ORDER : I.A. No. 5671 of 2020: 1. The instant interlocutory application has been filed for condoning the delay which has occurred in filing the appeal. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant, in view of the office note dated 06.03.2023, does not intend to press this interlocutory application. 3. In view thereof, the instant interlocutory application is dismissed. L.P.A. No. 344 of 2020: 4. The instant appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is directed against the order/judgment dated 21.05.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No. 1855 of 2018, by which the learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition has quashed the penalty order dated 02.02.2012 passed by the disciplinary authority. 5. The brief facts of the case of the writ petitioner as per the pleading made in the writ petition which require to be enumerated reads as under: The petitioner who was appointed on a Class-IV post in the Dumka Collectorate was put under suspension vide order dated 03.01.2011 and department proceeding was initiated against him by furnishing charge memo in Prapatra-K and explanation was called for. The writ petitioner, in turn thereof, submitted his explanation on 09.03.2011. The enquiring officer, upon enquiry, found the charges proved and second show-cause notice was issued to him to which he has responded vide his reply dated 12.09.2011 denying all the charges levelled against him. The departmental authority, vide order No.22/2012 as contained in memo no.120 dated 02.02.2012 awarded punishment to the writ petitioner. Being aggrieved with the said decision, the writ petitioner preferred appeal before the Commissioner, Santhal Pargana Division, Dumka being Misc. Service Appeal No. 192/12-13 which was dismissed by the appellate authority on 08.11.2017. 6. It is evident from the factual aspect as per the pleading made in the writ petition that the writ-petitioner while posted as a Class-IV employee in the Dumka Collectorate was put under suspension in contemplation of departmental proceeding for commission of irregularity/misconduct of making direct correspondence to the higher authorities. The memorandum of charge was issued to the writ petitioner and the writ petitioner had participated in the enquiry before the enquiry officer, however, charge has been found to be proved and the same having been accepted, the order of punishment has been passed inflicting the following punishment. The memorandum of charge was issued to the writ petitioner and the writ petitioner had participated in the enquiry before the enquiry officer, however, charge has been found to be proved and the same having been accepted, the order of punishment has been passed inflicting the following punishment. (a) forfeiture of 10 annual increments with cumulative effect; (b) forfeiture of ACP/MACP and promotions, and (c) denial of full salary and allowance during the period of suspension. The writ petitioner, being aggrieved with the order of punishment, had approached this Court by filing writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 1855 of 2018 which has been allowed by quashing the order of penalty against which the instant intra-court appeal has been filed. 7. Mr. Gauraj Raj, learned AC to AAG-II appearing for the appellant-State has submitted by admitting the fact that the order of punishment is not commensurate with the charges levelled as also the second punishment, i.e., forfeiture of promotion and forfeiture of ACP/MACP is not provided under the list of punishment but the same even accepting that the said punishment ought not to have been passed, but the learned Single Judge ought to have remanded the matter before the disciplinary authority for taking decision afresh depending upon the said in proposition to the charges levelled and hence, it is a fit case where the impugned order requires interference since the writ petitioner has been given the benefit on technicality. 8. While, on the other hand, Mr. Kunal Harsh, learned counsel for the respondent-writ petitioner has submitted that there is no error in the impugned order since the learned Single Judge after taking into consideration the fact that withholding 10 annual increments with cumulative effect has been considered to be arbitrary being not in proposition to the charges levelled as also forfeiture of ACP/MACP and promotion is not provided in the list of punishment. The learned Single Judge has rightly interfered with the order dated 02.02.2012, hence, no interference is required. On the basis of the aforesaid consideration, has quashed the order of punishment. The learned Single Judge has rightly interfered with the order dated 02.02.2012, hence, no interference is required. On the basis of the aforesaid consideration, has quashed the order of punishment. On the issue of remand, submission has been made that for the fault committed on the part of the disciplinary authority, the writ petitioner cannot be allowed to suffer, moreover, the departmental proceeding was initiated way back in the year 2011 and since then, 12 years have lapsed and the writ petitioner is to superannuate in the year 2027 and hence, remanding the matter due to the illegal action of inflicting punishment, if allowed, the same will be rigour upon the writ petitioner. 9. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the materials available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. 10. The order of punishment imposed against the writ petitioner is on the basis of the three charges framed against the writ petitioner : (a) Against the order of transfer the petitioner has submitted representation to the Chief Secretary, Jharkhand and copy was forwarded to the Commissioner, S.P. Division, Dumka, the Hon’ble Chief Minister Jharkhand and the Hon’ble Governor, Jharkhand. (b) He has commented on the working of the Deputy Commissioner, Dumka in his representation to the Chief Secretary, Jharkhand. (c) He has remained absent from 14.05.2010 to 19.05.2010 and 21.6.2010 to 14.09.2010 without approval of leave from the competent authority and again from 25.11.2010 to 03.12.2010 he has remained absent from duty without any information. 11. The charges has been found to be proved by the enquiry officer which has been accepted by the disciplinary authority basis upon which the following punishments have been imposed upon the writ petitioner: (a) forfeiture of 10 annual increments with cumulative effect; (b) forfeiture of ACP/MACP and promotions, and (c) denial of full salary and allowance during the period of suspension. 12. The learned Single Judge has considered the punishment no.(a), i.e., forfeiture of 10 annual increments with cumulative effect, to be disproportionate to the charge levelled. 12. The learned Single Judge has considered the punishment no.(a), i.e., forfeiture of 10 annual increments with cumulative effect, to be disproportionate to the charge levelled. The said finding based upon the proportionality, according to the considered view of this Court, cannot be said to suffer from error for the reason that the punishment is to be inflicted basis upon the gravity of charge and taking into consideration the status of the concerned employee, herein, the writ petitioner admittedly is a Class-IV employee having been in the meager pay scale and in that circumstances, forfeiture of 10 annual increments with cumulative effect, which happens to be a major punishment, the same admittedly will be very harsh punishment and due to the effect of cumulative in nature, the writ petitioner will be almost deprived of the salary as required for sustenance of his life and his family. The purpose of punishment is to give a message to the concerned employee that if there will be any misconduct, the same is to be dealt with by imposing punishment so that such type of misconduct be not committed in future. But, the purpose of punishment is not to be of such an extent that the suffering would result in demise of the concerned employee along with family. 13. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the forfeiture of 10 annual increments if has been considered to be harsh/disproportionate, which the learned counsel for the appellant also submits, the finding recorded to that effect by the learned Single Judge cannot be said to suffer from error. 14. So far as the punishment of forfeiture of ACP/MACP and promotion are concerned, admittedly, the forfeiture of ACP/MACP is not under the list of punishment as has been stipulated under Rule 49 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930. Further so far as the forfeiture of promotion is concerned, that is also not listed save and except putting the promotion as a bar by giving a punishment by way of imposing efficiency bar therein but that has also been deleted, hence, even the punishment of forfeiture of promotion is not in the list of punishment. Further so far as the forfeiture of promotion is concerned, that is also not listed save and except putting the promotion as a bar by giving a punishment by way of imposing efficiency bar therein but that has also been deleted, hence, even the punishment of forfeiture of promotion is not in the list of punishment. The law is well-settled that the punishment if not listed under the list of punishment, the same will be said to be without any authority as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Vijay Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., (2012) 5 SCC 242 . Relevant paragraph of the said judgment reads as under: “11. Admittedly, the punishment imposed upon the appellant is not provided for under Rule 4 of the 1991 Rules. Integrity of a person can be withheld for sufficient reasons at the time of filling up the annual confidential report. However, if the statutory rules so prescribe, it can also be withheld as a punishment. The order passed by the disciplinary authority withholding the integrity certificate as a punishment for delinquency is without jurisdiction, not being provided under the 1991 Rules, since the same could not be termed as punishment under the Rules. The Rules do not empower the disciplinary authority to impose “any other” major or minor punishment. It is a settled proposition of law that punishment not prescribed under the Rules as a result of disciplinary proceedings cannot be awarded. 