United India Insurance Co. Ltd. , Hoshangabad v. Manju Parihar
2023-07-31
VIVEK AGARWAL
body2023
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : Vivek Agarwal, J. This appeal under section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is filed by the Insurance Company, being aggrieved of the award dated 9-11-2010, passed by learned Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Hoshangabad (M. P.), in Case No. 12/2010, Smt. Manju Parihar and others vs. Firoz Khan and others, on the ground that accident took place on 24-1-2009. FIR was lodged on 8-3-2009, against an unknown vehicle i.e. after delay of 44 days. Thereafter, in the investigation, closure report was filed as no clue of any vehicle was given. Thereafter, falsely vehicle insured with the present appellant bearing registration No. MP-04-J/1866, has been implicated. 2. It is submitted that there is an interesting chronology of events. Deceased Meharban Singh was a police personnel. In the FIR (Ex.P/1), it is mentioned that incident took place on 24-1-2009. Information was received at the police station on 8-3-2009, whereas, Meharban Singh died while taking treatment on 7-3-2009. FIR was lodged against an unknown vehicle. In the FIR itself, it is mentioned that intimation was received that a person in an injured condition was lying on the road and he was identified as Meharban Singh. Case was registered under section 279, 337 of Indian Penal Code. What is interesting is that in the FIR, section 304-B of Indian Penal Code, has been scored out. After death of Meharban Singh, when intimation was received, then why section 304-B of Indian Penal Code was scored out is not understandable. Thus, FIR prima facie reveals that manipulation was being done to help the claimants, because they happen to be relatives of an employee of the Police Department. 3. In the final report dated 26-12-2009, offending vehicle was implicated. The sole witness to support the accident with the offending vehicle is Yashpal Singh s/o Lalit Singh Bhadoriya, resident of Guradiya, Tahsil Babai, District Hoshangabad (M. P.). He deposed that on 24-1-2009, at about 7:30 P.M., he had seen accident taking place at Village Semri Harchand, near culvert on the river, when Jeep No. MP-04-J/1866, had hit an unknown person. As a result, he was grievously injured and had fallen on the side of the road. He has deposed that accident took place in front of him. He was travelling from Village Semri to his Village Guradiya. He had seen the vehicle number and, later on, discovered that injured was Meharban Singh Parihar.
As a result, he was grievously injured and had fallen on the side of the road. He has deposed that accident took place in front of him. He was travelling from Village Semri to his Village Guradiya. He had seen the vehicle number and, later on, discovered that injured was Meharban Singh Parihar. He in para 2 of his examination-in-chief, has deposed that police had come to him to take information and then he had informed the police about the number of the vehicle, it was the Mahindra Jeep. 4. In cross-examination, there are glaring contradictions. He has admitted that he was not knowing Meharban Singh. He has admitted that he had seen incident from a distance of 100-150 ft. Mrs. Ruprah, submits that in a winter evening at 7:30 P.M., visibility is as such low and number of the vehicle could not have been seen from a distance of 100-150 ft. This witness admits that he is not remembering the date of the incident, but it was of the year 2009. Then he has admitted that he had not taken the deceased to the hospital. He has admitted that he had not stopped at the place of the incident after witnessing the incident. He has further admitted in para 6 of his cross-examination that he came to Court at the instance of the claimants to give his evidence. He had not received any notice from the Court. 5. There is no description of this witness in the evidence of Smt. Manju Parihar, otherwise she should have corroborated that how she came in contact with this witness Yashpal Singh and how and when he narrated the details of the incident and when they were given to the police. There is not a single word said about this witness in the examination in chief of Smt. Manju Parihar. Thus, it is evident that this witness is a planted witness. In a population of several lacs in a district, finding an unknown person who had not stopped after witnessing the incident, who had not approached the police to report about the incident, who did not identify the injured and it is not the case of witness Yashpal that after gathering knowledge that deceased was a police personnel he had approached the police, tracing a person out of several lacs persons, appears to be improbable.
Thus, it is evident that this witness has been planted. 6. Thus, this Court has no hesitation to hold that Yashpal Singh is a planted witness. Since police was interested in helping the family of the deceased, therefore, they planted him so to obtain compensation in favour of the family of the victim. Therefore, when examined in the light of the evidence of Manju Singh and that of Yashpal Singh, it is evident that it is a case of false implication. 7. At this stage, Shri Kapil Patwardhan, learned counsel for respondents has placed reliance on the judgment of Supreme Court in Narchinva vs. Kamat and another, AIR 1985 SC 1281 , relying on which it is submitted that whenever any breach is alleged, then burden to prove is on the person who is alleging the breach. 8. In the present case, this judgment will cut other way, when it is alleged that accident was seen by Yashpal Singh (PW/2), then burden was on the claimants to prove that how they came in contact with Yashpal Singh, who had not reported the matter to any of the authorities and who admitted in cross-examination that he had come to the Court at the instance of the claimants to give evidence. Therefore, this judgment in Narchinva vs. Kamat and another (supra), will be of no assistance to the claimants. 9. There is no cogent evidence to point out that accident had taken place with vehicle bearing registration No. MP-04-J/1866. Thus, the impugned award having been passed on surmises and conjectures deserves to be set aside and is, hereby, set aside. 10. In above terms, appeal is allowed and disposed of. 11. Record of the Tribunal be sent back.