JUDGMENT : Goutam Bhaduri, J 1. The present Appeal is against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 23.07.2021 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Kondagaon, District Kondagaon in POCSO Case No.21/2018 (CG) whereby, the Appellant has been convicted for the offence under Sections 363, 302, 376 and 201 of IPC as also under Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offence Act, 2012 (for short ‘the POCSO Act’) and sentenced to undergo RI for 7 years with a fine of Rs.1,000/- on each count under Sections 363 and 201 IPC and to undergo imprisonment for life with fine of Rs.1,000/- under Section 302 IPC. Since maximum sentence was prescribed under Section 4 of the POCSO Act, the Appellant has been sentenced only under Section 4 of the said Act to undergo imprisonment for life till his natural death with usual default stipulation and not under Section 376 IPC. 2. Case of the prosecution is that on 12.06.2018, Complainant-BP (PW-1) lodged a written report alleging that on 11.06.2018, his minor daughter aged about 4 years, while playing in village GTP went missing since 3 pm on the basis of which, missing report was lodged under Section 363 IPC. Subsequently, on 14.08.2018, at village GTP, the dead body of the child was found floating in a pond near the stone mines. Therefore, on the basis of the same, initial merg was registered and the dead body was sent for postmortem. After postmortem and investigation, as per the prosecution, at the instance of the accused/Appellant, who is the grand father of the deceased, the clothes i.e. the lungi and frock were recovered and after recording the statement of the witnesses, the Appellant was arrested and charge sheet was filed against him under Sections 363, 376, 302 and 201 IPC and under Section 6 of POCSO Act. 3. During the course of trial, the Appellant abjured his guilt and claimed to be tried and his statement was recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. In order to prove its case, the prosecution has examined as many as 15 witnesses and exhibited 33 documents. Charges were framed under Sections 363, 376, 302 and 201 IPC as also under Section 4 of the POCSO Act. The learned trial Court, after evaluating the evidence and facts, convicted the accused/Appellant as aforesaid. Hence this Appeal. 4. Charges were framed under Sections 363, 376, 302 and 201 IPC as also under Section 4 of the POCSO Act. The learned trial Court, after evaluating the evidence and facts, convicted the accused/Appellant as aforesaid. Hence this Appeal. 4. Shri Dangi, learned Counsel for the Appellant submits that admittedly, there is no eye-witness to the incident and the entire case is based on the incriminating articles recovered on the basis of the memorandum i.e. a lungi of the accused/Appellant and a frock of the deceased, which were hidden under the mud but the evidence would show that the recoveries were made from an open place. He further submits that learned Sessions Judge further proceeded to convict the Appellant on the basis of the statement of BP (PW-1), who is his son, who deposed against his father and reasons have been assigned as to why the son would depose against his father and such analogy would defeat the criminal jurisprudence without any proof. He further submits that the recovery so made by the prosecution would show that the Appellant has been falsely implicated in as much as the FSL report also does not support the prosecution. He placed reliance on Bijender Alias Mandar vs. State of Haryana reported in (2022) 1 SCC 92 and Vijay Thakur vs. State of Himachal Pradesh reported (2014) 14 SCC 609 and submits that the nature of recovery on which the Appellant has been convicted by the aid of circumstantial evidence does not prove the case of prosecution. Therefore, the impugned judgment requires to be interfered with and the Appeal may be allowed by acquitting the accused/Appellant. 5. Per contra, Shri Nayak, learned State Counsel supported the impugned judgment of conviction and submitted that recovery of the incriminating article i.e. the lungi had a particular identification and the same was proved by BP (PW-1), the son of the accused/Appellant. He further submits that as the incriminating article was recovered at the instance of the accused/Appellant, therefore, that would be deemed to be a fact discovered, which guaranteed the statement made in the memorandum under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. He further submits that as the incriminating article was recovered at the instance of the accused/Appellant, therefore, that would be deemed to be a fact discovered, which guaranteed the statement made in the memorandum under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. He further submits that the explanation as to how the frock and the lungi, which were recovered from a hidden side near the pond wherein the dead body was found, has not been properly given by the Appellant in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. Therefore, the judgment is well merited and does not call for any interference. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, examined the evidence, perused the documents available on record as also the impugned judgment. 