JUDGMENT : Arup Kumar Goswami, J. Heard Mr. Sudeep Johri, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. H.S. Ahluwalia, learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for respondent No. 1 and Mr. Pankaj Agrawal, learned counsel, appearing for respondent No. 2. 2. This appeal is preferred against an order dated 22.10.2018 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (S) No. 3056 of 2012, dismissing the writ petition. 3. Challenge in the writ petition was to an order dated 30.06.2012, by which, the petitioner, who was working as driver with respondent No. 2, was compulsorily retired in public interest on the ground that the District Medical Board had found him unfit to work as a driver, in the light of a notification No. 3-24/2000/3/1, dated 22.08.2000 of the General Administration Department. 4. The petitioner was due to retire on regular superannuation on 15.12.2017 and thus, he was compulsorily retired about 5 years prior to his actual date of retirement. 5. The writ petitioner died on 13.01.2021 and thereafter, his legal heirs have been substituted. 6. A contention was advanced before the learned Single Judge, as is noticed from the impugned judgment, that the petitioner ought to be accommodated by providing him with an alternative job which he could have performed despite his disability in connection with eyesight. 7. Though the impugned order dated 30.06.2012 does not recite the kind of disability that the petitioner had, the Medical Board opined, as is demonstrated by Annexure-R-2-3 of the return of the respondent No. 2, that the petitioner had a condition called “Bilateral Operated Glaucoma with No Perception of Light in Left Eye (one eyed)”. 8. It was also contended that the petitioner ought to have been given notice of retirement well in advance and if not, should have been paid salary in lieu of the notice period. There was no public interest involved in retiring the petitioner compulsorily. As the petitioner had crossed the age of regular superannuation by the time the writ petition came to be disposed of, a contention was advanced that a direction may be issued for payment of compensation. 9. The notification dated 22.08.2000, as reflected in the order of compulsory retirement dated 30.06.2012, was not placed on record. 10. As the petitioner had crossed the age of regular superannuation by the time the writ petition came to be disposed of, a contention was advanced that a direction may be issued for payment of compensation. 9. The notification dated 22.08.2000, as reflected in the order of compulsory retirement dated 30.06.2012, was not placed on record. 10. Learned Single Judge relied on Fundamental Rule 56 (2) (a), which provides that a government servant may, in public interest, be retired at any time after he has completed 20 years of qualifying service or he attains the age of 50 years, whichever is earlier, without assigning any reason by giving him a notice in writing. 11. Taking note of the nature of the duty that the petitioner was discharging, it was observed that he should have proper vision in both the eyes and if a person with defective eyesight is allowed to drive a vehicle, he will endanger the safety of all the persons travelling in such vehicle. 12. A finding was recorded that the petitioner did not lose his eyesight on account of some employment related injury and that the nature of ailment suffered by the petitioner could not be said to be one arising from occupational hazard. 13. The decision in Anand Bihari & Others v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur Through its Managing Director & Another, reported in (1991) 1 SCC 731 , which was pressed into service by the learned counsel for the petitioner, was held to be distinguishable on facts. However, there was no discussion on that aspect. 14. Mr. Johri submits that the learned Single Judge was not justified in dismissing the writ petition. He submits that it is an occupational hazard for a driver to develop over the years, problems relating to eyesight. Only because some medical disability had arisen, it does not behove on the part of the employer to unceremoniously show the door to an employee, who is in employment for couple of decades, taking shelter under the guise of “public interest”. In the attending facts and circumstances, he submits that it is a fit case where this Court may grant suitable compensation, as may be considered just and proper. In the attending facts and circumstances, he submits that it is a fit case where this Court may grant suitable compensation, as may be considered just and proper. In support of his submissions, he has placed reliance in the case of Anand Bihari (supra) as well as Bhagwan Dass & Another v. Punjab State Electricity Board, which was decided on 04.01.2008 (Civil Appeal No. 8 of 2008) 15. Mr. Ahluwalia and Mr. Agrawal seek to justify the order of the learned Single Judge. 16. In Anand Bihari (supra), services of the drivers working in the State Transport Corporation were terminated on the ground that they had developed eyesight which was not of standard required to drive buses. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had held that termination in such an event being covered by sub-clause (c) of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, ‘Act of 1947’), would not amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Act of 1947. That being the position, termination per se is not illegal because the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947 had not been followed while effecting such termination. 