ORDER : I.A. No. 1/2023: For the reasons stated, the application seeking early listing of the matter is allowed and the writ petition is heard finally with the consent of both the parties. S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 15899/2019: 1. The petitioner has invoked the extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court, calling in question the order dated 23.08.2018 (Annex.9), whereby his representation for considering his case for appointment has been rejected. 2. Narrated in brief, the facts appertain are that the petitioner vied for the post of Junior Accountant pursuant to advertisement dated 16.04.2015. The petitioner stood meritorious in the process of recruitment and an appointment order dated 30.06.2017 came to be issued in his favour. 3. During the course of verification of credentials, the petitioner disclosed the factum of pendency of a criminal case against him pursuant to FIR No. 197 dated 11.12.2015 alleging offence under sections 4 and 5 of Rajasthan Essential Services Maintenance Act, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1970”). 4. On finding petitioner’s involvement in the criminal case, the respondents vide order dated 12.07.2017, kept petitioner’s appointment in abeyance. 5. Feeling aggrieved of such decision, the petitioner preferred a writ petition before this Court (being S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 14305/2017), which came to be disposed of by a Coordinate Bench vide order dated 24.07.2018. By way of order dated 24.07.2018, the respondents were directed to consider petitioner’s representation in light of judgment dated 21.07.2016 of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Avtar Singh vs. Union of Indian and Others, Special Leave Petition (C) No. 20525/2011. 6. Petitioner’s representation in furtherance of above order dated 24.07.2018, came to be rejected by the respondent No. 3 per-viam order dated 23.08.2018. 7. The petitioner has preferred the present writ petition laying challenge to the order dated 12.07.2017 (Annex.6) so also the order dated 23.08.2018 (Annex.9). 8. The basic premise on which the petitioner has approached this Court is that subsequent to rejection of petitioner’s representation dated 23.08.2018, the criminal proceedings pending against him (being Case No. 235/2016) have culminated in the manner that the petitioner having accepted the charges levelled against him, has been held guilty of those offences but has been extended the benefit of sections 4/5 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1958”). 9. 9. The petitioner argued that the action of the respondents in cancelling his candidature is illegal and contrary to facts, inasmuch as, the allegations levelled against him, even if presumed to be correct, were trivial in nature. He pointed out that he was alleged to be a member of mob, which had purportedly disrupted the electricity supply during a strike called by the union. 10. It was argued that the petitioner had accepted his guilt to buy peace and get rid of unending prosecution in a hope that he will be given benefit of the Act of 1958. He nevertheless argued that his conviction for the offences under sections 4/5 of the Rajasthan Essential Services Maintenance Act, 1970 does not amount to moral turpitude. 11. Without prejudice to above, the petitioner argued that vide order dated 14.01.2019, passed in Criminal Case (No. 235/2016) the petitioner has been given the benefit of section 4/5 of the Act of 1958 and by virtue of provision contained in section 12 of the Act of 1958, the disqualification (if any) arising out of such conviction stands wiped out. The respondents were required to allow the petitioner to join the services, the petitioner emphasised. 12. In support of his contention that the petitioner’s guilt or conviction does not amount to moral turpitude, the petitioner invited Court’s attention towards the definition of moral turpitude given in section 2 (f) of the Rajasthan Police Act, 2007, which reads thus: (f) “moral turpitude” means involvement in any crime which pertains to cheating, forgery, intoxication, rape, outraging the modesty of a woman, illicit traffic as defined in the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (Central Act No. 46 of 1988), immoral trafficking as defined in the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (Central Act No. 104 of 1956), planned violence or any offence against the State as mentioned in Chapter VI of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Central Act No. 45 of 1860) 13. According to the petitioner, his conviction under the offences under sections 4/5 of the Act of 1970 cannot be treated to be a crime of grave nature amounting to moral turpitude, as defined in above provision. 