12. This Court in State of U.P. v. Madhav Prasad Sharma [ (2011) 2 SCC 212 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 300] dealt with the aforesaid 1991 Rules and after quoting Rule 4 thereof held as under : (SCC p. 216, para 16) “16. We are not concerned about other rule. The perusal of major and minor penalties prescribed in the above Rule makes it clear that „sanctioning leave without pay? is not one of the punishments prescribed, though, and under what circumstances leave has been sanctioned without pay is a different aspect with which we are not concerned for the present. However, Rule 4 makes it clear that sanction of leave without pay is not one of the punishments prescribed. Disciplinary authority is competent to impose appropriate penalty from those provided in Rule 4 of the Rules which deals with the major penalties and minor penalties. However, Rule 4 makes it clear that sanction of leave without pay is not one of the punishments prescribed. Disciplinary authority is competent to impose appropriate penalty from those provided in Rule 4 of the Rules which deals with the major penalties and minor penalties. Denial of salary on the ground of „no work no pay? cannot be treated as a penalty in view of statutory provisions contained in Rule 4 defining the penalties in clear terms.” (emphasis added) 13. The authority has to act or purport to act in pursuance or execution or intended execution of the statute or statutory rules. (See Poona City Municipal Corpn. v. Dattatraya Nagesh Deodhar [ AIR 1965 SC 555 ] ; Municipal Corpn., Indore v. Niyamatullah [ (1969) 2 SCC 551 : AIR 1971 SC 97 ] ; J.N. Ganatra v. Morvi Municipality, Morvi [ (1996) 9 SCC 495 : AIR 1996 SC 2520 ] and Borosil Glass Works Ltd. Employees' Union v. D.D. Bambode [ (2001) 1 SCC 350 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 997 : AIR 2001 SC 378 ].) 14. The issue involved herein is required to be examined from another angle also. Holding departmental proceedings and recording a finding of guilt against any delinquent and imposing the punishment for the same is a quasi-judicial function and not administrative one. (Vide Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab [ AIR 1963 SC 395 ], Union of India v. H.C. Goel [ AIR 1964 SC 364 ], Mohd. Yunus Khan v. State of U.P. [ (2010) 10 SCC 539 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 180] and Coal India Ltd. v. Ananta Saha [ (2011) 5 SCC 142 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 750].) 15. Imposing the punishment for a proved delinquency is regulated and controlled by the statutory rules. Therefore, while performing the quasi-judicial functions, the authority is not permitted to ignore the statutory rules under which punishment is to be imposed. The disciplinary authority is bound to give strict adherence to the said rules. Thus, the order of punishment being outside the purview of the statutory rules is a nullity and cannot be enforced against the appellant. 23. Thus, in view of the above, the punishment order is not maintainable in the eye of the law. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. Thus, the order of punishment being outside the purview of the statutory rules is a nullity and cannot be enforced against the appellant. 23. Thus, in view of the above, the punishment order is not maintainable in the eye of the law. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 8-7-2010 withholding the integrity certificate for the year 2010 and all subsequent orders in this regard are quashed. The respondents are directed to consider the case of the appellant for all consequential benefits including promotion, etc. if any, afresh taking into consideration the service record of the appellant in accordance with law.” 15. So far as the punishment no.(c) is concerned, the denial of full salary and allowance during the period of suspension is to be dealt with in view of the provision of Rule 97 of the Service Code. The denial of salary for the period of suspension cannot be without following the provision as contained under Rule 97 of the Jharkhand Service Code as has been decided by the Patna High Court in Shri Mahabir Prasad vs. The State of Bihar and Ors, 1988 PLJR 82 wherein at paragraph-3 it has been held which reads as under: “3. Mr. Tarkeshwar Dayal, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner did not challenge the validity of the order of censure. Learned counsel however, submitted that the order of the State Government that the period of suspension would be treated as on duty for the purposes of pension and gratuity but the petitioner would not get