JUDGMENT : 1. The plaintiff has filed this appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the learned First Additional District Judge Raigarh, District Raigarh (C.G.) in Civil Suit No. 38-A of 2011 dated 18.08.2011 whereby the civil suit filed by the plaintiff for specific performance of the contract was dismissed. 2. The facts of the present case are that the defendant is the recorded owner of the agricultural land situated in Village Singpuri, Post-Baradoli, Tehsil Pussore, District Raigarh comprising survey Nos. 46, 91/14, 91/15 and 119/4, total ad-measuring 0.845 hectares. He entered into an agreement to sell with the plaintiff on 02.05.2008 and the entire consideration amount i.e. Rs.2,50,000/- was paid on that very date. According to the conditions of the agreement, the defendant had to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff by June 2009. It is further pleaded that the plaintiff made many requests to execute the sale deed but no heed was given by the defendant. Thereafter, a registered notice through the advocate was sent to the defendant on 16.10.2008 but no response was given, thereafter the plaintiff filed a civil suit on 23.10.2009 seeking a decree of specific performance of the contract and in the alternative, refund of the earnest amount along with interest @ 3% per month. The defendant filed the written statement and denied the plaint averments. The defendant specifically pleaded that no agreement was executed and the amount of consideration was never received by him. 3. Learned trial Court framed issues after going through the pleadings of respective parties and held that the plaintiff could not prove that any agreement was entered into between the parties on 02.05.2008 and he further could not prove readiness and willingness and consequently, the civil suit filed by the plaintiff was dismissed. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant/plaintiff would submit that the entire amount of consideration was paid at the time of execution of the agreement to sell therefore there was no necessity for the plaintiff to prove readiness. With regard to willingness, he would argue that many requests were made for the execution of the sale deed and a registered legal notice was also sent but no reply was given by the defendant. He would further argue that in the written statement the defendant has not denied the contents of the plaint. With regard to willingness, he would argue that many requests were made for the execution of the sale deed and a registered legal notice was also sent but no reply was given by the defendant. He would further argue that in the written statement the defendant has not denied the contents of the plaint. He would further contend that the defendant in his statement has developed a new story that on account of the Tractor loan the agreement was executed but there is no pleading with regard to the same in the written statement. He would argue that the evidence beyond pleading is not admissible. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the matters of Ravinder Singh vs. Janmeja Singh and Others, reported in (2000) 8 SCC 191 , Jaspal Kaur Cheema and Another vs. Industrial Trade Links and Others, reported in (2017) 8 SCC 592 and P. Ramasubbamma vs. V. Vijayalakshmi, reported in AIR 2022 SC 1793 . He has also placed reliance on the judgment of this Court rendered in the matter of Sheikh Baboo vs. Madanlal Jaiswal and Anr. reported in AIR 2012 Chh. 155. 5. On the other hand, learned Senior counsel would oppose the submissions made by counsel for the appellant. She would submit that the learned trial Court has dismissed the civil suit after recording a well-reasoned finding. She would further submit that a Tractor was purchased from the plaintiff and therefore, as a security, the agreement in question was executed by the defendant and he, in his evidence, has elaborated the contents of the agreement and the pleading made in the last part of paragraph 4. She would further argue that Dinesh Yadav (PW-2) has not supported the due execution of the agreement and therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 6. I have heard counsel appearing for the parties and perused the documents placed on record. 7. From a perusal of the record, it is apparent that there was an agreement to sell the suit lands between the parties and a total consideration amount of Rs.2,50,000/- was paid. According to the conditions mentioned in the agreement to sell, the defendant had to execute the sale deed by June 2009. The witnesses to the agreement are Prakash Chandra Dewangan and Ajay Kumar Agrawal. According to the conditions mentioned in the agreement to sell, the defendant had to execute the sale deed by June 2009. The witnesses to the agreement are Prakash Chandra Dewangan and Ajay Kumar Agrawal. Ajay Kumar Agrawal, who is the son of the plaintiff, was examined as a plaintiff witness No. 2 and though up to some extent he has not supported the case of the plaintiff, with regard to the signature and execution of the agreement to sell he has supported the case. The defendant witnesses have also stated that an agreement was executed and according to them, it was executed with regard to Tractor. 8. From a perusal of the evidence of the parties, it is crystal clear that on 02.05.2008 an agreement was executed. A registered notice was sent to the defendant but it was not replied to which shows that the plaintiff has proved willingness and prior to that date, many requests were made by the plaintiff for registration of sale-deed therefore, the contention raised by learned Senior counsel with regard to readiness is not sustainable. In the matter of Sheikh Baboo (supra), this Court had dealt with the construction of the document as per Section 92 of the Evidence Act. This Court has also held that a heavy burden lies upon the defendant and such a defence should be accepted only with great caution. Paragraph 9 which is relevant is reproduced herein below:- “9. True, Section 92 of the Evidence Act does not preclude a party from showing that the writing is not really a contract between the parties but was only a fictitious or colourable device which cloaked something else and oral evidence is admissible to show that transaction was only sham or nominal transaction and was not intended to be acted upon. However, to prove the above fact, heavy burden lies upon the appellant/ defendant and such a defence should be accepted only with great caution, for, a registered document is obtained with the intention