JUDGMENT : A.Y. KOGJE, J. 1. The present appeal is preferred by the appellant-convict against the judgment and order of conviction dated 30.04.2016 passed in Sessions Case No. 242 of 2014 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 24, City Sessions Court, Ahmedabad. 2. By the impugned judgment and order of the conviction, the appellant-convict is convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 and 506(1) of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as the “IPC”) and is sentenced to undergo life imprisonment. 3. Learned advocate for the appellant submitted that the Sessions Court has committed an error in not tak into consideration the vardhy received by Khokhra Police Station from L.G. Hospital which came to be registered by P.S.O. informing that the deceased-Sunitaben has committed a suicide and is admitted burns ward of L.G. Hospital. 3.1 It is submitted that as the prosecution was launch on the basis of information of suicide, the appellant-convict cannot be convicted for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC. 3.2 It is submitted that the appellant was only living with the deceased-Sunitaben and her husband-Gatubhai Dhanjibhai Chauhan, who has not been at all investigated. Therefore, entire prosecution case is doubtful. 3.3 Learned advocate has tried to indicate that the deceased was earlier married to one Bachubhai of Vageda Village and while she was still married had eloped with Gatubhai and married Gatubhai. Both Gatubhai and deceased were living as husband and wife when the appellant started residing with both of them, and therefore, the role of other persons also required to be investigated. 3.4 It is submitted that there was no motive for the appellant to commit murder of the deceased, as there was no enmity or ill-feeling towards her, and therefore, there is a more probability of suicide being committed rather than murder. 3.5 It is submitted that the place where the incident took place there are bound to be eye-witnesses, but no eye-witnesses have been investigated or examined during the trial. 3.6 It is submitted that none of the panch witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution, and therefore, the case of the prosecution should be doubted. 3.7 It is submitted that the cause of death is also attributed to septicemia, and therefore, considering the date of incident and the death of the deceased, the death has resulted on account of lack of medical treatment. 3.7 It is submitted that the cause of death is also attributed to septicemia, and therefore, considering the date of incident and the death of the deceased, the death has resulted on account of lack of medical treatment. 3.8 Learned advocate has relied upon the decision of High Court of Tamil Nadu in case of S. Panneerselvam vs. State of Tamil Nadu in Criminal Appeal No. 1167 of 2006 and Criminal Appeal No. 1168 of 2006 dated 15.05.2008 in support of her case that the dying declaration has to be construed appropriately by taking into consideration the version of the other witnesses. 4. As against this, learned APP submitted that non error is committed. The procedure for recording the dying declaration was followed accurately and the same is executed by the Executive Magistrate, who recorded the dying declaration, who has no personal enmity to falsely involved the appellant-accused. Therefore, there is no reason to disbelieve the dying declaration recorded accurately. 4.1 It is submitted that ground of the appellant-accused regarding the ward by given to the Police Station indicating about the suicide cannot be treated to be an evidence better than the dying declaration. 5. In rejoinder, learned advocate for the appellant submitted that the reason for doubting the dying declaration is because the Executive Magistrate has stated that the thumb impression of the deceased was taken on the dying declaration, whereas, in his deposition, this witness has stated that there were bandages all over the body when the dying declaration was recorded, and therefore, there was no scope of applying the thumb impression. 6. Having heard the learned advocate for the parties and having perused the documents on record, the incident took place on 17.05.2012 where allegedly the deceased was set ablaze by the appellant-accused by dousing her with kerosene and setting her ablaze by a match stick. Vide Exh.4 charge was framed, the gist of which is the appellant-accused used to reside with the complainant-Sumintraben and her husband at Vatva and the appellant-accused used to work as laborer with the husband of the complainant. At that time, the appellant-accused got into illicit relationship with the complainant and about five months before 17.05.2012, the appellant-accused brought the complainant to a kachcha house (chhapra). The complainant told the appellant-accused to bring her husband to live with her. At that time, the appellant-accused got into illicit relationship with the complainant and about five months before 17.05.2012, the appellant-accused brought the complainant to a kachcha house (chhapra). The complainant told the appellant-accused to bring her husband to live with her. In that regard, the appellant-accused used to fight with the complainant frequently and threaten to kill the husband of the complainant. The accused argued - quarreled with the husband of the complainant at the house of the complainant at kachcha house (chhapra), opposite to Haripura, on 16.05.2012 and with intention to kill the complainant, the accused poured kerosene on the complainant and set her ablaze by lighting matchstick. The complainant was admitted to L.G. Hospital for treatment and she died on 22.05.2012 during treatment. 