7. Undisputedly, the present case rests entirely on the circumstantial evidence. The accused is grand father of the deceased. Age of deceased victim is not in dispute that she was a 4 year old girl. Recently, the Supreme Court, in such circumstances, at para-16 of its decision rendered in the matter of Boby vs. State of Kerala reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 50, has laid down its parameters to be considered in a case of circumstantial evidence which, read as under:- “16. Undisputedly, the present case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence. A three-Judges Bench of this Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 , has laid down the golden principles with regard to conviction in a case which rests entirely on circumstantial evidence. We may gainfully refer to the following observations of this Court in the said case: “153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [ (1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Cri LJ 1783] where the observations were made : [SCC para 19, p. 807 : SCC (Cri) p. 1047] “Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.” (2) the facts so hypothesis of should not be the accused is established should be consistent only with the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they explainable on any other hypothesis except that guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 8. Applying the aforesaid principles in the present case, it would be necessary for prosecution to link all the circumstances, which lead to conviction. 9. The Court, time and again, has held that certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict him. It has been laid down that there is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should be proved”. Further, the law as has been laid down shows that the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. The Court held that the circumstances should be such that they exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved and the chain of evidence should be complete. 10. The Court held that the circumstances should be such that they exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved and the chain of evidence should be complete. 10. In view of the aforesaid principle, we went through the evidence led by the prosecution. One of the evidences is about the last seen theory that the accused was last seen as per the statements of KP (PW-6) and DP (PW-7). The relation inter se between the accused/Appellant and the deceased cannot be ignored for the reason that the last seen theory has been developed as the platform is the house of the deceased and the accused. The accused is the grand father and the deceased is the grand daughter. Therefore, if the grand father and grand daughter are seen in a house wherein they used to reside, the last seen theory cannot be given much importance. Perusal of para-11 of the evidence of BP (PW-1), the son the accused/Appellant and father of the deceased shows that when he went to the market, at that time, his wife, daughter, nieces and his father-the accused/Appellant were in the house. Subsequently, when he came back from the market and saw that his daughter is missing, he enquired from his wife regarding the whereabouts of missing child. He further admits the fact that being a child, she (the deceased) used to roam around along with the villagers. KP (PW-6), the mother of the deceased has stated that when she returned from fields after getting vegetables and found her daughter missing, at that time, the accused/Appellant was laying tiles on the roof and subsequently, she states that having enquired, he said that the child is sleeping inside the house but she could not find her therein. 11. Therefore, at a short span of time when the child went missing, the accused/Appellant was found in the house doing some household job of laying tiles which raises doubt and literally demolishes the theory of last seen. It is obvious that when the dead body was recovered and postmortem was done, it was found that the deceased was sexually assaulted and murdered. According to KP (PW-6), the mother went to get certain vegetables and came back and in such intervention of time, the child was missing but the Appellant was very much in the house. It is obvious that when the dead body was recovered and postmortem was done, it was found that the deceased was sexually assaulted and murdered. According to KP (PW-6), the mother went to get certain vegetables and came back and in such intervention of time, the child was missing but the Appellant was very much in the house. Therefore, in order to allow the prosecution to sail on last seen theory, it would be necessary to have a reference to the law laid down in the case of State of U.P vs. Satish reported in (2005) 3 SCC 114 , which has further been reiterated in Boby vs. State of Kerala (supra) wherein at para-23, the Court has held as under :- “23. Insofar as last seen theory is concerned, it will be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Satish : “22. The last-seen theory comes into play where the time-gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were last seen alive and when the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible. It would be difficult in some cases to positively establish that the deceased was last seen with the accused when there is a long gap and possibility of other persons coming in between exists. In the absence of any other positive evidence to conclude that the accused and the deceased were last seen together, it would be hazardous to come to a conclusion of guilt in those cases. In this case there is positive evidence that the deceased and the accused were seen together by witnesses PWs 3 and 5, in addition to the evidence of PW 2.” Applying the aforesaid principles in the present case, the last seen theory projected by the prosecution appears to be bleak and porous. 