that it represents a bona fide transaction and is intended to be acted upon and it would be valuless if it can be gone behind in every case by mere assertion that which was stated at the time before the Registrar was untrue. The onus in such a case would be clearly on the defendant, as observed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in case of Mandas v. Manabai reported in 1972 M. PLJ page 852.” In the matter of Ravinder Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court had held that no evidence can be led on a plea not raised in the pleadings and no amount of evidence can cure defects in the pleadings. Paragraph 7, which is relevant is reproduced herein below:- “7. The election petition -is singularly silent of any such averment that the returned candidate, even "if, it be assumed for the sake of the arguments, had published and distributed certain documents, (Annexures A-1 to A-7), as alleged in the election petition either himself or through any other persons with his consent, that those statements were false and that the returned candidate either believed them to be false or did not believe them to be true, though in paragraph 9 of the election petition, which has been verified as correct on the basis of legal advice, this requirement emanating from Section 123(4) has been mentioned but without any assertion that the returned candidate in this case published the false statements knowing them to be false and/or not believing them to be true. The submission of Mr. Talwar, that at the trial, the petitioner could have said so in his evidence is futile. It is an established proposition that no evidence can be led on a plea not raised in the pleadings and that no amount of evidence can cure defect in the pleadings.” In the matter of Jaspal Kaur Cheema (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the defendant in the written statement must categorically deny or dispute averments made in the plaint, as evasive denial would amount to an admission of the allegation made in the plaint. Paragraphs 10 & 11 are relevant and are reproduced herein below: “10. Section 116 deals with estoppel of a tenant founded upon contract between the tenant and his landlord. It enumerates the principle of estoppel which is merely an extension of principle that no person is allowed to approbate and reprobate at the same time. The tenant who has been let into possession cannot deny his landlord’s title. In Bilas Kunwar v. Desraj Ranjit Singh & Ors. It enumerates the principle of estoppel which is merely an extension of principle that no person is allowed to approbate and reprobate at the same time. The tenant who has been let into possession cannot deny his landlord’s title. In Bilas Kunwar v. Desraj Ranjit Singh & Ors. AIR 1915 Privy Council 96, it was held that a tenant who has been let into possession cannot deny his landlord’s title, however, defective it may be, so long as he has not openly restored possession by surrender to his landlord. 11. The principle of estoppel arising from contract of tenancy is based upon the principle of law and justice that a tenant who could not have got possession but for a contract of tenancy admitting the right of the landlord, should not be allowed to put his landlord in some inequitable situation taking undue advantage of the position that he got and any probable defect in the title of his landlord. This Court in Bansraj Laltaprasad Mishra v. Stanley Parker Jones (2006) 3 SCC 91 has enumerated the policy underlying Section 116 as follows: “13. The underlying policy of Section 116 is that where a person has been brought into possession as a tenant by the landlord and if that tenant is permitted to question the title of the landlord at the time of the settlement then that will give rise to extreme confusion in the matter of relationship of the landlord and tenant and so the equitable principle of estoppel has been incorporated by the legislature in the said section. 14. The principle of estoppel arising from the contract of tenancy is based upon a healthy and salutary principle of law and justice that a tenant who could not have got possession but for his contract of tenancy admitting the right of the landlord should not be allowed to launch his landlord in some inequitable situation taking undue advantage of the possession that he got and any probable defect in the title of his landlord. It is on account of such a contract of tenancy and as a result of the tenant’s entry into possession on the admission of the landlord’s title that the principle of estoppel is attracted. 15. Section 116 enumerates the principle of estoppel which is merely an extension of the principle that no person is allowed to approbate and reprobate at the same time.” 9. 15. Section 116 enumerates the principle of estoppel which is merely an extension of the principle that no person is allowed to approbate and reprobate at the same time.” 9. Now coming to the facts of the present case in light of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and by this Court, it is quite vivid that the defendant has categorically denied the plaint averments and further, the story set up in the evidence was not pleaded in the written statement, therefore, the learned Court below committed an error of law in dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiff. From the evidence of defendant No.1, it is quite vivid that the agreement was executed between the parties therefore the onus shifted on the defendant to prove that no such agreement was executed on that date between the parties but the defendant failed to discharge his onus. 10. Taking into consideration the facts discussed above and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the opinion of this Court, the judgment passed by the learned trial Court is erroneous and the same is hereby set-aside. The agreement was executed in the year 2008 and Rs.2,50,000/- was advanced to the defendant but after 15 years, the decree of specific performance of the contract cannot be passed as pleaded and prayed by the plaintiff however the decree for refund of the amount advanced by the plaintiff may be passed. Therefore, the alternative prayer made by the plaintiff in the plaint is hereby decreed. The defendant is ordered to make a payment of Rs.2,50,000/- advanced by the plaintiff and the same shall carry interest @ 6% per annum from the date of execution of the agreement till the date of its realization. 11. Consequently, the appeal is allowed in part. A decree be drawn accordingly.