14. Mr. According to the petitioner, his conviction under the offences under sections 4/5 of the Act of 1970 cannot be treated to be a crime of grave nature amounting to moral turpitude, as defined in above provision. 14. Mr. Nishant Bafna, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, on the other hand, raised preliminary objection that the present petition is barred by res-judicata, inasmuch as, the petitioner has yet again challenged the order dated 12.07.2017 (Annex.6), which was the subject matter of the earlier writ petition. 15. Adverting to the merit of the case, learned counsel for the respondents argued that the petitioner was involved in the offences under sections 4/5 of the Rajasthan Essential Services Maintenance Act, 1970 and, therefore, he is not entitled to enter in the State services. 16. Learned counsel argued that in any case, it is the subjective satisfaction of the employer to offer or deny appointment, having regard to the nature of the delinquency and nature of the post. 17. It was argued that once the respondents have recorded their dissatisfaction and have found that the petitioner having involved in the offences under section 4/5 of the Act of 1970, is not eligible for appointment, the Court cannot enter into the arena of substituting its satisfaction and pronounce upon suitability or eligibility of a candidate. 18. He argued that even in the case of acquittal, Hon’ble the Supreme Court has held that appointment cannot be claimed as a matter of right, whereas in the present case, the petitioner has admittedly been convicted. 19. Learned counsel for the respondents cited following judgments of Hon’ble the Supreme Court: (i) Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration vs. Pradeep Kumar, (2018) 1 SCC 797 (ii) Avtar Singh vs. Union of India and Others, (2016) 8 SCC 471 (iii) Commissioner of Police vs. Raj Kumar, 2021 (8) SCC 347 (iv) Union of India and Others vs. Methu Meda, 2022 (1) SCC 1 20. On the question as to whether the petitioner’s involvement in commission of offences under sections 4/5 of the Act of 1970 amounts to moral turpitude, learned counsel for the respondents argued that involvement of an employee in a strike and attempt of disrupting electricity-which is an essential service is a serious matter and the State was perfectly justified in refusing appointment to the petitioner. 21. 21. Heard rival parties and perused the material available on record including the judgments cited by Mr. Bafna. 22. Preliminary objection raised by Mr. Bafna, if examined carefully, has no substance, given that after passing of the earlier order dated 12.07.2017 a fresh order dated 23.08.2018 has been passed. Petitioner’s essential grievance is against the subsequent order dated 23.08.2018, whereby his right to appointment has been eschewed. If the petitioner has challenged the earlier order dated 12.07.2017 also, due to inadvertence or otherwise, his writ petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of res-judicata. Admittedly, the petitioner has not filed any other writ petition oppugning the order dated 23.08.2018. Hence, the preliminary objection raised by the respondents is liable to be and is hereby repelled. 23. It is to be noted that the petitioner’s representation in light of Avtar Singh’s case came to be rejected on 23.08.2018 and the order of his conviction wherein benefit under sections 4/5 of the Act of 1958 has been given, came to be passed on 14.01.2019. 24. By virtue of provision contained in section 12 of the Act of 1958, the disqualification, if any, attached with the offence gets eclipsed. 25. This Court is not oblivious of the legal position settled by Hon’ble the Supreme Court that even in the case of acquittal, it is discretion of the State to grant or not to grant the appointment to a candidate having regard to the offence alleged vis-a-vis the post on which suitability is being examined. But then, the cases cited by the learned counsel for the respondents do not deal with the eventuality, when the person was given benefit of probation. 26. It is noteworthy that a circular has been issued by the Department of Personnel, Government of Rajasthan on 15.07.2016 (obviously binding upon the respondents), providing guidelines to ensure uniformity in approach in the cases relating to new appointments. Said circular itself provides that the candidates who have been given benefit of section 12 of the Act of 1958 shall be eligible for appointment. 27. Said circular itself provides that the candidates who have been given benefit of section 12 of the Act of 1958 shall be eligible for appointment. 