricks clan and thereby committed the aforesaid offence. 4. It is further case of the prosecution that on the date of offence, Yash Kumar Singh, aged about 13 years, left his house at 5:00 pm for playing badminton, when he did not return home, Anita Singh (PW-1) called him on his mobile phone by using cellphone of Inamul (PW-2), which was answered by unknown person who asked for ransom for custody of her son. Thereafter, FIR was registered vide Ex.P/1. Dehati merg intimation and merg intimation were registered vide Exs.P/34 & P/36, respectively. Thereafter, FIR was registered vide Ex.P/1. Dehati merg intimation and merg intimation were registered vide Exs.P/34 & P/36, respectively. Nazari naksha was prepared vide Ex.P/16. Inquest proceedings (Ex.P/4) were conducted and the dead body of the deceased was sent for postmortem. As per postmortem report (Ex.P/20), proved by Dr. R.N. Kerketta (PW-10), cause of death was external and internal hemorrhagic shock due to injury of great vessels of neck right side and nature of death is homicidal. Pursuant to memorandum statement of A-1 (Ex.P/5), shirt, two mobile sets and shoes have been seized vide Ex.P/10 and pursuant to memorandum statement of A-2 (Ex.P/12), clothes have been seized vide Ex.P/13). Dead body of the deceased was recovered vide Ex.P/2, pursuant to memorandum statements of A-1 & A-2. Seized articles have been sent for chemical analysis, but FSL report has not been brought on record for the reasons best known to the prosecution. 5. After due investigation, appellants were charge-sheeted for the aforesaid offences and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions for trial in accordance with law. The appellants/accused persons abjured their guilt and entered into defence. 6. In order to bring home the offences prosecution has examined as many as 24 witnesses and exhibited 52 documents and defence in support of its case has neither examined any witness nor exhibited any document. 7. The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record, convicted the appellants/accused persons herein for the offences as mentioned in the opening paragraph of the judgment, against which these appeals have been preferred questioning the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. 8. Mr. J.K. Saxena, learned counsel for the appellants, submit that appellants have falsely been implicated in crime in question and they have been convicted by recording a finding which is perverse to the record. 8. Mr. J.K. Saxena, learned counsel for the appellants, submit that appellants have falsely been implicated in crime in question and they have been convicted by recording a finding which is perverse to the record. He also submits that theory of last seen together of A-1 and the deceased, as projected by the prosecution on the basis of statements of Sanjay Kumar Yadav (PW-12) and Rajesh Ram (PW-13) is not established beyond reasonable doubt and there is no certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 brought on record by the prosecution to prove the call details (Ex.P/.44), therefore, in view of decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sundar @ Sundarrajan vs. State by Inspector of Police, 2023 SCC Online SC 310 no reliance can be placed on the certificate issued by Superintendent of Police. He further submits that as far as A-2 is concerned, it is a case of no evidence. He also submits that A-2 has been roped only on the basis of recovery based on his memorandum statement (Ex.P/12), whereas, his memorandum was recorded at 7:20 hours on 20th December, 2013, 20 minutes after the memorandum of A-1, therefore, recovery of the dead body cannot be attributed on the basis of disclosure statement of A-2. He further submits that except this there is no other evidence against the appellants to connect them with the offence. As such, the conviction of the appellants (A-1 & A-2) herein is liable to the set aside and they are entitled for acquittal. 9. On the other hand, Mr. Sudeep Verma, learned State counsel, supports the impugned judgment and submits that prosecution has been able to bring home the offences beyond reasonable doubt and the trial Court has rightly convicted the appellants herein for the aforesaid offence and, therefore, the instant appeals deserve to be dismissed. 10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and gone through the records with utmost circumspection. 11. The first question is as to whether the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature, which the learned trial Court has recorded the finding in affirmative that the death of the deceased is homicidal in nature on the basis of postmortem report (Ex.P/20) which is proved by Dr. 11. The first question is as to whether the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature, which the learned trial Court has recorded the finding in affirmative that the death of the deceased is homicidal in nature on the basis of postmortem report (Ex.P/20) which is proved by Dr. R.N. Kerketta (PW-10) which is the finding of fact based on evidence available on record, it is neither perverse nor contrary to the record and we hereby affirm the said finding. 