17. At paragraph 9, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: “9. Although the order of termination of service per se cannot be faulted on the ground of the breach of the Act, the important question that still remains to be considered is whether in the circumstances of the case and against the background of the relevant provisions of our Constitution, it can be said that the action of the Corporation is proper, equitable and justified. The facts on record show that all the workmen have put in service with the Corporation for long periods. All of them are above 40 years of age. Their superannuation age is 58 years. There is no dispute that they developed a weak or sub-normal eyesight or lost their required vision on account of their occupation as drivers in the Corporation. As is commonly known, the drivers of the buses run by the Corporation such as the present one, have to drive the heavy motor vehicles in sun, rain, dust and dark hours of night. In the process, they are exposed to the glaring and blazing sunlight and beaming and blinding lights of the vehicles coming from the opposite direction. As is commonly known, the drivers of the buses run by the Corporation such as the present one, have to drive the heavy motor vehicles in sun, rain, dust and dark hours of night. In the process, they are exposed to the glaring and blazing sunlight and beaming and blinding lights of the vehicles coming from the opposite direction. They are required to strain their eyesight every moment of the driving, keeping a watchful eye on the road for the bumps, bends and slopes, and to avoid all kinds of obstacles on the way. It is this constant straining of eyes on the road which takes its inevitable toll of the vision. The very fact that in a short period, the Corporation had to terminate the services of no less than 30 drivers who are before us shows the extent of the occupational hazard to which the drivers of the Corporation are exposed during their service. It also shows that weakening of the eyesight is not an isolated phenomenon but a widespread risk to which those who take the employment of a driver expose themselves. Yet the Corporation treats their cases in the same manner and fashion as it treats the cases of other workmen who on account of reasons not connected with the employment suffer from ill-health or continued ill-health. That by itself is discriminatory against the drivers. The discrimination against the employees such as the drivers in the present case, also ensues from the fact that whereas they have to face premature termination of service on account of disabilities contracted from their jobs, the other employees continue to serve till the date of their superannuation. Admittedly, no special provision is made and no compensatory relief is provided in the service condition for the drivers for such premature incapacitation. There is no justification in treating the cases of workmen like drivers who are exposed to occupational diseases and disabilities on par with the other employees. The injustice, inquiry and discrimination is writ large in such cases and is indefensible. The service conditions of the workmen such as the drivers in the present case, therefore, must provide for adequate safeguards to remedy the situation by compensating them in some form for the all-round loss they suffer for no fault of theirs.” 18. The injustice, inquiry and discrimination is writ large in such cases and is indefensible. The service conditions of the workmen such as the drivers in the present case, therefore, must provide for adequate safeguards to remedy the situation by compensating them in some form for the all-round loss they suffer for no fault of theirs.” 18. A perusal of the aforesaid judgment would go to show that within a very short period, the Corporation had to terminate the services of not less than 30 drivers and that such enormity of incidence of disability demonstrated the extent of occupational hazard to which the drivers of the Corporation are exposed to during their service. It also showed that weakening of the eyesight is not an isolated phenomenon, but a widespread risk to which those who take the employment of a driver exposes themselves. 19. Therefore, the finding of the learned Single Judge that it was not a case of occupational hazard, is not tenable in law. 20. A perusal of the above judgment would further go to show that the Hon’ble Supreme Court had suggested to the Corporation to frame a scheme of compensatory relief for drivers. The same having not borne any fruit, the Hon’ble Supreme Court at paragraph 15 laid down as follows: “15. In view of the helplessness shown by the Corporation, we are constrained to evolve a scheme which, according to us, would give relief as best as it can to the workmen such as the ones involved in the present case. While evolving the scheme and giving these directions we have kept in mind that the workmen concerned are incapacitated to work only as drivers and are not rendered incapable of taking any other job either in the Corporation or outside. Secondly, the workmen are at an advanced age of their life and it would be difficult for them to get a suitable alternative employment outside. Thirdly, we are also mindful of the fact that the relief made available under the scheme should not be such as would induce the workmen to feign disability which, in the case of disability such as the present one, viz., the development of a defective eyesight, it may be easy to do. Thirdly, we are also mindful of the fact that the relief made available under the scheme should not be such as would induce the workmen to feign disability which, in the case of disability such as the present one, viz., the development of a defective eyesight, it may be easy to do. Bearing in mind all the aforesaid factors, we direct the Corporation as follows : (i) The Corporation shall in addition to giving each of the retired workmen his retirement benefits, offer him any other alternative job which may be available and which he is eligible to