12. Now coming back to the recovery, we would follow the law laid down way back in the year 1946 by the Privy Council in the matter of Pulukuri Kottaya vs. King Emperor reported in AIR 1947 PC 67 wherein, the Privy Council has made the following observations: “11. 12. Now coming back to the recovery, we would follow the law laid down way back in the year 1946 by the Privy Council in the matter of Pulukuri Kottaya vs. King Emperor reported in AIR 1947 PC 67 wherein, the Privy Council has made the following observations: “11. High Courts in India have generally taken the view as to the meaning of s. 27 which appeals to their Lordships, and reference may be made particularly to (29) 10 Lah. 283 : 16 MANU/LA/0128/1929 : A.I.R. 1929 Lah. 344 : 115 I.C. 6 (F.B.), Sukhan v. Emperor and MANU/MH/0264/1931 : (32) 56 Bom. 172 : 19 A.I.R. 1932 Bom. 286 : 157 I.C. 174, Ganu Chandra v. Emperor on which the appellants rely, and with which their Lordships are in agreement. A contrary view has, however, been taken by the Madras High Court, and the question was discuss ed at length in a Full Bench decision of that Court in MANU/TN/0455/1937 : (37) I.L.R. (1937) Mad. 695 : 24 A.I.R. 1937 Mad. 618 : 171 I.C. 245 (F.B.), Athappa Gaundan v. Emperor where the cases were referred to. The Court, whilst admitting that the weight of Indian authority was against them, nevertheless took the view that any information which served to connect the object discovered with the offence charged was admissible, under S. 27. In that case the Court had to deal with a confession of murder made by a person in police custody, and the Court admitted the confession because in the last sentence (readily separable from the rest) there was an offer to produce two bottles, a rope, and a cloth gag, which, according to the confession had been used in, or were connected with, the commission of the murder, and the objects were in fact produced. The Court was impressed with the consideration that as the objects produced were not in themselves of an incriminating nature their production would be irrelevant unless they were shown to be connected with the murder, and there was no evidence so to connect them apart from the confession. Their Lordships are unable to accept this reasoning. The difficulty, however great, of proving that a fact discovered on information supplied by the accused is a relevant fact can afford no justification for reading into s. 27 something which is not there, and admitting in evidence a confession barred by s. 26. Their Lordships are unable to accept this reasoning. The difficulty, however great, of proving that a fact discovered on information supplied by the accused is a relevant fact can afford no justification for reading into s. 27 something which is not there, and admitting in evidence a confession barred by s. 26. Except in cases in which the possession, or concealment, of an object constitutes the gist of the offence charged, it can seldom happen that information relating to the discovery of a fact forms the foundation of the prosecution case. It is only one link in the chain of proof, and the other links must be forged in manner allowed by law. 12. In their Lordships' opinion MANU/TN/0455/1937 : (37) I.L.R. (1937) Mad. 695 : 24 A.I.R. 1937 Mad. 618 : 171 I.C. 245 (F.B.), Athappa Gaundan v. Emperor was wrongly decided, and it no doubt influenced the decision now under appeal. 13. The statements to which exception is taken in this case are first a statement by accused No. 6 which he made to the police sub-Inspector and which was reduced into writing, and is Exhibit "p." It is in these terms: The mediatornama written at 9 a.m. on 12-1-1945, in front of Maddineni Verrayya's choultry and in the presence of the undersigned mediators. Statement made by the accused Inala Sydayya on being arrested. About 14 days ago, I Kotayya and people of my party lay in wait for Sivayya and others at about sunset time at the corner of Pulipad tank. We, all beat Beddupati China Sivayya and Subayya, to death. The remaining persona, Pullayya, Kotayya and Narayana ran away, Dondapati Ramayya who was in our party received blows on his hands. He had a spear in his hands. He gave it to me then. I hid it and my stick in the rick of Venkatanarasu in the village. I will show if you come. We did all this at the instigation of Pulukuri Kotayya. 12th January, 1945. (Signed) Potla China Mattayya. (,,) Kotta Krishnayya. (Sgd.) G. Bapaiah, Sub- Inspector of Police. 