12. Now, the next question for consideration would be the appellants are authors of the crime in question? 13. The case of the prosecution is based on the circumstantial evidence and the trial Court has found incriminating circumstances established against two appellants herein. The five golden principles which constitute panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence have been laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 in paragraph 153 which state as under: “153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned ‘must or should’ and not ‘may be’ established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between ‘may be proved’ and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade vs. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 where the following observations were made: Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 14. Considering the nature of evidence available on record, it would be appropriate to consider the case of the two appellants herein one by one separately. Case of Imtiyaj Ansari @ Kalu (A-1) in CRA No. 543/2016 15. The trial Court has convicted A-1 on the basis of statements of Sanjay Kumar Yadav (PW-12) and Rajesh Ram (PW-13) and finding that pursuant to his memorandum statement (Ex.P/5) dead body of Yash Kumar Singh (deceased) was recovered vide Ex.P/2. However, Anita Singh (PW-1), mother of Yash Kumar Singh @ Raj, in her statement before the Court has stated that on 18.12.2013 at 5:00 pm her son Yash Kumar Singh @ Raj left her house stating that he is going to play badminton, but he did not come back to the house in the evening, thereafter, she registered the FIR vide Ex.P/1. Sanjay Kumar Yadav (PW-12) in his statement before the Court has stated that on the date of offence, he was working as a driver and driving Tata Magic, whose owners were Raj Singh & Suresh Singh, and on the date of offence i.e. 18.12.2013, at about 6:00, he was standing at Jashpur bus stand along with his vehicle and Yash Kumar Singh @ Raj was sitting in his vehicle, he received phone call on his mobile and immediately thereafter, A-1 came there with motorcycle and took Yash Kumar Singh @ Raj along with him on his motorcycle and thereafter, dead body of the deceased was recovered on 20.12.2023 at 8:00 am vide Ex.P/2, from the land of Vishwanath Bhagat’s old bricks clan. He has been subjected to some extent of cross-examination, but nothing has been extracted to hold that A-1 has not taken Yash Kumar Singh along with him. He has been subjected to some extent of cross-examination, but nothing has been extracted to hold that A-1 has not taken Yash Kumar Singh along with him. Similarly, Rajesh Ram (PW-13), who used to live at village Tikaitganj and he is a shopkeeper, in his statement before the Court, he has stated that on the date of offence between 6:00pm-7:00 pm A-1 along with Yash Kumar Singh came to his shop and purchased beedi & cigarette. He has also been subjected to some extent of cross-examination, but nothing has been extracted to hold that on the date of offence, he had not seen A-1 along with Yash Kumar Singh together between 6:00 to 7:00 pm. Thus, from the statement of Anita Singh (PW-1) that her son Yash Kumar Singh was missing from the evening of 18.12.2013 and from the statements of Sanjay Kumar Yadav (PW-12), & Rajesh Ram (PW-13) in which they have clearly stated that on the date of offence Yash Kumar Singh was with A-1 between 6:00 to 7:00 pm. Both the witnesses have clearly stated that Yash Kumar Singh was in custody of A-1. As such, it is quite vivid that A-1 had abducted Yash Kumar Singh on 18.12.2013 around 5:00 to 7:00 pm and thereafter, on 20.12.2013 dead body of Yash Kumar Singh was recovered at 8:00 am vide Ex.P/2 in presence of Kripashankar Bhagat (PW-3) & Rajsharan Bhagat (PW-4). Therefore, the burden of proof was upon A-1 who could have stated in his statement under Section 313 of the CrPC, as to what happened and what transpired with the deceased after he has kidnapped Yash Kumar Singh (deceased), but no such explanation has been offered by A-1 in his statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. which he was obliged to explain. 