27. It will not be out of place to reproduce relevant part of the circular, which makes it abundantly clear that according to the State’s policy, the petitioner is eligible for appointment: ^^,sls Ádj.k@fLFkfr;ka ftuesa vH;FkhZ dks fu;qfDr gsrq ik= ekuk tkuk pkfg,%& ¼1½ ftu vH;fFkZ;ksa dks vkijkf/kd Ádj.k ds vUos"k.k esa nks"kh ugha ik;k x;k gks rFkk vUos"k.kksijkar ,QŒvkjŒ Lohd`r dh tk pqdh gksA ¼2½ ftu vH;fFkZ;ksa dks fdlh vkijkf/kd Ádj.k esa U;k;ky; }kjk nks"keqDr dj fn;k x;k gks rFkk ml Ádj.k esa jkT; ljdkj }kjk vihy ugha djus dk fu.kZ; fy;k tk pqdk gksA ¼3½ vH;fFkZ;ksa ds ,sls Ádj.k ftuesa U;k;ky; }kjk ifjoh{kk vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 12 dk ykHk fn;k tkdj ifjoh{kk ij NksM+k x;k gksA ¼nks"kflf) fdlh fujgZrk ls xzLr ugha@jktdh; lsok@Hkkoh thou ij fdlh Ádkj dk foijhr ÁHkko ugha½ ¼4½ vH;fFkZ;ksa ds ,sls Ádj.k ftuesa nks"kh djkj fn;k tkdj fd'kksj vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 1¼1½¼,½ dk ykHk Ánku fd;k x;k gksA** 28. Dealing with the identical fact situation and circular issued by the State, in the case of Amit Singh Rathi vs. State of Rajasthan, S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2205/2021, decided on 10.03.2023, this Court has held thus: “11. Heard the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondent-State and perused the material available on record. 12. Before adverting to the rival contentions, this Court would like to observe that the respondents have cancelled/revoked petitioner’s appointment without following the basic canon of law, opportunity of hearing being the first principle of natural justice. It is surprising to note that before snatching petitioner’s livelihood, they did not even deem it imparative to issue a notice to him. The order impugned is thus, violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 13. A perusal of the record makes it abundantly clear that the respondents were having all requisite details including the copy of the order dated 10.01.2020, passed in the appeal preferred by the petitioner. The judgment dated 10.01.2020, passed in the appeal preferred by the petitioner in unambiguous terms confers benefit of section 4 of the Act of 1958 upon the petitioner, so far as charges for the offences under sections 3/25 and 4/25 of the Arms Act are concerned. 14. The judgment dated 10.01.2020, passed in the appeal preferred by the petitioner in unambiguous terms confers benefit of section 4 of the Act of 1958 upon the petitioner, so far as charges for the offences under sections 3/25 and 4/25 of the Arms Act are concerned. 14. A further look at the order dated 10.01.2020 shows that the conviction of the petitioner for the offences under sections 399 and 402 of the Indian Penal Code has been set aside. 15. Such being the position, it was not open for the respondents to cancel petitioner’s selection/appointment by taking an absolutely erroneous and hyper-technical view of the matter. The State’s stand that petitioner’s acquittal is not honourable, though does not find mention in the order impugned, but even if examined on merit, is untenable. The petitioner has been acquitted of the charges under sections 399 and 402 of the Indian Penal Code. The so called ‘honourable acquittal’ is not required to be mentioned in the judgments of the Courts and it is required to be deciphered from the adjudication made. 16. A perusal of Para 13 of the judgment dated 10.01.2020 reveals that this Court has acquitted the appellants (including petitioner) of the charges for the offences under sections 399 and 402 of the Indian Penal Code. Given that the petitioner has been acquitted of the very charges, the respondents’ stand that the his acquittal was not honourable is absolutely uncalled for and unsustainable. 17. Adverting to petitioner’s conviction for the offences under sections 3/25 and 4/25 of the Arms Act, suffice it to observe that though petitioner’s conviction has been affirmed qua charges, but he has been given the benefits of section 4 of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. 18. Once the benefit of section 4 has been granted, it was not open for the respondents to cancel petitioner’s candidature, else the entire purpose of the Probation of Offenders Act, more particularly section 12 thereof would be defeated. Section 12 of the Act of 1958 Reads thus: “12. 18. Once the benefit of section 4 has been granted, it was not open for the respondents to cancel petitioner’s candidature, else the entire purpose of the Probation of Offenders Act, more particularly section 12 thereof would be defeated. Section 12 of the Act of 1958 Reads thus: “12. Removal of disqualification attaching to conviction - Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, a person found guilty of an offence and dealt with under the provisions of section 3 or section 4 shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to a person who, after his release under section 4 is subsequently sentenced for the original offence.” 