anything more than the subsistence allowance already received by him during the period of suspension is invalid, because the petitioner was not given an opportunity to be heard before the said order was passed. In support of this contention, learned counsel relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in M. Gopalkrishna Naida v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1968 Supreme Court 240). There is substance in the contention of learned counsel. The facts of the Supreme Court case were, more or less, similar in the sense that the delinquent officer had been suspended pending the Departmental enquiry. The enquiring officer found the officer not guilty, but the Government disagreed with that finding and served a notice to show cause why he should not be dismissed. The facts of the Supreme Court case were, more or less, similar in the sense that the delinquent officer had been suspended pending the Departmental enquiry. The enquiring officer found the officer not guilty, but the Government disagreed with that finding and served a notice to show cause why he should not be dismissed. Subsequently, the Government held that the charges against the officer were not proved beyond reasonable doubt. It also held that the suspension and the Departmental enquiry “were not wholly unjustified”. The order further directed, inter alia, that the entire period of absence from duty should be treated as period spent on duty under Fundamental Rule 54(5) for purposes of pension only, but that he should not be allowed any pay beyond what he had actually received or what was allowed to him by way of subsistence allowance during the period of his suspension. The Supreme Court held that Fundamental Rule 54 contemplates a duty to act in accordance with the basic concept of justice and fair play. The authority has to afford a reasonable opportunity to the officer concerned to show cause why clauses (3) and (5) should not be applied. In that case the order was held to be invalid as no reasonable opportunity to the officer to show cause was given. Rule 97 of the Bihar Service Code, 1952, is in pari materia with rule 54 of the Fundamental Rules. The petitioner, therefore, ought to have been given an opportunity to show cause why clauses (3) and (5) of Rule 97 should not be applied in his case. As that had not been done, the application is allowed and the impugned portion of the order contained in Annexure 1 which reads “The period of suspension be treated as on duty for the purposes of pension and gratuity but he will not get anything more beyond the subsistence grant already received by him during the period of suspension” is struck down as invalid. It would be open to the competent authority to consider the question de novo, after giving the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the action proposed against him. There will be no order as to costs.” 16. Subsequently, the Hon'ble Apex Court has also considered the same very issue in the case of State of Jharkhand and Anr. It would be open to the competent authority to consider the question de novo, after giving the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the action proposed against him. There will be no order as to costs.” 16. Subsequently, the Hon'ble Apex Court has also considered the same very issue in the case of State of Jharkhand and Anr. vs. Amresh Narayan Singh, (2020) 14 SCC 411 wherein at paragraph-7, it has been held which reads as under: “7. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 97 indicates that where a government servant is suspended, the authority competent to order the reinstatement has to consider and make a specific order regarding the pay and allowances for the period of absence from duty and on whether the period shall be treated as a period spent on duty. Sub-rule (2) indicates that where the authority concludes that the suspension was “wholly unjustified”, the government servant shall be given full pay and allowances as if the order of suspension had not been passed. The High Court misconstrued the provisions of Rule 97 in coming to the conclusion that full pay and allowances must necessarily follow as a consequence of the suspension being revoked. This construction is contrary to the plain terms of Rule 97 as extracted above. The disciplinary proceedings have been held in abeyance pending the conclusion of the criminal trial. It is only after the conclusion of the departmental inquiry that the competent authority will have to decide, in terms of Rule 97, how the period of suspension should be treated and whether it is liable to be treated as a period spent on duty. A decision will be taken on the pay and allowances which should be allowed. The directions which were issued by the High Court at this stage were hence contrary to Rule 97.” 17. Herein, it appears from the record that before taking such decision of denial of full salary and allowance during the period of suspension, no process as stipulated under Rule 97(d) of the Jharkhand Service Code has been taken recourse and hence, the punishment to that effect also cannot be inflicted upon the writ petitioner. 