16. The Supreme Court in the matter of Sucha Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2001) 4 SCC 375 while dealing with a case where two persons were taken away by armed assailants from their house at night and their dead bodies, studded with gunshot injuries, were found next morning lying near their house and the abductors did not explain and furnish any information, which was within their exclusive knowledge as to what happened to the deceased therein after they were abducted. It was held that presumption can be drawn and the abductors were responsible for murder of the deceased therein and observed in Para-15, 18, 19 & 20 as under: “15. The abductors alone could tell the court as to what happened to the deceased after they were abducted. When the abductors withheld that information from the court there is every justification for drawing the inference, in the light of all the preceding and succeeding circumstances adverted to above, that the abductors are the murderers of the deceased. *** *** *** 18. Learned senior counsel contended that Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not intended for the purpose of filling up the vacuum in prosecution evidence. He invited our attention to the observations made by the Privy Council in Attygalle and Another vs. The King, AIR 1936 PC 169 and Stephen Seneviratne vs. The King, AIR 1936 PC 289 . In fact the observations contained therein were considered by this Court in an early decision authored by Vivian Bose, J. in Shambhu Nath Mehra vs. State of Ajmer, AIR 1956 SC 404 . The statement of law made by the learned Judge in the aforesaid decision has been extracted by us in State of West Bengal vs. Mir Mohammad Omar (supra). It is useful to extract a further portion of the observation made by us in the aforesaid decision: “33. Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above principle has gained legislative recognition in India when Section 114 is incorporated in the Evidence Act. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process the court shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct etc. in relation to the facts of the case.” 19. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process the court shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct etc. in relation to the facts of the case.” 19. We pointed out that Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but the section would apply to cases where prosecution has succeeded in proving facts for which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the accused by virtue of special knowledge regarding such facts failed to offer any explanation which might drive the court to draw a different inference. 20. We have seriously bestowed our consideration to the arguments addressed by the learned senior counsel. We only reiterate the legal principle adumbrated in State of West Bengal vs. Mir Mohammad Omar, AIR 1936 PC 169 that when more persons than one have abducted the victim, who was later murdered, it is within the legal province of the court to justifiably draw a presumption depending on the factual situation, that all the abductors are responsible for the murder. Section 34 of the IPC could be invoked for the aid to that end, unless any particular abductor satisfies the court with his explanation as to what else he did with the victim subsequently, i.e. whether he left his associates en-route or whether he dissuaded others from doing the extreme act etc. etc.” 17. Very recently, the Supreme Court in the matter of Ram Gopal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2023 Live Law (SC) 120 by relying upon its earlier decisions in the matter of Rajender vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2019) 10 SCC 623 and Satpal vs. State of Haryana, (2018) 6 SCC 610 held that in a case based on circumstantial evidence furnishing or non-furnishing of explanation by accused would be very crucial fact and theory of last seen together as propounded by the prosecution has to be proved against him and observed in Para-06 and 9 as under: “6. It may be noted that once the theory of “last seen together” was established by the prosecution, the accused was expected to offer some explanation as to when and under what circumstances he had parted the company of the deceased. It may be noted that once the theory of “last seen together” was established by the prosecution, the accused was expected to offer some explanation as to when and under what circumstances he had parted the company of the deceased. It is true that the burden to prove the guilt of the accused is always on the prosecution, however in view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, when any fact is within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Of course, Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve the prosecution of its duty to prove the guilt of the accused, nonetheless it is also equally settled legal position that if the accused does not throw any light upon the facts which are proved to be within his special knowledge, in view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, such failure on the part of the accused may be used against the accused as it may provide an additional link in the chain of circumstances required to be proved against him. In the case based on circumstantial evidence, furnishing or non- furnishing of the explanation by the accused would be a very crucial fact, when the theory of “last seen together” as propounded by the prosecution was proved against him. *** *** *** 9. In