JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. 1. The instant appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is directed against the order/judgment dated 12.07.2018 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No. 1357 of 2009, whereby and whereunder, the order dated 11.02.2009 has been quashed and set aside with a direction upon the respondent no.4 to issue notice to the writ petitioner for ascertaining the eligibility in terms of educational qualification and medical fitness, if required, for his appointment, within six months. 2. The brief facts of the case of the writ petitioner as per the pleading made in the writ petition which require to be enumerated reads as under: The mother of the writ petitioner, namely, late Chaiti Devi, while working under the respondents, died in harness on 27.09.1998 and at the time of her death, the writ petitioner was aged about 14 years. Thereafter, the writ petitioner vide letter dated 16.12.1998 requested the respondent-CCL, appellant herein, to allow him for appointment on attaining majority after four years. By letter dated 03.10.2005, the claim of the writ petitioner for compassionate ground was rejected on the ground of delay in filing the application against which the writ petitioner approached this Court by filing writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 670 of 2006 and the said writ petition was disposed of quashing the order dated 03.10.2005 with a direction to consider the case of the writ petitioner afresh. The respondent-CCL, pursuance to the order dated 02.05.2008 passed in W.P(S) No. 670 of 2006, again rejected the claim of the writ petitioner vide order dated 11.02.2009 on the ground that the writ petitioner was only 14 years of age at the time of death of his mother, as such, he could not have been kept in live roster under the provision of 9.5.0 (iii) of NCWA-VI as the minor of 15 years or above was eligible to be kept in live roster in the year 1998. 3. It is evident from the pleading made in the writ petition as referred hereinabove that the mother of the writ petitioner, namely, late Chaiti Devi, died in harness on 27.09.1998. Thereafter, the writ petitioner submitted an application for appointment on compassionate ground on 16.12.1998 under clause 9.3.2 of the NCWA but at that time, the writ petitioner was aged about 14 years. Thereafter, the writ petitioner submitted an application for appointment on compassionate ground on 16.12.1998 under clause 9.3.2 of the NCWA but at that time, the writ petitioner was aged about 14 years. The writ petitioner on attaining majority submitted an application for compassionate appointment on 28.05.2004 but the aforesaid application was rejected on the ground that the said application has been filed beyond the period of six months. The writ petitioner, therefore, filed writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 670 of 2006 which was allowed vide order dated 02.05.2008 holding therein that the claim under the National Coal Wage Agreement-VI does not stipulate submission of an application for appointment on compassionate ground by a minor within six months and accordingly, the matter was directed to be considered afresh. The claim of the writ petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground, however, was again rejected but this time on the ground that at the relevant time, when his mother died, he was aged about 14 years and was not eligible to be kept in live roster as per the National Coal Wage Agreement-VI The writ petitioner, approached this Court by filing writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 1357 of 2009 and the learned Single Judge of this Court after assigning reason that on remand while passing the order it was not available for the respondents to take a fresh ground of rejection. The learned Single Judge has come to the conclusion that while taking the fresh ground rejecting the appointment on compassionate ground, cannot be said to be proper and accordingly, impugned decision of rejection of the claim of the writ petitioner vide order dated 11.02.2009 has been quashed and set aside with a direction upon the respondent no.4 to issue notice upon the respondent for ascertaining the eligibility in terms of educational qualification and medical fitness, if required, for his appointment, within six months, which is the subject matter of the instant appeal. 4. Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted by referring to clause 9.5.0(iii) which according to him, is applicable from 01.01.2000, whereby and whereunder, the minimum age to keep the dependant of the deceased employee in live roster has been kept as 12 years but prior to 01.01.2000, it was 15 years and admittedly, the age of the writ petitioner was below 15 years and hence, he has not been kept in live roster. However, on the first occasion, the ground of delay in making application was taken for rejection while there was limitation as per the decision of the administrative authority in this regard for that such application is to be filed within six months, however, said decision having been quashed and the matter remanded before the authority then the issue of the writ petitioner has been considered on merit and in course thereof, it was found that as on the date of the death of the mother of the writ petitioner, the writ petitioner was having less than the age of 15 years, as such, he has not been kept in live roster, hence, there is no reason to provide appointment on compassionate ground by keeping him in live roster contrary to the condition as stipulated under 9.5.0(iii) of the National Coal Wage Agreement-VI. The contention has been raised by assailing the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order that on remand, the claim cannot be rejected by taking a fresh ground. Submission has been made in this regard that the issue, in the first round had not been considered on merit as the application was found to be beyond the period of six months since the same was filed after lapse of four years, hence, there was no occasion for the respondent authorities to consider the case of the writ petitioner on merit but