18. Herein, it appears from the record that before taking such decision of denial of full salary and allowance during the period of suspension, no process as stipulated under Rule 97(d) of the Jharkhand Service Code has been taken recourse and hence, the punishment to that effect also cannot be inflicted upon the writ petitioner. 18. Learned counsel for the State-appellant has submitted that even accepting there is material irregularity in inflicting punishment but the same will be only considered to be a technical fault committed on behalf of the disciplinary authority and on technicality, there should be no advantage to the delinquent employee and hence, the matter is to be remitted to the authority concerned, i.e., disciplinary authority, for taking decision afresh. 19. 19. Submission which has been made in this regard, cannot be disputed due to the reason that on technicality there cannot be any advantage to anybody rather the enquiry if initiated is to be given logical end but the said principle is to be applied depending upon the facts of the case and herein, the writ petitioner is a Class-IV employee and has been dealt with by issuance of memorandum of charge in the year 2011 and has faced rigour of departmental proceeding till passing of the order by the learned Single Judge on 21.05.2020 and now we are in 2023 and if, at this juncture, the matter will be remitted before the disciplinary authority for passing a fresh decision, the writ petitioner will again be put on rigour and hence, this Court, applying the principle laid down in the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Punjab National Bank and Others v. Kunj Behari Misra [ (1998) 7 SCC 84 ] wherein it has been laid down on the issue of remand that on technicality when the order of punishment has been quashed due to want of non-compliance of the principles of natural justice on the ground of lack of decision of opinion of the disciplinary authority with the finding recorded by the enquiry officer and in that circumstances by taking into consideration the fact that the concerned employee has faced rigour of departmental proceeding for a period of 14 years and in the meanwhile he has retired, in that view of the matter, the Hon'ble Apex Court has found that the case is not to be remanded so as to not put the concerned employee again face the rigous of the departmental proceeding. Relevant paragraph of the said judgment reads as under: “21. Both the respondents superannuated on 31-12- 1983. During the pendency of these appeals, Misra died on 6-1-1995 and his legal representatives were brought on record. More than 14 years have elapsed since the delinquent officers had superannuated. It will, therefore, not be in the interest of justice that at this stage the cases should be remanded to the disciplinary authority for the start of another innings. During the pendency of these appeals, Misra died on 6-1-1995 and his legal representatives were brought on record. More than 14 years have elapsed since the delinquent officers had superannuated. It will, therefore, not be in the interest of justice that at this stage the cases should be remanded to the disciplinary authority for the start of another innings. We, therefore, do not issue any such directions and while dismissing these appeals, we affirm the decisions of the High Court which had set aside the orders imposing penalty and had directed the appellants to release the retirement benefits to the respondents. There will, however, be no order as to costs.” 20. This Court considering the aforesaid observation made by the Hon'ble Apex Court and taking into consideration the fact of the given case that the writ petitioner is a Class-IV employee and has already faced rigour of departmental proceeding for about 12 years and he is to retire in the year 2027, therefore, it is not a fit case to remand it before the authority. 21. Further, the remand order is also not fit to be passed since admittedly herein, it is the laches committed on the part of the authority concerned in imposing wrong punishment even though the disciplinary authority are well aware that the statutory mandate about the punishment which is to be imposed and which is not to be imposed but even then, incorrect punishment has been imposed, therefore, question is that for the illegality committed on the part of the disciplinary authority why the delinquent employee be allowed to suffer that too when he has already faced the rigour of departmental proceeding. This Court, therefore, is of the view that it is not a case of remand for passing fresh order. 22. In view thereof, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the order impugned. 23. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and stands dismissed. 24. Pending interlocutory application, if any, also stands disposed of.