view of the afore-stated legal position, it is discernible that though the last seen theory as propounded by the prosecution in a case based on circumstantial evidence may be a weak kind of evidence by itself to base conviction solely on such theory, when the said theory is proved coupled with other circumstances such as the time when the deceased was last seen with the accused, and the recovery of the corpse being in very close proximity of time, the accused does owe an explanation under Section 106 of the Evidence Act with regard to the circumstances under which death might have taken place. If the accused offers no explanation or furnishes a wrong explanation, absconds, motive is established and some other corroborative evidence in the form of recovery of weapon etc. forming a chain of circumstances is established, the conviction could be based on such evidence.” 18. If the accused offers no explanation or furnishes a wrong explanation, absconds, motive is established and some other corroborative evidence in the form of recovery of weapon etc. forming a chain of circumstances is established, the conviction could be based on such evidence.” 18. In view of the principle of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Sucha Singh (supra) and Ram Gopal (supra), we are of the considered opinion that the trial Court has rightly held that it is A-1, who abducted Yash Kumar Singh (deceased) and thereafter, caused his death as no explanation under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. has been furnished by him as to what happened to the deceased after he was last seen together with the deceased by Sanjay Kumar Yadav (PW-12) & Rajesh Ram (PW-13). 19. Furthermore, it has been established from the evidence available on record that the dead body of the deceased was recovered vide Ex. P/2, proved by Kripashankar Bhagat (PW-3) & Rajasharan Bhagat (PW-4) pursuant to the memorandum statement of A-1 (Ex. P/5). 20. The Supreme Court in the matter of State of Maharashtra vs. Suresh, (2000) 1 SCC 471 held that if an incriminating material is recovered pursuant to memorandum statement of accused, he is required to explain as to how else he came to know of such concealment and non-explanation is fatal to the accused and observed in Para-26 as under: “26. We too countenance three possibilities when an accused points out the place where a dead body or an incriminating material was concealed without stating that it was conceded by himself. One is that he himself would have concealed it Second is that he would have seen somebody else concealing it. And the third is that he would have been told by another person that it was concealed there. But if the accused declines to tell the criminal court that his knowledge about the concealment was on account of one of the last two possibilities me criminal court can presume that it was concealed by the accused himself. And the third is that he would have been told by another person that it was concealed there. But if the accused declines to tell the criminal court that his knowledge about the concealment was on account of one of the last two possibilities me criminal court can presume that it was concealed by the accused himself. This is because accused is the only person who can Offer the explanation as to how else he came to know of such concealment and if he chooses to refrain from telling the court as to how else he came to know of it, the presumption is a well justified course to be adopted by the criminal court mat the concealment was made by himself. Such an interpretation is not inconsistent with the principle embodied in Section 27 of the Evidence Act.” 21. The aforesaid principle of law laid down in Suresh (supra) was followed with approval in the matter of Ningappa Yallappa Hosamani and Others vs. State of Karnataka and Others, (2009) 14 SCC 582 . 22. Thereafter, in the matter of Arvind Singh vs. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 11 SCC 1 the Supreme Court has observed as under: “88......In the present case, the dead body was lying in a concealed place and that there was no possible explanation on behalf of the accused as to how the body came to be concealed at that particular place, when the prosecution evidence proves that the accused were near the place of recovery of dead body almost at the probable time of death.” 