when the ground of limitation has been considered to be not proper by quashing the order of rejection on the ground of limitation by this Court then only the case of the writ petitioner has been considered on merit and in course thereof, the writ petitioner has been found not eligible as per the condition stipulated under clause 9.5.0(iii) of the National Coal Wage Agreement-VI. Submission has been made that on remand, there was bar for the appellant not to consider the issue on merit by taking into consideration the fact that as to whether the writ petitioner was entitled to be kept in live roster, that exercise has been done, hence, there is no error if the issue has been decided afresh. Learned counsel, on the basis of the aforesaid ground has submitted that the order passed by the learned Single Judge is not sustainable in the eyes of law. 5. While, on the other hand, Mr. Learned counsel, on the basis of the aforesaid ground has submitted that the order passed by the learned Single Judge is not sustainable in the eyes of law. 5. While, on the other hand, Mr. Om Prakash Prasad, learned counsel for the respondent-writ petitioner has submitted that the writ petition although was less than the age of 15 years and as per clause 9.5.0 (iii) which has been held applicable from 01.01.2000, whereby and whereunder, the age of 15 years for keeping the dependant in live roster has been reduced to 12 years, but the case of the writ petitioner since was considered by taking into consideration the ground of delay in filing such application and hence, once that ground has been quashed and set aside, then the appellant-respondent ought to have considered the case of the writ petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground but instead, the same has been rejected by holding the writ petitioner not eligible as per the condition stipulated under clause 9.5.0(iii). It has been contended that the learned Single Judge, therefore, by applying the judgment passed by this Court in Lakhan Kumar vs. Central Coalfields Limited and Ors., (2005) 3 JLJR 190 wherein he was also below the age of 15 years on the date of the death of his father, i.e., on 23.11.1997, but even then, the appointment on compassionate ground was offered to him and applying the said principle, if the order has been passed by the learned Single Judge by quashing and setting aside the impugned decision taken by the authority concerned, the same cannot be said to suffer from error. 6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the materials available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. 7. The fact which is not in dispute in this case is that the mother of the writ petitioner while working as a piece-rated worker, died in harness on 27.09.1998. 6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the materials available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. 7. The fact which is not in dispute in this case is that the mother of the writ petitioner while working as a piece-rated worker, died in harness on 27.09.1998. The admitted position so far as the age of the writ petitioner is concerned, was below the age of 15 years on the date of death of his mother and thereafter, he made an application but the writ petitioner was of 14 years of age at the relevant time, therefore, he again made an application for his appointment on compassionate ground after attaining majority as per clause 9.3.2 of the National Coal Wage Agreement, but his case was rejected vide order dated 03.10.2005 on the ground that the application was filed after delay of four years from the date of death of his mother. Being aggrieved with the order of rejection, the writ petitioner preferred writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 670 of 2006 and the same was allowed by remitting the matter before the authority to consider the case of the writ petition afresh on merit. For ready reference, the operative part of the order is being reproduced as under: “… In the circumstances, the impugned order dated 03.10.2005 is quashed and matter is remitted to the Director (Personnel) CCL, Darbhanga House, Ranchi (respondent no.2) to pass a fresh order in accordance with law, as early as possible and preferably within four weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. …” 8. The appellant had considered the case of the writ petitioner and rejected the same on the ground that on the date of death of his mother, he was below the age of 15 years, hence, he could not have been kept in live roster at that time. The appellant, for taking such decision, had relied upon the condition stipulated under clause 9.5.0, more particularly sub-clause (iii) thereof. The appellant, for taking such decision, had relied upon the condition stipulated under clause 9.5.0, more particularly sub-clause (iii) thereof. For ready reference, the same is being reproduced as under: “9.5.0 Employment/Monetary compensation to female dependant Provision of employment/monetary compensation to female dependants of workmen who die when in service and who are declared medically unfit as per Clause 9.4.0 above would be regulated as under:- (i) In case of death due to mine accident, the female dependant would have the option to either accept the monetary compensation of Rs.4000/- per month or employment irrespective of her age. (ii) In case of death/total permanent disablement due to causes other than mine accident and medical unfitness under Clause 9.4.0, if the female dependant is below the age of 45 years she will have the option either to accept the monetary compensation of Rs.3000/- per month or employment. In case the female dependant is above 45 years of age she will be entitled only to monetary compensation and not to employment. (iii) In case of death either in mine accident or for other reasons or medical unfitness under Clause 9.4.0, if no employment has been offered and the male dependant of the concerned worker is 12 years and above in age, he will be kept on a live roster and would be provided employment commensurate with his skill and qualifications when he attains the age of 18 years. During the period the male dependant is on live roster, the female dependant will be paid monetary compensation as per rates at paras (i) & (ii) above. This will be effective from 01.01.2000. (iv) Monetary compensation, whenever applicable, would be paid till the female dependant attains the age of 60 years. (v) The existing rate of monetary compensation will continue. The matter will be further discussed in the Statndardisation Committee & finalized.” 