14. The whole of that statement except the passage "I hid it (a spear) and my stick in the rick of Venkatanarasu in the village. I will show if you come" is inadmissible. We did all this at the instigation of Pulukuri Kotayya. 12th January, 1945. (Signed) Potla China Mattayya. (,,) Kotta Krishnayya. (Sgd.) G. Bapaiah, Sub- Inspector of Police. 14. The whole of that statement except the passage "I hid it (a spear) and my stick in the rick of Venkatanarasu in the village. I will show if you come" is inadmissible. In the evidence of the witness Potla China Mattayya proving the -document the statement that accused 6 said "I Mattayya and others went to the corner of the tankland. We killed Sivayya and Subayya" must be omitted. 15. A confession of accused 3 was deposed to by the police Sub-Inspector, who said that accused 3 said to him: I stabbed Sivayya with a spear, I hid the spear in a yard in my village. I will show you the place. The first sentence must be omitted. This was followed by a Mediatornama, Ex. Q.I, which is unobjectionable except for a sentence in the middle, He said that it was with that spear that he had stabbed Boddapati Sivayya, which must be omitted. 16. The position therefore is that in this case-evidence has been admitted which ought not to have been admitted, and the duty of the Court in such circumstances is stated in s. 167, Evidence Act, which provides: The improper admission or rejection of evidence shall not be ground of itself for a new trial or reversal of any decision in any case, if it shall appear to the Court before which such objection is raised that, independently of the evidence objected to and admitted, there was sufficient evidence to justify the decision, or that, if the rejected evidence had been received, it ought not to have varied the decision. It was therefore the duty of the High Court in appeal to apply its mind to the question whether, after discarding the evidence improperly admitted, there was left sufficient to justify the convictions. The Judges of the High Court did not apply their minds to this question because they considered that the evidence was properly admitted, and their Lordships propose therefore to remit the case to the High Court of Madras, with directions to consider this question. If the Court is satisfied that there is sufficient admissible evidence to justify the convictions they will uphold them. If the Court is satisfied that there is sufficient admissible evidence to justify the convictions they will uphold them. If, on the other hand, they consider that the admissible evidence is not sufficient to justify the convictions, they will take such course, whether by discharging the accused or by ordering a new trial, as may be open to-them. 17. Their Lordships have, therefore, humbly advised His Majesty that this appeal be allowed and that the case be remitted to the High Court of Madras, with directions to consider whether the evidence on record apart from the confessional statements of accused No. 3 and accused No. 6 which their Lordships have held to be inadmissible, is sufficient to justify the convictions and to make such order in the matter as may be tight having regard to their decision upon the question remitted to them.” 13. Therefore, the necessary implication would show that Section 27 of the Evidence Act not only requires that the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object was produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, but it also requires the information given must relate distinctly to the said act. The information as to the past user, or to the past history of the object produced is not related to its discovery. Now coming back to the discovery part in the present case, according to the prosecution, after the Appellant was apprehended, he admitted his guilt before the police officers, which has been stated by DM (PW-4) by way of extra judicial confession but that part would be hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act and would not be admissible. 14. Perusal of the memorandum (Ex.P-10) records that the accused/Appellant has stated that he has committed the murder of his grand daughter and threw her dead body in a pond near stone mines and concealed his lungi and the frock of the deceased under the mud. On the basis of the said memorandum, the frock and the under garment of the deceased were recovered vide Ex.P-11. The narration of Dr. JP (PW-11) shows that the said articles were recovered from the bank of the pond from inside the mud. On the basis of the said memorandum, the frock and the under garment of the deceased were recovered vide Ex.P-11. The narration of Dr. JP (PW-11) shows that the said articles were recovered from the bank of the pond from inside the mud. According to prosecution averments, pursuant to the said seizure on 18.06.2018 at 8.40 am, the lungi was recovered vide Ex.P-13 from inside the shrub at the bank of the pond under the mud and by such recovery (Ex.P-13), the hairs of the accused/Appellant were also seized. The said seizure (Ex.P-13) whereby the lungi was recovered shows that the hairs were also attached to it. The witnesses to the said seizure are FN (PW-3) and DM (PW-4). FN (PW-3) has not supported such seizure. Statement of DM (PW-4) shows that when the dead body was found floating on the pond, one lungi was recovered therein vide Ex.P-13, which was identified by BP (PW-1), the son of the accused as that of his father, the accused/Appellant. The frock of the deceased was seized vide Ex.P-11. This witness (DM, PW-4) only deposed that the police seized the said frock and in the cross-examination, he states that nothing was recovered from the accused. 