23. Returning to the facts of the present case in the light of principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in above-mentioned judgments, it is quite vivid that A-1 had kidnapped minor Yash Kumar Singh from the lawful custody of his parents which was clearly witnessed by Sanjay Kumar Yadav (PW-12) & Rajesh Ram (PW-13) which the trial Court has found proved in preceding paragraphs and we have also affirmed that it is A-1 who had kidnapped minor Yash Kumar Singh. Furthermore, the dead body of Yash Raj Singh (deceased) was recovered vide Ex. P/2, proved by Kripashankar Bhagat (PW-3) & Rajasharan Bhagat (PW-4), pursuant to the memorandum statement of A-1 (Ex. P/5). Furthermore, the dead body of Yash Raj Singh (deceased) was recovered vide Ex. P/2, proved by Kripashankar Bhagat (PW-3) & Rajasharan Bhagat (PW-4), pursuant to the memorandum statement of A-1 (Ex. P/5). As such, the dead body of Yash Kumar Singh (deceased) was recovered to the place pointed out by A-1 which is an incriminating circumstances and the same he has failed to explain in his statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. as to how and under what circumstances Yash Kumar Singh died. In that view of the matter, it is clearly established that it is A-1 who is the author of the crime. 24. However, incriminating circumstance found established by the trial Court and recorded by the trial Court in Para 59 of its judgment is that A-1 had used mobile No. 7879780313 (wrongly typed in Para 59 of the impugned judgment mobile No. 7579780313), mobile of his brother Mumtaj Ansari (PW-6), to call on mobile no. 9179058722 to communicate Anita Singh (PW-1), mother of Yash Kumar Singh, for demanding ransom amount for that purpose A-1 had kidnapped Yash Kumar Singh. The relevant paragraph states as under- 25. In order to assail the above-stated finding holding it to be a piece of incriminating circumstance, it has been contended on behalf of the appellant that call details (Ex.P/44) are not supported with certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, therefore, it is inadmissible in evidence and, as such, no reliance can be placed upon it, as the trial Court went wrong in accepting it as a piece of incriminating evidence and reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun Panditrao Khotkar vs. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2021) 7 SCC 1 in which their Lordships resolving the dispute and the conflict raised in the matters of Shafhi Mohammad vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2018) 2 SCC 801 and Anvar P.V. vs. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473 have clearly held that production of certificate under Section 65B of the Evidence Act is mandatory only in case of secondary evidence where primary evidence is not laid or original is not produced. Their Lordships further held that the certificate required under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act is a condition precedent to the admissibility of secondary evidence by way of electronic evidence as laid down in Anvar P.V. (supra) and incorrectly clarified in Shafhi Mohammad (supra). It was held as under: “61. We may reiterate, therefore, that the certificate required under Section 65-B(4) is a condition precedent to the admissibility of evidence by way of electronic record, as correctly held in Anvar P.V. (supra), and incorrectly “clarified” in Shafhi Mohammed (supra). Oral evidence in the place of such certificate cannot possibly suffice as Section 65-B(4) is a mandatory requirement of the law. Indeed, the hallowed principle in Taylor vs. Taylor, (1875) LR 1 Ch D 426 which has been followed in a number of the judgments of this Court, can also be applied. Section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act clearly states that secondary evidence is admissible only if led in the manner stated and not otherwise. To hold otherwise would render Section 65- B(4) otiose.” Their Lordships also held that the required certificate under Section 65B(4) is unnecessary if the original document itself is produced and this can be done by the owner of a laptop computer, computer tablet or even a mobile phone, by stepping into the witness box and proving that the concerned device, on which the original information is first stored, is owned and/or operated by him. The reference was answered in paragraphs 73.1, 73.2 and 73.3 as under: “73.1. Anvar P.V. (supra), as clarified by us hereinabove, is the law declared by this Court on Section 65B of the Evidence Act. The judgment in Tomaso Bruno, (2015) 7 SCC 178 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 54 being per incuriam, does not lay down the law correctly. Also, the judgment in Shafhi Mohammad (supra) and the judgment dated 3-4-2018 reported as Shafhi Mohd. vs. State of H.P. (2018) 5 SCC 311 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 704, do not lay down the law correctly and are therefore overruled. 73.2. The clarification referred to above is that the required certificate under Section 65-B(4) is unnecessary if the original document itself is produced. vs. State of H.P. (2018) 5 SCC 311 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 704, do not lay down the law correctly and are therefore overruled. 