9. It is evident from the condition as under clause 9.5.0 (iii) that the said condition stipulates that the dependant of the deceased employee will be kept in live roster if more than the age of 12 years and has not attained the age of 18 years. The matter will be further discussed in the Statndardisation Committee & finalized.” 9. It is evident from the condition as under clause 9.5.0 (iii) that the said condition stipulates that the dependant of the deceased employee will be kept in live roster if more than the age of 12 years and has not attained the age of 18 years. It is evident from the aforesaid condition that the same has been made applicable from 01.01.2000, meaning thereby, clause 9.5.0 (iii) has been held applicable on the basis of bilateral agreement enriched in between the parties from 01.01.2000, hence, the condition of keeping the dependant in live roster having more the age of 12 years has been made operative from 01.01.2000, as such, prior to 01.01.2000, the dependant who is having the age in between 15 to 18 years, will be kept in live roster. 10. Herein, admittedly, the writ petitioner at the time of death of his mother was below the age of 15 years, as such, he could not have been kept in live roster since during the relevant time, the minimum age for keeping the dependant in live roster was 15 years which was subsequently, reduced to 12 years w.e.f. 01.01.2000. 11. The case of the writ petitioner has been considered in the light of the condition stipulated under clause 9.5.0 (iii) and was rejected by taking into consideration the fact that the writ petitioner was not eligible to be kept in live roster. The said order was quashed and set aside by the learned Single Judge on the ground that there cannot be any decision by the respondent authorities of taking a different decision which was not taken on the earlier round while considering the case of the writ petitioner. But, the said finding, according to the considered view of this Court, cannot be said to be proper for the reason that when the case of the writ petitioner had been rejected on the ground of limitation there was no occasion before the respondents to go into the issue on merit regarding the eligibility of the writ petitioner on the basis of the age criteria. The same can only be said to be considered if the application was filed for consideration of his case for appointment on compassionate ground if the application would have been filed within time. The same can only be said to be considered if the application was filed for consideration of his case for appointment on compassionate ground if the application would have been filed within time. The rider of limitation since has been quashed by this Court by remitting the matter before the authority concerned for re-consideration, as such, at that occasion, the issue of eligibility regarding the age to keep the writ petitioner in the capacity of dependant in live roster is required to be considered so as to look into the entitlement of the writ petitioner for consideration for appointment on compassionate ground for the purpose to make it in consonance with the condition stipulated under clause 9.5.0 (iii) of the National Coal Wage Agreement-VI. 12. The respondent has considered the same and found the writ petitioner to be below the age of 15 years which is the requirement as per the condition of the National Coal Wage Agreement in view of the fact that the death of the mother of the writ petitioner took place on 27.09.1998. however, it has been contended on behalf of the writ petitioner that the entire National Coal Wage Agreement-VI containing the age of 12 years under clause 9.5.0 (iii) came into effect from 01.07.1996 and continued till 30.06.2001, but, we are not in interest with such argument for the reason that the effectiveness of condition stipulated under clause 9.5.0 (iii) as referred above, has been shown to be effective from 01.01.2000, therefore, on or before 01.01.2000, the minimum age for keeping the dependant in live roster will be 15 years. 13. This Court, after having discussed the aforesaid aspect of the matter and coming to the order passed by the learned Single Judge has found therefrom that the learned Single Judge has given two reasons in interfering with the order impugned of rejecting the claim of the writ petitioner, i.e., on limitation and on the basis of the discussion as above, the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge that the issue of age of keeping the dependant in live roster cannot be re-opened, is hereby considered to be improper finding. 14. The finding of the learned Single Judge is based upon the judgment rendered by this Court in Lakhan Kumar vs. Central Coalfields Limited and Ors. (supra). 14. The finding of the learned Single Judge is based upon the judgment rendered by this Court in Lakhan Kumar vs. Central Coalfields Limited and Ors. (supra). So far as the finding of the learned Single Judge based upon the said judgment is concerned, we, in order to appreciate the fact, have gone through the aforesaid judgment and have found therefrom that the aforesaid judgment does not pertain to keeping the dependant in live roster rather the consideration was with respect to the fact that on the date of death of his father, i.e., on 23.11.1997, the said Lakhan Kumar was of 15 years of age and still the authorities have chosen not to offer appointment on compassionate ground, herein, that is not the case of the writ petitioner that he was having the age of 15 years on the date of death of his mother since he was of the age of 14 years at that time and further of keeping the writ petitioner in live roster. Reference in this context is required to be made upon the implication of the National Coal