19. Section 12 which contains a non-obstante clause obliterates or expunges the disqualification attached to or emanating from a conviction. 20. That apart, the respondents have relied upon the circular dated 04.12.2019 in order to cancel petitioner’s selection, whereas a simple look, particularly Para 2 (iii) thereof (reproduced herein) reveals that the petitioner was entitled to be entered into the State services. The order/action of the State is clearly contrary to its own circular let alone the statutory provisions: ^^2- ,sls Ádj.k@fLFkfr;ka ftuesa vH;FkhZ dks fu;qfDr gsrq ik= ekuk tkuk pkfg,%& ¼1½-------------------- ¼2½-------------------- ¼3½ vH;fFkZ;ksa ds ,sls Ádj.k ftuesa U;k;ky; }kjk ifjoh{kk vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 12 dk ykHk fn;k tkdj ifjoh{kk ij NksM+k x;k gksA ¼nks"kflf) fdlh fujgZrk ls xzLr ugha@jktdh; lsok@Hkkoh thou ij fdlh Ádkj dk foijhr ÁHkko ugha½A** 21. As an upshot of the discussion forgoing, the writ petition succeeds. The order dated 25.01.2021, rejecting petitioner’s candidature and cancelling his appointment order dated 14.07.2020 is hereby quashed. 22. The respondents are hereby directed to allow the petitioner to join within a period of four weeks from today, if the petitioner is otherwise eligible and suitable. 23. The petitioner shall be entitled to notional benefits from the date of issuance of his appointment order. 24. It is hereby made clear that the respondents shall be free to examine petitioner’s suitability on all counts other than his conviction referred to in the order dated 25.01.2021. 25. Stay petition also stands disposed of accordingly.” 29. 23. The petitioner shall be entitled to notional benefits from the date of issuance of his appointment order. 24. It is hereby made clear that the respondents shall be free to examine petitioner’s suitability on all counts other than his conviction referred to in the order dated 25.01.2021. 25. Stay petition also stands disposed of accordingly.” 29. One cannot but remain oblivious of the fact that the prescribed punishment for the offence under section 4 of the Act of 1970 is maximum to the extent of six months, or fine which may extend to Rs. 200/- or with both and punishment under section 5 of the Act of 1970 is for one year, or with fine which may extend to Rs. 1,000/- or with both. 30. In prima-facie opinion of this Court apart from the punishment being less than a year, the offences or conviction cannot be said to be a moral turpitude, having regard to the allegation levelled against the petitioner. 31. Concededly, when the respondents rejected petitioner’s representation, the order dated 14.01.2019 was not in existence and hence, there was no occasion for the respondents to consider the aspect of petitioner having been given benefit of section 4/5 of the Act of 1958. 32. The petitioner is directed to file a representation while placing a copy of the order instant. He shall also furnish a copy of the order dated 14.01.2019 and relevant law. 33. The respondents, more particularly, the respondent No. 3-Director, Finance and Accounts, Jaipur shall consider petitioner’s candidature afresh, in light of order dated 14.01.2019, whereby he has been given the benefit of probation under the Act of 1958. He shall take into account the above reproduced part of circular dated 15.07.2016 or other prevailing circular, issued by the State in this regard and shall pass a fresh order, dispassionately on or before 31.05.2023. 34. The competent authority shall also have due regard to relevant law, as noticed hereinabove and the object of the Act of 1958, which is primarily beneficial and reformative in nature. The competent authority should bear in mind that if a meritorious youth simply because of having participated in a strike is dealt with by the State with such apathetic approach, it would be an affront to mandate of section 12 of the Act of 1958. 35. The competent authority should bear in mind that if a meritorious youth simply because of having participated in a strike is dealt with by the State with such apathetic approach, it would be an affront to mandate of section 12 of the Act of 1958. 35. In case the petitioner is found suitable for appointment, he shall be given notional benefits from 30.06.2017 the date of issuance of appointment order. Petitioner shall not claim monetary benefits for the period prior to his joining. 36. The writ petition so also stay petition stands disposed of accordingly.