73.2. The clarification referred to above is that the required certificate under Section 65-B(4) is unnecessary if the original document itself is produced. This can be done by the owner of a laptop computer, computer tablet or even a mobile phone, by stepping into the witness box and proving that the device concerned, on which the original information is first stored, is owned and/or operated by him. In cases where the “computer” happens to be a part of a “computer system” or “computer network” and it becomes impossible to physically bring such system or network to the Court, then the only means of providing information contained in such electronic record can be in accordance with Section 65-B(1), together with the requisite certificate under Section 65-B(4). The last sentence in Para 24 in Anvar P.V. (supra) which reads as “....if an electronic record as such is used as primary evidence under Section 62 of the Evidence Act.....” is thus clarified; it is to be read without the words “under Section 62 of the Evidence Act.....” With this clarification, the law stated in Para 24 of Anvar P.V. (supra) does not need to be revisited. 73.3. The general directions issued in Para 64 (supra) shall hereafter be followed by courts that deal with electronic evidence, to ensure their preservation, and production of certificate at the appropriate stage. These directions shall apply in all proceedings, till rules and directions under Section 67-C of the Information Technology Act and data retention conditions are formulated for compliance by telecom and internet service providers.” 26. In the matter of Ravinder Singh @ Kaku vs. State of Punjab, 2022 Live Law (SC) 461 their Lordships of the Supreme Court while following the decision of Arjun Panditrao Khotkar (supra) have held that oral evidence in the place of certificate cannot be possibly suffice as Section 65B(4) is a mandatory requirement of law. Their Lordships held that Section 65B(4) is a mandatory requirement of law and observed as under: “21. In light of the above, the electronic evidence produced before the High Court should have been in accordance with the statute and should have complied with the certification requirement, for it to be admissible in the court of law. Their Lordships held that Section 65B(4) is a mandatory requirement of law and observed as under: “21. In light of the above, the electronic evidence produced before the High Court should have been in accordance with the statute and should have complied with the certification requirement, for it to be admissible in the court of law. As rightly stated above, oral evidence in the place of such certificate, as is the case in the present matter, cannot possibly suffice as Section 65B(4) is a mandatory requirement of the law.” 27. Returning to the facts of the present case in the light of the aforesaid pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar (supra) and Ravinder Singh @ Kaku (supra), prosecution has failed to produce certificate under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act and further failed to establish that mobile No. 7879780313 (wrongly typed in Para 59 of the impugned judgment mobile No. 7579780313), is of Mumtaj Ansari – brother of A-1, was actually used by A-1 and he called on mobile No. 9179058722 which was received by Anita Singh (PW-1), and mobile No. 9179058722 was used by Anita Singh, though two mobile sets have been seized pursuant to memorandum statement of A-1 and it has been taken as incriminating piece of evidence, since it is not supported by certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. As such, call details (Ex.P/44) is inadmissible for want of mandatory certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Concludingly, though the call details (Ex.P/44) is an inadmissible piece of evidence, but in view of the statements of Anita Singh (PW-1), Sanjay Kumar Yadav (PW-12) & Rajesh Ram (PW-13), it is evident that A-1 had abducted Yash Kumar Singh and, therefore, in the light of principles of law laid down by the their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matters of Sucha Singh (supra) & Ram Gopal (supra), A-1 has failed to explain in his statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. as to how and under what circumstances Yash Kumar Singh died. Pursuant to the memorandum statement of A-1 (Ex.P/5) dead body of Yash Kumar Singh was recovered vide Ex.P/2, which he has also failed to mention as held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter Suresh (supra), Ningappa Yallappa Hosamani (supra). Pursuant to the memorandum statement of A-1 (Ex.P/5) dead body of Yash Kumar Singh was recovered vide Ex.P/2, which he has also failed to mention as held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter Suresh (supra), Ningappa Yallappa Hosamani (supra). In that view of the matter the conviction of A-1 for offences under Sections 364(A), 507 and 201 of the IPC is well merited. Case of Ravitosh Toppo (A-2) in CRA No. 71 of 2016 28. A-2 has been implicated on the ground that pursuant to his memorandum statement (Ex.P/12), dead body of Yash Kumar Singh has been recovered vide Ex.P/2. It is pertinent to mention here that memorandum statement of A-1 was recorded on 20.12.2013 at 7:00 am vide Ex.P/5 and memorandum