Wage Agreement which has been carved out in view of the provision of Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which provides that if the parties have come out with bi-partite agreement outside the conciliation proceeding then the same will bind the parties and herein the agreement has been arrived at by way of National Coal Wage Agreement in view of the provision of Section 18(1) of the Act, 1947 and hence, the same is having statutory fervor 15. The aforesaid issue has also been considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Mohan Mahto Vs. Central Coal Fields Limited & Ors., (2007) 8 SCC 549 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to observe about the statutory fervor of the National Coal Wage Agreement as would appear from para-10 which reads as under: “10. A settlement within the meaning of sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act is binding on both the parties and continues to remain in force unless the same is altered, modified or substituted by another settlement. No period of limitation was provided in the settlement. We would assume that the respondent had jurisdiction to issue such circular prescribing a period of limitation for filing application for grant of appointment on compassionate grounds. No period of limitation was provided in the settlement. We would assume that the respondent had jurisdiction to issue such circular prescribing a period of limitation for filing application for grant of appointment on compassionate grounds. But, such circular was not only required to be strictly complied with but also was required to be read keeping in view the settlement entered into by and between the parties. The expanding definition of workman as contained in Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act would confer a right upon the appellant to obtain appointment on compassionate grounds, subject, of course, to compliance with the conditions precedent contained therein.” 16. The position of law is well settled that the terms and conditions cannot be allowed to be deviated while herein, the terms and conditions has arrived at by way of National Coal Wage Agreement since is having the statutory fervor, therefore, the same cannot be allowed to be deviated. The condition stipulated under clause 9.5.0 (iii) is that the dependant of the deceased employee can only be kept in live roster if he has attained the age of 15 years till the date of attaining majority. 17. The writ petitioner admittedly was less than the age of 15 years and hence, he cannot be kept in live roster and if he will be allowed to be kept in live roster, the same will be contrary to the condition stipulated in the agreement. The authorities concerned by taking into consideration the aforesaid aspect of the matter, if have rejected the claim of the writ petitioner, the same cannot be suffer from error. 18. This Court, having discussed the fact and legal issues and coming to the order passed by the learned Single Judge, has found that the learned Single Judge has come to a finding that even if the writ petitioner has not attained the age of 15 years at the time of compassionate ground after the matter was remitted to the respondent authority on the ground that he was not eligible for keeping him on live roster cannot be countenanced in law. Further, there is no answer by the respondents, why the aforesaid plea was not raised by them in the previous proceeding. The respondent have also failed to distinguish the case of the writ petitioner from the said Lakhan Kumar. 19. Further, there is no answer by the respondents, why the aforesaid plea was not raised by them in the previous proceeding. The respondent have also failed to distinguish the case of the writ petitioner from the said Lakhan Kumar. 19. This Court since has considered each and every aspect of the matter regarding the requirement to keep the dependant in live roster, as such, finding of the learned Single Judge cannot be said to be proper finding in view of the fact that the condition stipulated under clause 9.5.0 (iii) of the National Coal Wage Agreement-VI since is the statutory fervor, therefore, the same is having legal force in view of the provision of Section 18(1) of the Act, 1947. 20. The question of raising the aforesaid issue on the previous occasion also cannot be said to be a proper finding for the reason that in the earlier round of litigation, the issue of live roster was already there as would appear from bare reading of the order passed therein dated 02.05.2008 as has been appended as Annexure-5 in which it has been referred that after the death of the mother of the writ petitioner, an application was filed when the writ petitioner was 14 years of age that he should be kept in live roster which itself clarifies that the aforesaid issue was already there, however, the ground of rejection was making of application beyond the period of six months. As has been discussed above that the question of consideration of issue on merit can only arise if the issue on limitation first be dealt with. Herein, since the application of the writ petitioner filed on earlier occasion has been rejected on the ground of limitation hence, the respondent authorities has not gone into the issue of applicability of the condition under 9.5.0(iii), hence, it is not a case where the aforesaid ground was not there at that time. 21. So far as the third ground that the respondent have failed to distinguish the case of the writ petitioner from the case of Lakhan Kumar is concerned, this Court on consideration of the judgment rendered in Lakhan Kumar’s case is of the view that the issue involved therein is quite different to that of the facts of the case in hand as has been discussed hereinabove. 22. 22. This Court, after taking into consideration the fact in entirety, is of the view that the order passed by the learned Single Judge required interference. Accordingly, the order dated 12.07.2018 is, hereby, quashed and set aside. 23. In the result, the writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 1357 of 2009 is dismissed. 24. Pending interlocutory application, if any, also stands disposed of.