15. The factum of the said recovery is further fortified by the statement of BP (PW-1), the son of the accused/Appellant, who at para-13 of his evidence, admits that the clothes which were recovered from the bank of the pond are similar to that which are available in the market. He, however states that the nature of clothes which the accused used to wear, was never used by the other villagers. This statement may create a doubt of ‘may’ but not conclusive as ‘must’. According to BP (PW-1), who is the father of the deceased, before going out to the market, he and his father, the accused were laying tiles over the roof and his wife KP (PW-6) was at home along with his daughter and nieces N and D. 16. Therefore, there is no specific evidence on record that the lungi, which was recovered had an unique identification with the clothes which the accused used to wear. The witnesses BP (PW-1) and DM (PW-4) who were part of recovery at the relevant time, did not say that the clothes were buried under the mud or sub-merged under the water. Therefore, there is no specific evidence on record that the lungi, which was recovered had an unique identification with the clothes which the accused used to wear. The witnesses BP (PW-1) and DM (PW-4) who were part of recovery at the relevant time, did not say that the clothes were buried under the mud or sub-merged under the water. Only the investigating officer SP (PW-13) has supported the recovery. It is cardinal principle in the administration of criminal justice in cases where heavy reliance is placed on circumstantial evidence is that where two views are possible, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other towards his innocence, the one which is favourable to the accused must be adopted. This proposition has been laid down in the matter of Kali Ram vs. State of H.P. reported in (1973) 2 SCC 808 and has been reiterated in the matter of Pradeep Kumar vs. State of Chhattisgarh reported in (2023) 5 SCC 350 wherein, relevant para-27 reads as under :- “27. It is important to note that the cardinal principles in the administration of criminal justice in cases where heavy reliance is placed on circumstantial evidence, is that where two views are possible, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other towards his innocence, the one which is favourable to the accused must be adopted.” Therefore, if doubt has been created about recovery of lungi and frock as version states it was not sub-merged under water or mud but other version says that it was sub-merged, in such circumstances, the view which is to support the accused should be adopted. 17. Now, further travelling in the evidence, after the said recovery of the dead body, it was subjected to postmortem and it is not in dispute that the death was homicidal in nature as per postmortem (Ex.P-18). As per Ex.P-19, one vaginal swab and 3 vaginal slides of the deceased were also obtained. The hairs of the deceased were also seized by Ex.P-13 and were sent for FSL examination. Perusal of Regional FSL report (Ex.P-33) shows that the hairs which stuck to the lungi seized from the accused vide Article ‘D’ and marked as ‘C2’ were human head hair and the hair Article ‘C2’ which was seized from the lungi of the accused was termed as inadequate for comparison. Perusal of Regional FSL report (Ex.P-33) shows that the hairs which stuck to the lungi seized from the accused vide Article ‘D’ and marked as ‘C2’ were human head hair and the hair Article ‘C2’ which was seized from the lungi of the accused was termed as inadequate for comparison. The report under the FSL, which is filed as Ex.P-29 shows that the cloth i.e. lungi, which was recovered at the instance of the accused/Appellant from the spot was marked as reference from the spot C1 and the hairs which were marked as C2 and D were reserved for DNA test. However, the said DNA test report is not on record. Likewise, the vaginal swabs found from the frock were marked as G1 & G2 and vaginal slides were marked as G3 & G4. The spermotozoa was also found but there is no evidence as to whether it belongs to the accused/Appellant or not by any DNA test or other admissible evidence. Likewise, the blood stained soil was recovered vide Ex.P-12 from the spot and was sent for FSL examination, but no blood was found on such soil as per FSL. 18. The reliance placed by learned Counsel for the Appellant on Vijay Thakur vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Bijender alias Mandar vs. State of Haryana (supra) wherein, the submission is made that when the chain of events is incomplete, recovery based on disclosure of statement does not inspire confidence and the conviction cannot be sustained is agreeable to us and for reference, the relevant paras i.e. 18, 19 & 20 of are reproduced hereunder :- “18. It is to be emphasised at this stage that except the so-called recoveries, there is no other circumstances worth the name which has been proved against these two appellants. It is a case of blind murder. There are no eyewitnesses. Conviction is based on the circumstantial evidence. In such a case, complete chain of events has to be established pointing out the culpability of the accused person. The chain should be such that no other conclusion, except the guilt of the accused person, is discernible without any doubt. Insofar as these two appellants are concerned, there is no circumstance attributed except that they were with Rajinder Thakur till Sainj and the alleged disclosure leading to recoveries, which appears to be doubtful. The chain should be such that no other conclusion, except the guilt of the accused person, is discernible without any doubt. Insofar as these two appellants are concerned, there is no circumstance attributed except that they were with Rajinder Thakur till Sainj and the alleged disclosure leading to recoveries, which appears to be doubtful. When we look into all these facts in entirety in the aforesaid context, we find that not only the chain of events is incomplete, it becomes somewhat difficult to convict the appellant only on the basis of the aforesaid recoveries. 19. In Mani v. State of T.N 2008 1 SCR 228 this Court made the following pertinent observation on this very aspect: (SCC p. 279, para 26) 26. The discovery is a weak kind of evidence and cannot be wholly relied upon and conviction in such a serious matter cannot be based upon the discovery. Once the discovery fails, there would be literally nothing which would support the prosecution case.” 20. There is a reiteration of the same sentiment in Manthuri Laxmi Narsaiah v. State of A.P 2011 14 SCC 117 in the following manner: (SCC p. 119, para 6) 6. It is by now well settled that in a case relating to circumstantial evidence the chain of circumstances has to be spelt out by the prosecution and if even one link in the chain is broken the accused must get the benefit thereof. We are of the opinion that the present is in fact a case of no evidence.” 19. Likewise, in the law laid down in Bijender Alias Mandar vs. State of Haryana (supra), it was held that at times the court can convict an accused exclusively on the basis of his disclosure statement and the resultant recovery of inculpatory material. However, in order to sustain the guilt of such accused, the recovery should be unimpeachable and not be shrouded with elements of doubt. Para-16 which is relevant is reproduced as under:- “16. We have implored ourselves with abounding pronouncements of this Court on this point. It may be true that at times the Court can convict an accused exclusively on the basis of his disclosure statement and the resultant recovery of inculpatory material. However, in order to sustain the guilt of such accused, the recovery should be unimpeachable and not be shrouded with elements of doubt. It may be true that at times the Court can convict an accused exclusively on the basis of his disclosure statement and the resultant recovery of inculpatory material. However, in order to sustain the guilt of such accused, the recovery should be unimpeachable and not be shrouded with elements of doubt. We may hasten to add that circumstances such as (i) the period of interval between the malfeasance and the disclosure; (ii) commonality of the recovered object and its availability in the market; (iii) nature of the object and its relevance to the crime; (iv) ease of transferability of the object; (v) the testimony and trustworthiness of the attesting witness before the Court and/or other like factors, are weighty considerations that aid in gauging the intrinsic evidentiary value and credibility of the recovery.” 20. Applying the aforesaid principles in this case, since there is no eye-witness and it was a blind murder, the conviction was solely based on the circumstantial evidence of recovery of the clothes i.e. lungi and the frock from the bank of a pond. The witnesses have stated that the said recoveries were made from the open place but there is no evidence that the articles were not buried under the mud or were sub-merged under the water. The map of the spot (Ex.P-17) shows that the recovery was from the open place and if according to the seizure witness, it was from the bank of the pond, naturally it would be accessible to the general public at large and knowledge cannot be confined only to the accused. The nature of unique identification with the recovery to show that only the accused was using such unique identified clothes, has also not been established. 21. In view of the above, we are of the view that doubts loom large on the evidence led by the prosecution. Consequently, the accused would hold the sway for acquittal. Accordingly, the Appeal is allowed and the conviction and sentence imposed upon the Appellant under Sections 363, 302 and 201 of IPC as also under Section 4 of the POCSO Act, 2012 are hereby set aside and he is acquitted of the said charge. The accused/Appellant is in jail. He be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.