statement of A-2 was recorded on 20.12.2013 at 7:20 am vide Ex.P/12 and dead body of Yash Kumar Singh has been recovered on 20.12.2013 at 8:00 am. However, at this stage, it would be appropriate to notice the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sukhvinder Singh and Others vs. State of Punjab, (1994) 5 SCC 152 in which their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered the issue, as to whether, there can be rediscovery of fact already disclosed and held that disclosure made by more than one accused leading to one and the same discovery, first in point of time would alone be admissible and held as under in Para 16 of its judgment: 16. The first piece of circumstantial evidence relied upon against them revolves around the recovery of the dead body of Varun Kumar from the house of Sukhvinder Singh and his parents on the disclosure statements made by Sukhvinder Singh, Sukhdev Paul and Puran Chand Ex. PW 10/B, Ex. PW 10/C and Ex. PW 10/D respectively. We are surprised at the manner in which the disclosure statements were recorded by the investigating agency and relied upon by the Designated Court. That Section 27 of the Evidence Act is an exception to the general rule that a statement made before the police is not admissible in evidence is not in doubt. However, vide Section 27 of the Evidence Act, only so much of the statement of an accused is admissible in evidence as distinctly leads to the discovery of a fact. That Section 27 of the Evidence Act is an exception to the general rule that a statement made before the police is not admissible in evidence is not in doubt. However, vide Section 27 of the Evidence Act, only so much of the statement of an accused is admissible in evidence as distinctly leads to the discovery of a fact. Therefore, once the fact has been discovered Section 27 of the Evidence Act cannot again be made use of to ‘rediscover’ the discovered fact. It would be a total misuse - even abuse - of the provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. From the testimony of PW14, SI Kashmir Singh it transpires that in the presence of PWs Hari Dutt and Jugal Kishore during the interrogation by SI Amar Singh, Sukhavinder Singh appellant made a disclosure statement to the effect that he along with others had concealed the dead body of Varun Kumar in the stack of hay in the room and that he could get the same recovered. His disclosure statement Ex. PW10/B was accordingly recorded which was signed by him and attested by the panch witnesses. Except for the discovery of the dead body of Varun Kumar on the basis of the disclosure statement of Sukhvmder Singh, Ex. PW 10/B, no other portion of the statement of Sukhvmder Singh implicating himself and others with the commission of the crime is admissible in evidence. After the disclosure statement was made by Sukhvinder Singh disclosing as to where the dead body of Varun Kumar had been concealed and from where it could be recovered, the recording of the disclosure statements of Sukhdev Paul and Puran Chand Ex. PW 10/C and Ex. PW 10/D was a wholly impermissible exercise and an obvious attempt to rope in Sukhdev Paul and Puran Chand with the aid of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Since, the information had already been given by Sukhvinder Singh, appellant in his disclosure statement Ex. PW 10/B, the two subsequent statements Ex. PW 10/C and Ex. PW 10/D were not admissible in evidence because at the best they were leading to the "rediscovery of a fact already disclosed and capable of discovery.” It has been admitted by PW14 that the disclosure statement, Ex. PW 10/B, the two subsequent statements Ex. PW 10/C and Ex. PW 10/D were not admissible in evidence because at the best they were leading to the "rediscovery of a fact already disclosed and capable of discovery.” It has been admitted by PW14 that the disclosure statement, Ex. PW 10/B, made by Sukhvinder Singh was the first in point of time and that he had disclosed where the dead body had been concealed and that he could point out the place and get it recovered. The investigating officer should have immediately acted upon the disclosure statement Ex. PW 10/B, rather than wait and record two more disclosure statements, as if the authenticity of recovery of dead body could be achieved by the mere number of disclosure statements leading to the discovery of one and the same fact. In the face of the admission of PW14 as noticed above, it is obvious that the so-called disclosure statements of Sukhdev Paul and Puran Chand Ex. PW 10/C and Ex. PW 10/D were not admissible in evidence and the Designated Court fell in error in relying upon the same. Admittedly, so far as Puran Chand is concerned, apart from the disclosure statement Ex. PW 10/D, there is no other piece of circumstantial evidence relied upon by the prosecution and once we rule out of consideration the disclosure statement allegedly made by Puran Chand Ex. PW 10/D, the conclusion is inescapable that the prosecution has not been able to establish the case against Puran Chand beyond a reasonable doubt and there is no circumstance which can connect him with the alleged crime. The prosecution has led no evidence to show any connection inter se so far as the three appellants are concerned. 