7. The main contention of the appellant is that when the information was given to the concerned Police Station and recorded by the Police Station as a M.L.C. case, it is stated that the deceased had herself poured kerosene and set herself ablaze as a result of which she has received burn injuries. Exh.29 is the document under the signature of P.S.O. of Khokhra Police Station. However, Exh.27 is the FIR given by the deceased herself on 17.05.2012 and recorded by the P.S.I. of Khokhra Police Station. She has narrated the manner in which the incident took place and on account of verbal quarrel with the appellant, the appellant was angry and he sprinkled kerosene from carbo lying in the house, and thereafter, set her ablaze because of which she receives burn injuries and upon hearing the shout, the neighbors duos the fire and shifted her to the hospital. 8. Exh.19 is the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate, wherein in answer to question no. 14 pertaining to incident, the deceased has narrated as under: “On 16.05.2012, at about 6 p.m. at my present residence, my friend/lover Pinkal poured kerosene on me and set me on fire by lighting matchstick, and therefore, I have got burned on my whole body. For the last four months, I had left my husband and I used to reside with my lover Pinkal Christian. I have not set myself on fire. He has set me on fire as I told him to leave. I do not have any progeny. For the last four months, I had left my husband and I used to reside with my lover Pinkal Christian. I have not set myself on fire. He has set me on fire as I told him to leave. I do not have any progeny. Pinkal Christian used to work as a laborer with my husband Gatubhai, and therefore, I came in contact with him. He had stayed at our house for one month. Therefore, he had threatened me and took me with him. Therefore, I used to reside with him at present.” 9. From this document, an attempt is made by the defence by referring to question no. 12 asked by the Executive Magistrate to the deceased that at the time of incident, who was in the house, at that time, she has replied that she was alone. The Court is not inclined to accept the submission of the defence in view of a clear statement given by the deceased in answer to question no. 14. The Court has that version given by the deceased in the FIR as well as in the dying declaration is very much consistent, and therefore, completely reliable. 10. Executive Magistrate Shri Danabhai Bhuraji Rajput was examined at Exh.17 on behalf of prosecution. In his evidence, he has clearly deposed that after recording the dying declaration, it was read out to the deceased and she had put her signature. Exh.19 document - dying declaration also records the satisfaction of the disposing capacity by the attending Doctor, and therefore, the Court finds that the content of the dying declaration and the procedure of recording the same cannot be doubted in any manner and would be sufficient to record the conviction. 11. Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act is a provision under which the statement of the person becomes relevant, if it is made as to the cause or circumstances which led to the cause of his death and where such circumstances leading to death comes in question. The dying declaration produced at Exh.19 clearly meets with the requirement of Section 32 of the Evidence Act, and has therefore being correctly accepted by the Sessions Court as a reliable evidence to record the conviction. 12. The dying declaration produced at Exh.19 clearly meets with the requirement of Section 32 of the Evidence Act, and has therefore being correctly accepted by the Sessions Court as a reliable evidence to record the conviction. 12. The attempt on the part of defence by submitting that the immediate neighbors have not supported the case of prosecution, who were examined as PW-3 Shardaben Vishnubhai Patel and PW-4 Jaywantiben Umeshbhai Patel were declared hostile will pale into insignificance in view of substantial evidence in the form of dying declaration. 13. The reliance placed upon by the learned advocate for the appellant on the decision of S. Panneerselvam (supra), it would be pertinent to point out that the Apex Court was examining the case where there was conflict with regards to fact of who set the deceased ablaze between the prosecution witnesses and the dying declaration recorded. Thus, the Apex Court has given a guideline recording accepting the dying declaration, if it is of such a nature where the recording is made in a correct manner and is not result of either tutoring or promoting or product of imagination and that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to record the dying declaration otherwise, if that be so, then the conviction can be based without any further corroboration. 14. As discussed herein above, for the reasons assigned by this Court as well as by the Sessions Court, the Court has found that the dying declaration of the deceased was above any suspicion and sufficiently clear to support the conviction. 15. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. The judgment and order of conviction dated 30.04.2016 passed in Sessions Case No. 242 of 2014 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 24, City Sessions Court, Ahmedabad stands confirmed. Bail and bail bonds of the accused, if any, stands discharged. R&P be sent back to the concerned Trial Court, forthwith.