perform. (ii) In case no such alternative job is available, each of the workmen shall be paid along with his retirement benefits, an additional compensatory amount as follows: (a) where the employee has put in 5 years' or less than 5 years' service, the amount of compensation shall be equivalent to 7 days' salary per year of the balance of his service; (b) where the employee has put in more than 5 years’ but less than 10 years’ service, the amount of compensation shall be equivalent to 15 days’ salary per year of the balance of his service; (c) where the employee has put in more than 10 years' but less that 15 years' service, the amount of compensation shall be equivalent to 21 days' salary per year of the balance of his service; (d) where the employee has put in more than 15 years' service but less than 20 years' service, the amount of compensation shall be equivalent to one month's salary per year of the balance of his service; (e) where the employee has put in more than 20 years' service, the amount of compensation shall be equivalent to two months' salary per year of the balance of his service. The salary will mean the total monthly emoluments that the workman was drawing on the date of his retirement. (iii) If the alternative job is not available immediately but becomes available at a later date, the Corporation may offer it to the workman provided he refunds the proportionate compensatory amount. (iv) The option to accept either of the two reliefs, if an alternative job is offered by the Corporation, shall be that of the workman.” 21. (iii) If the alternative job is not available immediately but becomes available at a later date, the Corporation may offer it to the workman provided he refunds the proportionate compensatory amount. (iv) The option to accept either of the two reliefs, if an alternative job is offered by the Corporation, shall be that of the workman.” 21. In the case of Bhagwan Dass (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (for short, ‘Act of 1995’), which reads as follows: “47. Non-discrimination in Government employments. – (1) No establishment shall dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his service: Provided that, if an employee, after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, could be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits: Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier. (2) No promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of his disability: Provided that the appropriate Government may, having regard to the type of work carried on in any establishment, by notification and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in such notification, exempt any establishment from the provisions of this section.” 22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that Section 47 of the Act of 1995 contains a clear directive that the employer shall not dispense with or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his service. In construing a provision of a social beneficial enactment, that too, dealing with disabled persons intended to give them equal opportunities, protection of rights and full participation, the view that advances the object of the Act and serves its purpose must be preferred to the one which obstructs the object and paralyses the purpose of the Act. 23. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that from the larger point of view, the officers failed to realize that the disabled too are equal citizens of the country and have as much share in its resources as any other citizen. 23. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that from the larger point of view, the officers failed to realize that the disabled too are equal citizens of the country and have as much share in its resources as any other citizen. The denial of their rights would not only be unjust and unfair to them and their families, but would create larger and graver problems for the society at large. What the law permits to them is no charity or largess but their right as equal citizens of this country. 24. While allowing the appeal with costs quantified at Rs. 5,000/-, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows: “In light of the discussions made above, the action of the Board in terminating the service of the disabled employee (appellant No. 1) with effect from March 21, 1997 must be held to be bad and illegal. In view of the provisions of Section 47 of the Act, the appellant must be deemed to be in service and he would be entitled to all service benefits including annual increments and promotions etc. till the date of his retirement. The amount of terminal benefits paid to him should be adjusted against the amount of his salary from March 22, 1997 till date. If any balance remains, that should be adjusted in easy monthly installments from his future salary. The appellant shall continue in service till his date of superannuation according to the service records. He should be reinstated and all due payments, after adjustments as directed, should be made to him within six weeks from the date of presentation of a copy of the judgment before the Secretary of the Board.” 25. The original writ petitioner had served the Corporation, even after date of his regularisation in 1990, for more than 20 years. 26. In view of the discussion above, we direct the respondent Corporation to pay, over and above the retirement benefits, compensation which shall be equivalent to two months salary per year of the balance of his service. This shall be done within a period of two months from today. If the amount aforesaid is not paid within the stipulated period, the same shall carry interest @ 6% per annum. 27. Resultantly, the order of the learned Single Judge is set aside. 28. The writ appeal stands allowed with the aforesaid directions.