29. Thus, the rediscovery of fact that is of dead body of Yash Kumar Singh which has also been disclosed by A-1, would not be admissible in the light of the principles of law laid down in Sukhvinder Singh (supra). 30. Furthermore, A-2 has been implicated in crime in question also on the ground that pursuant to his memorandum (Ex.P/12), clothes have been seized vide Ex.P/13, however, seized articles have been sent for chemical analysis to FSL, but FSL report has not been brought on record for the reasons best known to the prosecution. 30. Furthermore, A-2 has been implicated in crime in question also on the ground that pursuant to his memorandum (Ex.P/12), clothes have been seized vide Ex.P/13, however, seized articles have been sent for chemical analysis to FSL, but FSL report has not been brought on record for the reasons best known to the prosecution. The Supreme Court in the matter of Balwan Singh vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Another, (2019) 7 SCC 781 held that if the recovery of bloodstained articles is proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution, and if the investigation was not found to be tainted, then it may be sufficient if the prosecution shows that the blood found on the articles is of human origin though, even though the blood group is not proved because of disintegration of blood the recovery is of no use and observed in paragraphs 23 and 24 as under: “23. From the aforementioned discussion, we can summarise that if the recovery of bloodstained articles is proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution, and if the investigation was not found to be tainted, then it may be sufficient if the prosecution shows that the blood found on the articles is of human origin though, even though the blood group is not proved because of disintegration of blood. The court will have to come to the conclusion based on the facts and circumstances of each case, and there cannot be any fixed formula that the prosecution has to prove, or need not prove, that the blood groups match. “24. In the instant case, then, we could have placed some reliance on the recovery, had the prosecution at least proved that the blood was of human origin. As observed supra, while discussing the evidence of PWs 9 and 16, the prosecution has tried to concoct the case from stage to stage. Hence, in the absence of positive material indicating that the stained blood was of human origin and of the same blood group as that of the accused, it would be difficult for the Court to rely upon the aspect of recovery of the weapons and tabbal, and such recovery does not help the case of the prosecution.” 31. Hence, in the absence of positive material indicating that the stained blood was of human origin and of the same blood group as that of the accused, it would be difficult for the Court to rely upon the aspect of recovery of the weapons and tabbal, and such recovery does not help the case of the prosecution.” 31. In that view of the matter, it would be unsafe to convict A-2 only on the ground that pursuant to his memorandum statement (Ex.P/12), clothes were seized vide Ex.P/13 and this incriminating circumstance evidence does not support the case of the prosecution as FSL report has not been brought on record to prove that on seized article blood/human blood was found. In view of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Balwan Singh (supra) recovery is of no use to the prosecution. As such, since there is no oral and documentary evidence on record to connect A-2 herein with the offences in question, we hereby set aside the conviction of A-2 for offences under Sections 364A, 507 & 201 of the IPC as well as there respective sentences and he is entitled for acquittal on the basis of benefit of doubt. 32. In view of the above discussion, the conviction of Imtiyaj Ansari @ Kalu (A-1) for offences under Sections 364(A), 507 and 201 of the IPC is hereby affirmed and conviction of Ravitosh Toppo (A-2) for offences under Sections 364(A), 507 and 201 of the IPC is hereby set aside and he is acquitted of the charges. Ravitosh Toppo (A-2) is reported to be on bail, he need not surrender. However, his bail bonds shall remain in operation for a period of six months as per the provisions contained in Section 437-A of the Cr.P.C. 33. As a consequence, Criminal Appeal No. 543/2016 is dismissed and Criminal Appeal No. 71/2016 is allowed. 34. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original records be transmitted to the concerned trial Court and to the Superintendent of Jail where they are lodged and suffering jail sentence, forthwith for necessary information and action, if any.